Speech by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel at the Frankfurt Finance Summit 2011 on March 23, 2011, in Frankfurt/Main:

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

26 March 2011 · Frankfurt Finance Summit 2011 · House of Finance, Frankfurt, Germany

Context
Merkel addressed the Frankfurt Finance Summit on March 23, 2011, speaking at the House of Finance on global upheaval, Libya, and strengthening Frankfurt as a financial center.
Main themes
Financial center of Frankfurt, global financial crisis aftermath, North Africa uprisings, Libya conflict and UN resolution, Germany's foreign policy stance, European stability, demographic challenges in North Africa, international sanctions, economic development, foundation establishment
Duration
~42 min
91st percentile
Words
5,019
91st percentile
Sentences
244
93rd percentile
Readability
52
67th percentile
Grade
11.2
35th percentile
Syntax
3.09
59th percentile
Vocabulary
2.03
15th percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 53%52%
  • Institutional 16%16%
  • Geopolitical 11%11%
  • Ceremonial 11%11%
  • Environmental 7%7%
  • Social 3%3%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Not in focus 1%

244 sentences in 53 paragraphs

Dear Prime Minister, dear Volker Bouffier,

dear Madam Mayor, dear Petra Roth,

dear Mr. Raettig,

dear President Trichet,

dear President of the Bundesbank Weber,

dear Professor Müller-Esterl,

dear Professor König,

ladies and gentlemen,

I am very pleased to be here today – in the House of Finance, which is embedded in Frankfurt University;

firstly

, because I have heard a lot of good things about the university, and secondly

, because my former economic advisor, the future President of the Bundesbank, has strongly recommended this institution of the House of Finance and the foundations to be established, as he was firmly convinced, a conviction I immediately adopted at the time, that something very good and important is being created here. With the establishment of the foundation today, an important step is also being taken to strengthen the financial center of Frankfurt, so that not only the practical everyday life of finance takes place here, but also young people receive an appealing education, thereby giving a dynamic, sustainable, and future-oriented financial center another facet. This is, of course, a very, very good initiative.

I have come to you today at a time when the world is in a rather eventful phase of upheaval. We all thought that after overcoming this international financial and economic crisis, we had already experienced very eventful days, weeks, and months. But we are now witnessing further developments that keep us on our toes. I believe this applies not only to politics but also to everyone interested in global developments.

There are, this is my first point, the developments in North Africa that have been ongoing for several weeks and months, which, from the impression one gets when following the news, are far from over. The Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia, the changes in Egypt, the current events in Libya, as well as in Bahrain, Yemen, and partly also in Syria and Algeria. It shows something that is also a reflection of the interconnected structures worldwide, namely that people everywhere have the desire to live freer from corruption, from torture, that they want to move away from the absence of freedom of expression and be able to shape their own lives. This change often occurs in a way that has no tradition and is therefore highly associated with unpredictable outcomes.

At the moment, the focus is on Libya. I would like to say at this point that we, of course, want the end of a war that Gaddafi is waging against his own people, along with everyone else in the world, and that we believe that every effort must be made to bring about an end to the war. Germany has long been advocating – I will reiterate this tomorrow at the European Council – for an oil embargo, because we believe that this could hit Gaddafi and his regime hard. Therefore, we also support all sanctions.

As you know, we are now a member of the UN Security Council and have therefore also had to work on the resolution that deals with the conditions and requirements for Libya. We have expressed concerns regarding the so-called no-fly zone and military attacks. This has led to Germany's abstention. With this, we are not neutral, but we have made our position clear – when I say "our," I mean that of the entire federal government. This has led to a broad discussion, to which I would like to say: Of course, for us, as for all other partners, this resolution is now adopted, and we wish every success for its implementation and enforcement.

Germany will not participate with soldiers in this military operation. However, there are also military operations in which others are not involved or have not been involved. I want to remind you of UNIFIL or the election observation in Congo, where Germany was involved and, for example, the United States was not. So I believe we can argue very calmly about this as well.

We wish for a successful implementation of the UN resolution, and we will have to undertake a lot politically to shape the developments in North Africa sensibly, positively, and fruitfully. Because we will also experience, if we do not take care – and when I say "we," I mean representatives of both business and politics – that North Africa can develop positively, dynamically, and with a forward-looking approach, that we will have a problem in Europe, because people will then go where they expect prosperity. From my perspective, prosperity must be created at home. That is the task we face – at the moment both in Tunisia and in Egypt.

If you look at the demographic composition there, you see that almost 50 percent of the people are under 25 years old. They have demographic problems in a completely different way than we do. These young people want to have a perspective. Therefore, the uprisings there are a mixture of individual needs for freedom and, of course, the longing for a growing standard of living. Therefore, we will have to consider together, wherever possible, in business and politics, how we can promote economic development. This is not an easy task.

There is talk of a new partnership, which I strongly support. Such a new partnership – sometimes referring to the Marshall Plan of the United States for Europe after World War II – may be correct. Nevertheless, the question arises whether the structures that exist there provide the points of connection that lead to good market-oriented development. Who are the people with whom we can initiate economic development there?

All these complicated questions can be clarified precisely in a partnership between politics and business in Germany and Europe, because many companies that work in the region also have experience with the mentality and the approach of the people there. Certainly, we cannot simply impose our kind of progress there as a stamp, but we must provide help for self-help. Anything else will go wrong. I am deeply convinced of that.

Second

point. We have experienced a shocking earthquake and tsunami in Japan, which has left us all speechless in its magnitude, followed by a serious accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant, the end of which we cannot yet foresee. Certainly, the situation in a highly developed industrial country, even though it is very far from us, where such an accident occurs, is an event that does not leave anyone unchanged compared to before this earthquake and these events. I personally do not believe that this is possible.

Therefore – German election campaigns notwithstanding – I say this is an event that impresses and changes the world. Therefore, I also believe it is right to take a moment to pause and consider what we can learn from such an event. That is why we have decided to implement a comprehensive safety review for all nuclear power plants within the framework of a moratorium and to discuss energy policy in Germany once again during this time. We have done this often. We do this in Germany with great passion and also very controversially. But discussing energy policy that is rationally justified does not mean shutting down German nuclear power plants only to import nuclear energy from other countries in our neighborhood. Rather, we must strive to create a future energy supply, also using bridging technologies. This is a task we must face. Personally, I say from the experience with the incidents in Japan: The sooner the exit from nuclear energy is possible, the better. But it must be an exit with moderation.

After all, Germany has a consensus that does not exist in all countries, namely that nuclear energy is, so to speak, a bridging technology. This means that it is also to be replaced by renewable energies. However, this also means that we must continue to focus on affordable electricity and on jobs that are not relocated to places where environmental standards are not taken into account. And this also means that those who may be more attached to classical technologies must develop more passion for entering the age of renewable energies. At the same time, those who are so eager to talk about the age of renewable energy must be willing to truly create the necessary new infrastructure and not immediately stand at the forefront of every citizen movement when a new high-voltage line is needed.

I believe that the Japanese, with their inherent steadfastness and courage, will manage to rebuild. We stand by them wherever possible. What impact the catastrophe will have on global economic developments is currently difficult to assess. I do not believe that we need to have the greatest fears at the moment. But this also depends on the question of developments in Fukushima, as it naturally causes great concern when limits for food and other things rise.

We must keep all of this in mind, because we know from the international financial and economic crisis that our world is so interconnected that, even if thousands of kilometers separate us, all events can also affect us elsewhere, just as events in Germany or Europe can influence other continents. Therefore, tomorrow at the European Council, we will also discuss the topic of nuclear energy, stress tests for nuclear power plants – it is good that we have already invented this term for banks; it is now being further developed by EU Commissioner Oettinger – and comparable safety standards. In addition, we will also revise safety standards at the International Atomic Energy Agency and discuss them within the framework of the G20.

It is now just over a year since the Greek problem became increasingly virulent, and we in Europe were actually faced with a situation that I could not have imagined for many years – at least with regard to the euro. The euro was introduced, the euro had worked well and wonderfully. By the way, it still works very well today. But at that time, what we now refer to as "spreads" had come together in a nearly miraculous way. Interest rates were almost harmonious among all European countries. The euro – as it still proves today, as I want to reiterate – has demonstrated the stability that we Germans were accustomed to from the Deutsche Mark. If we look at the inflation rate of recent years, we see that it was even more stable than the Deutsche Mark in its last years.

Then came the international financial and economic crisis. I was known as someone who struggled with the economic stimulus programs and always preferred to wait another day because I saw the consequences of public debt on the horizon and asked myself as a responsible, but not stingy person: Do you have to incur this debt or not? But it was absolutely undisputed that economic stimulus programs had to be implemented. I believe we Germans did quite well with short-time work, with the municipal investment program, with many practical things that were accountable. But as a result, state debts naturally increased. Consequently, people decided to take a closer look at the situation in Europe and specifically in the euro area. This, in turn, led to significant tensions in this area.

You know all of this and understand that we had to respond politically. It is very important that it is not the euro – as Jean-Claude Trichet often said – that is in crisis, but we have a debt crisis in various states and problems with various banks. And it is also very important that when you have a difficult situation, at least an analysis is made in such a way that the right remedy can be put on the way. Thus, it was necessary, on the one hand, to show solidarity, factual solidarity, which was demonstrated in the rescue program for Greece, and later in the so-called EFSF. But it was also necessary to make a political commitment to the euro, which the market participants have since understood.

The euro is our common currency. A country like Germany, as the largest economy in Europe, has perhaps benefited more from the euro than others. It is unimaginable how many purchases of other currencies and how many currency crises we would have had in various European countries if this euro had not existed during the international financial and economic crisis. It has also guided us quite calmly through the most difficult time of this crisis. And from my perspective, it has proven itself. However, the crisis has revealed that the individual countries are significantly different in their economic performance, and therefore the question of how to manage national debt is answered very differently by the markets.

It also shows that there are countries that do not have such high overall debt and are still viewed with skepticism in the focus of the markets. Then there are others whose overall debt may be somewhat higher, but which are expected to have better growth rates. I will, of course, not name any examples here, but will only say this theoretically. In any case, it was a process for all of us in the European Union to accept that solidarity on one side was necessary. But it was also a process to accept that solidarity is not possible without a quid pro quo, that is, without stabilization efforts from the respective country.

Now one can – and this is indeed done in public and also in Parliament to some extent – talk for a long time about how many years sins were committed, how many years the Stability and Growth Pact was not properly accepted. But that does not help us today. The question is: Have we drawn the right lessons and do we give credibility to the lessons we have drawn by finally fulfilling the requirements? I must again say, when I consider the time span from February 2010 to March 2011, that Europe has gone through quite a rapid learning process, which is reflected in a completely new architecture. On one side, we have support mechanisms – the European Financial Facility, the EFSF, with Greece currently being a program participant – and on the other side – we will discuss this in Brussels tomorrow and the day after – the outlook for a permanent stabilization mechanism, the so-called ESM. We have fought hard over how this is to be filled in the sui generis construction of the European Union. Because we did not have a No-Bail-Out clause for nothing when introducing the euro; that means no state is liable for the debts of another.

It was overlooked at that time that situations could arise in which problems in one country could jeopardize the stability of the euro as a whole, and thus everyone could be affected. We had to find an answer to such a situation. We are now doing this through a limited amendment to the treaty and by naming the fact that the euro as a whole can be endangered and that it is then the collective task of all to counteract this. And we are doing this through the design of the ESM. It is important for us – and this is certainly not always seen as the optimal solution from the perspective of the central bank or those working in financial institutions – that this is done intergovernmentally. That this is decided unanimously, because the budgetary rights as the king's right of the respective national parliament must not be endangered. The Federal Constitutional Court has also reiterated this in its ruling on the Lisbon Treaty.

When one focuses on Europe and looks at this entity as a market participant, one wonders: How could we best obtain a commitment to Europe and this euro? Would it not be advisable to issue common government bonds, so-called euro bonds, to know that the euro countries feel responsible for each other? I am very grateful to Jean-Claude Trichet for making it clear that this would be a way, but not the best, because it would obscure the fact that the capacities for economic strength in Europe are very unevenly distributed. Then we would have solidarity, but a form of solidarity that would not exclude the possibility that we could collectively slide into a precarious situation. The question is not only whether we are being solidary, at least for me as Chancellor, but also where our solidarity ends, whether we as the European Union will still be an interesting competitive factor in global markets or whether we will slide into mediocrity and lower categories. This may not matter to financial market participants where this leads, but it does matter to me. And it must also matter to those who want prosperity.

Therefore, uniform interest rates must emerge from similar competitive strength, but not through forced communalization in areas where this communalization is not helpful. This gives rise to the conditions for support through the EFSF and the ESM – strict conditionality, reform programs, and for that again solidarity. The question is how we can achieve this when the sins of the past are too great? We must also consider a permanent mechanism that involves creditors in the rescue measures, and in a predictable manner. Anything else would bring significant disadvantages to the European financial markets.

What I find very interesting at the moment is – you read this every day – that on one hand there is a permanent discussion about restructuring or debt relief, and at the same time it is repeatedly said: Under no circumstances should you change the rules of the EFSF, you must maintain them, you must show reliability. I understand that, but it is all the more important that when we enter a permanent mechanism, such options are available so that everyone can prepare for them in good time. By setting these options parallel to the rules of the IMF, no one can say that we are playing an international special role in the euro area.

We now have a discussion about Greece, to which we have granted a certain reduction in interest rates compared to the original program – in exchange for a commitment to go beyond the agreed reform program in terms of privatization. I believe it is a good step that Greece is opening up in this area. We are still in talks with Ireland. The principle of performance and quid pro quo must always be maintained. At least as important as the ESM – I would say more important – is the sharpening of the Stability and Growth Pact. Because one is the EFSF and ESM – rescue mechanisms that one would rather not want to use at all – the other is, so to speak, the precaution to ensure that such cases do not occur again.

For this, the Stability Pact has now gained much more teeth – on the one hand, a stronger consideration of prevention. Before the Maastricht criteria are even violated, the Commission can already take action. On the other hand: stricter enforcement of the Maastricht criteria, especially regarding overall debt. In this regard, we have committed to something, and all euro states, which is not trivial. We have said that all those with an overall debt of over 60 percent – which includes Germany, especially due to the situation of HRE – are willing to reduce their overall debt by five percent of GDP per year. As long as one has good growth, that is easy. But in years when growth is very moderate, that is a difficult task. But we will commit to this, in the form of guidelines. It is not for nothing that some countries have fought for a long time over whether it really has to be that strict.

We have then embarked on an exciting matter that is still being developed and refined. It concerns the observation of the macroeconomic situation of a country and when one can say that this situation is developing unhealthily. We have situations, I mention the country Spain, where for years the debt ratio was below 60 percent and yet no one would say that the country is completely without problems. The country has also reacted significantly and begun structural reforms. One could have seen some things earlier if one had not only looked at the three percent deficit criterion and the 60 percent overall debt, but also addressed the question of export surpluses or import surpluses.

We Germans are, of course, always a bit agitated when it is said that export surpluses must be reduced. Because if export surpluses are based on real competitiveness, then I must not eliminate them. Nevertheless, one must keep an eye on whether the economic relations are functioning reasonably in the sense of an asymmetric approach. When looking at global balances, one should be able to view the euro area as a whole. But when looking within Europe, one must differentiate things a bit more closely.

I believe we have now put together a package that takes precautions and have supplemented it with a pact for the euro, which brings the issue of competitiveness into focus. I would just like to say that the discussion being held about this is quite remarkable. Of course, no one wants any centrally organized directive that brings everyone to the same level of competitiveness. That is not possible at all. But Jean-Claude Trichet, I can say this, told me that he ran around for years saying it cannot be that in an area with the same currency some have a 117 percent wage increase and others 17 percent, and then one wonders in the end why it does not run smoothly. And if the 117 percent wage increase is also in areas where competitiveness is certainly not higher, and the 17 percent is where competitiveness is higher, then it is not surprising that this leads to certain asymmetries.

All these factors – whether unit labor costs, retirement age, or labor market flexibilities – are outside the competence of the European Commission and have therefore not been considered for years. That one must, of course, also consider how long employment lasts according to the respective demographic situation is not surprising either. That one is now trying to bring this to mind and say that we must grow together over the next ten years rather than continue to drift apart – that is a task that should be addressed. I have been surprised that some have had difficulties with this. Because I mean, if there are some on a scale of competitiveness in Europe and others are elsewhere, then the poor president of the European Central Bank cannot conduct a uniform monetary policy because everything falls apart in a large tension field. I think that market participants are very closely monitoring how unit labor costs, social systems, and many other things are developing. And whether one invests a lot when one has a three percent or less than three percent deficit, and the other consumes everything, is of course also of utmost importance in the medium term.

Since all of this is national competence, one must be willing to coordinate, even though there is no obligation to do so. Therefore, there is intergovernmental coordination. We have now elevated this to the level of heads of state and government in the hope that when we look each other in the eye, we will also keep what we promised the year before. Now one can always be skeptical and say, we do not believe that. We can only prove this through actions. But it cannot get worse than it is now. So I say it is worth a try. And so we are now approaching this pact.

We have invited all those who do not yet belong to the euro area to join this pact. A few countries will fortunately do so. Then, if done skillfully, an international image will emerge that we are growing together in our strength. We in Germany have placed great value on this not becoming an average event, that we do not approach our competitiveness to our common average, but that we orient ourselves to the best – not only the best in Europe, but also the best among our strategic partners. This means daring to look outward from America to Japan to China. Because there is a danger that Europe will focus too much on itself and, when economic growth is good in Germany, it will be said that it will somehow be enough. We are then in Europe in the greatest danger of not being at the forefront of global competitiveness. If Europe does not learn to look beyond its own borders, we will eventually find ourselves somewhere where, for us, what does not suit everyone, prosperity will no longer be what we have today. We can achieve this, I am convinced, but we must do something for it.

The world is not sleeping. I said before the international financial and economic crisis that the cards would be reshuffled in this crisis. You can see today that they have indeed been reshuffled. Our card has not turned out badly, while Europe's can still improve. In any case, we have our hands full keeping up with global growth.

I do not want to go further into the question of the banking situation here. I just want to make a self-critical remark. The announced stress test for European banks in the summer of last year did not contribute to increasing our credibility. Therefore, we must draw lessons from it. Furthermore, Germany was also involved, as we have banks whose competitiveness has not yet been fully proven. I do not want to describe this in detail now. Mr. Ackermann is not meant here, I want to add that explicitly.

However, it does no good to gloss over the situation by not conducting the stress test properly; rather, the starting point must be the analysis or observation of reality in order to draw the right lessons. Therefore, I hope that the second round of the banking stress tests will proceed in such a way that we can also draw the right lessons from it. Because we have also learned this: If a parallel test is conducted in Washington and it is then stated that the result just found in Europe unfortunately does not correspond to reality, the effect on the markets is even more devastating than if no stress test had been conducted at all.

That is why we wrote in the conclusions of the Eurogroup meeting last Friday that all member states are ready to actually recapitalize their banks as a result of the stress test. Of course, the banks must first try on their own, but otherwise, the states stand behind it, because otherwise, we can design the EFSF and the ESM as well as we want, but if the banks do not function, it is not enough. And I say this here in Frankfurt.

Now, one last point on regulation. We have said that no financial product, no financial center, and no financial institution should emerge from the international financial crisis unregulated. Much has been achieved; I want to say that explicitly. Banking supervision in Europe has improved, as has the supervision of other areas. We have a restructuring law in Germany, and there are efforts in Europe to create something similar. The derivatives markets are being regulated. We are now in discussions with the European Commission on how we can improve oversight. Perhaps the most important steps have been better capital requirements and the consultation speeds for Basel III. These have far exceeded those for Basel II. It is right and good that a result has been reached very quickly. We have regulations for hedge funds.

We certainly have, because the participants in the financial markets are creative individuals, quite a few attempts at evasive maneuvers to circumvent regulations. To that, I simply say that we in politics are partly dependent on the cooperation of people who are well-versed in these areas. That sometimes creates difficulties. I do not want to hide that. Because most of those who work in the financial market sector also derive completely legitimate profits from it, which means they are reluctant to cut off their own water supply. A sustainable perspective cannot be demanded; rather, it must also be partly enforced through regulation. Therefore, we will keep an eye on ensuring that the new regulation we have found does not lead to the emergence of completely new products that then fall outside of regulation again.

We have also learned in this crisis that the damages are so great and so obvious that we should actually try to strive for a reasonable framework in the area of financial markets. Because, I also say, we all live in democracies in Europe. We should all contribute to ensuring that what is so successfully lived in Germany with the social market economy does not fall further into disrepute. Because the perhaps most regrettable consequence of the international financial and economic crisis is that many people have great doubts about whether this social market economy still functions properly. And since we have seen in this economic crisis that we depend on the commonality of employees with employers, we all do well to take this mutual responsibility seriously. The same applies to the financial sector as to the real economy: We are all in the same boat and should all feel committed to mutual responsibility.

I thank you for allowing me to be here today. I assure you that we will do everything politically to strengthen the financial center of Frankfurt while also strengthening our European house, sometimes through disputes, through discussion. Productive debate in intellectual new territory is, in my view, indispensable to arrive at reasonable results. In this sense, you need not be afraid when we sometimes argue at the European level that we are no longer committed to the necessary things. Because what one argues about is what one loves. That is how you should see it. And that is why we approach it with great passion.