Speech by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel at the Spring Meeting of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly on May 26, 2008, in Berlin:

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

26 May 2008 · Spring Meeting of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly · Berlin, Germany

Context
Merkel addressed the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Spring Meeting in Berlin on May 26, 2008, reflecting on transatlantic partnership and German history.
Main themes
Transatlantic alliance, NATO, German reunification, Cold War history, European integration, peace and freedom, Treaty of Rome, multipolar world order, US role in global affairs, Germany Treaty, value-based alliances, Afghanistan mission
Duration
~23 min
71st percentile
Words
2,703
71st percentile
Sentences
135
77th percentile
Readability
48
58th percentile
Grade
11.5
38th percentile
Syntax
2.89
33rd percentile
Vocabulary
2.10
26th percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 66%64%
  • Ceremonial 20%19%
  • Institutional 8%7%
  • Social 5%5%
  • Economic 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 4%

135 sentences in 36 paragraphs

Dear Mr. President, dear José Lello,

dear colleague, dear Karl A. Lamers,

dear Volker Bouffier,

dear colleagues gathered here today in Berlin!

We are pleased that Germany is hosting this conference this year. I warmly welcome you all to the German capital, to the capital of reunified Germany at this historic site, which Karl A. Lamers has already mentioned.

In March of last year, we celebrated the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome to commemorate a European event. We certainly could not have celebrated 50 years of the Treaty of Rome with 27 member states of the European Union if it had not been for the transatlantic partnership, which, with the emergence of NATO as a result of World War II, made a significant contribution to the formation of value-based alliances—alliances based on common ideas that have made a substantial, if not decisive, contribution to having not only peace but also peace and freedom together in Europe.

For this, I extend heartfelt thanks to all those who, regardless of which side of the Atlantic they come from, have contributed to this, from a Chancellor who still remembers that this museum stood on the east side of the wall, who lived not far from here and who, when she was a physicist at the Academy of Sciences of the former GDR and traveled every day along the wall from Berlin-Mitte to Adlershof, never dreamed that she would be able to enter the West before her retirement, let alone that we could become a reunified country. Just as you are gathered here, it has been worth standing up for values, fighting for them, and contributing to them. We have achieved a great historical success.

Another historical reminiscence: May 26 is a good date for this conference, as today marks 56 years since the so-called Germany Treaty was signed at the House of History between the then very young Federal Republic and the three Western victorious powers. The Germany Treaty abolished the occupation statute, granted the Federal Republic the rights of a sovereign state, and emphasized the common goals of Western integration and reunification.

The treaty came into force three years later. The day after, on May 6, 1955, the Federal Republic of Germany became a member of the North Atlantic Alliance. Painful years and decades of division of our country, of division of our continent followed—years in which many people had to endure much suffering in the struggle for freedom, years in which the wall divided this city, in which the wall divided Germany, and the Cold War determined our living environment in Europe.

However, no other city embodies the unyielding will of the alliance of North Americans and Europeans to stand up for what is most important to us: for our values and for our freedom. Therefore, it is, of course, a particularly moving moment for us to welcome you here today in the capital of Germany.

Next year, we will celebrate 60 years of the Federal Republic of Germany and note that in 2009, we will also mark the 20th anniversary of the fall of the wall. This means we are a generation that is witnessing the present transition into history. I do not know how you feel about it. For me, it was an interesting aha experience that after the seemingly long division of Germany, we have already lived and worked together for a third of the history of the Federal Republic of Germany, and therefore this reunified Germany had to "emancipate" itself to some extent in many ways.

After the fall of the wall, after the end of the Cold War, after the fall of the Iron Curtain, many thought that the essential conflicts of history had been overcome and that we were facing a time of peace, democracy, and freedom in most parts of the world. There were important people who wrote books about the end of history. However, we then experienced that it continued. I assert that we are still in a transformation process today—from thinking in the configurations of the Cold War to a new world, which we sometimes describe as multipolarity. We could certainly discuss this at length.

It is my firm conviction that the United States of America plays a crucial role. We can see this today in all matters of war and peace. However, there will no longer be a single superpower that can solve the conflicts of this world alone against others. This has various implications. It means that our American friends must engage with us, that we must discuss the conflicts of this world, that we must forge friendships, and that we must have alliances that go far beyond transatlantic alliances. One of the major questions that NATO will have to discuss in the future will be how the transatlantic alliance relates to other partners who are helping us today, for example, in Afghanistan. I mention Australia, for instance.

But there is also—the Germans are experiencing this in a special way—the other side: If we want to be consulted and asked, we cannot simply walk away and say: We are good for theoretical discussions; others will handle the practical implementations. This means that those who want to have a say must take on more responsibility. This is the situation we find ourselves in at the moment.

Furthermore, we are dealing with completely new threats. One of the facts is that, in retrospect to all the alarming events of the Cold War, the world of the Cold War still appears relatively clear. The fronts were clear. There were two superpowers with their respective allies. A look at the map of Africa showed how the states were always represented in pairs. One aligned with the Soviet Empire, the other with the United States of America. This significantly shaped my geography lessons because I learned everything about the states in the Soviet sphere of influence but nothing about the others, so today I can still very well categorize based on my knowledge gaps who belonged to whom. Sometimes states also changed sides. That was part of it.

During that time, there was a system that worked. That was the system of deterrence. One could assume that neither side was so irrational as to intend to destroy itself in the struggle for its own advantage. Today, however, we are dealing with so-called asymmetric threats, which are complicated because those who attack the free world, democracies, and open societies do not hesitate to put their own lives at risk.

We are, of course, entering completely new constellations when it comes to the questions of how much of our freedom we are willing to put at risk and how much we must retain, and how much of our fighting power, our determination, and our conviction we must weigh in when it comes to defending our ideals.

It is one of the—I would almost say—disappointing messages after the end of the Cold War that we now face even more complicated challenges that we must address with completely new means, and in which we must call upon our societies to support these means so that they do not jeopardize their own free society.

The threat analysis has been newly summarized and expressed by our Federal Government of the Grand Coalition in a white paper. We have come to a concept of so-called "networked security," in which we no longer view the categories of "military" here and "political" and "civil society" there as separate. Rather, we must see things in a connected way because the threats we face today also involve general attacks on our free societies.

Therefore, NATO faces very concrete but also principled challenges. In the past, we did not know states that essentially lacked a state structure. Moreover, we were not so confronted with the fact that sometimes it is difficult to distinguish between internal and external attacks. Today, however, we must find new answers to all these questions. I explicitly state: We will only find them through an open discourse in the transatlantic alliance. It is even more important to continually reaffirm our common value foundation.

Behind us lies an exciting NATO summit in Bucharest—you have all followed it—where we discussed the concept of "networked security" in an extraordinarily gratifying manner using Afghanistan as an example. The gratifying change in the French position has allowed us to discuss "networked security" even in the seemingly purely military alliance of NATO, and that President Karzai, as well as the UN Secretary-General and the relevant military leaders, were present. This made it possible to have a comprehensive discussion about success in Afghanistan. I can say that I welcomed this very much.

I believe we all agree: There will always be military tasks. It is not possible to shirk them and pretend that every problem can be solved with civil society measures and political dialogue. However, it is impossible to separate the military component from the other efforts.

In our governmental practice—this applies equally to the parliamentary area—this has already led to significant changes. When has it happened that representatives of development aid organizations regularly consult with those of the Bundeswehr, with police forces, and with those responsible for foreign policy, discussing the next measures for the respective areas based on their respective responsibilities? Of course, there have been apprehensions, at least in Germany, when non-governmental organizations negotiate continuously with military staffs. But I say: That is good and right. This has also led to changed perspectives. From my point of view, this is progressive for all involved. I explicitly say: For all involved.

We also discussed NATO enlargement in Bucharest and were pleased to welcome Croatia and Albania. I very much regretted that we could not resolve the question of—let me put it politely—FYROM due to a name dispute in such a way that we could also include that entity. It does not matter what it is called when the admission takes place. Politically, the door for NATO membership is open for Macedonia, as we call it in Germany. We hope that the pending cases can truly be resolved.

At the Bucharest summit, we successfully resolved a difficult discussion, namely the question of Ukraine and Georgia. We sent a political message that states: Membership in NATO is decided by the member states and those who apply for admission, not by third parties. This discussion was conducted clearly. On the other hand, I say: I advocated that we do not take the next step yet, namely to develop a MAP for these two countries, because I believe that the alliance, given its challenges, has a fundamental interest in ensuring that the development situation for those who wish to join is sufficiently stable so that we do not have to deal exclusively with conflict cases within the alliance. We know from the experiences of the European Union that this is sometimes the case.

We also know from the cooperation between NATO and the European Security and Defense Policy that we face much incompatibility regarding cooperation due to unresolved questions between Turkey and Cyprus, which we cannot afford—neither in the police mission in the Balkans nor in the police mission in Afghanistan. It requires intensive discussions and various exceptions every time to solve practical tasks here. Therefore, I was somewhat hesitant.

I personally believe that there is a fundamental interest in intensifying NATO-Russia cooperation. After years, a NATO-Russia summit has taken place again. If one does not speak with each other, one should not be surprised that certain prejudices build up. Therefore, I advocate that we hold these NATO-Russia summits much more frequently. This does not mean that Russia indirectly determines NATO affairs. But it does mean that one is informed about mutual interests, concerns, and aspirations. Therefore, I believe that especially in connection with the so-called missile defense activities, a regular dialogue between NATO and Russia is of utmost necessity so that trust can grow.

It makes no sense for us to ignore real existing dangers where conflicts arise simply because we do not want to deal with them. The challenge, for example, posed by rockets from Iran could be a real one. It is not one today. However, Iran's nuclear program is of the utmost concern to us. Therefore, we must jointly develop a protection option. I explicitly say: We should seek dialogue with Russia as often as possible in this regard.

Next year, we will celebrate the NATO anniversary summit in an exciting configuration. The French President and I have invited to a NATO anniversary summit at the German-French border in Bucharest. Those familiar with NATO know the symbolic power of this. It is not only of great symbolic significance for Europe and for NATO's historical context, but it also includes the good news that France wants to politically return to NATO. I welcome this immensely and am therefore very grateful that French President Nicolas Sarkozy was willing to accept this joint invitation.

This NATO summit will be the starting point for the mandate for a security strategy for the near future. After perhaps completing the transformation phase 20 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, we will need to consider how to establish structures in which NATO can function in the next ten to twenty years. I am confident that the concept of "connected security" will play a significant role in this context.

As we do in the European Union, we will certainly also need to discuss questions such as: Where does enlargement end, and how should it develop in the long term? We will need to compare and develop the instruments of crisis management systems. We will have to talk about the NATO-EU partnership, in which there is no opposition, but rather a true intertwining. A corresponding strategic concept for the future can be a very exciting and challenging endeavor.

I believe that NATO has been a success story over the past 60 years – despite all the frictions, discussions, and conflicts that have also occurred. I believe that NATO, in another form and with different challenges, will remain an indispensable instrument of the transatlantic partnership.

I would like to thank you, the parliamentarians, for accompanying this work and thus representing the pillars for society. Because security policy that has no acceptance can achieve nothing. We know how difficult that is. But there must be advocacy for the acceptance of security policy. Therefore, the bridge between Strasbourg and Kehl may be a symbol of your work, which you are gathered here today to represent. Thus, your tireless advocacy for an important alliance is a bridge into society.

Personally, I say: We must place the transatlantic partnership on more pillars than just this one alliance. That is why I am making a great effort, for example, to ensure that the European Union and the United States of America enter into an economic partnership, where we say based on shared values: We do not need trade barriers between us, but we must eliminate the barriers that exist between our countries, because we have other, more urgent tasks in the world than spending billions of euros or dollars on different procedures for car crash tests and corporate accounting.

If we further develop this partnership in the transatlantic space, it will be a wonderful foundation for our values to spread worldwide as successful values. However, we must not indulge in illusions. After the end of the Cold War, it was clear that Western values were clearly superior to communist dictatorships and socialist country models. There was a majority in the world for that. Today, we face the task of presenting our values – the individual protection of human dignity and its indivisibility – to other countries that are not yet convinced of the success of corresponding societal models. Only if we advocate for this through good work, determined action, and unity can we succeed. I am confident: We can achieve this success. But we do not have it in the bag yet.

In this spirit, I wish you fruitful work and good discussions. Do not shy away from conflicts internally. Only if we bring things to the table can we truly make progress. And outwardly, demonstrate transatlantic partnership.