Speech by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel at the event "Central German Economy in Dialogue" on July 3, 2009, in Halle an der Saale:

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

4 July 2009 · Central German Economy in Dialogue · Halle an der Saale, Germany

Context
Merkel addressed the 'Central German Economy in Dialogue' event in Halle an der Saale on July 3, 2009, reviewing two decades of post-reunification economic progress.
Main themes
German reunification progress, East German economic development, Aufbau Ost, labor market challenges, Solidarity Pact II, global financial and economic crisis, budget consolidation, Agenda 2010 reforms, medium-sized enterprise structure, renewable energy and new technologies, Central German states competitiveness
Duration
~32 min
85th percentile
Words
3,891
85th percentile
Sentences
207
90th percentile
Readability
55
76th percentile
Grade
10.1
22nd percentile
Syntax
2.88
32nd percentile
Vocabulary
2.02
13th percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 78%75%
  • Institutional 11%10%
  • Ceremonial 6%6%
  • Social 3%3%
  • Geopolitical 2%2%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 4%

207 sentences in 46 paragraphs

Dear Madam President Schaar,

dear Presidents,

Madam Mayor,

Mr. Prime Minister, dear Wolfgang Böhmer,

esteemed members of the German Bundestag and the state parliaments,

and above all, you, ladies and gentlemen,

I am very pleased to have accepted this invitation from the Central German Chambers today. I have just heard a bit about the two impressive development stories, and probably everyone here in the hall could tell their own.

As has already been indicated here, we are in the 20th year after the fall of the Berlin Wall. On November 9 of this year, we will remember that event. When one considers that the Federal Republic of Germany has celebrated its 60th anniversary, one also becomes aware that we have already spent almost a third of that time not only together in Germany but also shaping this Federal Republic of Germany together. East and West are on a common path, but still in some respects a different one. You in the economy are used to regularly taking stock. Therefore, I would like to briefly state where we stand.

The Federal Government adopted the annual report on the status of German unity 2009 on June 10. It was debated in the Bundestag. We agree with the analysis of the Central German Chambers: The renewal of the economic base of the East German states has progressed well. It is characterized by a fairly well-diversified medium-sized enterprise structure. It is a structure that we would say has a future and, above all, shows very dynamic growth. The share of industry in gross value added in the three Central German states already reaches almost the West German average today. This is an astonishing development curve in recent years. The service sector has also developed quite well, if I only think of the logistics location Leipzig/Halle. Alongside the traditional economic focal points such as chemistry, the automotive industry, optics, and the food industry, important potentials in new technology fields are emerging. Microelectronics, energy, and environmental technology are good examples of this.

Thus, one can already say that the Aufbau Ost is not simply a replica of the West, but that overall, if I think for example only of renewable energies, independent fields have developed in the Central German states that point strongly into the future.

However, the labor market balance is still mixed: The unemployment rate reached its lowest level since 1991 last year, but on average it is still twice as high as in the old federal states.

The comparison with West German states such as Lower Saxony, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, and Schleswig-Holstein is interesting in terms of economic performance per capita. In this comparison, the East German states today account for 82 percent. In the year 2000, it was still 74 percent. One can see that there is a significant development here. However, it also shows that this development is not abrupt but takes place over a considerable period.

This clearly indicates the necessity of the Solidarity Pact II, which is time-limited but is a reliable commitment for you. This means that we will adhere to this Solidarity Pact II until 2019. We will have to continue working to equalize the different performance capabilities. The goal is to be able to compete with the medium and somewhat structurally weaker states in the old federal states. I believe that this can be achieved. But I will come to the crisis-like development that makes this task somewhat more difficult.

We were actually on a good path regarding the decline in unemployment and the budget balance. By the end of last year, the number of unemployed was below three million. We had a budget plan that provided for new borrowing of six billion euros for the year 2010, and in 2011, no new borrowing would have been necessary. That was something to be proud of. I do not want to hide the fact that at the beginning of the legislative period, we raised the value-added tax by two percentage points for the budget consolidation of the federal and state governments and by one percentage point to reduce labor costs. These have fallen from 41 percent at the beginning of the legislative period to below 40 percent – more precisely: to 39 percent – including the employee contribution to health insurance from July 1, 2009.

We have shown – and we should remember this – that changes that began in the previous legislative period through the reforms of the Agenda 2010 can indeed mean a positive development for our country. Especially because it was possible to show people very well that there can be a positive effect when something is changed, it is all the more regrettable that the international financial and economic crisis intervened. This crisis abruptly ended these developments.

I also tell you: We could not have imagined – I personally could not either – that nearly 20 years after German reunification, representatives of legitimate financial institutions would suddenly come to us and say: Either you save us, or the entire economy will collapse. We saw what happens when such a domino effect occurs in the case of Lehman Brothers. Certainly, the non-rescue of Lehman Brothers led to a stronger shock effect of the global economic crisis than would have otherwise been the case. This crisis would have occurred anyway. No one can say what it would have looked like. However, the case of Lehman Brothers did not call for further examples to test whether a bank is systemic or not. This led us to have to provide guarantees.

Today, a so-called bad bank law has been passed in the German Bundestag. The banks are still not fully operational. Look at the banking structure in Germany. There is the three-pillar model. The savings banks are relatively stable, as long as we do not talk about their co-ownership in the state banks. Sometimes this is not well received, but it is true that the one who owns 40 percent of all state banks cannot say that it does not concern him at all. This is a broad topic of discussion. I know that. But with the passing of the bad bank law today, we have still helped. The cooperative banks have also proven to be quite reasonable. It is the case that the attempt to maximize returns by taking every risk has not proven to be a successful model.

I would like to slightly contradict what was just said, namely that there are no visible efforts to contain these unpredictable and irresponsible risks worldwide. When Germany held the G8 presidency in 2007, we tried during that presidency to better regulate some financial market products. We failed. I must say that very clearly. We failed due to the Anglo-Saxon banking world and the hard lobbying work of Wall Street and the City of London. On the other hand, we know that we need functioning banks. It makes no sense to say: We can get by worldwide with savings banks or cooperative banks. That will not be so easy. We are already seeing that the granting of long-term and cross-regional loans is quite burdensome, which will still cause us problems. I will come back to that shortly.

At the G20 summit in London, we made a number of decisions. This ranged from the tasks of rating agencies to hedge fund regulations to various supervisory bodies. We are internationally united in the need for multilateral supervisory institutions – the term "Financial Stability Board" is one example – but this is a laborious process. In September of this year, we will take stock at the G20 summit in Pittsburgh: What has been implemented from London, in what quality has this occurred in which part of the world, how do the things fit together?

This will be a tough piece of work, as we are already seeing first tendencies among banks that are making splendid deals with the government bonds that the states had to issue to save the banks. There is also the situation that some banks are under state influence while others have not needed state aid and are exploiting their comparatively independent situation to poach good personnel from the banks that are under state control. We also need to be careful about how this develops.

Why did we implement these bank rescue packages? We did not implement them for the bankers, for the banks. We implemented them for people like you and for savers. A modern economy – which includes Central Germany just as much as any other in Germany and Europe – needs a functioning credit system.

I agree with you when you say: We have lived beyond our means. The risks were far too high and the equity provisions were far too low. – There lies the key to preventing such a crisis in the future: strict equity requirements for banks so that they can bear the risks they take themselves. But we need financial institutions. Therefore, it makes no sense to retrospectively aim for their complete destruction. – Now there is a danger that we will have to pay a high part of the price for the value correction of what was overspent in the world and what needs to be brought back to a normal level.

In this context, I see in Germany two problems that I would like to address openly with you and can deepen in the discussion.

The

first

problem is that we have a banking landscape that is fundamentally not sufficient for our industrial base. Therefore, many international institutions have engaged, such as UniCredito – I have been told that they will engage further – the Royal Bank of Scotland – a major lender in Germany – or BNP Paribas. They have partially withdrawn from the German market because they themselves are in trouble, have received state aid from their home countries, and therefore are scaling back their foreign business. This is happening to some extent in Germany. However, it is happening especially in Central and Eastern Europe, which is putting those countries in even greater difficulties.

Our exports from Germany – which account for 40 percent of our gross domestic product – depend significantly on the functioning of the European market. In most sectors, exports to European countries, and significantly to Central and Eastern European countries, account for up to 70 percent. This means: It is not only interesting for us how we survive the crisis, but also how others survive this crisis so that we can export to those countries again.

We need a functioning economy that can also rely on long-term loans. Now the question of guarantee programs arises, as well as what you just brought up here. This is the question of corporations that are state-subsidized.

I want to point out that I still believe that Opel is a special case, and that is because Opel is 100 percent General Motors and General Motors is 70 percent owned by the American and Canadian government. Everything we have done so far is nothing more than separating Opel somewhat legally from General Motors and thus giving Opel a perspective in Europe. How this perspective will be used, we do not yet know today.

But we can discuss an interesting case with Opel. I am often told that too many cars are produced worldwide and that we therefore need a market correction. For me as Chancellor, the question arises: Is Opel the case where I contribute to the global market correction? That would require me to be sure that among the cars built in Europe, America, and elsewhere, Opel would have no chance of competitiveness. Everyone who has dealt with Opel, including financial investors like Ripplewood, has told us: catastrophic management, but very good car production. What do you think is the reason Fiat was interested in Opel? Not only because Fiat builds good cars on its own, but also because they know what they would have in Opel.

I do not want – and this is in the interest of all suppliers – that we have great regulatory discussions in Germany while all the countries around us are saving their companies, and then we can say: Germany has made a significant contribution to market consolidation due to overproduction in the world. I say: Yes, where it is necessary, because our products are not competitive. Where it is not necessary and where our products are competitive, I also look at what is happening in France, Britain, and America. We do not provide such aid as, for example, 30, 40, or 50 billion dollars that have already flowed to GM. This gives that company an extremely good starting chance. But I do believe that we should perhaps grant a bridging guarantee of 1.5 billion euros to enable a company like Opel to get a fresh start. If we had initiated insolvency, we would have had an interesting legal case for global law. The respective insolvency laws in America, Spain, England, and Germany would have applied. No lawyer could tell us how that would interact. Therefore, I ask you not to engage in a prototypical discussion at this point.

Regarding the guarantee programs. If our banks were to operate in a way that I found satisfactory, I would say: Then the federal government does not need to grant guarantees, although there are comprehensive state guarantee programs at all times that help companies. Sometimes it is pretended that such a thing did not exist before. But the banks do not operate as they used to. Basel II, in which I am trying to ensure at the European level that the procyclical effects, that is, also through the constant "downgrading" of certain sectors, do not automatically lead to ever worse credit conditions – that is a thick board that I have to drill – leads to healthy companies being granted loans only under conditions that no longer allow for profitable production. So I believe we can certainly help with guarantee programs.

Medium-sized companies have the characteristic that they are not all nationally known and therefore are not always a case for German television. I can tell you that of the 1,500 applications we have already received for our guarantee program, over 95 percent come from medium-sized companies. Every small company is treated just like every large one.

We tend to place the guarantee program at the center of our regulatory discussion. – There is less talk about short-time work. It is an excellent instrument to build a bridge. – Therefore, I say: Let us, of course, proceed according to uniform criteria. We have demonstrated with the example of Arcandor that those who had difficulties as early as summer 2008, when there was not even a crisis, cannot receive guarantees now because the business concept is not sound. Or they only receive the assistance that is always granted under normal insolvency law. That is also the case. But we want to help those who have fallen into a difficult situation due to the crisis. I believe that is already a significant difference from what was done in the former GDR, where efficiency really did not matter.

I say it again: I must ensure that we are not the only ones who are regulatory clean, while everyone else keeps their companies afloat in a small mix of state aid. The crisis is international. You cannot combat it without looking at what others are doing. That is my request to consider.

We know that by the middle of the next decade – in the new federal states even much earlier – we will have a significant shortage of skilled workers. This means we must have the intention to build bridges now to retain skilled workers for whom we have just built the market and who may be 35, 40, or 45 years old. You know in the new federal states what it means when there are no longer enough apprentices and trainees. The demographic change is much more pronounced here.

As a means of combating the crisis, we have proposed a variety of measures. The crafts and construction industries were allowed to benefit from infrastructure measures. I hope Halle has already decided what can be done in connection with schools and kindergartens. We have said: Let us invest in the future. That is reasonable. The means of short-time work is absolutely right, as I think. From July 1, 2009, health contributions will be reduced and tax relief will be introduced. We have improved the corporate tax reform with regard to procyclical effects so that the corporate tax reform does not lead to an acceleration of a company's difficulties. We have extended the existing regulation for the actual taxation of value-added tax for East Germany until 2011 and expanded it to West Germany, so that we also contribute to a bit more liquidity. In addition, there are infrastructure measures, especially transport projects, and much more. This does not mean that everyone no longer has difficulties. But I believe that the federal government has initiated quite a bit with its stimulus packages to overcome them.

It is particularly important to me that we pay attention now in the crisis to ensure that we come out of the crisis stronger than we went in. This means that we must not forget to invest in research and development. It is also important to me that when we talk about the state debts that are, of course, a huge problem, we understand that we must not embark on a path in the middle of the crisis that makes growth more difficult in the coming years. The question of who emerges strengthened and who weakened from this crisis, from this trough that we have probably now reached – a minus of six percent in gross domestic product for all of Germany has never happened before; during the oil crisis, there was once a minus of 0.9 percent, which was the worst the Federal Republic of Germany has ever experienced – and how we can one day deal with our debts again depends on how quickly we can get out of this trough. For me, this crisis is only over when we have reached the level of economic development before the crisis again. I do not mean the level of the trough, but the level when we are out of this trough. The path out is just as important as what we have experienced so far.

It sometimes seems that when you are at the bottom, you say: Now we have already spent so much money. Back then, I was driven by the thought that it was not enough and that I did not understand the extent of the crisis. When I now speak of the need to consider the way out of the crisis, there is suddenly a discussion about how much debt we are incurring, that no euro of the two stimulus programs is properly solidly financed and that all of this is additional debt. Therefore, I say: Let us complete the solution to the task sensibly so that we can take a solid financial path from a reasonable foundation with the help of the debt brake.

For the eastern federal states, this crisis will probably not have as dramatic an impact as for the export-oriented southern federal states, which are experiencing an extreme situation for the first time in decades because this is a completely export-driven crisis. Therefore, it will still require a lot of strength from us to make the right decisions here. "Right decisions" means for me to promote research and development and to do everything possible to ensure that the engineers coming from the universities do not become unemployed again after completing an ambitious course of study. This also means for me: No tax increases and, wherever procyclical effects occur in companies, the reduction of crisis-enhancing effects. We must do everything we can to quickly emerge from this crisis with the help of growth promotion.

The difficulty regarding the crisis is not only that it is an international crisis, but that it also affects the individual sectors very differently. This means that, for example, there are quite good developments in the pharmaceutical industry and in the entire healthcare market. Germany allows the automatic stabilizers to take effect. This also means that we do not increase social security contributions. This means we do nothing that leads to reductions in the benefits of the social security systems. We want to maintain domestic consumption to some extent in order to preserve purchasing power internally during the time when exports are collapsing.

We hope – I know this is the principle of hope, but we can do nothing else but build bridges – that by the end of this year, the growth paths internationally, from the Asian to the American markets, will rise again and that we will then also get onto a reasonable path. It is true: Everything must be done simultaneously to ensure that such a crisis cannot happen again. However, I would like us, when we look back in five years, not to find that Germany is the country that lost its leading position in the crisis. That would be a great shame. I must be completely honest: The danger exists, and one must not underestimate it. Therefore, we must continually look at how others are addressing these issues.

For the new federal states, investment grants and other funding programs are important and indispensable. The desire has been expressed by the prime ministers of the central German states to reintegrate the question of "Eastern Development" more strongly into the Chancellery, as this is a cross-cutting task. We will think about this after the election. We have the task of strengthening and further developing what has been created here in the coming years.

I believe that a significant contribution to this can be made by reducing bureaucracy. We have established the Regulatory Control Council. We have reduced bureaucratic costs related to reporting and statistical obligations. We want to reduce these by 25 percent by 2011. We rely on you to inform us about what is particularly difficult because we often do not know the effects in that regard. This is also a request to the chambers.

We want to do everything to ensure that the medium-sized sector is recognized as the backbone of our economy regarding the risks it takes and the services it provides in our country. Therefore, the two examples I just mentioned were very impressive, showing what you have achieved in the last 20 years. I know that you have to make many difficult decisions. It is very impressive to see how one can come from Germany to Norway, tap into new markets, tackle many things, and provide people with jobs. We are aware: The state cannot do that. The state needs money to enable public services, guarantee infrastructure, and provide reasonable educational offerings. That is all correct. But the companies lead you.

Therefore, I would like to conclude, before we enter into the discussion, with a heartfelt thank you for your daily work for the benefit of your employees, but also for the benefit of the Federal Republic of Germany. We can be proud of what we have achieved, but we must not rest on our laurels, as there is fierce competition worldwide for the best performances.