Speech by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel at the XIX German Banking Day of the Association of German Banks on March 31, 2011, in Berlin:

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

3 April 2011 · XIX German Banking Day of the Association of German Banks · Berlin, Germany

Context
Merkel addressed the 19th German Banking Day of the Association of German Banks on March 31, 2011, in Berlin, discussing lessons from the global financial crisis.
Main themes
International financial and economic crisis, social market economy, shared responsibility, trust in banking sector, financial sector regulation, role of banks in economy, state intervention and taxpayer burden, financial market stabilization, moral responsibility of banks, real economy vs. financial economy, German banking sector
Duration
~33 min
85th percentile
Words
3,918
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Sentences
193
88th percentile
Readability
44
46th percentile
Grade
12.1
46th percentile
Syntax
3.03
51st percentile
Vocabulary
2.10
27th percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 71%70%
  • Institutional 21%21%
  • Ceremonial 3%3%
  • Geopolitical 3%3%
  • Social 3%3%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 1%

193 sentences in 40 paragraphs

Dear Mr. Schmitz,

ladies and gentlemen!

I am very pleased to accept your invitation to the 19th German Banking Day of the Association of German Banks. Every five years, there is a unique opportunity to take a more fundamental look at developments in the financial sector beyond the daily events. I believe that the Banking Day 2011, in particular, offers ample opportunity for this. For the time since the last Banking Day in 2006 can certainly be considered one of the more dramatic periods in the 110-year history of the Banking Association. I believe we can all agree on this assessment.

The international financial and economic crisis has presented us with enormous and largely unprecedented challenges in recent years. It has highlighted the interconnectedness of the world. It has thrown markets into turmoil worldwide. It has destroyed vast amounts of wealth. It has deeply unsettled many, many people. It has raised questions about the responsibilities of politics, business, and banks. I believe I am not saying anything incorrect when I state: The crisis originated in the financial sector. It bears significant, though by no means sole, responsibility. Therefore, the guiding principle of shared responsibility for the financial center of Germany is a truly correct and defining thought for Banking Day 2011.

The Federal President already pointed out moral implications this morning. Given the importance of developments in the financial sector, it is also acceptable that the Federal President and the Federal Chancellor speak at an event on the same day. This is highly unusual. But you can explain it by the fact that so much has happened in the last five years.

We share responsibility for the financial center. This also entails a societal responsibility. This is also appropriate given that the economic and social order accepted by all of us is the order of the social market economy. In the social market economy, there is a framework provided by politics within which companies and citizens can develop freely. The social market economy is a profoundly democratic order. All participants in the social market economy have the same rights and the same obligations.

We have all experienced in a special way during the international financial crisis that financial institutions – namely, banks – play a key role. They are involved in nearly all economic processes. They accept deposits. They provide loans. In doing so, they create the conditions for investment, consumption, and economic growth.

I believe we should return to a holistic view. The division between the financial economy here and the real economy there may have been quite interesting in some phases of the crisis. But in the end, the social market economy must be the overarching roof, including its societal significance.

Let me put it this way: In the social market economy, banks have a serving function. They are service providers for citizens and for companies. You all know: Trust is a key to the functioning of the social market economy, of the market economy as a whole. That is why trust in the services of banks is so indispensable and immediately important for activities within the framework of the social market economy to succeed.

This means that trust is an absolutely necessary component of functioning economic cycles and stable communities. We are truly in the same boat here. That is why we also bear a shared responsibility for this trust, when one considers – as can be seen from the 110-year history of the Banking Association – that one does not want to make a big deal only at a single point in life, but rather aims to act sustainably and in the long term within an economic system.

However, this trust has been profoundly shaken during the international economic and financial crisis. It has shown us that a national and even a European perspective alone is no longer sufficient. Too many high-risk and opaque financial transactions have triggered shockwaves and brought the financial system to the brink of collapse. States and governments had to assume responsibility for this sector, and they did. But the fact that state institutions and ultimately taxpayers have shown responsibility is a fact that cannot be repeated, but from which lessons must be drawn. This is the core of the discussion we need to have with each other.

It was, of course, an experience of the capability of states that within a few days funds for financial market stabilization were established and that many financial institutions were able to secure their existence as a result. The alternatives would have caused much, much more serious damage not only to the financial institutions but to societies as a whole. Therefore, we made the right decisions regarding our entire economies, even in hindsight. But – and this must be said – no false conclusions should be drawn from this. If the conclusion of some market participants is that in the event of difficulties for large institutions, states will regularly rush to the rescue, that would be wrong.

You must understand state institutions and governments that are doing everything possible to ensure that such a situation does not arise again. For this, we need a cooperative relationship with financial institutions. If we share the common understanding that such a situation must not be repeated, we will also find the right solutions. If this understanding does not unite us, we have a serious problem. Because it is normally not the task of the state to support distressed banks. The real economy can attest that it is also not the task of states to support real economic institutions. To derive a legitimate claim solely from the fact of interconnectedness – because one is systemic, one is thus free from all requirements – would be a catastrophic conclusion for the acceptance of market-based mechanisms in our society.

This means that the rules of the social market economy also apply to financial institutions. They benefit from profits. They bear the losses. Companies that fail leave the market. Those are the rules. Therefore, banks, like all other companies, must also take personal responsibility. Only in this way can the right incentives work.

This conviction has led us, with the experience of this financial crisis, to say: We must reform the regulatory framework. I believe that the new financial market rules, the introduction of a debt brake regarding state finances, and the strengthening of the European economic and monetary union are the right conclusions.

On the way to redesigning the financial market rules, we have achieved some important things. But I also say: We have not yet achieved everything. It was right to say at the beginning of the financial crisis: We must subject every financial center, every financial market participant, and every financial product to regulation. Of course, it was foreseeable that there would be a discussion about how and in what manner this should happen. But the principle is not wrong.

On the way to redesigning the financial market rules, we have first created something important in Germany, namely the restructuring law. It is a milestone. It enables a financial market-friendly restructuring or winding down of systemically relevant banks. The problem was precisely that systemically relevant banks could not be subjected to normal market mechanisms and that a company that is not successful can simply exit the market.

That there is this law in Germany is good, but given the global interconnectedness, it is of course not enough. This means we must also achieve at least a European level that owners and creditors bear the financial burdens as much as possible. Therefore, European and also global rules must be established for this. This is one of the essential tasks that the G20 still has to accomplish in the area of financial market regulation. "Too big to fail" – that must not remain unaddressed; a solution must be found. Therefore, we are advocating for a redesign of the financial market rules at the international level in this regard.

The discussions will become increasingly difficult as time goes on from the starting point of the crisis. This is already foreseeable. Therefore, my appeal to you is not to contribute to making these discussions more difficult, but to face the challenges.

We also want to solve the question at the international level because we need fair competition, for which a cross-border crisis management in the financial sector must be created. The more different the regulations are in the transatlantic area or elsewhere, the more difficult it is, of course, to guarantee fair competition.

The European Commission is very much orienting itself towards the German restructuring law in creating a restructuring mechanism, which we coordinated with France on essential points. Furthermore, we have established an effective system of financial supervision in Europe. We have ensured that in the future, hedge funds and rating agencies will also be supervised.

We have also achieved a lot within the G20. Here I want to mention the tightening of capital standards. The new "Basel system" is a huge milestone. It has not yet been implemented by everyone, but the mere fact that the negotiations were much shorter compared to Basel II shows that lessons have indeed been learned. The new regulations on future remuneration systems are also better than the old ones. Whether they have already eliminated all weaknesses will unfortunately only be shown in practice.

I am aware that parts of the financial world also say: Okay, there is a new regulation; now we will use all our intellectual power to find ways to circumvent it. Since market mechanisms always consist of developments, my heartfelt request at this point is not to take the cat-and-mouse game too far. It will lead to nothing or only to incorrect regulation – I predict that to you. Then there should be no complaints, because if the main essence of the activity consists of circumventing regulations that are sensible, states will correspondingly impose new regulations that, from their perspective, are actually not justifiable because they ultimately will not be good for global economic growth. It is simply the case: A crisis like the one we had between 2008 and 2009 cannot happen often – I say: never again – if we are to avoid massive damage to the acceptance of market mechanisms in our society.

However, we have also achieved a lot, we have learned some things, not only in the area of financial market rules, where further work is needed, but also in the area of supervision and in the area of "global governance," as it is nicely called. This concerns the question of what role supranational institutions, such as the IMF, play as control bodies and to what extent we are willing to cede our own competencies. We Europeans are relatively advanced in this regard because we constantly coordinate within the European Union. Other G20 member states find it infinitely difficult in this respect. The question of what national sovereignty is worth in a globally interconnected economic system is far from being conclusively answered. But there are good advances regarding the IMF, FSB, and other institutions that one could not have imagined five years ago.

It was already foreseeable that after we – to put it bluntly – rescued financial institutions and stimulated the real economy by implementing stimulus programs, there would be follow-up effects. One of the reasons why I have been very cautious as Federal Chancellor in deciding which stimulus programs to implement was the knowledge of the next step, namely that the issue of public debt would come under the scrutiny of the same market participants who were previously rescued by accepting the increase in public debt. Now you can say that there was no other way, but you must also understand that this evokes various emotions. I do not want to go back to square one, but I must say that the question of regulation is crucial in this respect because the taxpayer, who ultimately always steps in as part of the general public, naturally also has his very valid thoughts on this.

We have therefore said in Germany, during this time when we had to implement economic stimulus programs, that the question of sound public finances is a core issue in order to be prepared for the challenges of the future. That is why we introduced the debt brake – a decision that I believe is groundbreaking, which binds us significantly in individual cases. It is not easy to deal with this debt brake, but out of the realization that an unacceptably high national debt would be a major element of instability, we made this decision and will now be forced to manage sustainably, similar to how you must also manage much more sustainably due to the increased capital reserves in the name of Basel III.

Now we have relatively weathered the crisis in the Federal Republic of Germany well. However, we have also seen that something I said at the beginning of the crisis is true: The cards are being reshuffled worldwide in such a crisis. In order to continue to assert ourselves economically, our budget discussions are now shaped on one hand by the requirements of the debt brake and on the other hand by the experience from the crisis that investment expenditures must be strengthened and that investments in research, development, and the preservation of the substance of society are absolutely important – especially in a country like Germany, which faces enormous demographic challenges and therefore, more than others that do not have such demographic challenges, must pay attention to sound finances. We have a chance to exceed the rules of the debt brake regarding the federal budget, and we will, of course, take this opportunity wherever possible.

We have seen that as a result of the financial crisis, the economic crisis, and the economic stimulus programs, the tensions and different situations in the area of the European market, especially the Eurozone – that is, the zone of economic and monetary union – have become visible to an extent that has not been the case since the introduction of the Euro. After the Euro was introduced, spreads shrank wonderfully. A nearly uniform interest rate level created the impression that our economic, financial, and performance capabilities were relatively harmonious within the Euro area. However, the crisis made the differences more visible – they had, of course, already existed before. It became evident that the burdens of individual states could only be managed in different ways.

This has put us in the Eurozone in a difficult situation, but – and this is the truly encouraging aspect of the matter – it has also sharpened the awareness that the non-compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact has indeed contributed to such phenomena. In this respect, we are currently essentially working on addressing the sins of the last ten years. This must be done with all determination. Since a representative of the European Parliament, Werner Langen, is present here, I want to say: There is great consensus on this between the Parliament, the Commission, and the member states. Therefore, we have not only discussed the tightening of the Stability and Growth Pact but have also elaborated it in very concrete terms.

We have established a rescue mechanism that was born out of necessity and is now being designed as a long-term mechanism, and we have created the so-called "Euro Plus Pact," which states that we must become economically more coherent. This, of course, has not only to do with overall debt and deficits of the annual budget but also with unit labor costs, social systems, investment expenditures, and much more. This coherence must not be aligned with the average of the European member states, but the benchmarks are set by the best. Because Germany and Europe must assert themselves in the global markets. Our prosperity can only be secured if we achieve exactly this.

The tightening of the Stability and Growth Pact has a good chance of being decided soon, in all its facets. This tightening will also include the overall debt of a state. The tasks for countries that have a total debt exceeding 60 percent of GDP are enormous: an annual reduction of five percent of the excess – that is a tough requirement. Germany is also currently significantly above 60 percent of GDP in total debt due to expenditures we had in the area of bank bailouts. This means that we also have tasks to fulfill here.

We will establish a permanent stability mechanism. About a year ago, there were heated discussions regarding the first example of Greece. However, I stand by it – even if the discussions have taken too long from the perspective of many of you: A simple act of solidarity without a counter-performance would have been absolutely fatal for the overall development of the Euro. It was necessary to incorporate conditionality here, to address the causes of the problems, and to expect a commitment to higher competitiveness and solidity from the countries that receive solidarity in the Eurozone. This has not been an easy political process, but I can say today that it has been surprisingly successful. With the European Stability Mechanism – known as ESM – that will come into effect in 2013, we will have a fund that meets these requirements.

In this ESM, we have also included something that could not be included in the first regulation of the solidarity fund, the EFSF, namely the participation of private creditors. There is an interesting discussion about this issue. Everyone who deals with these questions theoretically believes that this is the least one must do. All those who deal with these questions practically in the markets may express their opinions to the theorists but never to the politicians, and they certainly try to put pressure on the politicians in a rather miraculous way. Politicians are faced with the question: Do we cause another crisis with this decision, or do we do what is factually reasonable? We are always in a difficult situation there, but we must make decisions.

I believe it is right that in the future, at least in the case of insolvency – and I do not hide the fact that I would have liked to go further – we should foresee the participation of private creditors in aid measures for Euro countries. I believe it is right that we should largely orient ourselves to the international mechanisms that are also prescribed by the IMF. I believe that the markets have understood this by now.

However, it is sometimes hard to bear when one reads about overdue restructuring at every corner and end, but then follows the unwillingness in a detailed example when it comes to the crunch. Therefore, I say: I have understood, we must not change the rules of the EFSF. However, it is right that a permanent mechanism has exactly these provisions. The markets must adjust to this. Because market discipline is absolutely necessary to break the spiral in which the debt of states is also encouraged by the markets. We need market discipline as part of the market economy mechanisms.

The "Euro Plus Pact" is a novelty. It essentially deals with the coordination of policy areas that are not communitized, that is, not part of the European action areas. The pact arose from the realization that stability in a common currency area must be paired with equal or similar economic strengths. It does not mean a centralization of pension, health, and other policies – I want to state this explicitly. But a common currency area cannot avoid basic rules of political action. That the retirement age and the duration of work must have something to do with the demographic development of a country if one wants to achieve a tension-free common currency area is simply the case. This has nothing to do with centralization. That unit labor costs must not develop completely differently is also a realization that cannot be resisted. All of this has always been described with "Political Union," which did not exist at the beginning of the monetary union, but whose introduction must now, in a certain way – even if it is a voluntary, coordinating manner – be made up for.

We have brought this issue to the highest possible level, namely to the level of heads of state and government. Since they cannot be trusted alone, the monitoring has been taken over by the Commission, which in turn continuously informs the Parliament, ensuring that a sufficiently critical public is guaranteed. I hope that from this fact, one of the tougher sanctions will arise, namely a quasi-moral sanction, so that countries must come closer together. Of course, this must first prove itself in practice, as we have often failed to meet obligations. However, we in the Eurozone have also paid a bitter price for this. If we attribute a certain learning ability to each other, it also has something to do with positive future expectations. We will therefore strive to deliver the corresponding results.

This means that we have come to a strengthened European monetary system. We have thus made a political commitment to the correctness of the Euro. I explicitly say: Germany is one of the big winners of the introduction of the Euro. When many now speak of what aid measures we would have to provide and that Germany is so heavily called upon – which is, of course, inherent in the nature of the matter, as we are also the largest European economy – I just want to remind you that the conditions during the times of many other independent currencies in Europe were not as ideal as they sometimes appear in retrospect. The support purchases of other currencies – whether from France, Spain, or Italy – were also always solidarity actions of a strong exporter, namely the Federal Republic of Germany, in order to have a reasonable economic area in which reliable framework conditions also existed for its own economy. This means that it cannot be said that there have never been any expressions of solidarity in Europe, even regarding the past. Therefore, one must also speak very openly and positively about this.

We have placed great value on the fact that the IMF is always involved. Why? Not because Europe cannot do it alone, but because I have learned from the markets that they like harmonious communication. For me, the idea has always been a specter that we in Europe, for example, agree on conditionality for a country like Greece, Ireland, or another country, and then the International Monetary Fund critically examines the whole thing and says: Well, we would have done it quite differently. Such divergent communications are quite unhelpful, to put it mildly. Therefore, cooperation in the cases of necessary reform programs for individual countries is, in my view, absolutely correct.

All of us – politics, business, the real economy, and especially the financial institutions – will still be under strong scrutiny from the people in our respective countries in the coming years. Therefore, I want to conclude with what I said at the beginning: If we want market economy mechanisms to enjoy sustainable high acceptance, and if we want the model of the Social Market Economy, which has made so much profit, growth, and prosperity possible, to work in the 21st century, then everyone must take responsibility. In this sense, I also hope for good cooperation in the next five years. Until the next German Banking Day.