Speech by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel at the Business Leadership Meeting 2010 of the "Süddeutsche Zeitung" on November 25, 2010, in Berlin:

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

27 November 2010 · Business Leadership Meeting 2010 of the "Süddeutsche Zeitung" · Hotel Adlon, Berlin, Germany

Context
Merkel addressed the Süddeutsche Zeitung Business Leadership Meeting 2010 in Berlin on November 25, 2010, discussing Germany's economic recovery and fiscal challenges.
Main themes
Economic recovery and growth, public debt and fiscal consolidation, unemployment and labor market, demographic change and full employment, lessons from the financial crisis, social responsibility of politics and business, investment budgets and public finance, stimulus programs and exit strategy, long-term unemployment, retirement age and working life extension, globalization and economic policy
Duration
~38 min
89th percentile
Words
4,544
89th percentile
Sentences
230
92nd percentile
Readability
49
59th percentile
Grade
11.3
37th percentile
Syntax
3.00
47th percentile
Vocabulary
2.02
12th percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 57%57%
  • Social 15%15%
  • Institutional 12%12%
  • Geopolitical 9%9%
  • Environmental 4%4%
  • Ceremonial 3%3%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Not in focus 1%

230 sentences in 46 paragraphs

Ladies and gentlemen,

I am pleased to be here again today at the Hotel Adlon for the now fourth leadership meeting on the economy organized by the "Süddeutsche Zeitung." Although this event was only established in 2007, the congress has already developed a good tradition. You have also pointed out that there is indeed a chance that this leadership meeting on the economy will continue to take place. Since 2007, we have certainly not been bored in the field of economics. With the international financial and economic crisis, the topics of economy, finance, and globalization have gained even more significance.

The appeal of this event undoubtedly lies in the fact that you are dealing with issues that are not only of great concern to representatives of the economy but also to many citizens. These are the questions about the lessons learned from the crisis and the social responsibility of politics and businesses. Since I am only present for the opening, I truly wish you fruitful and intensive discussions from which we can all learn a lot.

The question of responsibility and accountability is at least as pressing at the exit of the crisis valley as it was at the beginning. It is, of course, not definitively answered. I do not want to gloss over the fact that this year we can report a comparatively positive economic development. Looking at Germany, the growth rate will be over three percent. Current forecasts are at 3.4 percent. What is even more important to me, and of course to the people in the country, is that the number of employed persons rose to nearly 41 million in September. Never before have more people been employed in Germany. The number of unemployed has fallen to below three million. For next year, forecasts predict that it will average below three million.

Even more importantly, there is for the first time a structural reduction in long-term unemployment. In combination with the significant challenge for Germany, which is demographic change, this can, if we handle it wisely, become a process in which we can gradually move closer to full employment. I believe this is not only good news, but it is also truly worth addressing how we can particularly bring younger people into work, who are already facing a permanent transfer payment situation by their mid-20s. Additionally, the question arises of how we can extend working life. The retirement age of 67, which is demographically necessary, will only be accepted if there is the possibility to work longer.

But we must not forget that even with over three percent growth, we will not reach the level of 2008 until at least the end of next year, perhaps even later. This means we will be several years below the level of 2008. Many calculations show that productivity gains must actually occur every year. The crisis is therefore not yet over. We will still feel the effects of the crisis for quite some time.

The fact that we have navigated the crisis so well in Germany is, of course, also due to significant economic stimuli and stimulus programs. If we add 2009 and 2010, these amount to about four percent of gross domestic product. This is a significant contribution. This does not just disappear; unfortunately, it is reflected in the budgets.

We have managed to keep social insurance costs largely stable, but at the price of immense new debt. If today we incur only 50 billion euros in new debt instead of the 80 billion euros we had planned at the beginning of the year, it creates a sense of relief. If one had looked at a new debt of 50 billion euros in the past, the feeling would have been sheer horror. It is still one of the highest new debts. The new debt for 2011 will be somewhat lower than that of 2010. But it is still one of the highest new debts we have ever had. The highest new debt was 40 billion euros in the mid-90s. This means that public finances are still in a very difficult situation. This is reflected not only in the federal budget but also in the state budgets. It is particularly evident in the municipal budgets.

When we consider the necessary exit strategy from the stimulus programs, we know that this will involve massive consolidation needs in the coming years. This naturally means that we must fight hard to prevent the investment ratio in our budgets from continuing to decline. I said yesterday in the German Bundestag that in the early 90s, we had investment leeway of over 40 percent in the federal budget. Today we are somewhere around 20 percent. This means that there must be no decline in investment budgets at all. This, in turn, means that we must make cuts elsewhere – whether in public administrations, in standards, or in social spending. In this context, the labor market situation is of utmost importance. The fact that we alone in the federal budget, which amounts to 320 billion euros, spend 40 billion euros on long-term unemployment shows where significant savings potentials lie, which can either be used for consolidation or investments if we succeed in reducing structural unemployment. There is still much to be done.

One effect of the crisis is a deep uncertainty among people regarding the question of what options politics has, what the relationship between markets and politics is, or between politics and economic institutions, when I include private enterprises, banks, the financial world, and everything related. Since we know from Ludwig Erhard that psychology is a very important factor, the question of the acceptance of the social market economy is more pressing than ever. It is evident how the trust of the population in our economic and social order has shrunk. Less than half of those surveyed today still believe – according to a study by the Federal Association of German Banks – that the social market economy has proven itself. At the beginning of the survey in 1994, it was still three-quarters of those surveyed. This indicates a significant flattening. Here it is about – at least this is my interest and should actually be the interest of all of us – that the belief in the social market economy's societal order increases again among the people. This must, of course, determine our political actions. Politics cannot just cater to one group; we need a fundamental acceptance because the fundamental acceptance of the social market economy has also helped us navigate through this crisis.

There is no legal obligation on the part of companies and employees to accept stimulus programs, such as short-time work. If every medium-sized business in our country had said, "I will play it safe; I am not interested in what options politics offers me with short-time work; I simply will not take advantage of it," if there had not been a certain basic trust in our order, a much more difficult societal crisis management would have been necessary. Therefore, this trust is something we should cherish or that we need to rebuild. Many people feel powerless against the market mechanisms of globalization. They also feel that the nation-state can no longer act alone. It is all the more important that we strengthen global cooperation alongside national and European politics. We have done this to a significant extent in connection with this crisis.

Fortunately, we have had the strength to enshrine the debt brake in our constitution, with a high level of detail, so that there is practically no escape. This is good because the temptations to perhaps make a few concessions would likely always be there. Therefore, it is good that we have regulated this constitutionally. This is also recognized internationally. I believe that we have had the strength to take this first step on the path toward the federal consolidation goal in 2016, which is recognized and accepted everywhere.

However, there is also an international discussion asking: Must Germany already begin this exit strategy when the average deficit in the Eurozone is 6.7 percent and we are at just under four percent this year? Should we do this when the figure in the UK is ten or eleven percent and in America just under ten percent? I believe it is right. I emphasize again that Germany is one of the countries in the world experiencing the strongest aging process. We are more obligated than others to push forward with consolidation today to open up options and opportunities for future generations.

When we talk about finances, we certainly have not only the national task of stability culture. I believe it has proven to be correct that Germany is advancing this issue when I look at the entire Eurozone. You remember the discussions we had in connection with Greece. I am still convinced that it was right not to simply provide quick assistance but to advance the stability culture in Europe in this context, imposing strict conditions to show solidarity.

That is why the discussion process regarding this assistance also took longer than some might have expected. I firmly believe that those who insisted on the stability culture and the necessary structural measures in Greece should not be counted among the guilty but rather that it was the right thing to do. It is evident today in the actions of the Greek government that the Greek government is also utilizing these opportunities. I find it particularly nice that it shows that one does not even have to lose elections with this. The outcome of the Greek local elections clearly indicates that a large part of the population understands that what is being done is right for the future of Greece. It is as I have often said: It is not the one who helps quickly who helps correctly, but help must also be qualitatively right.

Looking back at the last few months, I am more optimistic than in the spring that the European Union will emerge strengthened from the current challenges, which we are observing again these days. In just a few months, we have not only achieved something regarding Greece, but we have also made it clear that we are ready to strengthen and specify the stability and growth pact in several directions:

First, the strengthening of the stability and growth pact regarding sanctions related to the deficit, including an early warning mechanism. This means that even before the deficit mark of three percent is breached, the Commission can intervene.

Second, we have said that the debt level of a country can also lead to sanctions, which was not the case before.

Third, we have stated – this may turn out to be the most important expansion of the understanding of the stability pact in the medium term – that macroeconomic data will also be examined in the future to see if there are developments that are fundamentally contrary to stable economic development in a member state of the European Union, particularly in the Eurozone. It still needs to be refined which indicators will be used in what way. But the basic agreements are already in place.

I believe that in a few years we will look back on this time and say: This was the right thing to do. It must be said that we have not only strengthened the requirements of the deficit procedures but also demonstrated solidarity. We have shown solidarity not only in connection with Greece but there is now a comprehensive solidarity mechanism for the Euro that did not exist before. This means there is more solidarity today than there was a year ago. If one follows some discussions, one gets the impression that solidarity is being reduced.

In addition, we are all, including the Federal Republic of Germany, ready to say: We need a permanent crisis mechanism for the protection of the Euro. To ensure as much security as possible and not to think about 2013 only at the end of 2012, we have said: We are now addressing the question of what this crisis mechanism should look like. Looking back, there has been no crisis mechanism for the Euro so far – neither a temporary nor a permanent one. The great news is that in the future – no member state of the Eurozone doubts this – there will be a crisis mechanism.

Germany and France have discussed this very question. It is as follows: When there is such a crisis mechanism in a currency union, it is of course important to ensure that market mechanisms are not completely shut down, that there is not a currency area of various countries, which still exist as nation-states, in which market mechanisms play no role at all. We all agree – perhaps everyone in this room as well – that market mechanisms, namely: for example, different interest rates, can also impose discipline.

This means that the combination of stricter sanctions and a permanent crisis mechanism that only comes into play in exceptional cases – which hopefully will never occur if the sanctions take effect beforehand – must not lead to a situation where one leads the most beautiful and pleasant life once this crisis mechanism is reached. It must of course be made clear how market forces manifest themselves in this context.

I believe we all agree that the markets currently exhibit a high level of nervousness. Therefore, I would like to make something very clear at this point, which we have said many times: This is not about the crisis mechanism from today until the year 2013, in which something is to be changed. Everything remains as agreed. Rather, it is about the question of how a future crisis mechanism will be designed. This is not about bonds that were issued under the old temporary crisis mechanism and that may have a long duration beyond 2013, but rather about the question: If a country should ever need a crisis mechanism for bonds issued after 2013, that is, after the temporary mechanism expires – how will that work? We are currently working on a high degree of predictability for all those involved.

Again, the impression is created that one would automatically assume a state insolvency. However, that is not the case at all. It is more about how private investors can be involved in different ways. I would like to take this opportunity to remind you that the so-called "Collective Action Clauses," for which there is obviously no German word anymore, are already being applied in many cases today. These "Collective Action Clauses" are indeed a possibility that could be applied here. However, I do not see any case today of a Euro member state that would find itself in a situation requiring restructuring. This means we are currently operating in spheres of improbabilities that, in my opinion, are significant.

Therefore, the most important thing now is that everyone in Europe does their homework. We have created the umbrella so that a country like Ireland, which is in a difficult situation, can claim this umbrella. This is, of course, tied to conditions that are currently being negotiated. Hopefully, these negotiations will be concluded soon. On the other hand, other countries have already made significant efforts recently. I would therefore say: Today, we are in a significantly better position in our stability culture in Europe than we were a year ago or at the beginning of the crisis. This will also prove to be an important question in the future.

In Europe, I believe we have demonstrated a high degree of solidarity. I would like to reiterate at this point: Germany is one of the countries that has benefited the most from the Euro. Therefore, Germany is of course willing to show solidarity for the Euro. However, Germany also has an interest in ensuring that the Euro is a strong, lasting, and accepted currency in the markets. Therefore, the question of a strong Euro is inextricably linked to the culture of stability and economic strength.

We have also said: We are working more closely in the internal market within an economic government of the 27 member states. What does that mean? It means, of course, that we know we need to have increasing coherence. But this coherence cannot consist of taking the average value of all European capabilities; rather, we must strive to take the best country as the benchmark, which exists in the European Union – in some cases that is Germany, in other cases it is others – because otherwise we will fall behind as a continent.

My trip to Asia for the last G20 meeting made it clear to me once again what dynamic countries we are surrounded by. The emerging markets are in an incredible race to catch up. When one considers what has happened in this crisis, one concludes that the statement that in such a crisis the cards in the world are reshuffled is certainly correct. That the cards have been reshuffled in such a way that, for example, China has emerged from this crisis not weakened but strengthened is evident today. This applies both in terms of political influence and economic strength.

Therefore, it was also good that we came together in the G20. Therefore, it is important that Europe strives to be among the strongest and most dynamic regions in the world, and therefore it was important that we made significant progress regarding the financial market architecture. If one looks at the current situation – we talked much more about it last year – one sees that a lot has happened. The Basel II negotiations took many years, while the Basel III negotiations took less than two years. The capital requirements of the future will make such crises significantly less likely. We have new supervisory structures, we will make derivatives trading more transparent, and we have other bonus regulations. However, not everything has been accomplished. In particular, an internationally uniform procedure regarding the question of "too big to fail," that is, what happens to systemically relevant banks when they fail, has not yet been sufficiently established. However, there has been significant progress in many areas. We have also proposed a national restructuring law for banks and a bank levy. This still needs to be discussed in the Bundesrat. I hope that this will also be done relatively quickly. Europe will do something similar. We have also regulated hedge funds. Compared to the time before the crisis, the overall picture has changed significantly.

One danger that I still see is – as was already the case in the 1930s – that various forms of protectionism could gain ground – certainly less in tariff areas, as most states are WTO members. But in non-tariff areas, one can certainly do a lot. Therefore, we must pay attention to this. At the G20 summit in Seoul, we reiterated: The Doha Round is of utmost importance; it must be concluded. I hope that it can indeed be concluded under the French G20 presidency. That would be an important signal for free trade.

Since my Russian colleague, Prime Minister Putin, will be standing here tomorrow morning, who has already written an essay for today's event newspaper, I want to make it very clear: Of course, we support the idea of a free trade zone between the European Union and Russia. However, I must temper this somewhat. Because the steps that Russia has taken recently do not exactly point in this direction. The positive message in advance: Russia will hopefully soon join the WTO. This is the prerequisite for us to reach a free trade zone. The negotiations on this are quite advanced. However, Russia has now formed a customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan. This does not exactly facilitate our free trade zone with Russia and the EU. Because in the case of Kazakhstan and Belarus, the question of WTO membership is even less resolved than with Russia. I also keep hearing news from Russia that import duties are being raised relatively unexpectedly or – less frequently – removed again. This would not be immediately compatible with a free trade zone. But if there is goodwill on the Russian side, then it is of course also in European interest to reach a free trade zone.

When we talk about overcoming the financial and economic crisis, it is of course also important that we, like all other European countries, do our homework regarding the framework conditions for a good economy. I have already spoken about the labor market. Here, it will be especially important for us in the coming years to set the right incentives for taking up work. Through the modification of additional earning opportunities and the reorganization of Hartz IV rates, we have set important milestones in this regard. The redesign of Hartz IV regulations is constitutionally mandated; there are not too many leeways. However, we have utilized the leeways that we believe we have to make living on Hartz IV a transitional situation and not a permanent state, for example, by not including alcohol and cigarettes in the basic needs. We must do everything to make taking up work attractive.

I also believe that the issue of a minimum wage – at least a general statutory minimum wage – will not help us make taking up work attractive. It does not solve the problem that someone, due to their specific family situation, still needs additional payments and thus becomes a so-called top-up recipient despite working eight hours a day, because depending on the number of children, one would otherwise quickly reach minimum wages of over ten euros. I believe we are not making progress here. However, when it comes to sector-specific minimum wages, we have indeed found solutions in many cases together with the social partners.

Through the educational offerings for children or the benefits for education, we will primarily make it clear that we do not want the next generation to be shaped in such a way by their parents' transfer reception that they cannot adequately participate in social life and education. Therefore, we are putting a lot of effort into designing this education package and ensuring that there will be benefits in kind.

We will of course have to stick to the retirement age of 67. I can mention the numbers again: In 1950, we had a situation where six employed persons worked for one retiree, who received an average pension for ten years. Today, there are three employed persons working for one retiree, and that with an 18-year pension receipt period. In 20 years, in 2030, two employed persons will have to work to support one retiree who will then receive a pension for over 20 years. I believe these are facts that cannot be ignored, and no political party should bury its head in the sand in light of them. Therefore, it is imperative that we create an extension of working life.

We are also seeing a change in the population in another area, namely regarding the proportion of migrants in younger generations. This proportion is increasing significantly. This means that the issue of integration will be a key issue for the question of employability or qualified workforce in Germany. Therefore, we must also address the question of the recognition of professional qualifications obtained abroad; a legislative process is currently underway for this. We will also have to continue to deal with the immigration of qualified individuals, although we really need to be careful here – as shown by a look at other countries, even those that have the point system preferred by some – that we do not again get immigration into the social security systems, but rather a needs-driven immigration focused on the areas where we do not have enough skilled workers.

We have a firm commitment to remain an industrial nation. This also means: Energy supply is of great importance – at least according to the Federal Government's view.

In the energy debate, we have tried to ensure three things.

First, we want to make energy supply environmentally friendly. We also believe that if we are pioneers in achieving the age of renewable energies, this can create high innovative and qualified employment potential. The motto is therefore: Rapidly reaching the age of renewable energies.

Second, in the meantime, electricity must also remain affordable.

And third, there is also a high interest in supply security. We should not operate under the motto: We can somehow get the electricity from our neighboring countries. While we can do that, it is not the preferred way in light of our self-understanding and our capabilities to generate energy.

Therefore, we want to consider nuclear energy as a bridging technology, but extend the operating times beyond what was agreed upon by the Red-Green coalition. You can basically say – and this is indeed news – that the Christian-Liberal coalition is ready to phase out nuclear energy. But I also say: This means, of course, that we also need to think about disposal. The fact that Red-Green simply imposed a moratorium on the exploration of a final repository was not a great act in terms of sustainable policy. Therefore, this exploration must continue.

If we want to reach the era of renewable energies and keep electricity affordable, it is imperative to quickly rebuild the infrastructure and adapt it to the new circumstances. We probably need to build not hundreds, but thousands of kilometers of new high-voltage lines. However, when I look at how long this takes and how many local protests arise around each individual construction project, I realize that this could be the weak point or the Achilles' heel of the entire restructuring of our electricity economy. We are entirely responsible for this ourselves; we cannot blame anyone else. Therefore, the question sometimes arises whether, if we did not yet have railway tracks and high-voltage lines in Germany, we would actually still manage to electrify and "railway-ify" our country. Even at CDU meetings, I do not encounter anyone who approaches this with joyful optimism, but rather always with a somewhat startled expression.

Therefore, I would like to conclude by noting that in the federal government, we spend three billion euros more each year on research and education because we believe that, especially in a country with an aging population, the most important resource from which we can generate prosperity for the future is science, research, and education. We are good in some fields, but we also experience that we have now handed over entire areas to other regions of the world. Therefore, it must always be said: Legal claims to prosperity are not yet distributed in the world; this institution does not exist. Therefore, Germany will have to continue to strive. I believe that Germany can achieve this. We have a great population, we have a good basic education, we have a stable democracy in which many things can be resolved and in which one can work well. However, competition will become tougher. We must face this.

In this sense, I say as Chancellor: Germany can hold its own, Germany has done many things right in the crisis, but we must continue to strive to stay where we are today or to become even better.