Speech by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel at the event of the Initiative for a New Social Market Economy "Success with Responsibility – made in Germany: the Social Market Economy" ...

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

2 June 2009 · Initiative for a New Social Market Economy event "Success with Responsibility – made in Germany: the Social Market Economy"

Context
Merkel addressed the Initiative for a New Social Market Economy conference in Berlin on June 2, 2009, amid a severe global financial crisis.
Main themes
Social market economy, international financial and economic crisis, Germany's export dependency, global economic governance and regulation, education and research investment, protectionism and fair competition, banking sector failures, financial market transparency, long-term economic reform, prosperity and innovation
Duration
~47 min
93rd percentile
Words
5,634
93rd percentile
Sentences
296
95th percentile
Readability
53
72nd percentile
Grade
10.5
26th percentile
Syntax
2.86
29th percentile
Vocabulary
2.04
16th percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 73%70%
  • Institutional 11%10%
  • Geopolitical 8%7%
  • Ceremonial 7%7%
  • Social 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 4%

296 sentences in 70 paragraphs

Dear Professor Tietmeyer,

dear Mr. Kannegiesser,

Commissioner Almunia,

Mr. Draghi,

Mr. Federal Minister of Economics, dear Mr. zu Guttenberg,

Excellencies,

ladies and gentlemen,

dear colleagues from the parliaments,

thank you very much for the invitation to this conference of the Initiative for a New Social Market Economy at an extraordinary time.

Professor Tietmeyer, last year we were together at a celebratory event at the Federal Ministry of Economics on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Social Market Economy. At that time, we agreed that the Social Market Economy is a successful model, that it embodies "made in Germany" in a special way and "prosperity for all" in a comprehensive sense, as has not been the case in Germany before.

In my speech at that time, I said that we are, of course, facing new challenges. Since an international financial and economic crisis of this magnitude was not yet on the horizon, I primarily pointed out the long-term necessities that would continue to make the Social Market Economy a successful model in Western Europe and especially in Germany. I said then: After "prosperity for all," it is important that we ensure in the coming years that education for all lays the foundations for innovation, creativity, research capability, and renewal power to be the hallmark of the future for Germany. Nothing has changed in this regard due to the crisis. As a medium- and long-term goal, this will remain on the agenda.

In the meantime, something has happened. We have agreed between the federal and state governments to spend ten percent on education and research by the year 2015, of which three percent is for research. In the coming years, for example, South Korea will spend 4.5 percent of its gross domestic product on research and development. This means that we are not at the forefront of the world in this area.

However, we are now facing an international crisis that particularly affects the export nation of Germany. Just on the 60th birthday of the Federal Republic of Germany, we are likely to record the most severe economic downturn. People no longer believe the forecasts as they did before, but the facts of the first quarter unfortunately suggest that the forecast of minus six percent is not so far off regarding economic growth. When one considers that the largest decline in economic development in the Federal Republic of Germany so far was minus 0.9 percent, it shows the dimension and the challenge we are facing.

The good thing in times of a prosperous world economy for Germany was and is a high export capacity. In times of depressed world markets, export orientation naturally becomes a challenge. All the more, Germany has an inherent interest in drawing the right lessons from this crisis and ensuring that the world economy as a whole gets back on its feet quickly, as this is also a prerequisite for economic growth here. To say it right away: I do not believe in the discussions that we need to change and should not be so dependent on exports anymore. I neither believe that this is feasible, nor do I think that we could compensate for anything through domestic demand – especially not in light of our demographic development. We must therefore continue to build on our strengths.

However, this crisis is reshuffling the cards in the world. Not always does regulatory behavior characterize the crisis management of other countries in the world. I observe this very closely. We need equal playing fields and must, as an export nation, do everything to prevent protectionist or unilateral behavior by individual countries from creating a completely distorted international competitive environment.

What is the cause of this international financial and economic crisis? Professor Tietmeyer just hinted at this. These causes go back a long way. They certainly lie in certain technical developments in the banking sector, in the beautiful information technology that allowed the packaging, reshuffling, and sorting of financial market products that were hardly understandable even as originals, leading to obfuscations and allowing the whole thing to drift into a high sphere of detachment. An interesting phenomenon is that even bankers can no longer explain their own products after three rounds of reshuffling. Such a thing, in my opinion, only happens once in history when humanity is still somewhat clear-headed.

One of the causes was that there was only a small circle of experts in this field, almost all of whom were embedded in the business itself, thus participating in the profits, and therefore there was no knowledgeable public oversight.

The second point is that it all played out internationally. This means it was largely beyond the reach of individual nation-states. Therefore, an international framework must be created.

I fully agree with you that the cause does not lie solely in the economy. Economic actors behave as they behave. It is of little use to appeal to the moral quality of each individual actor. That does not work; no matter how much one may regret it. Therefore, in dealing with the crisis and preventing a recurrence, it is primarily about creating a proper regulatory framework that does not stifle all market forces and restricts them too much.

Among the causes, in my view, ultimately lies a behavior that was also politically supported, for example, by the monetary policy in the United States and by the refusal to adopt any rules at the major stock exchanges of this world. During our G8 presidency, we fought a very desperate battle based on small examples. But ultimately, what lies behind it for me is that growth was declared the overriding goal, and thus all sins below this target were accepted – and for a long time seemingly to the advantage of many actors. It is true that Germany also benefited from this because exports were doing well.

One can have a long discussion in the sense of the chicken-and-egg debate about who is to blame. That does not help us now. We must fight this crisis and draw lessons from it. I also say this: The experience of the people in Germany is already a very fundamental one. We were on a course that began with Agenda 2010 and was continued by the Grand Coalition, which showed the people: Reforms can bring success. The number of unemployed had fallen below three million. The budgets had stabilized. We were on a good path regarding compliance with the stability criteria of the European Union. We had, for the second time – the first time was shortly before German reunification under Finance Minister Theo Waigel – the chance for a balanced federal budget, in which no new debts would have been incurred at the federal level within a year. All of this was abruptly shattered. This is a fundamental experience that we must politically deal with. Nevertheless, we must continue to encourage people not to close themselves off to reforms and changes. This will occupy us very, very much in the coming years.

Since we cannot or can hardly hold anyone responsible for the crisis, the only political legitimacy is to tell the people: Yes, we have drawn the lessons from the crisis. These must be lessons of the international community.

It is interesting to look back at the beginnings of the history of the Social Market Economy. I am not an expert; I say that right away. But it is very exciting to see what lessons were drawn from the world economic crisis back then. The Ludwig Erhard Foundation has published a very nice document on this. Because the Social Market Economy is so important to us, we all tend to instrumentalize it a bit for our respective purposes. Therefore, it is sometimes good to go back to the origins.

The world economic crisis was a fundamental experience, where one had to recognize that there are situations in which market forces simply no longer work and therefore state regulatory measures become absolutely necessary to bring market forces back into action. That is exactly the experience we have had now. After the end of the German Democratic Republic and since my active participation as a citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany, I had not imagined that representatives of the markets would come to me and say: Either you intervene state-wise, or the entire economy collapses. That was the situation in the autumn of last year. It was not said: Think again, reconsider. Instead, it was said in the spirit of: If it does not happen tonight, everything is over.

A truly interesting and exciting pressure was unleashed, which I tried to cushion somewhat. But there was not much to be done because the international community simply made this demand after the fall of Lehman Brothers. My only request is that one occasionally remembers that there are situations in which it is not so bad that there are states. If they had not existed, we would not be sitting here so calmly in the Hotel Adlon today. However, the state now has the task – and this is rightly viewed by the population and the public with the greatest sensitivity – to bring market forces back into action. This is primarily the task in the banking sector. We have had sufficiently many contentious discussions about this.

The American response to the world economic crisis was somewhat different. It was less characterized by regulatory policy but was, for example, much more focused on a pragmatic active fight against the crisis in practical implementation through Keynes. It is quite interesting that, in light of these different approaches today, so many years later, we can better understand some political discussions that we have between Europe and the United States. As always, I believe that the right answer lies in a good mix of both approaches: One is concrete crisis management, the other are the long-term consequences that we have to draw.

Germany has plunged into many regulatory discussions. This ranged from Professor Sinn's statement that we should nationalize the banks to statements that this would be the very last resort. Everything was present in the political spectrum.

We have long struggled with the question of expropriating a bank. We debated it for so long and built so many barriers that fortunately it may not come to that. The effort was worth it. One must say that. But it was also somewhat strange that solely because we declared that a systemically relevant bank cannot go bankrupt, the normal procedure for the insolvency of such a bank was excluded, meaning that a market-based instrument was not available, and thus the direction of what one could still do changed. The taxpayer cannot ultimately pay for an institution that would actually no longer exist, and only because of the systemic obligation that we cannot let it go bankrupt. To prop it up with taxpayer money until it makes excellent profits again is a philosophy that I, as Chancellor, can hardly support.

We states – this will still need to be discussed in the future; and on this question, I honestly say I have no answer yet – have made a commitment within the framework of the international financial world that banks with systemic risk cannot go bankrupt, which binds us in an extraordinary way. Once a bank knows this, it only has to grow large enough. Then it has the states in its hands, so to speak. Therefore, we must ask ourselves what framework conditions we set. One may also need to consider – perhaps the discussants today can talk about this – whether a country with a relatively low gross domestic product can have an unlimited number of large banks without it being clear what risks arise from that. Because otherwise, the state itself can no longer fulfill its commitments. Even with these commitments, it is in a difficult situation.

I do not want to hide at this point that I see with some concern that there are banks that, if they come out of the crisis well, will have an excellent business field simply due to the fact that states have spent so much money to rescue the banks, namely the buying and selling of government bonds. This will last for a few more years. I also observe this critically because it poses certain risks. This means we need to achieve a reasonable self-risk coverage for financial institutions in the future. One element of this is retaining the own products that have been touted as so great. We have now reached five percent. There was already a great outcry at ten percent. I have been somewhat surprised by that. But okay, five percent is better than nothing.

Then there is the question of international oversight. What happens with banks that operate across regions? Here in Europe, we struggle with this. However, I say that for me there is no alternative to a European banking supervision. That is not a question. But that alone is not enough. We need institutions that do this globally. Regarding the question of whether this can be done solely intergovernmentally or whether an institution like the FSB or the IMF must take on a stronger responsibility, I, as a European who has already come to terms with the fact that nation-states must cede competencies to Brussels, tend to say: We must not declare the ceding of competencies in these matters as taboo. Mr. Professor Issing has developed a risk atlas of the most important financial institutions with his group for us. I think that is an interesting idea that we should pursue further.

When I look at the speed of the G20 process, I can state that we had a very successful meeting in London. We are now at the level of the arduous implementation. But we must be careful that we do not lose momentum before the actual conclusions are drawn. There are still several thick boards to drill through. I see the danger that the renewed strength of the financial markets makes things more difficult for us very clearly. Anyone who comes out of the crisis somewhat strengthened will try to resist future regulations. In this respect, the G20 meeting in the fall in Pittsburgh – incidentally on September 24 and 25 – will have a certain urgency. If we do not succeed there in properly tying down the structural issues, it will be very, very difficult to make progress in the recovery process of the world economy.

If it is true that the deeper causes ultimately lie in the fact that we have accepted building growth on deficits and accepted imbalances in the world, a procedure is needed – I would like to do this in the form of a "Charter for Sustainable Economics" – in which we agree on fundamental principles of an international financial market architecture and certain principles. Many are currently avoiding this, even though the G20 has decided that we should work on such a charter, because the developing and emerging countries fear that growth will be restricted for them – that is the primal fear we also have with all environmental agreements – and because the developed countries do not want to commit themselves regarding their deficits.

I am firmly convinced: Just as we have Mr. Almunia and the European Commission, who repeatedly remind us of the Stability and Growth Pact, we must make similar agreements worldwide. Otherwise, we will not achieve a level playing field that I have mentioned. Since in the time of globalization risks are always distributed among all and profits can remain concentrated among a few, this goal is absolutely imperative for me, because otherwise we will not achieve an evolutionary continuous and sustainable development of the world economy.

We will have to clarify structural issues, which I do not want to go into further here. We have not yet found the international format. On one side, we have the G8 plus the G5 – India, China, Mexico, Brazil, and South Africa – which we have brought to a common discussion culture in the Heiligendamm process on the platform of the OECD. This process will probably be extended by two years under the Italian G8 presidency. That is good. Competing with this is the format of heads of state and government that emerged from the G20 finance ministers' format. There is still no international agreement – we need to discuss this in the summer in Italy – on how these two formats will develop in relation to each other. The G20 is not yet a guarantee that there will be global acceptance. Therefore, it is necessary to skillfully link the group of 20 with the respective regional economic organizations to gain broad support from the African Union, the Latin American, and Asian regions. If we look closely, we see that alliances in the regions are strengthening and that we can derive a better global action option from this.

I have always advocated the term "New Social Market Economy," almost simultaneously with your initiative. I have done this from the understanding that we need a new dimension of the Social Market Economy, namely the international one.

Mr. Kannegiesser just told me, when you spoke about the Social Market Economy and that certainly not every facet is exportable, so nicely: The Germans still always think first of export. We have not done badly with that. I say: The basic principles of the Social Market Economy must become the foundation of global economics, whether we call it that or not. We need a regulatory framework. States or institutions must be the guardians of this regulatory framework. Otherwise, there will be severe eruptions worldwide again and again in the long term.

Now we have a crisis. I would like to say something about its management from the perspective of the national Social Market Economy. I believe the bank rescue has been reasonably successful. However, we face various problems.

First:

We have always known that Germany has a rather underdeveloped banking sector. The fact that international banks have largely withdrawn from the German business because they are first occupied with themselves, partly nationalized, and not very active regionally poses a significant problem for our industrial nation with regard to long-term regional investments. There are fewer players.

Second:

Regarding the banks. I will leave Deutsche Bank aside for now. It has come through the crisis well, as long as everything remains as it is at the moment. Sometimes it is a bit funny: If a bank comes through well – I have not shared every communication from Deutsche Bank – and we have one less problem child, we do not need to get upset, but can be satisfied that one is not causing us problems. I want to say that at this point as well.

Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank decided to merge before the crisis, which we have always considered a good idea. However, this has not led to a significant increase in their lending volume. The difficulties they carried with them have contributed to the fact that they cannot develop to full bloom in a short time.

Then there are the state banks in Germany. – The savings banks have performed well. I want to say that explicitly. Sometimes the co-owners overshadow this, but we are still working on that problem. – The state banks also need to restructure. However, if they restructure too quickly during the crisis, their lending volume will not grow either. We need to be careful that this takes place in a reasonable sequence and that suitable business models are available. It is also an interesting question how one can operate for a long time without a business model.

From my perspective, we are now in a very special phase of bank rescue and consolidation. Everyone has recognized that intensive intervention was necessary – in a hospital, one would speak of an intensive care unit. But now the rehabilitation phase is actually beginning, in which it is about bad banks and toxic papers. We must be careful not to spare efforts here, because otherwise we will have surviving banks but not fully operational banks. Therefore, the question of how we deal with these toxic papers and what solution we find that burdens the taxpayer as little as possible is one of the crucial and exciting questions that the whole world is grappling with, by the way. The philosopher's stone has not yet been found by anyone, but various approaches are in circulation. That is what occupies us in the banking sector.

I am also concerned about another issue: We in the European Union have – as orderly as we are – implemented the Basel II agreement one-to-one and with a nice directive. The Americans have not done that. I had already discussed this with the then president during our G8 presidency.

What is rightly conceived now proves in the crisis firstly to be distorting competition against America and secondly to be equipped with incredible pro-cyclical effects.

This means that Basel II, the pro-cyclical effects, and the accounting rules are points we need to work on, especially for the time of the crisis. For the time afterwards, we have already established that we will need capital reserves at the banks that are built up in good times and then made available in times of crisis. But that is future music that we need to think about, which does not help us in the present.

From all I hear, it is the case that if we do not do something about the pro-cyclical effects of Basel II in the coming months of summer and fall, we will face significant credit restrictions and the effect that growth will start more slowly than it could will become very strong. Therefore, my heartfelt request, especially to Mr. Draghi and Mr. Almunia: Please dedicate yourselves to this issue. It is a back-and-forth, no one is really responsible, and no one wants to commit a regulatory sin. But if we had even a hint of the vehemence with which we have dealt with other matters regarding this part, that would be very good. In any case, we will continue to push for this from Germany.

How do we now get through the valley of the crisis? Sometimes it is portrayed as if, once we have reached the low point, the crisis is over. The crisis is, of course, only over when we reach the point we were at in 2008. But what does the economic trend look like, the form of how we come out of this crisis? A V-shaped trend would be the best: quickly down, quickly up. But that probably will not happen. The question of which country in the world will come out of this crisis how strong or how weak will be decided along a U-shaped trend, so to speak at a "bathtub" – whether it is a sitting bathtub, a stretching bathtub, or a children's bathtub. In any case, it is crucial that one does not linger long at the bottom but comes out as quickly as possible. Therefore, it will also be so important in the coming years that we focus on reasonable sustainable growth and do not impose restrictions that continue to constrict us.

We have now reacted and asked ourselves what our greatest treasure in Germany is. That is our skilled workers, masters, and engineers; no question about it. Therefore, we are doing everything to support market forces where they are not yet functioning properly, in the form of short-time work, infrastructure programs, and also guarantees, which I will come to shortly. I believe that the idea of short-time work was a very reasonable one. I want to make it clear here: All our measures are designed so that they apply the same criteria for freelancers who have one employee to companies that have one hundred thousand employees. Also, when it comes to the granting of guarantees, there is now much talk about only helping the big ones and not the small ones. However, I believe there are already 345 cases in which smaller companies have also been helped. They are just not so well known that they make it into the general news. But a lot is being done in this regard.

We have agreed on tax and levy reliefs that will come into effect, especially on July 1 – both in the tax area in the context of cold progression and tax allowances as well as in the levies regarding health costs, which will then bring the additional wage costs down to less than 40 percent. That is something that is, of course, a lighter burden for the economy than in other times.

With all these things, we have two things done.

Firstly,

we have made a contribution for ourselves in Germany so that domestic demand and especially consumption have not collapsed so far.

Secondly,

This is also a contribution that we make to address the international crisis. Because just this year, our trade balance will change by at least 130 billion euros in favor of imports, as exports have collapsed while imports remain strong because we continue to consume. Thus, we are one of the countries – as confirmed by the IMF – that is making a significant contribution to stabilizing the world markets. In addition, there are the automatic stabilizers that we have in Germany, which, given our broadly developed social security system, of course, have a much stronger effect than is the case in other countries. In this respect, we have indeed made good contributions.

Now it is clear that, after the banks have somewhat fallen out of focus, the entire political discourse and discussion is naturally concentrating on the individual cases in which companies have encountered difficulties.

In this regard, I would like to address two things and explain the approach using the examples of Opel and Arcandor.

I maintain that we had a special case with Opel, for which I do not see a second such case in comparison, and that we have, however, established a clear procedure for all other cases that is not politically dependent from the very first moment. We have agreed on a guarantee program and criteria for this guarantee program – this was decided in the Cabinet – and have set up a guarantee committee. There is a so-called steering committee, which is politically staffed by state secretaries. But we have also installed a steering council, which has economic experts, and in cases of fundamental importance or above a certain guarantee threshold, which is set at 300 million euros, it must provide its recommendation in light of the results of the guarantee committee before the steering committee makes a decision.

I have the firm intention – I believe this unites me with the Federal Minister of Economics; and this is also agreed upon within the entire government – to proceed according to this procedure and – some think one should do this or that – not to act otherwise. If we do not do this, we will, of course, find ourselves in an extremely difficult situation, because then it would only be about sympathies, antipathies, and the sizes of companies that exist or do not exist. This cannot possibly work with a guarantee framework of 100 billion euros or 115 billion euros, if you include the small and medium-sized enterprises. Therefore, this procedure will also be followed in the case of Arcandor. The political discourse will also be guided by this.

We had to decide on the future of Opel. Here, the situation turned out to be extraordinarily complicated. I believe this was also the basis of our entire discussion. It is very difficult to assess the risks in this case. We had a negotiation situation involving an American parent company with a European or largely German company. This American company is now essentially owned 60 percent by U.S. government representatives and 12 percent by Canadian government representatives, so 72 percent by state institutions. With this ownership structure, it entered a special American bankruptcy procedure, in which, however, the framework conditions, the regulatory framework for the bankruptcy, were set by the state. We were very keen to achieve a separation of the European area from the American area.

We can now speculate for a long time about whether it would have been possible to achieve this separation if we had immediately set a bankruptcy in Europe and Germany. To the business representatives present here, I just want to say: That would not have been so great for you either. The nice pension protection association would have first offered a burden of four billion euros. Whether they would have appreciated that there, I do not know. I am now looking at Mr. Kannegiesser, because he said something about it this morning. But I have already exchanged views with him on everything. Then there is, of course, the fact that we do not have a creditor bank for Opel. This means that if it had come to what is now the case with Qimonda, namely a bankruptcy procedure, in which the insolvency benefits are paid by the Federal Employment Agency and the operating costs are paid by the creditor banks, then the creditor banks for the payment of the operating costs would have been state banks. All of this had to be weighed.

I still respect the concerns of the Federal Minister of Economics and would like to express my sincere thanks at this point, because, of course, the interests of the German state must also be represented. If one accepts everything from the very beginning under any conditions, then that is, of course, not particularly helpful. The Minister of Economics has made sure at this point that we have fully represented our interests.

We have agreed that we will now go the route of the bridging phase and the potential investor Magna. It must be made very clear: Magna has not yet signed a binding contract. These are letters of intent. We have politically made it as concrete as one can, but every legal document – there will also be several lawyers here – begins with all that is not yet binding, and only then comes what one intends. Since I am a physicist and do not know the difference between the correct result and the binding result, I must be equipped with the utmost caution in this regard.

So we are giving Opel a chance. I consider that fair. But I also say: We have agreed in the government that the guarantee framework is limited. In the new legal structure, Opel must manage with this guarantee framework. We are aware of the risks. We know that there are opportunities. But without any financial commitment from the state, it would not have been possible in any case. We sincerely wish all the best to the employees at Opel.

Insolvency lawyers have also told us that one could perhaps have made legal history by looking at how German and European bankruptcy procedures would interact with "Chapter 11" and how that would then move back and forth. But in these times, we were all less interested in new doctoral theses in the legal field than in a practical rescue. Overall, I consider the result to be justifiable, but not risk-free, to be completely clear. That one can arrive at very different results in this complex risk assessment goes without saying.

I believe the most complicated phase regarding the future of the social market economy will begin when we have overcome the crisis. Can we manage – the opposite of what has been the truly terrible aspect of past crises – to return to the path of virtue, particularly regarding public debt? When will this point be reached? That the European Commission can currently simply operate "business as usual," although it previously urged us as states to spend as much money as possible to get the economy going again, I believe it knows itself. But the independence of the European Central Bank must be maintained, and the measures that other central banks are currently taking must be rolled back. I view with great skepticism the powers that, for example, the Fed has and how the Bank of England has also carved out its little lines in the European area. The European Central Bank has already somewhat yielded to international pressure with the purchase of covered bonds. We must collectively return to an independent central bank policy and a policy of reason. Otherwise, we will find ourselves back at exactly this point in ten years.

Because it will not work – this is the lesson from the social market economy – without mechanisms, without rules, and without social agreements, it is so important to establish an international financial market order. And for us as member states of the European Union, it is important to adhere to the discipline of our own treaties. This will require the hardest political work from all of us. If some buy short-term growth again by circumventing these rules, it will be politically nearly impossible for others to demand compliance with the rules from their own population. Therefore, the solution to this international financial and economic crisis will also be a test of our cooperation in the world. I will continue to demand this strongly.

We all currently have so many daily problems to solve that the long-term perspective can be lost. But that must not happen, because otherwise we will fall into a severe crisis of the entire political system. I do not want that, because I am a friend of democracy and have experienced it as a wonderful life experience through German unity. Therefore, I will fight to ensure that we draw the right lessons.