Speech by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel at the "Leadership Meeting Economy 2011" of the Süddeutsche Zeitung on November 17, 2011, in Berlin:

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

18 November 2011 · Leadership Meeting Economy 2011 of the Süddeutsche Zeitung · Berlin, Germany

Context
Merkel addressed the fifth Süddeutsche Zeitung Business Leaders Meeting in Berlin on November 17, 2011, discussing Europe's debt crisis and German economic performance.
Main themes
Eurozone debt crisis, European economic stability, German economic recovery, youth unemployment in Europe, structural labor market reforms, sovereign debt, stimulus programs, G20 coordination, fiscal consolidation, demographic development, self-fulfilling market prophecies, Italy and Mario Monti
Duration
~42 min
91st percentile
Words
5,063
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Sentences
253
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Readability
52
68th percentile
Grade
11.0
32nd percentile
Syntax
2.99
46th percentile
Vocabulary
2.00
10th percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 62%60%
  • Institutional 17%17%
  • Social 12%12%
  • Ceremonial 5%5%
  • Geopolitical 3%3%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 4%

253 sentences in 56 paragraphs

Dear Mr. Kister,

Excellencies from near and far,

ladies and gentlemen,

I am pleased to be here today at the fifth Business Leaders Meeting of the Süddeutsche Zeitung. Tradition is not a value in itself, but the last two attendances did not prevent me from coming back to you this year, to put it in a northern German understatement. In the south, one would say: It was so nice that I was happy to come back here.

When I first participated in the Business Leaders Meeting two years ago, we were strongly under the impression of the banking crisis, the crisis of the international financial markets, which then continued in the form of a crisis in the real economy. This also led to a decline in the economy in Germany in 2009 of more than five percent of our gross domestic product, which had never happened in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany before.

At that time – the G20 was then established – we all reacted very coordinated at the level of heads of state and government and launched stimulus programs. I was accused of hesitance at that time, although it was of course foreseeable that this would not come without a price. Consequently, a sovereign debt crisis developed for some states, which is now particularly in focus in the Eurozone. Nevertheless, I say: It was right for David Cameron, when he became Prime Minister, to deal with Britain's debts; that is my deep conviction. If the focus should shift away from Europe, it will certainly also include the consideration of other countries more and even more strongly.

We were of course pleased, to return to the stimulus programs, that they indeed resulted in economic growth – for Germany as an export nation, a very strong growth of 3.7 percent last year and also a significant one this year. But in a way, it was of course also foreseeable that the structural growth factors in Germany would never yield a permanent growth rate of 3.7 percent. That was a catch-up effect. That we are now rather landing at one percent or 1.5 percent does not mean a recession, but if it were to remain so, it would be a very predictable development in light of the circumstances in Germany. Moreover, the growth rates in other European countries before the international financial and economic crisis were not as exorbitantly high as one would have wished. This must also be taken into account.

There is above all – somewhat in combination with our demographic development – a very good situation in the labor market. This is very good for Germany. It is the case that this is also the result of significant structural measures that were taken under Chancellor Schröder and were never reversed, but rather somewhat strengthened. When people in Europe always talk about this and that not having worked yet, they should also remember that structural reforms, for example in the labor market, can never take effect within two quarters during which a Troika visit takes place in a country, but always take two to three years before any effect can be seen. I think we must be careful not to fall into a kind of short-sightedness and continuously undo our own results; I will return to the decision-making situation in Europe shortly.

If, assuming Mr. Monti receives the mandate to form a government on Sunday evening, one reads on Monday afternoon that the government formation in Italy has not helped, hardly after it has occurred and without a program being announced, one must really be careful that we – free after Ludwig Erhard, who said: "Economics is always 50 percent psychology" – do not do everything in such a way psychologically that we create self-fulfilling prophecies, which we then wonder about afterwards. That is certainly also my request to all those who express themselves in the online world more than I do. However, I have also given YouTube interviews by now; so no worries: I am happy to join the trend.

The crisis is therefore not over. We have entered a different phase, although we can currently be very satisfied in Germany, especially regarding the employment situation. We can explain this: Reforms have taken place; and there is a certain demographic development. We are particularly pleased – I believe this is also an indicator that must be worked on, especially in the European context – that youth unemployment in our country, even though it is still too high, is ultimately below ten percent, so that young people have a good perspective.

However, if we have an average youth unemployment rate of 20 percent in Europe – in some countries up to 40 percent – one should not be surprised that market participants, regarding the future prospects of a country's growth, look very closely at such an indicator, as it is related to medium-term and long-term expectations. Therefore, this must be addressed. Growth alone in Europe is not an end in itself, but it must above all be associated with a perspective for the people.

Now the focus is currently on the situation in the Eurozone. I want to reiterate very clearly here what I said at the party conference in Leipzig: The Federal Government, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the party leading the coalition, the Christian Democratic Union, stand together with the CSU and FDP for the preservation of the Eurozone. This is also reflected in my very drastic words. I firmly believe that if the Euro fails – then Europe as a continent will certainly continue to exist, and one will not immediately go to war against each other – but it will leave the heaviest and most serious scars.

There are enough political and economic reasons to work towards a good future for the Eurozone. There are just as many political and economic reasons to coherently further develop the entire internal market for the 27 EU member states and not just the Eurozone, which consists of 17 member states. Because there are currently certain tensions – because the non-Euro member states on the one hand say "You must overcome the structural flaws of the Euro" and at the same time say "But we do not want to be left behind" – this requires a great deal of political sensitivity. But I also say this personally and on behalf of everyone in the Federal Government: We are ready to provide that. We want a Europe with Great Britain. We certainly want a Europe with a strong Poland. We invite as many countries as possible to participate in the Euro, but we also know that realistically not all of them will be able to do so in the foreseeable future. One simply has to learn to deal with these circumstances.

In the Eurozone, the situation is such that we are constantly discussing one quick solution after another – this has all been on the agenda before: from the immediate introduction of Euro bonds to the swift implementation of debt cuts to the question of whether the ECB must finally become a "lender of last resort." I am convinced that none of these means, if implemented immediately, will bring about a solution to the crisis. Rather, we do well to consider: Where are the roots of the crisis and how can we work on these roots and thus improve the foundation of the crisis solution?

That is why I also spoke of a breakthrough to a new Europe. Such a breakthrough can only succeed if we are also internally ready to change our treaties where we deem it necessary. An entity like the European Union, which declares to a rapidly changing world that it has made its last effort with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and then never again deals with a change to its legal foundations during its lifetime, has, in my opinion, already lost in the markets, because such an entity cannot remain competitive and vital in a changing world. Therefore, I consider this barrier we have erected, namely that we cannot change our treaties, to be one of the greatest psychological hurdles that can be built against the future viability of Europe, because the mere psychological fear we spread when we talk about what could go wrong prevents everyone from saying: This is really a viable entity that adapts to the realities of the world. Therefore, treaty changes are not an end in themselves – just as my presence here is not an end in itself because it is a tradition – but they must not be excluded from the outset.

Now let us return once again to the roots, to the causes of the situation.

First, it is the debt crisis in some states, that is, excessive national debt also due to the stimulus programs that became visible during the crisis, but which were fundamentally already in place beforehand.

Second, it is the lack of competitiveness and above all the tensions arising from differences in the competitiveness of the member states of the European Union.

Third, it is the political construction of the Eurozone, which does not bring about the necessary political integration that is required to have a common currency in the long term.

It is interesting to note – this must also be said to the actors in the financial markets – that during the ten years of the Euro's existence, for nine years, as if there had been Euro bonds, there were hardly any interest rate differences, even though competitiveness was not significantly less divergent than it is today. This means that not every market assessment is inherently meaningful and correct – this must be said at this point – just as not every political calming was correct at this point. Even back then, one should have worked on the causes and the differences. And one should have also worked on a Political Union, which was not done sufficiently.

At the moment, we are seeing rather an overvaluation that expresses itself in great insecurity. I am deeply convinced that this insecurity can only be overcome through firm political solutions. One can say: Okay, that the ECB also bought bonds in the summer for reasons of monetary stability is its independent decision. I will not comment on that. But if politics believes that the ECB can solve the problem of the Euro's weakness as a "lender of last resort," then it is, in my view, deluding itself into something that will not happen. Therefore, my main point is political action. We have done a lot in that regard, but it is currently somewhat overlooked. In my firm conviction – and I have been in the European Councils for six years now – significant things have changed.

First: The heads of state and government are personally dealing with the economic and competitive situation. We have adopted the Euro Plus Pact, which expresses that even where there are national responsibilities, we will work more closely together and tell each other more ruthlessly where the weaknesses of each country lie, because this has not been discussed in Europe for years. Jean-Claude Trichet, former ECB President, often recounted how he always came to the meetings of the finance ministers with lists of wage increases in the public domain, from which strongly divergent wage developments in Europe could be inferred. He always said: This will not go well; you will see that you will encounter tensions that will one day lead to an explosion. We are now dealing with this ourselves. Structural reforms have been initiated in many countries. I think, for example, of what has been done in Spain regarding the labor market and budget consolidation. I am quite certain: This will pay off one day, even if it is not always visible in the current spread developments.

Second: We have tightened the Stability and Growth Pact. It has been violated about 60 times during the existence of the Euro. However, this has never left a significant impact. Italy has had a total debt level of significantly over 100 percent of GDP for the last ten years. This has also not been particularly criticized by any market participant; therefore, one might have felt somewhat at ease. Today, everything is evaluated differently. One must face that.

Therefore, the following three innovations in the Stability and Growth Pact are, for me, the most important.

First,

that there is more prevention by identifying foreseeable misdevelopments – also within the framework of the "European Semester" with the Commission, in which national budgets must be presented and analyzed. In the Eurogroup, we have committed ourselves to ensuring that national parliaments undertake to implement any recommendations from the Commission regarding national budgets at the national level.

Secondly

, that the issue of total debt is given greater importance. I believe that most European countries will be able to meet the deficit criterion – no new borrowing higher than three percent of gross domestic product in a year – in the foreseeable future. It is more difficult to reduce the percentage of total debt exceeding 60 percent by one-twentieth each year during times of lower growth. This will be the real major task. If you have a debt level of about 81 percent like Germany, then you need to reduce total debt by one-twentieth of 21 percent, which is about one percent, each year to reach 60 percent in 20 years. This is where I see the real challenge. This second part of the Stability Pact has not played a significant role in the Commission's assessments so far. However, it is now being given more focus.

The

third

is that an analysis of macroeconomic factors will also be conducted. Because it is not enough to have less than three percent new borrowing and perhaps be at 60 percent total debt, but do almost nothing for innovation and very little in the area of investment. This may work for five to seven years, but it will eventually have bitter consequences. If we want to eliminate the tensions in the Euro area, we must also have a certain coherence in this regard.

I believe that with the current contractual situation, the strength of adherence to these criteria is not given. The sanctions that are currently possible – monetary penalties – are sanctions that are ultimately ineffective or inappropriate. Because if you are already facing financial constraints and then have to pay penalties, the problem worsens, so we will only have to increase rescue umbrellas again. I cannot see any real sense in that.

Therefore, we must return to one of the weaknesses of the Lisbon Treaty – interestingly, this point played a role in the convention that took place at that time – namely the open question: Can either the Commission or the member states file a lawsuit before the European Court of Justice in the event of a violation of the Stability and Growth Pact, just as one can do in the case of non-compliance with any directive? This was presented by the European People's Party and rejected by the government representatives of the nation-states – including Germany. It was said: This concerns our national budget, it is none of the European Union's business. On the other hand, however, there was a collective European commitment in the Stability and Growth Pact.

Therefore, I am firmly convinced that it must be possible to obtain a right of intervention for European institutions over national budgets to the extent that compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact is concerned, which is why a right to sue before the European Court of Justice should be granted. This can be limited to Eurozone countries, it can be done in the form of a protocol, which already exists in a preliminary form for Euro countries. So it is about a very limited amendment to the treaty. But those who claim that this is not part of crisis management and believe that the ECB can solve it and that this treaty amendment is not significant, but that it can be done sometime when everything has calmed down, are mistaken. We may have somewhat different opinions on this in Europe, but mine is incredibly firm. There must be a willingness on the part of the nation-states to commit themselves collectively in a core area of their own responsibilities, and to do so bindingly. This is the additional piece of integration that, I believe, is essential if we want to convince the markets that we will continue on this path together. Therefore, this is, so to speak, the keystone of many efforts we have already undertaken.

One fact that I want to highlight in this context is that the efforts to establish debt brakes, as we call them in Germany, or golden rules, as they are called in France, are increasing among European member states. Austria has just done this, Spain has done it in a certain way, France is still fighting for it. Together with the French president, we have said: We want all member states of the Eurozone to establish such debt rules for themselves.

Of course, we have dealt very intensively with the issue of Greece. There have also been many different assessments. I believe it would be wrong to say that the question of how to deal with Greek debt has already been resolved. This question has certainly led to a certain insecurity because the supposedly safe product, government bonds, is suddenly not so safe anymore. For a long time, the Troika also tried to tackle the Greek problem as if it were a liquidity crisis. However, it then became very clear that the restructuring measures were set too ambitiously to be achieved quickly. The last debt sustainability analysis by the Troika has shown: Debt sustainability is not possible without a certain reduction of the debt. In my opinion, this must be worked on quickly now. There are no empirical values within a currency union regarding how markets will react.

It is very important here – we have repeatedly said this in the Council, and I say it again here: We firmly believe that Greece is a special case in the European context, both in terms of debt and the ability to emerge from that debt. Greece has done a lot, Greece is working very ambitiously – I wish the new Prime Minister all the success in this. But still, debt sustainability is not given from within. These negotiations should take place very quickly now, as they also contribute to the overall unrest.

Furthermore, it is right and important that the new government in Italy under Prime Minister Monti, whom I wish all success, makes it very clear very quickly that Italy is now fully utilizing its capabilities, which it indeed has. Italy is a strong economic country, Italy is a partly very innovative country with a good economic base. You all know this better than I do.

The questions we face now are: How can we express our solidarity, what about the European banks? I would like to express myself very cautiously on both questions, but I will say: The political decisions have been made; what is currently lacking is the concretization. If I may express a suspicion, I would say: This is also not a factor that calms the market. Therefore, it would be very important for the European banking supervision to quickly and decisively state which banks need to make which capital increases. It would also be very important that after the comprehensive general discussion about leveraging the EFSF, we eventually know exactly how it works. Both must be concretized, otherwise, in my view, the unrest will be too great.

That was what I wanted to say about the European issue. We must prepare ourselves – at least this is my firm conviction – that we can only solve the issue through political actions and a medium-term vision for the further development of the European Union, especially the Eurozone. Everything else will be short-term measures, where the EFSF can intervene and this and that can happen. But it will not solve the problem overall.

Therefore, it was particularly noticeable at the G20 meeting that many countries had not previously problematized the structure of the European monetary union, but upon closer examination, they were surprised that while there is a common bank and a currency, there are 17 different budget institutions, and everyone is basically free to do what they want. This simply cannot work if there is – I repeat myself – no more binding force.

In terms of international growth, we need to do our homework. We must overcome our debt crisis. We need to become more competitive. We will not achieve this solely through budget consolidation. There is again a misunderstanding; I said this in Cannes as well. Not all growth measures cost money. However, it has become established that one cannot launch economic stimulus programs without a lot of money. Economic stimulus programs in the narrower sense may not be able to be launched without money either. But one can implement labor market reforms. One can carry out internal market reforms. One can liberalize the service sector. One can unleash professional groups. Germany still has a lot to do in this regard. It is not the case that we stand out gloriously as a special case. We have huge problems; I will say more about that shortly. I believe that we should not lose sight of the point of implementing growth measures that do not cost money immediately in Europe.

The

second

thing we can do in the area of growth is, of course, to reduce trade barriers. I must again say that the saddest experience, despite otherwise very good packages of measures within the G20, is that we have not made any progress in the Doha Round. The trend is towards bilateral trade agreements. I find that to be only the second-best solution. Essentially, during the Great Depression of the 1930s, we did not act correctly at this point. We fell into protectionism. When I read the OECD report for the G20 meeting, I see that protectionist tendencies are increasing everywhere. I consider this to be a great danger. We could create a lot of growth if we were to overcome our shadows in this regard.

In the past two years, we have talked about regulating the financial markets. Here, more has happened in some areas than may be perceived. It was very good at this year's G20 meeting in Cannes that the issue of "too big to fail" was addressed, which concerns the large systemically relevant banks – 29 in total worldwide – that must prepare for a higher capital base.

Now we must work diligently and urgently to take a look at the entire shadow banking system. I suspect this will not be easy. The more we regulate the banks, the more there is an attempt to shift freedoms into this so-called shadow banking area. The race between regulators and those who come up with new products is relatively unlimited. Because this entire area is not yet sufficiently regulated, we have the problem that people at home do not have the impression that man has made the economy a servant again, but, on the contrary, people are chasing after certain phenomena in the markets. I consider this to be extremely difficult in the long run. Therefore, I can only hope that among the G20 countries, the will remains to do something in the area of regulation. There are now topics that have a high symbolic power. For example, the financial market transaction tax, which, if introduced globally, would of course have no negative effect at all. But unfortunately, we are far from a global introduction.

In conclusion, a brief remark about Germany and the future of Germany. Germany is one of the countries most affected by demographic changes. If we were not talking today about the Eurozone and the debt crisis of individual states, we would be focusing much more on demographic changes in Germany. We must especially think about our labor force potential. Here is a point that we can still improve in Germany, the participation of women in employment. This concerns the issues of reconciling family and work, expanding childcare facilities, and much more. We are making progress, but it is still a process. Even in 2013, when the legal entitlement of children under three years to a place in a childcare facility is to be implemented, it is expected that still less than 40 percent of children under three years will be able to attend such a facility. We have the impression that the regional demand is actually higher. There are many single mothers who cannot participate in employment simply because they do not have childcare. This is a problem that Germany must address.

We have decided on measures within the coalition that will facilitate the immigration of skilled workers from abroad. A permanent residence permit with a review after three years is planned for earnings starting at 48,000 euros; until now, it was 66,000 euros. This means we hope to invite smart minds to us. There is a widespread misconception in Germany that the world is queuing at Germany's gates with its best talents and that everyone wants to come to Germany. That is not the case. Because we have a language barrier, we are relatively rigid when it comes to the employment of family members, and other factors. Therefore, we will have to undergo a significant change in mentality.

In addition, there is the major issue of integration. In industrial metropolitan areas, more than 50 percent of children enrolled in school have a migration background. When we look at the school graduation rates, dropout rates, and the types of schools that children with a migration background attend, it is still far from what children with a German background demonstrate in terms of performance. We have done a lot here: language tests, integration courses for parents, and much more. This issue can only be considered partially resolved. There is still a great deal to be done.

I believe that regarding our pension system, we have made quite good provisions for the demographic challenges. There is a decoupling of health costs from labor costs in the health system due to additional contributions. This will develop in the coming years. However, in terms of care, we have not yet found sufficient solutions to be truly prepared for old-age security.

Regarding pensions, I must make a qualification: We have incorporated the necessary demographic factors into the statutory pension system. However, this will lead to a decline in the pension level to 41 percent of the last gross income over the next 20 years. This means we can no longer promise people that their standard of living can be maintained solely through the statutory pension. When we look at the supplementary pension – known as the Riester pension in our country – we see that only one-third of employees participate in it. This means there is insufficient capital coverage. The company pension system adds to this. However, we are indeed concerned that an ever-increasing portion will have to rely on basic security. The federal government has, by the way, taken on the costs for basic security for systematic reasons because we believe that municipalities are overwhelmed by it. Therefore, this was an important point in connection with the insurance for unemployment benefits II.

One last point regarding the budget structure: The federal budget amounts to over 300 billion euros. Of this, 80 billion euros are spent on pension insurance – which also includes child-rearing periods, widow's and survivor's pensions. You can see what a huge block this is. A second block is the support for long-term unemployed individuals and their families, amounting to 40 billion euros. A total of 120 billion euros from the federal budget is spent solely on pension benefits and benefits related to long-term unemployment.

For the first time, a decrease in long-term unemployment is being recorded. We must continue to work on this issue with all our might. Just imagine if we could halve these expenditures of 40 billion euros. Then we would have 20 billion euros more for debt reduction or investments. Our investment budget is not sufficiently developed. At the moment, we are largely living off our existing infrastructure. Therefore, we have placed a focus on transport infrastructure. The area in which we have acted correctly and in a forward-looking manner is the entire field of education and research, as far as the federal level is concerned. We spend an additional four billion euros each year on research. This provides a high level of reliability for our research institutions. I believe this is also recognized overall.

What I wanted to convey to you with this last block is the following: Germany knows that it has many homework assignments to complete. We have an inkling that, like us, the population is not particularly keen on cuts, tax increases, or similar measures. But my deep conviction – this is my concluding remark – is as follows: We now have a choice; we can hastily communalize everything and anything in Europe, which will lead to markets being calmed in the short term, but will massively reduce Europe's competitiveness, and we will find ourselves somewhere, but no longer in the leading position in the world. I did not want to participate in such a development because, as is well known, I come from the GDR and saw the opportunity in 1990 to switch to a competitive environment.

As I see how the world is developing, as I see what is happening in other parts of the world, and as I unfortunately also see that many European countries are no longer as integrated into the global markets from an industrial base as they experience it like Germany does – in Europe, it is said: As long as Germany and France grow, we will be fine – I say: We, as Europeans, must look at what is happening in the world as a whole. Times have changed. One does not necessarily have to invest money in Europe anymore. But I say: We are working to ensure that people will want to do so again. That is worth all the effort.