Speech by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel at the Commanders' Conference of the Bundeswehr on November 22, 2010, in Dresden:

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

22 November 2010 · Commanders' Conference of the Bundeswehr, 20 Years of the Army of Unity · Dresden, Germany

Context
Merkel addressed the Bundeswehr Commanders' Conference in Dresden on November 22, 2010, marking the 20th anniversary of the unified German armed forces.
Main themes
Bundeswehr reform, 20 years of German reunification army, Afghanistan deployment, fallen soldiers and casualties, mental health of soldiers, inner leadership and citizen in uniform, NATO alliance obligations, German rearmament history, Konrad Adenauer legacy, peaceful revolution and Dresden, civil-military relations, defense policy responsibility
Duration
~32 min
85th percentile
Words
3,885
85th percentile
Sentences
195
88th percentile
Readability
50
62nd percentile
Grade
11.2
34th percentile
Syntax
2.91
35th percentile
Vocabulary
2.17
41st percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 36%34%
  • Institutional 25%24%
  • Ceremonial 25%24%
  • Social 11%10%
  • Economic 3%3%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 5%

195 sentences in 48 paragraphs

Dear Federal Minister, dear Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg,

dear President of the Saxon State Parliament, dear Matthias Rößler,

dear Mayor, dear Helma Orosz,

dear State Secretaries,

dear Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces,

dear colleagues from the German Bundestag,

above all, dear participants of this Commanders' Conference,

I am pleased that you have invited me to speak to you today on the occasion of the anniversary "20 Years of the Army of Unity." The title "20 Years of the Army of Unity" makes it clear that this Bundeswehr conference can once again send a signal of change, after a high degree of change has already taken place 20 years ago. It will be a very programmatic conference. I think it will therefore also be a very interesting conference for all of you.

However, I do not want to begin my speech here without first thinking of the victims that the deployment in Afghanistan has claimed. This year, we mourn the death of eight soldiers. They fell in combat, they were victims of treacherous attacks. The memorial services were moments that certainly no one will forget in their lifetime. As Chancellor, I want to express once again that we will always remember our fallen with sorrow and respect. We will not forget them or the suffering of their families and friends.

We also think of the wounded – already 30 this year. This morning we heard again of the wounded. We wish them all a swift and complete recovery. We also think of the soldiers whose souls bear wounds from what they have experienced in the missions. I believe we must neither suppress nor underestimate mental illnesses. We must continually advocate in our society that this suffering and these difficulties are not forgotten.

I say this also in light of the reforms that will be very important for the Bundeswehr. Because every new direction set by a reform, every deployment decision has an immediate impact on the lives and life planning of our soldiers. We must always live up to this responsibility. I think the entire federal government is doing that.

At this point, I would like to sincerely thank Federal Minister of Defense Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg for having found a language of reality, especially with regard to the deployment in Afghanistan – certainly a harsh language for many at first. But we have all understood by now: What the soldiers experience in Afghanistan is sometimes reminiscent of war. These are war-like conditions. We have great understanding when our soldiers say that they are partially in a war.

This has implications because, when we think today of the history of the Bundeswehr, it is a new experience. It is an experience that must not only be processed by the Bundeswehr and the soldiers in deployment, but one that society must also participate in, and it demands that we find justifications for what we will do in the context of our alliance obligations and for the security of our country in the future.

Twenty years of the Army of Unity have certainly been eventful years for all who participated. It is a wonderful gesture that we are here today in Dresden. Dresden stands exemplarily for the peaceful revolution. Someone like Matthias Rößler could tell much about that. Dresden also stands for a consistent building of democracy. It represents the sense of community in our country when I think of the Frauenkirche behind us, whose reconstruction has become a reality through a great collective effort of all Germans. I find it very nice that Jörg Schönbohm and Werner Ablaß are here today, who can still report firsthand what was created during that upheaval.

But before I come to that, I want to remind you once again of how it was when the Bundeswehr was established in the 1950s. This was associated with passionate discussions. A rearmament so shortly after the Second World War – that was anything but an easy step at the time. Nevertheless, it was the right decision. It required the decisiveness and conviction of the government at that time, with Konrad Adenauer as Chancellor and the Ministers of Defense Theodor Blank and Franz Josef Strauß, to push forward the establishment of the Bundeswehr.

Konrad Adenauer considered security policy and the Western alignment to be so important that he made some political compromises. The fact that we today have a pay-as-you-go pension system and not a capital-funded one is directly related to his prioritization. The alliance with the trade unions in pension reform was so important to him because it meant he faced somewhat less resistance in rearmament. He said: The fundamental decision on security policy must be made first. Then he looked at what else was possible in social policy. It was right that he made that decision at the time.

Perhaps one of the great achievements of the cultural society in our Federal Republic of Germany was that we developed the guiding principle of the so-called "Inner Leadership" and the image of the citizen in uniform. I believe this is a wonderful image that we must continue to preserve and develop.

At that time, it was certainly constitutive that the establishment of the Bundeswehr was associated with conscription. Conscription was the answer to the threat, but it also ensured a deep bond with the population. This has proven itself over decades. Therefore, it is right that today, in the face of upcoming reform steps, we do not take the questions "What will happen to conscription? How do we develop it further?" lightly, but rather discuss them seriously, as we have already done.

It was important to say that conscription should be part of the establishment of the Bundeswehr. Nevertheless, conscription was not, so to speak, at the beginning; rather, it was the answer to the following questions: Where are our alliance partners? They were in the then West. What is necessary for security? That was the necessity to create a Bundeswehr. How can I create acceptance in the population? The answer to that was conscription. Since then, we have been confronted with the fact that the Bundeswehr is inconceivable without integration into the Western alliances.

A similarly difficult decision came in 1990. Today we see very clearly what manifested itself at the end of the 1980s – for us it was 1989 with the fall of the Wall – and then developed in the 1990s. It was the collapse of a bipolar world system. It was the end of the Cold War, the end of the Iron Curtain, and a complete restructuring of the world through the triumph of freedom. Freedom had triumphed. We were, of course, all overjoyed; the people of Dresden a bit faster than the North Germans. I still remember the trains heading north with signs that read: "Sleep on!" The people of Dresden already knew what time it was.

At that time, the necessary consequence of the end of the bipolar world system was, of course, that the NVA had to be dissolved. Thousands of its former soldiers and their equipment had to be integrated into the Bundeswehr. I followed this process with the greatest respect at the time. I do not know if I, as a former citizen of the GDR, would have had the strength, foresight, and affection to drive this process forward. However, it was primarily the then Minister of Defense and Jörg Schönbohm who accomplished this. There was also a complete reorientation regarding the stationing locations in the new federal states and a massive disarmament process. This means that the Bundeswehr was literally faced with a tremendous logistical and organizational task from the very first day of unity.

The Bundeswehr also made a huge contribution to the dismantling of the inhumane inner-German border. This must not be forgotten either. Minefields were cleared, hundreds of kilometers of barriers were dismantled. We can hardly imagine all of this today; but it was a great challenge that was met in a magnificent way.

11,000 selected former soldiers of the NVA became part of the Bundeswehr. This was not just an administrative act. Suddenly, people came together who had recently stood as enemies against each other. I have been told that it was not always met with joy when Bundeswehr soldiers from the West suddenly entered a room with Bundeswehr soldiers from the East. They may have had more washbasins, but at first, it was not comfortable for everyone when they suddenly found themselves together.

However, this developed into an incredible success story. The aid deployment, especially of conscripts, during the flood disaster in 1997 was already a completely natural act. I personally remember with great joy how we conducted oaths in our constituencies in the new federal states from the very beginning and how we looked with slight dismay at Berlin or other West German places, where it was not seen as a satisfaction but rather as a provocation. I believe that the new federal states made a really good contribution to the acceptance of oaths and actions of the Bundeswehr in public.

This means that the Bundeswehr quickly and convincingly achieved internal unity. It has significantly shaped the internal unity of Germany. All those who contributed to this can be proud.

Dresden is an important Bundeswehr location. Just now, there was a murmur when it was pointed out that people would be glad if it could stay that way. I do not want to preempt anything, but the Military History Museum will remain here for a while longer. We are already looking forward to the reopening. I think it will be a wonderful thing. Without wanting to preempt the structural decisions of the Federal Minister, I suspect that the Army Officer School will not be moving away immediately either. I will refrain from requesting information for my own constituency.

After the shaping of German unity, after a few books had been written about the end of history, we abruptly entered the reality of the future. Already in 1991, the UN mission in Cambodia began. This was followed by Somalia in 1993 and the challenges in the Balkans in the mid-1990s.

A great shock regarding what equal rights in the course of German unity can also bring additional duties, federal governments that have sued at the Federal Constitutional Court, and much more, we have experienced until we reached the point today where over 7,000 soldiers are deployed abroad – in Africa, in Afghanistan, still in the Balkans, in the Mediterranean, and in the Indian Ocean.

It shows: The multipolar world is different, but it is not without threats or challenges. We are certainly still not at the end of our thought process regarding our tasks and how we can meet these tasks. This applies not only to the Federal Republic of Germany but also to the international community.

In this context, the significant, I would even say very significant NATO meeting this weekend is also relevant, where a new strategic concept was adopted. In 1999, a new strategic concept had already been established. The fact that another one is needed just ten years later indicates that the alliance to which we are deeply committed also sees the new challenges.

I can only recommend that this new strategic concept be made as widely known as possible among the soldiers. It is largely well-written and describes the challenges and tasks of NATO in an extraordinary way. It shows: The challenges are new; they are not located at the borders, but far away from the borders of the alliance. They have to do with states that are not proper states, with terrorism, and with completely different challenges such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

We can consider ourselves fortunate that after many years in which an alliance partner like France did not accept the characterization of NATO as a political alliance but viewed NATO as a purely military alliance, the decision of the French President last year to fully integrate France into the structures of NATO now allows for an adequate discussion regarding the challenges we face today. Because none of these challenges we face today can be addressed through purely military actions. The deterrence of the Cold War was a very effective, and incidentally, also a structurally very manageable way to respond to the challenges of a bipolar world. Today, deterrence is not the answer, at least not the only answer. Nuclear weapons will remain part of deterrence, but they are not the sole answer to the challenges we face.

All the new challenges can only be met through a combination of military strength and political action. We in the Federal Republic of Germany have early on, using Afghanistan as an example, forged a path for such thinking through the approach of interconnected security. With regard to Afghanistan, even one step further will need to be taken – towards the political dimension of a reconciliation process. If NATO were to remain an alliance where one can discuss the actual military action but not the connection between crisis prevention, security strategies, and political challenges, then NATO would not be able to meet its challenges. The new strategic concept is a very political concept, in which, of course, military strength and military capability are important factors, but are embedded in a comprehensive understanding of the entire alliance.

Another aspect of this NATO Council was the meeting with Russia. Despite all the differing opinions on the Georgia conflict, it became clear at this NATO Council that Russia is a partner and not an adversary in the medium and long term regarding the security policy challenges and threats I mentioned. There are still long paths to be traveled, but when I look at where our actual threats lie, I can only say: In most cases, Russia can be of utmost importance to us – whether it concerns resolutions against Iran's nuclear program or a completely changed attitude towards the engagement in Afghanistan in recent years. Five years ago, the thinking about Afghanistan was more along the lines of: Let’s see how the West fares there after we have suffered a deep defeat. In the meantime, there is a common understanding because peace and stability in the entire region are in both Russian and our interest. This is a huge qualitative advance, which is, of course, evident in many facets of cooperation – whether it is logistical collaboration, the provision of helicopters, or the use of transport routes.

That is why it is so good that we are making a significant step regarding the question of what our Bundeswehr should look like in the future precisely at this phase of realignment and clarification of NATO. In this regard, if I may put it so succinctly, a lot of work lies ahead of you. However, it does not only lie ahead of you, but we want to accomplish it together, as far as political support and decisions are concerned, which are associated with the suspension of conscription.

In the history of the Federal Republic, whenever the essential decisions for the Bundeswehr were good – fortunately, they have always been made correctly – the starting point of consideration has always been the question: What is necessary for the security of our country, what is necessary for the security of our alliance partners? The same question has been asked this time: What do we need in light of the completely changed threat situation in our world, how must the Bundeswehr look?

When we answer this question, we must say: The army of unity has become an army in action. I explicitly say: We are not making decisions just for two or three years. If all goes well, then the transfer of responsibility in Afghanistan in 2014 will look such that we will no longer need combat troops there. This has been stated by many NATO partners. This means we cannot align the future of the Bundeswehr based on the example of Afghanistan. But what can be said is that international deployments will always play a role – whether partly for prevention, so that no further conflicts break out, whether for the aftermath of conflicts like in UNIFIL, or whether – this is an even more urgent task – in combating piracy.

The army in action will have a greater significance than we thought ten or twenty years ago. Therefore, we must align the Bundeswehr to the specific requirements of these tasks.

This has happened in two respects, first through the consideration of security policy requirements, the report of the Inspector General to the Minister, and second in regard to the resulting realization that a suspension of conscription in the current situation is not only justifiable but seems to be a security policy preference, meaning that it is warranted.

Now one might ask: What does this mean and what are the implications? But first of all, it is also historically correct not to completely close our eyes to changed conditions and not to say: Because conscription has been so successful, we must continue it regardless of any security policy situation.

Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg often points out – I can do the same – that conscription is actually very dear to us. I have spoken to a large part of you with great enthusiasm and warmth about conscription. I have talked about the oaths and all that we, as those who are not part of the Bundeswehr, have also emotionally felt again and again when we spoke of conscription as part of the citizen in uniform. The decision to say: Now let’s look at all this again very soberly is therefore all the more difficult.

I will now speak for a second as the party chair of the Christian Democratic Union. At first, I also thought: It is a tough task to convince a party that, just like the CSU, has always stood for the Bundeswehr, to take such a path. However, I believe that the reasons are extraordinarily robust. Now I do not actually want to invoke the ultimate reason; but it must also be kept in mind: Is it still constitutionally justified in the current security policy situation to impose such a severe infringement on a person's freedom as is done in the form of conscription? When one looks at the percentages of those who were drafted and who actually went to the Bundeswehr, the question arises whether all of this is still fair.

That is why it is good to say: Suspending conscription now is right; but it remains in the Basic Law because we cannot foresee the security policy situation in five, ten, fifteen, twenty, or thirty years. The suspension will bring about profound structural changes for the entire Bundeswehr, which in turn will raise profound questions. The mayors, district administrators, and local politicians are – as one notices again and again – almost simultaneously, if they were not already before the question of whether conscription will be suspended, occupied with the question: What does this mean for my Bundeswehr location? It is understandable to question that. Nevertheless, the security policy architecture of our Federal Republic of Germany must be oriented towards other questions than just those of the locations.

Nevertheless, I say: The more we take the soldiers, the relatives, the families, and the local politicians along on this path, the better this reform will succeed for us. It is actually a good sign that people like to have the Bundeswehr in their locality. This is also part of the integration of the Bundeswehr into our country. – Light murmuring, but only in the front row. – I think that is nice, and you should actually be pleased that the Bundeswehr has achieved such societal appreciation with its presence on site.

I also know that we – despite all the discussion about the army in action; I want to say this here as well – must also always think of those who are at home, who keep the Bundeswehr on its toes locally and here in the country. Although 300,000 soldiers have already been deployed. One must not forget that. In the meantime, it is a huge number. But there are also many who ensure that things run smoothly at home. They must not be forgotten either.

If we now suspend conscription, we are of course venturing into completely uncharted territory, relying on the idea that we can make military service so attractive that it will still be taken up by at least 7,500 people per year even without obligation. This will be a great challenge. Therefore, I can only advise all of you: Be confident. Consider what you or your sons and daughters expect from such voluntary service. This is a test for the Bundeswehr, but it is also an opportunity for it to clearly demonstrate who the Bundeswehr is in our country and whether it is enjoyable and whether it helps in further professional life to have spent some time in the Bundeswehr and gained experiences there. My heartfelt request regarding the restructuring is: Always think of the opportunities. The risks are evident; that is beyond question. But not only: "no risk, no fun" and: "no leadership without risk," but also: enjoyment in change.

With that, I come to the second part. Not only will conscription be suspended. There is also a commission that has dealt with the future structures, including the command structures of the Bundeswehr, the so-called Weise Commission, whose results you are probably following daily with more or less joy. I do not know if everyone is already standing at the door in the morning cheering and saying: Thank you, Mr. Weise, and thanks to your colleagues for providing us with such a situation report on the Bundeswehr. I only know that State Secretary Otremba has the great task, I believe, to draw the necessary conclusions regarding structural development by January. But my heartfelt request again as Chancellor – I say this as a Chancellor who stands behind you and who wants the success of the Bundeswehr with you: Remember once again the time of German reunification. Remember once again how much uncertainty existed in many places and how you ultimately shaped the restructuring. Take it again like that now. Assume: Each of you is someone who is valued in the Bundeswehr with the assumption that each of you wants the best for the security structure of our country and thus for a capable Bundeswehr in the alliance, in NATO. If you carry out the new restructuring process in this spirit, it could also symbolize the willingness to change and the necessity of change in our country.

When one sees the changes in our world, when one sees how the victory of freedom at the end of the 80s and the beginning of the 90s brought opportunities for billions of people, how that has also changed the weights in the world, then I may tell you as Chancellor: You can truly be an essential part of a modern and a strong Germany. This is good for Europe, this is good for NATO, and this is good for the values that we live together, each in our responsibility, again and again: Unity and justice and above all freedom. I ask you, participate bravely and joyfully. It will pay off for Germany.