Speech by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel at the 42nd Munich Conference on Security Policy on February 4, 2006, in Munich:

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

5 February 2006 · 42nd Munich Conference on Security Policy · Munich, Germany

Context
Merkel addressed the 42nd Munich Security Conference on February 4, 2006, delivering the opening speech on transatlantic partnership and Germany's evolving security responsibilities.
Main themes
Transatlantic partnership renewal, NATO adaptation, European Union strengthening, asymmetric security threats, Germany's foreign policy responsibility, globalization, international order, domestic economic reform, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, Cold War legacy, German defense commitment, multilateral cooperation
Duration
~34 min
86th percentile
Words
4,102
86th percentile
Sentences
217
91st percentile
Readability
46
51st percentile
Grade
11.5
39th percentile
Syntax
2.94
39th percentile
Vocabulary
2.07
21st percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 76%76%
  • Institutional 11%11%
  • Economic 6%6%
  • Ceremonial 6%6%
  • Social 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 0%

217 sentences in 67 paragraphs

Dear Mr. Teltschik,

Excellencies,

Ministers,

honorable members of parliament,

ladies and gentlemen!

Dear Mr. Teltschik, I thank you for your kind welcome and also for your reminder of the words from last year. I gladly accepted your invitation to deliver the opening speech today; for over the years, the Munich Security Conference has rightly become a trademark - a trademark for open and honest dialogue about our common foreign and security policy challenges, and also a dialogue that takes place not only in this room but in many, many conversations on the sidelines of this conference. That is just as important.

This year, you have themed the Security Conference "Renewal of the Transatlantic Partnership." If we take a look back, the Cold War ended with the triumph of freedom across Europe and in other parts of the world at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. This was accompanied, and still is, by an economic gain in freedom that we call globalization. Today, we have an unprecedented intertwining of investment flows, capital flows, communication flows, and information. This means we have completely new, qualitatively new opportunities, but we also have dramatic fears, especially when I think of Germany, which struggles to cope with this openness in many areas.

The symmetrical threats of the Cold War have transformed into asymmetrical threats of a completely new kind. The erosion of state structures, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction in the hands of unreliable regimes - these are just a few keywords with which we describe the challenges and threats of our time today. The world has become overall more transparent. Almost no one can escape conflicts elsewhere anymore. We must confront this situation.

Now the question is: How do we respond - I ask this for Germany - to these new challenges? I am convinced that we can only meet these challenges together. "Together" I say first and foremost with regard to the transatlantic partnership. Why is this so, even after the Cold War? It did not have to be an automatic process. I believe it is so because we are united by a common value base, a shared understanding of responsible freedom, and a common view of humanity and human dignity. This is, for me, the foundation from which to assume that the transatlantic partnership should also be the basis for addressing the challenges of the 21st century.

For us in Germany, European unification on one side and the transatlantic partnership on the other are the pillars of our foreign and security policy. I explicitly state: A reunified Germany is ready to take on responsibility within this framework and to take on more responsibility, beyond the actual alliance territory, for the safeguarding of freedom, democracy, stability, and peace in the world.

I would like to clarify what is necessary for this based on four conditions.

First,

Germany must develop economically in a sensible manner, because economic strength, in my view, is linked to the security policy scope of action that we have.

Second,

we must contribute to ensuring that NATO addresses and adapts to the changing framework conditions.

Third,

we need a strengthened Europe, a strengthened European Union.

Fourth,

we must consolidate our activities regarding a common international order policy. I believe that only if we succeed in all four areas will we be able to meet the challenges we face today.

I would now like to outline, based on these four points, what contributions we must make in this regard.

First of all,

a domestic political thought: We, as the new federal government, have set ourselves the goal that Germany will regain a place among the top group within the European Union in the next ten years, in terms of growth, employment, and also innovation capability. I consider this important because, on the one hand, it is a prerequisite for prosperity within our country, but it is also a prerequisite for us to be capable of taking on foreign policy responsibility from a position of domestic strength. A country in which its own citizens are insecure finds it very difficult to take on international responsibility.

Therefore, we must reduce bureaucracy, reform the labor market, invest primarily in research and development, and address the demographic challenges, meaning we must secure our social systems for the future. Against this backdrop, we must also - I address this openly here - confront a budget situation in which we regularly, and for decades, spend more than we take in, and this in light of a demographic situation that will not make the problem easier in the future.

This means we can and want to take on responsibility, but we may not meet everyone's expectations regarding what we can financially allocate for defense in some areas. However, I say that we do what we do very efficiently.

We are contributing in Afghanistan with 2,500 members of the Bundeswehr in the ISAF mission.

We are contributing in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina with nearly 3,500 soldiers.

We are in the Horn of Africa, in Sudan, and in the Southern Caucasus, to name just a few important regions.

Germany is now involved in the mission in Rafah, which is a novelty as we are engaging in a completely new region.

We provide the largest troop contribution to the NATO Response Force.

We are also implementing our commitments in the area of strategic airlift with great effort as part of the decisions made at the Prague Summit.

This means we are contributing for many.

We have a parliamentary army. The expansion to almost all regions of the world is a clear political challenge. This requires many discussions. But we - government factions and opposition factions - have largely brought these discussions together to a positive outcome. We also want to utilize the synergy effects within the European Union, and there is stronger European cooperation in this regard. For example, we can increase shares in deployable troops and much more.

Internal strength, economic strength, and our own contributions must then secondly be combined with the question: How should NATO operate in the future? I believe that even today NATO is the glue of transatlantic interests and the transatlantic value community. But if it is to remain so in the future - I think ten or twenty years ahead - then, I believe, we must openly discuss what NATO must achieve. In my view, it must be a body in which a permanent joint analysis of threats is conducted and discussed. It must be the place where political consultations about new conflict hotspots that arise in the world are held, and it should, in my opinion, be the place where political and military actions are coordinated.

I believe we must make a decision: Do we want to give NATO a primacy in transatlantic cooperation, so that the necessary political consultations are first attempted here and the necessary measures are decided - this does not mean that everyone must always participate in everything - or do we want to give NATO a secondary role? This decision must be made. In my view, it should be made in such a way that NATO has primacy and other paths are only taken when no agreement can be reached in NATO. If this should be the common understanding of all - but that must be discussed - then the NATO Council can certainly take on these tasks, and it can also turn out in daily political consultations that this is practicable.

This also means that political conflicts will be discussed for which immediate military operations or actions are not necessary. This means that the situation in the Middle East or in Iran must, in my view, be discussed here. For this, we need political will, and in order to be able to act, we also need the corresponding military capabilities. I believe I am not revealing a secret when I say that this is not always the case today. In the coming years, it will have to be decided whether the will is there or not. I explicitly advocate for this. I also know that we Europeans must be careful that the technological gap between us and the United States does not grow but is minimized as much as possible. However, I also know that we are talking about an extraordinarily difficult issue when we consider the actual circumstances.

The central test case for NATO's ability to act and also its credibility remains, of course, the success of its operations; that is beyond question. It can be said that the spectrum of NATO operations has gained incredible breadth in recent years: from military actions to peacekeeping measures, training, transport, and advisory services, now even to deployment in natural disasters and the protection of major sporting events, when I think of the upcoming World Cup in Germany, to which I warmly invite you all. However, I do not have any tickets to give away. But we have many large screens on our streets, and you are welcome to join us there when "the world is a guest among friends," as the motto goes.

When we consider the breadth of NATO's action spectrum, I find the diversity of action fields impressive. This naturally raises the question: Where are the limits of what NATO can achieve? Resources are scarce. I believe the NATO Secretary General can hold extensive lectures on this. Therefore, we must also clearly define where the tasks lie. This was done at the summit in Washington in 1999 when the strategic concept was developed. This was then furthered in Prague in 2002 with the establishment of the NATO Response Force. I believe that the theoretically correct steps have been taken and that the practical implementation has also been good in part. When I think of the NATO Response Force, at least the German contribution is satisfactory.

But we must also see that the world has changed significantly since 1999. Therefore, I propose to consider whether we should not discuss in 2008 or 2009 - ten years later - how we need to further develop strategic concepts. Because 1999 was before September 11, 2001, and before the major round of enlargement. We want other countries to be able to become NATO members as well. This means that countries like Croatia, Macedonia, and Albania can have legitimate hopes of becoming NATO members. However, this presents new challenges, and therefore I would suggest such a discussion for the year 2008.

We know that Ukraine and Georgia also want a perspective for NATO. I want to say at this point: There must be no automatism, but it is necessary to look at the efforts of the respective candidates and the extent of their alignment with the defined values on which NATO is based. The standard must be that it cannot simply be about enlargement, but that the quality must also be maintained.

I come

thirdly

to European integration and the transatlantic partnership. I would like to tell our American friends that they should not view this skeptically but see it as an opportunity. I believe that the European Union, the more united it acts, can also make NATO a more efficient body. In recent years, we have equipped the European Union - Germany and France have made significant contributions in this regard - with a security strategy. We are in the process of building a common European defense industry. Since 2003, there have been independent European operations - partly NATO-supported, partly from our own structure.

When I think of the Althea mission in Bosnia, I can say: If we look back to the beginning of the 1990s and see where we are now, at the beginning of the 21st century, Europe and the European Union have grown into a role where we are truly ready to take on our own political responsibilities, including military security. I believe it can fill us as Europeans with a sense of pride that we are finally able to contribute to ensuring peace and security on our own continent. We do this, of course, with the support of our American partners, but to a much greater extent, we are convinced that this is our responsibility.

Especially when you look at the Balkans, you see how the European perspective, that is, the perspective of membership in the European Union, is an indispensable prerequisite for us to be able to reduce our military presence. I am firmly convinced that it will not be possible to lead the countries of the Western Balkans into a peaceful future without giving them the European perspective. This can, of course, only happen step by step, but it must be present.

We will conduct other missions through the European Union. We are currently discussing the extent to which we can respond to the request of the United Nations for support in the elections in Congo. I want to make it clear here: We as Europeans have a great interest in ensuring that the stabilization efforts of the United Nations in this country are brought to a successful conclusion. But again, I must tell you: Having such a discussion in the German Bundestag would have exceeded the limits of our imagination a few years ago, and even now it is still uncharted territory.

Of course, there is still much to be done. We had intended to install a European Foreign Minister with the Constitutional Treaty. The prospects for this Constitutional Treaty have suffered setbacks through referendums in which the population did not approve of this project. We can do a lot to improve efficiency within European foreign policy, even without the Constitutional Treaty. But we must recreate our institutional prerequisites in the European Union in the medium term. I have not given up hope that this can happen within the framework of a Constitutional Treaty.

The importance of the partnership between the European Union and NATO is growing. The European Security Strategy, NATO's Strategic Concept, and the National Security Strategy of the United States of America provide a suitable basis for a deepened dialogue on the further shaping of our common security agenda. When you go through this, you see that the level of agreement is astonishing. I do not want to philosophize further about the differences between the words "preemptive" and "preventive." But it is highly interesting that things are developing in a common direction.

The foreign ministers of NATO and the EU met for the first time last year for an informal exchange of views in a small circle. I believe that these dialogues should continue. However, they must then - I return to my view of what role NATO should play - complement the political discussions within NATO. They should not be seen as a counterweight but should be understood as a complement.

NATO and the EU - I believe it can be said - are the most successful value and security alliances of recent history. Therefore, they can also become a stabilizing anchor in the world or are already so today. The European Security Strategy states: "In joint action, the European Union and the United States can be a powerful force for good in the world."

This brings me to the fourth point: We also need security partners in other regions of the world as powerful alliances. The NATO Secretary General commented on this yesterday or the day before. We cannot do everything. We would overextend ourselves if we acted as if that were the case. Therefore, it is very important that NATO builds a dense network of partnerships with countries and international organizations with very different focuses and objectives. The diversification, the breadth of conflicts and cooperations, is indeed the hallmark of the 21st century. The Cold War was, so to speak, a confrontation between relatively homogeneous blocs. Today we have very different conflicts that we must address. This also requires a great speed in adapting to the respective conflicts.

I believe that in this context, regional organizations should take on more responsibility for security in the future. I think, for example, of the African Union. NATO should provide help for self-help in building its own capabilities and capacities. This means: For me, this is an additional task for NATO.

We need to do more in the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. We must intensify our cooperation and consultations with partner countries such as Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. This means that a multitude of political activities is necessary, which can then also lead to military cooperation.

I would like to illustrate the multitude of crisis areas we are dealing with by means of four examples.

In the first case, I want to talk about Afghanistan. I think Afghanistan is a highly interesting example of how we can build stable political structures step by step from the central threat of the 21st century, namely the dangers of terrorism, and from the situation of a quasi non-functional state. For me, the cooperation of operations like Enduring Freedom, which have a clear military character, with operations like ISAF, which are stabilizing and range from military tasks to police tasks to building political structures, and which also include activities of non-governmental organizations, development aid, and reconstruction work, is exemplary. They encompass the entire spectrum of how one could move from a completely unstable structure to a politically stable country. That must be the goal.

This also corresponds to the expectations of our population, which at home naturally asks, "What are you doing there?" They want to see progress. They want to see that something is happening. I believe we are also very accountable in this regard. Therefore, it is important that we work across the entire spectrum.

I believe that the conferences in Bonn and Berlin – now continued by the Afghanistan Conference in London – show that we consider the continuation of the political process to be just as important as the military operations in this region. Many will decide based on the example of Afghanistan whether we can act successfully. I am convinced that this can succeed, even though I do not want to downplay the difficulties that exist.

Secondly: We must respect the outcome of the parliamentary elections with the electoral victory of Hamas in the Palestinian territories. But there are also reasons for concern. Therefore, I want to repeat what I also said during my trip to the region and what may also have implications for financial aid to the Palestinian Authority: Israel's right to exist must be recognized, it must be clear that violence is not a means of political confrontation, and the previous steps of the peace process must be recognized by the Palestinian Authority. Anything else would mean an incredible setback. I believe and am also very glad that the European Union and others have made this unequivocally clear.

Thirdly: The commitment to stability is, of course, primarily directed at Iraq. We support the establishment of democratic and economically successful structures. In close coordination with the new Iraqi government, we will continue to train soldiers and police officers. We want to help the Iraqi authorities with justice, the establishment of a free press, the training of university teachers and engineers, and, of course, especially in vocational training. We provide significant financial support by forgiving Iraq debts amounting to 4.5 billion euros. I believe this is also an important prerequisite for the process to continue there.

Fourthly, we are, of course, observing the developments in Iran with the utmost attention these days. We want and must prevent the development of Iranian nuclear weapons. Iran's nuclear program raises legitimate suspicion, legitimate concern, and legitimate fear that it is not about the peaceful use of nuclear energy, but that it also involves military options. Iran has willfully - I must say this unfortunately - crossed the "red lines" known to it. I must add that the completely unacceptable provocations of the Iranian president make reactions necessary for us. I say this especially as the German Chancellor: A president who questions Israel's right to exist, a president who denies the existence of the Holocaust, cannot expect Germany to show even the slightest tolerance on this issue. We have learned from our history.

We want a solution to this conflict. There have been a multitude of offers. Negotiations are still taking place in the Board of Governors. I also say that the referral to the UN Security Council is not a provocation for Iran, because the UN Security Council should, in my view, be the legitimate place where international conflicts are discussed. Therefore, I can only say: It would be good if we could resolve this conflict quickly. There are a multitude of offers, but this, of course, requires the willingness to cease rhetorical activities on one side and to engage with the negotiation lines that are offered on the other.

I believe that in connection with Iran, it will be very important whether we build broad partnerships beyond the EU and the United States. In this regard, I see a very important role for Russia. Russia's role in this Iran conflict will, of course, be of utmost importance. It will certainly also be able to influence the opinions of other countries; I say this with all caution. Therefore, the strategic partnership that Germany has with Russia will also have to prove itself in the question of resolving conflicts with Iran. I hope and am optimistic that this will succeed, but we will certainly still have some difficult discussions to conduct.

It will also depend greatly on how countries that are increasingly playing a role - I name China, India, and Brazil as examples for many others - respond to the question of Iran. Because the broader the statement of the international community is regarding what is acceptable and what is not acceptable, the more impressive this will, of course, be for Iran.

We have many other regions to consider. I do not want to list them all; Belarus, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia are just briefly mentioned. We must see how we can address all these conflicts in global structures and institutions and implement their solutions.

We need rapid responses, and therefore I believe that the reform of the United Nations is of particular importance. The United Nations today is too slow in its responsiveness, and therefore this is not just a question of simple structural changes, but it is a question of the operational capability of a global institution, which Germany and I personally attach great importance to. Progress was made at the United Nations summit in September 2005. Some things - I think of the Peacebuilding Commission - have been advanced. But, for example, the reform of the Security Council is still pending. Its outcome will be crucial for whether the United Nations can become a more capable instrument.

I also personally believe that the instruments of conflict prevention and crisis management must become more effective, and for this, we need a common legal basis. In my view, the further development of international law must take place within the framework of the UN - at least I would consider this optimal - so that there is indeed a legitimized, widely supported basis to respond to the completely new challenges of the 21st century. Germany wants and will contribute to this.

Germany knows its role, Germany feels deeply connected to the European Union and wants to contribute to integration within the European Union, and Germany relies on the transatlantic partnership. We know our strengths, but we are also aware of our limits. The challenges of globalization cannot be tackled by a country with 80 million inhabitants alone; neither in terms of economic cooperation opportunities - here we need institutions like the WTO and many others - nor in terms of the demands for our own security. Therefore, we are convinced, out of our deepest self-interest, that we need alliances like NATO and that we need the transatlantic partnership. This self-interest is, in my view, always the best prerequisite in politics for achieving important cooperation.

I want to explicitly say that for me, the good news of my trip to the United States of America was that there is also a deep feeling here that the United States of America needs the Europeans. We were sometimes not so sure about this. But in this shared understanding that neither of us will master the challenges of the 21st century alone, I believe that we need a strengthening of the transatlantic partnership and that we can shape this strengthening. At least Germany will contribute to this.