Sovereign local payment of the external debt of the Argentine Republic

Argentina Cristina Fernández de Kirchner · President of Argentina

19 August 2014

Context
Fernández de Kirchner submitted a bill to Argentina's Congress on August 19, 2014, proposing local sovereign debt payment mechanisms to circumvent U.S. court orders blocking restructured debt payments.
Main themes
Sovereign debt restructuring, vulture funds litigation, pari passu orders, local sovereign payment mechanism, U.S. court jurisdiction challenge, Argentine public order, debt restructuring 2005-2010, creditor equality, congressional authority over debt, 2001 Argentine financial crisis
Duration
~90 min
98th percentile
Words
10,795
98th percentile
Sentences
263
94th percentile
Readability
32
19th percentile
Grade
16.7
88th percentile
Syntax
3.83
99th percentile
Vocabulary
2.51
96th percentile

Translated from Spanish

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 52%50%
  • Institutional 40%38%
  • Geopolitical 6%6%
  • Ceremonial 2%2%
  • Social 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 4%

263 sentences in 161 paragraphs

TO THE HONORABLE CONGRESS OF THE NATION:

I am pleased to address Your Honorability with the purpose of submitting for your consideration a bill to declare of public interest the Restructuring of the Debt 2005-2010 and the local sovereign payment, which encompasses one hundred percent of the Holders of Public Securities of the Argentine Republic, under fair, equitable, legal, and sustainable conditions.

In exercising its power as a Sovereign State, the Argentine Republic reaffirms its will, authority, and capacity to pay, and its commitment to honor its obligations.

The enactment of the legal norm proposed herein is necessary, as the Argentine Republic has seen the procedure for the collection by the Holders of the Public Debt Securities restructured in the years 2005 and 2010 blocked by the illegitimate and illegal measures adopted by the courts of the United States of America in the case NML Capital Ltd. et al v. Republic of Argentina (the pari passu orders), pending before the Southern District Court of New York City, United States of America; unprecedented anywhere in the world.

Through this initiative, the implementation of various legal instruments is promoted to allow the collection of the services corresponding to one hundred percent of the Securities issued within the framework of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring 2005-2010, and those that will be issued in the future in replacement of those that have not yet entered said Restructuring.

As is known to the Honorable Congress of the Nation, the Supreme Court of the United States of America, on June 16, 2014, rejected the writ of certiorari presented by the Argentine Republic and, thus, upheld the orders issued in the aforementioned judicial case, which illegally and illegitimately obstruct the collection of the funds paid by the Argentine Republic on June 26, 2014, for the purpose of canceling the services of the restructured debt under Decrees No. 1,735 dated December 9, 2004, and 563 dated April 26, 2010.

Essentially, the pari passu orders issued by Judge Griesa in the case NML Capital Ltd. et al v. Republic of Argentina illegitimately seek to force the Argentine Republic to grant - paradoxically - unequal treatment among its creditors, condemning it to pay the vulture funds that are parties to that litigation, 100% of principal plus accrued interest every time Argentina pays the total amount owed (only interest) to the Bondholders who adhered to its Exchanges in the years 2005 and 2010.

The measures adopted by the Justice of the United States of America in the cited case have been issued in manifest excess of jurisdiction and competence and seek to force the Argentine Republic to violate its sovereign public debt restructuring policies approved by that Honorable Congress of the Nation, which are part of the Public Order of the Argentine Nation, recognized by the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation in the case “Claren Corporation c/ E.N arts. 517/518 CPCC exequátur s/varios,” ruling of March 6, 2014.

The unreasonableness of the pari passu orders issued by Judge Griesa is such that the measures forcibly impose on the Argentine Republic the failure to comply with its obligations and, consequently, violate its Public Order legislation and the contracts signed with the creditors holding 92.4% of its sovereign debt, which was previously deferred.

It is worth recalling that the National Congress, through Law No. 25,561 (B.O. 7/01/2002), declared a public emergency in social, economic, administrative, financial, and exchange matters. Immediately following that law, through Law No. 25,565 (B.O. 21/03/2002), the National Congress expressly provided for the deferral of payments of public debt services in order to attend to the basic functions of the National State (see Art. 6).

This cessation of payment of external public debt at the end of 2001 had profound and painful consequences for the Argentine Republic. During the crisis, industrial employment had fallen by 28% compared to the levels reached ten years earlier, with a reduction of 17% for construction. By May 2002, only 40.1% of the employed were registered salaried workers, that is, who had social security coverage or some degree of stability.

The deferral of payment of external public debt thus appears not as an isolated, particular fact, but within the framework of the decisions made by the National State in the full exercise of its sovereign and constitutional powers to face a structural crisis that jeopardized its own institutions.

In this regard, it is important to note that Article 75 of the National Constitution establishes in paragraphs 7 and 8 that it is the responsibility of Congress: “To arrange for the payment of the internal and external debt of the Nation,” as well as “To set annually, in accordance with the guidelines established in the third paragraph of paragraph 2 of this article, the general budget of expenses and calculation of resources of the national administration, based on the general government program and the public investment plan and to approve or reject the investment account.”

In exercising these powers, and always within the framework of the emergency situation, Law No. 25,827 of the Budget for Fiscal Year 2004 was enacted, through which it was ordered “…the deferral of payments of the public debt services of the national government, originally contracted prior to December 31, 2001, or under regulations issued before that date, until the National Executive Power declares the completion of the restructuring process” (see Art. 59).

In this context, and after an extensive and laborious process of dialogue and negotiation with its creditors, the Argentine Republic opened the “2005 Exchange.” Thus, through Decree No. 1,735/04, the restructuring of the National State's debt was ordered through a national and international exchange operation, which had an adhesion rate of over 76%.

Subsequently, Law No. 26,017 provided that the National Executive Power could not, regarding the bonds referred to in that norm, reopen the exchange process established in Decree No. 1,735/04 mentioned, and also prohibited the National State from carrying out any type of judicial, extrajudicial, or private transaction regarding those bonds (see Arts. 2 and 3).

Law No. 26,547 suspended the validity of Articles 2, 3, and 4 of the aforementioned Law No. 26,017 until December 31, 2010, or until the National Executive Power, through the Ministry of Economy and Public Finance, declared the restructuring process of the public securities covered by the referred norm completed, whichever occurred first. Additionally, it authorized the Ministry of Economy and Public Finance to carry out all necessary acts for the conclusion of the restructuring process of the public securities (see Art. 2), stipulating in Article 3 that the financial terms and conditions offered could not be equal to or better than those offered to creditors in the debt restructuring provided by Decree No. 1,735/04. It also established that the holders of eligible public securities for the exchange interested in participating in the restructuring operation had to waive all rights and claims that they might have in virtue of those securities. And it prohibited the National Executive Power from offering holders of public debt who had initiated judicial, administrative, arbitral, or any other type of actions more favorable treatment than to those who had not done so.

Exercising that authorization, the National Executive Power opened the “2010 Exchange,” through the issuance of Decree No. 563/10, which ordered the restructuring of the National State's debt instrumented in the public securities that were eligible for the exchange provided in Decree No. 1,735/04, which allowed the adhesion to the Argentine debt restructuring process to reach 92.4%.

Subsequently, within the framework of the aforementioned sovereign debt restructuring process, in 2013 Law No. 26,886 was enacted, which authorized the National Executive Power, through the Ministry of Economy and Public Finance, to carry out all necessary acts for the conclusion of the restructuring process of the public securities that had been eligible for the exchange provided in Decree No. 1,735/04 and its complementary regulations that had not been presented to it or to the exchange provided by Decree No. 563/10, under the terms of Article 65 of Law No. 24,156 on Financial Administration and Control Systems of the National Public Sector and its amendments, in order to adjust the services of that debt to the payment possibilities of the National State in the medium and long term (see Art. 1).

Likewise, through its Article 2, the powers granted to the National Executive Power were limited, establishing that the financial terms and conditions offered could not be better than those offered to creditors in the debt restructuring provided by Decree No. 563/10, and the conditions and limitations provided in Article 5 of Law No. 26,547 were maintained. Finally, through Article 7, the validity of Articles 2, 3, and 4 of Law No. 26,017 was suspended until the Congress of the Nation declares the restructuring process of the Public Securities covered by the referred norm completed.

It is also pertinent to recall that, through Law No. 26,895 of the General Budget for Fiscal Year 2014, the deferral of payments of the public debt services of the national government provided in Article 39 of Law No. 26,784 was maintained, until the completion of the restructuring process of all public debt originally contracted prior to December 31, 2001, or under regulations issued before that date. The National Executive Power was also authorized, through the Ministry of Economy and Public Finance, to continue with the normalization of the services of the public debt referred to in Article 56 of that law, under the terms of Article 65 of the Financial Administration and Control Systems of the National Public Sector Law No. 24,156, and its modifications, and with the limits imposed by Law No. 26,017, the NATIONAL EXECUTIVE POWER being empowered to carry out all necessary acts for the conclusion of the aforementioned process, in order to adjust such services to the payment possibilities of the NATIONAL STATE in the medium and long term (see Arts. 56 and 57).

It is also timely to remember that on November 7, 2003, NML Capital Ltd. and others sued the Argentine Republic before the Southern District Court of New York for the failure to pay certain Global External Bonds in their possession - issued under the Fiscal Agency Agreement (FAA) dated October 19, 1994.

The plaintiffs are “vulture funds” based in tax havens (Cayman Islands, Delaware, among others) that bought Argentine bonds - after the default and even after the exchanges of 2005 and 2010 - for cents on the dollar, and solely for the purpose of litigating to achieve the collection of 100% of the debt and thus obtain usurious profits. These entities and their allies engage in financial speculation, and their business model consists of buying the debt of crisis-stricken countries at a bargain price, to then reap exorbitant profits at the expense of the efforts of other creditors and the populations of these countries. NML never invested in the Argentine Republic. Vulture funds do not make genuine investments; they are international speculators who exploit the flaws of the global financial system and - literally - bet on obtaining enormous profits at the expense of the well-being of millions of people.

On December 12, 2003, having become aware that NML and other plaintiffs would attempt to argue in the future that any payments that the Argentine Republic might make regarding a potential debt restructuring, or to international financial institutions, would violate the pari passu clause contained in the securities in their possession, Argentina filed a motion before Judge Griesa requesting that he declare that such payments would not violate that clause.

In an oral hearing held on January 15, 2004, with Judge Griesa and several plaintiff parties in related cases, representatives of the Republic of Argentina raised with the judge what would happen if the issue of the pari passu clause was not addressed at that time, anticipating this move by NML from the outset. Thus, the Republic of Argentina requested that it be established that the pari passu clause (i) does not require pro rata payment, (ii) does not prohibit payment to one creditor, and (iii) does not order the cessation of payments for not paying one or more creditors. NML argued that the clause does require pro rata payment, but urged the judge not to decide on the grounds that the issue was not "ripe." Judge Griesa rejected the motion based on a technicality, claiming that there was no "case or controversy" to address, and therefore it was not relevant at that moment or for the future. In this way, he refused to provide legal certainty to the Republic of Argentina prior to facing the largest sovereign debt restructuring process in its history. What is even more serious is that Judge Griesa himself remarked in one of the hearings that he found "a very strange interpretation of the pari passu clause" that the Republic of Argentina warned could be abusively invoked by NML in the future. However, Judge Griesa's opinion was not subsequently the same, but rather contrary, and the consequences of his decision are now evident.

In 2004, after obtaining a favorable ruling from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals against Peru, and following a strong lobbying campaign, the vulture funds succeeded in having the New York State Legislature amend Article 489 of the New York Judiciary Law ("NY Code – Section 489: Purchase of claims by corporations or collection agencies," also known as the "Champerty Defense"), based on a rule of the traditional Common Law system, which prohibited the purchase of debt for the purpose of taking legal action to collect it, aimed at preventing abuses of the legal process. This directly hindered the business of the vulture funds, as the purchase of distressed debt at bargain prices is their main means of subsistence. The amendment to this article limited the "Champerty" defense solely to those purchases of debt under five hundred thousand US dollars (U$S 500,000), thus ensuring a "safe harbor" for the purchase of significant amounts of debt (according to the message elevating the bill: Memorandum in Support, New York State Assembly, Bill Number: A7244C), in undisputed benefit of those funds.

After paving the way with the limitation of the "Champerty" defense, NML extended the boundaries of its aggressive strategy of speculation and extortion, and began to seek attachments against Argentine state assets around the world; subsequently, these requests extended to all types of assets regardless of their characteristics (diplomatic, military, cultural, scientific, etc.), including autonomous agencies and companies with majority state ownership, among others.

However, in the realm of International Law, States possess sovereign legal equality, which means, among other things, that their assets cannot be subjected to enforcement measures unless certain exceptions are presented. This customary rule of international law has been incorporated by various States into their domestic legal systems, including the United States of America, which adopted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") in 1976. Thus, in the United States of America, enforcement measures against foreign States must comply with the standards of the FSIA, which grants those subjects immunity from execution on their property and assets, with limited exceptions.

The Republic of Argentina relied, at the time of issuing the bonds governed by the laws and jurisdiction of the United States of America, on the total and correct application of the FSIA, which provides certain immunities in terms of enforcement. If the enforcement of certain Argentine assets has not been possible for the plaintiffs, it is simply due to the right that the Republic has to invoke those immunities, as any sovereign State would do, especially when threatened with illegitimate, exorbitant, and disproportionate claims.

As has been said, these illegal and illegitimate enforcement measures endorsed by the judicial system of the United States, in violation of its own rules (FSIA) and the principle of sovereign immunity of the Republic of Argentina, were nothing but a strategy by NML to pressure the Republic of Argentina to submit to the payment of one hundred percent of what was demanded - which is not only much more than what was accepted by 92.4% of the other creditors, but is a claim that seeks a profit margin exceeding 1600% - immediately.

The plaintiffs were fully aware of the provisions of the FSIA, and therefore, by acquiring sovereign debt bonds that had defaulted, they accepted the risks or difficulties that would entail the collection of that debt.

However, in October 2010, NML finally applied its definitive strategy and requested permission to amend its complaint against the Republic of Argentina, alleging that the country had been in continuous violation of the pari passu clause since the exchange in 2005, as according to the vulture fund's interpretation of that clause, it implied that if any creditor of the State did not receive the corresponding payment, that State was prohibited from making any payment on its debt, as all must receive "equal treatment."

Furthermore, it requested the issuance of an order ("injunction") that would provide for pro rata payments to creditors ("ratable payments"), which translated into preventing payment to the bondholders who participated in the exchanges of 2005 and 2010 unless, simultaneously or in advance, NML and the other co-plaintiffs were paid the total of their unstructured holdings.

On December 7, 2011, Judge Griesa ruled that both the enactment of Laws Nos. 26,017 and 26,547, as well as the periodic payments of the services of the bonds issued for the exchanges, involved the reduction of the rank of NML's bonds, thus violating the pari passu clause.

On February 23, 2012, Judge Griesa issued an order requiring Argentina to pay the plaintiffs in full when payments were made to the holders of bonds issued for the exchanges. In March of that year, Argentina appealed these decisions to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, suspending the effects of Judge Griesa's ruling during the appeal process. Meanwhile, the Judge also ordered Argentina not to modify the procedure by which payments on the bonds were made, so as not to evade a potential ruling (the "anti-evasion" measure of March 5, 2012).

On October 26, 2012, the Court of Appeals issued its decision: (a) on the one hand, it confirmed Judge Griesa's ruling on the existence of a violation of the pari passu clause, and (b) on the other hand, it remanded the case to Judge Griesa to clarify the pro rata payment formula and how it would affect third parties (including intermediary banks).

On November 21, 2012, Judge Griesa clarified the pro rata payment formula, establishing that the payment of 100% due to the plaintiffs must be made along with the payment of services to the holders of the restructured debt. Additionally, he detailed the list of third parties involved (participants in the payment process) and lifted the "stay" (suspension) of February 23 - which was later restored by the Court of Appeals at Argentina's request on November 28. The Republic of Argentina argued that it does not constitute in any way "equal treatment" to judicially guarantee that the vulture funds would receive full payment - and all at once - of the claimed debt, while a vast majority of bondholders voluntarily accepted haircuts and sustainable financial conditions for the Republic by adhering to the 2005 and 2010 exchanges.

Undoubtedly, these decisions of the Judicial Power of the United States of America protect speculation and usury, and jeopardize any possible attempts by States to undertake voluntary debt restructuring processes. In order to justify their unequal treatment - albeit with the excuse, paradoxically, of applying a clause of equal treatment - Judge Griesa determined that by accepting the exchange offers, the restructured bondholders opted for certainty, avoiding the risk of litigating their rights under the bonds of the Fiscal Agency Agreement (FAA). But they knew very well that other bondholders of the FAA would attempt to obtain full payment of the amounts owed under those bonds through persistence in litigation. He emphasized that for many years the plaintiffs have unsuccessfully tried to enforce their judgments against Argentina (due to the sovereign immunity it enjoys) but that now the decisions of the District Court and the Court of Appeals based on the pari passu clause allow providing the plaintiffs with full recovery of the amounts owed under the FAA bonds.

Judge Griesa disregarded the right of Sovereign States to immunity from execution, and explicitly expressed his satisfaction at having found - at the suggestion of the litigants - a way to evade the FSIA itself. According to the Judge, "it is not an injustice to have rulings that, at last, imply that Argentina must pay the debts it owes. After ten years of litigation, this is a just result." In fact, in the very hearings of this litigation, the Judge expressly acknowledged that his rulings were a means to circumvent the sovereign immunity of the Argentine State, and "compel it" to comply with the judgments against it.

On December 28, 2012, Argentina appealed the decision of November 21, which was confirmed on August 23, 2013, by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Thus, on February 18, 2014, Argentina requested the Supreme Court of the United States of America to take the case (submitting a "writ of certiorari") alleging, as it had done since its first submission in the case, among other issues, the violation of the execution immunity enjoyed by the Argentine State under the FSIA and that this decision would have, in its case, serious systemic consequences not only for the Republic of Argentina but for the future of all sovereign debt restructurings, as recognized by the United States government itself, Brazil, Mexico, France, the International Monetary Fund, UNCTAD, and numerous other international organizations. However, that request was denied on June 16, 2014, leaving Judge Griesa's orders in effect.

The judicial order of November 21, 2012, in the case NML Capital Ltd., et al, v. Republic of Argentina issued by Judge Griesa, confirmed by the Second Circuit on August 23, 2013, and which became final on June 16 with the rejection of the writ of certiorari by the Supreme Court of the United States of America, orders the Republic of Argentina as follows:

a. Whenever the Republic pays any amount due under the terms of the bonds or other obligations issued in the Republic's Exchange Offers of 2005 or 2010, or any exchange or substitution of the Exchange Offers that may occur in the future (collectively, the "Exchange Bonds"), the Republic must simultaneously - or in advance - make a "Pro Rata Payment" to NML.

b. Such "Pro Rata Payment" must be in an amount equal to the "Payment Percentage" (as defined below), multiplied by the total amount currently due to NML in relation to the bonds at issue in these cases, including pre-judgment interest.

c. Such "Payment Percentage" must be the fraction resulting from the division of the total amount actually paid or that the Republic intends to pay under the terms of the Exchange Bonds by the total amount then due under the Exchange Bonds.

d. The Republic is prohibited from failing to comply with Paragraph 1 (c) of the FAA, including making any payment under the terms of the Exchange Bonds without simultaneously - or in advance - making a Pro Rata Payment to NML.

e. Within three (3) days following the issuance of such order, the Republic must provide copies of the order to all participants in the payment process of the Exchange Bonds ("Participants"). Such Participants will be bound by the terms of the order as provided by Rule 65(d)(2) and prohibited from aiding and abetting any violation of the order, including any other failure by the Republic to comply with its obligations under Paragraph 1 (c) of the FAA, such as any effort to make payments under the terms of the Exchange Bonds without also simultaneously - or in advance - making a Pro Rata Payment to NML.

f. The term "Participants" refers to the individuals and entities that act in concert or active participation with the Republic, to assist the Republic in fulfilling its payment obligations under the Exchange Bonds, including: (1) the trustees and/or registrars under the Exchange Bonds (including, but not limited to, The Bank of New York Mellon, formerly known as The Bank of New York); (2) the registered owners of the Exchange Bonds and nominees of the depositaries of the Exchange Bonds (including, but not limited to, Cede & Co. and The Bank of New York Depositary (Nominees) Limited) and any institution acting as a nominee; (3) clearing entities and systems, depositaries, clearing system operators, and settlement agents for the Exchange Bonds (including, but not limited to, the Depository Trust Company, Clearstream Banking S.A., Euroclear Bank S.A./N.V., and the Euroclear System); (4) paying agents and transfer agents of the Exchange Bonds (including, but not limited to, The Bank of New York (Luxembourg) S.A. and The Bank of New York Mellon (including, but not limited to, The Bank of New York Mellon (London)); (5) lawyers and other agents contracted by any of the above or by the Republic in relation to its obligations under the Exchange Bonds.

g. Nothing in the order shall be interpreted as extending to the conduct or actions of a third party acting solely in its role as a "intermediary bank," under Article 4A of the UCC and N.Y.C.L.S. U.C.C. § 4-A-104, implementing a funds transfer in relation to the Exchange Bonds.

h. Any third party that has received due notice of the Order, in accordance with Rule 65(d)(2), and that requires clarification regarding its duties under the Order, if any, may file a motion with the Court, notifying the Republic and NML.

i. Simultaneously or prior to making a payment on the Exchange Bonds, the Republic shall certify to the Court, and give notice of this certification to its Participants and to NML's lawyers, that the Republic has complied with its obligations under the Order to make a Pro Rata Payment to NML.

As Your Honor can appreciate, with respect to the scope of the Argentine Republic, these foreign judicial measures not only recognize the payment of the non-restructured public debt under its original conditions, disregarding the national public order regulatory framework, but at the same time, they establish a mechanism that blocks the collection procedure of the restructured public debt, all in terms that are contrary to Argentine Public Order, according to what has been established by the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation in the recent case "Claren Corporation v. E.N. arts. 517/518 CPCC exequatur s/varios," ruling of March 6, 2014.

The decisions made throughout the debt restructuring processes impose a series of obligations on the Argentine Republic towards the Holders who adhered to the Exchanges of 2005 and 2010. These obligations primarily concern the payment of the respective services for principal and interest on the new series of bonds issued accordingly, regulated by internal rules and by the Offering Prospectuses and the Trust Agreement ("Trust Indenture").

In what is relevant here, it should be noted that the relevant payments that Argentina must make are made to the Trustee ("Trustee"), which is Bank of New York Mellon (BNYM), in the accounts that this foreign entity has opened at the Central Bank of the Argentine Republic, no later than 1:00 P.M. local time at that payment location, on the business day prior to each interest payment date or principal payment date (see Section 3.5 Payments, Trust Indenture).

All sums paid to the Trustee under the Debt Securities and the Trust Agreement must be held by it in trust for the Holders of the Debt Securities and applied by the Trustee to the payments due under the Debt Securities and the Trust Agreement, at the times and in the manner provided in the Debt Securities and in the Trust Agreement (Section 3.1.). The Trustee, therefore, must apply such amount to the payment due on that Payment Date and, until such application, those amounts shall be held in trust by the Trustee for the benefit of the Holders entitled to them, and the Republic shall have no interest in such amounts (Section 3.5.).

From the moment the payment is made to the Trustee, the amounts deposited are no longer the property of the Republic. Consequently, it is the Trustee's responsibility to transfer the amounts thus deposited to the Holders of the securities who have an absolute and unconditional right to them (see Section 4.9, Trust Indenture).

The obligations imposed by Argentine laws within the framework of the restructuring process and the commitments made by Argentina to its restructured creditors impose on the Republic the obligation to deposit the amounts corresponding to the respective maturities in the account of the Trustee in the Argentine Republic, in accordance with the Trust Agreement entered into on June 2, 2005, and amended on April 30, 2010. For its part, said agent must receive the funds and distribute them.

In this regard, the Argentine Republic made the payment corresponding to the interest maturity that occurred on June 30 of this year on June 26, 2014, without the BNYM having proceeded to distribute the sums deposited to the Holders of the Bonds from the Exchanges of 2005 and 2010, issued under the Laws of New York and England (Eurobonds).

The Argentine Republic has sought from the outset a definitive, fair, equitable, legal, and sustainable solution to its debt with all bondholders who have not yet entered the Republic's Exchanges. However, a global solution cannot, by definition, prioritize the claims for approximately 1.65 billion US dollars from the claimants who have the orders of February 23, 2012, which represent less than 1% of the Republic's debt eligible for the Exchanges, or for that matter, additional claims of over 2.4 billion US dollars that only these claimants have in other legal actions.

The holdings of the holdouts represent less than 7.6% of the total sovereign debt that the Argentine Republic began to restructure in 2005, in a process through which a voluntary agreement was reached with more than 92.4% of its creditors. A minority cannot jeopardize the restructuring achieved with the Exchanges of 2005 and 2010.

Judge Griesa stated that the only way to resolve this conflict is for the Republic and the claimants to reach an agreement. However, any agreement that could eventually be reached in the NML case currently faces a difficult obstacle: the Rights Upon Future Offers ("RUFO") clause contained in the prospectuses of the Exchanges of 2005 and 2010. This clause establishes that if Argentina voluntarily makes a purchase or exchange offer or requests consents to modify any Eligible Security not offered or accepted in the previous Exchanges, it must take the necessary measures to ensure that the participants in the 2005 and 2010 Exchange operations have the right to exchange the securities received in accordance with the conditions set forth in the respective prospectuses, which in this specific case, following the expectations disseminated by the holdouts, would amount to the total payment of interest plus principal of the original bonds.

This clause is in effect until December 31, 2014, and its activation would completely destroy the debt restructuring processes carried out in 2005 and 2010, annihilating the efforts made by the State and its population to meet their international commitments.

The RUFO clause was intended to protect the principle of equity among creditors. The purpose of the clause was to assure those bondholders who agreed to participate in the debt exchanges offered, betting on the country, that Argentina would not offer a better deal to those who refused to participate. The incorporation of the clause in the new bonds issued also served to reinforce the adherence of bondholders. The logic of this clause is that no bondholder would be willing to submit to a restructuring if they knew that, in the near future, those who did not could receive the full principal plus interest on their defaulted debts; otherwise, the bondholders who accepted the exchange would end up "financing" the holdouts.

On the other hand, according to the terms of Law No. 26,886, the National Executive Power has only limited renegotiation powers, which do not authorize it, at present, to offer better financial conditions than those previously agreed to the bondholders who had entered into previous exchanges, nor to those who had initiated legal actions, a more favorable treatment than to those who had not.

On June 23, 2014, Judge Griesa appointed a "Special Master" to assist the parties in reaching a definitive solution that takes into account the factual and legal limitations previously mentioned. At all times, the Argentine Republic attended the hearings convened by the Special Master. It is noteworthy that it has been the Minister of Economy and Public Finance himself who has held, on various occasions, conversations with the Special Master, and on two occasions with him and the representatives of the claimants.

Such conduct by the Argentine Republic demonstrates its willingness to engage in dialogue in order to reach a solution, although it should be emphasized that a country cannot resolve a matter of such complexity in a few weeks and with the risk presented by the activation of the RUFO clause.

The Argentine Republic has honored its debts with all Holders who entered the Exchanges of 2005 and 2010, in the largest, most complex, and most successful sovereign debt restructuring process that any country has faced. The total adherence of 92.4% of the Holders with eligible Securities is clear evidence of this, as is the global support for the efforts made by our country in various fields and international organizations (ECLAC, OAS, UNCTAD, G-77, IMF, among others).

The co-director of the Centre for Economic and Policy Research and president of Just Foreign Policy in Washington, D.C., Mark Weisbrot, warned about the dangers that the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States to reject the review of Judge Griesa's ruling that forces Argentina to pay the vulture funds poses for the financial world and, above all, for the future of Americans. In an article titled: "Who Shot Argentina?", published in U.S. News and World Report, he stated that the court's rejection of his country's case "destroys" the agreement that Argentina, or any other in the future, reaches with bondholders whose securities are in payment deferral.

Likewise, the G77+China sent a letter to Judge Griesa, to the Supreme Court of the United States, and to Secretary of State John Kerry, expressing its "full solidarity and support" for Argentina regarding the ruling issued by the U.S. courts in the case against the vulture funds. In the note, signed and sent to the three recipients by the president of G77+China, Sacha Llorentty Soliz, the group composed of 133 countries "highlights its concern about the serious consequences of the ruling, which go beyond Argentina and could affect any country facing similar situations."

In the same vein, the Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Alicia Bárcena, expressed support for the Argentine position in the claim against the vulture funds, and raised the need to establish an "international mechanism" to resolve the "conflicts of interest arising from sovereign defaults." This is so, because the global financial crisis and its effects, and the eurozone crisis, "have once again highlighted several of the deep inconsistencies and inequities, both in relation to the organization of the international monetary system and with the excessive power that the world of finance acquires over that of labor and production."

Since May 2003, the Republic has embarked on a firm policy of debt reduction. This strategy was based on two sovereign debt restructurings, which crystallized in the voluntary debt exchange processes in 2005 and 2010, mentioned above. However, the debt reduction process was not limited to the restructuring of the defaulted debt, but was more comprehensive, with the aim of normalizing Argentina's financial relations with the international financial market and increasing National Sovereignty. Currently, the debt of Argentines, which in 2002 represented approximately 166% of GDP, has decreased to represent, in foreign currency, an amount less than 10% of GDP.

In this regard, the Argentine Republic has provided ample evidence of its willingness to negotiate and capacity to pay:

- Since the renegotiation process initiated in 2003, Argentina has paid more than 190 billion US dollars in principal and interest between 2005 and 2013, distributed among the national public sector, the private sector (both foreign and national), and multilateral credit agencies, without threatening the process of growth with social inclusion that began in 2003.

- Furthermore, in 2006, the total debt with the International Monetary Fund was canceled for 9.53 billion US dollars.

- Recently, the country negotiated an innovative payment mechanism with creditors gathered in the Paris Club for a debt of 9.69 billion US dollars, which will enhance the investment of member countries in Argentina, with a scheme that considers the economic and financial sustainability of the agreement. In this context, on July 28, 2014, the Ministry of Economy and Public Finance made a payment equivalent to 642 million US dollars corresponding to the initial payment of principal owed to the creditor countries that make up the Paris Club.

- Argentina also negotiated and reached settlement agreements to cancel obligations arising from arbitration processes conducted before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) for 677 million US dollars.

- In addition, it reached a Settlement Agreement and Friendly Solution with the company Repsol S.A. for the expropriation of 51% of the shares of YPF S.A., achieving a discount of over 50% regarding the claim filed with ICSID and payment over more than 10 years; this agreement was ratified by the Honorable Congress of the Nation through Law No. 26,932.

- The total cancellation of the Optional Bonds of the National State 2012 (BODEN 2012), the Bond of the Argentine Nation 2013 (BONAR 7), and other financial operations that substantially improved the debt profile of the Argentine Republic is also noteworthy.

It is evident, then, that the Argentine Republic has a willingness for dialogue and negotiation with each and every one of its creditors. However, the vulture funds refuse to maintain negotiations under fair, equitable, legal, and sustainable conditions for both parties.

The Argentine Republic cannot negotiate an agreement with the claimants in the NML case without significantly affecting its reserves. Judge Griesa's ruling forces payment to the vulture funds at the same time as payments are made to the holders of the exchange for interest maturities. The vultures themselves also admit that Judge Griesa's ruling implies additional obligations for the country of at least 7.5 billion US dollars, that is, more than 25% of the country's international reserves balance. It is evident that a blow of that magnitude implies a disproportionate detriment to Argentina.

On the other hand, it would be enough for just 80% of the holdouts to receive the same treatment as the vulture funds for that amount to turn into 15 billion US dollars. Furthermore, if 92.4% of the bondholders who entered the exchange claimed the same, under the RUFO clause, the Argentine Republic could face lawsuits for amounts that some specialists estimate at more than 500 billion US dollars, and that would be at least 120 billion US dollars.

In hearings held before Judge Griesa, the plaintiff has stated: “If [Argentina wants] to talk about an agreement, they know where to find us. They not only have until June 30, your honor. They have a 30-day grace period after June 30. They do not have to pay the exchange bonds until July 30.” That is to say, a ruling that could imply lawsuits for more than 15 billion US dollars must be “negotiated” in 40 days, under the threat of keeping the payment to restructured bondholders blocked. In fact, in the words of NML's lawyer before Judge Griesa, there also seems to be no such negotiation: “We are ready to sit down with [Argentina] if they want to talk about this. But without making any concessions regarding their obligation to pay us the 1.4 billion US dollars that are before the court now.” As stated, the judicial strategy followed by the vulture funds will allow them to obtain a profit of around 1600%, thus obstructing the payment to 92.4% of Argentina's creditors who accepted the restructuring.

The effective collection of the equivalent of 539 million US dollars paid by the Argentine Republic in accordance with its national legislation and its contractual commitments on June 26 of this year is currently blocked by court order, preventing third parties unrelated to the case from receiving the claims of which they are legitimate owners, and whose payment was fulfilled in a timely manner by the Argentine Republic. The ruling seeks to force a solvent and liquid debtor like the Argentine Republic, which systematically meets its financial commitments, to enter into default.

It is appropriate for the National State to continue defending its successful sovereign debt restructuring process that has allowed the country to experience the longest period of growth with social inclusion in its history. The Argentine Republic demands fair, equitable, legal, and sustainable conditions to fulfill its obligations to 100% of its creditors.

Previous experiences have shown that when financial resources are insufficient, countries must resort to mortgaging their strategic assets and natural resources. In this regard, a recently published article on the website of the American Task Force Argentina (AFTA) is surprising, in which payment to the vulture funds is linked to the ownership of Vaca Muerta, the second largest unconventional gas reservoir in the world located in Argentine Patagonia. It also mentions two foreign countries, China and Russia, members of the G20. It is threatened that the American company Chevron could leave the country if the vulture funds are not paid. What are the true purposes of the vulture funds? Why do they venture into issues of hydrocarbons, of third countries, of private companies?

In the hearing of July 22, 2014, Judge Griesa emphatically highlighted the word “obligations,” asserting that Argentina has done everything possible to comply with those obligations that pertain to it. However, Judge Griesa's orders do nothing but attempt to force the Argentine Republic to violate the obligations assumed with the restructured bondholders, with the sole objective of benefiting a tiny percentage of bad faith creditors who have never had any intention other than to achieve exorbitant profits at the expense of the efforts of the Argentine State, its population, and the bondholders who accepted to participate in the restructuring, understanding that the Argentine Republic has the will to pay its debts, in a manner that is fair to its people, equitable among creditors, legal according to the applicable legal framework, and sustainable for its economy.

The aforementioned hearing of July 22, 2014 also shows that Judge Griesa does not fully understand the complexity of the Argentine debt restructuring case. Furthermore, the lack of knowledge about the payment mechanisms of different types of bonds, the role played by the actors involved in those mechanisms, and the existence of the various jurisdictions that govern them, has led him to issue arbitrary measures that place some restructured bondholders in a better position than others. In that hearing, the District Court expressed confusion about the expansive scope and operability of the pari passu orders.

Judge Griesa did not address at all the jurisdictional arguments concerning entities involved in the international funds transfer system located outside the United States, despite the unprecedented extraterritorial scope of the pari passu. Regarding the main issue that the Court addressed in that hearing—whether the pari passu applies to Bonds governed by Argentine Law—the court expressed ignorance of key facts, including that some of the bonds are Exchange Bonds but are not pari passu with External Debt since they constitute “Domestic Debt Denominated in Foreign Currency,” while other bonds are not even Exchange Bonds.

This situation is yet another element that reveals the arbitrariness of the measures issued by a Judge who also seems determined to evade the provisions of the FSIA in order to ensure that the claimants can collect at all costs and, in turn, prevent the restructured bondholders from doing so.

According to the description above, the Argentine Republic has developed different courses of action in order to safeguard the sovereign interests of the Nation and, at the same time, the rights of the third parties involved—such as the Holders of the Debt Titles restructured in 2005 and 2010.

In this sense, the Argentine Republic on June 27, July 7, and August 11, 2014, published in the Official Bulletin of the Argentine Republic LEGAL NOTICES TO HOLDERS OF ARGENTINA DEBT EXCHANGES 2005-2010; as well as in various local and international media, and on the website of the Ministry of Economy and Public Finance.

These legal notices aimed to inform the aforementioned Holders that the Argentine Republic, on June 26, 2014, fulfilled its payment obligations assumed in the “Trust Indenture” dated June 2, 2005, amended on April 30, 2010, before the Holders and the Trustee Agent (Bank of New York Mellon – BNYM); having proceeded to deposit the sums corresponding to the interest maturities of June 30, 2014, within the framework of the applicable Argentine and foreign legislation.

The effects of this payment in light of the different legislations applicable to the restructured public debt titles were also duly notified. In this regard, the Trustee Agent and the payment agents were reminded of their obligations under the “Trust Indenture” and the applicable legislation, as well as the rights of the Holders of restructured titles.

The last legal notice informed bondholders of all actions taken by the Argentine Republic in accordance with the obligations established in the “Trust Indenture,” including the demands made to the Trustee and the payment agents, recognizing the absolute and unconditional right of the bondholders to collect the amounts deposited in the fiduciary account of the Trustee Agent (BNYM), being that property exclusively owned by the bondholders.

Likewise, the Republic highlighted that in light of the aforementioned, none of the default situations provided for in the “Trust Indenture” were configured, and that as a result of the ongoing judicial proceedings before the Southern District Court of New York, in the case NML Capital Ltd., et al, v. Republic of Argentina, which involves a small number of creditors who did not participate in the 2005 and 2010 Exchanges, some of the payments previously made by the Argentine Republic have not yet reached the accounts of the bondholders who participated in the aforementioned Exchanges. That risk factor had already been reported by Argentina in the Prospectuses of the Offers to Restructure its Sovereign Debt in 2005 and 2010, explicitly explaining that: “[t]he payments of Argentina in relation to the Offer (including the payments owed by Argentina on what was agreed in the Offer) or to the holders of New Titles may be affected, ordered, or otherwise questioned by the holders who refused to participate in the Offer or by other creditors of Argentina.”

Finally, the Argentine Republic reaffirmed that it has the resources and the will to meet the commitments assumed in the Debt Exchanges of 2005 and 2010; that it will continue to urge the Trustee Agent to fulfill its obligations, and will continue to urge the courts of the United States of America to remove the impediments that currently interfere with the proper distribution of the payments that the Argentine Republic has made. It also urged bondholders to exercise their rights and their consequent judicial remedies under the “Trust Indenture,” in the event that the Trustee Agent fails to fulfill its obligations, particularly the obligation to transfer the amounts for the payments that the Republic has made in their favor.

At the international level, on August 7, 2014, the Argentine Republic filed a lawsuit against the United States of America before the International Court of Justice, based in The Hague, aimed at holding the defendant accountable for the damages being caused to Argentina by the decisions made by the U.S. judicial courts, in the context of the aforementioned case NML Capital Ltd., et al, v. Republic of Argentina.

The Argentine Republic stated in its lawsuit that the United States of America, through its Judiciary, has violated its international obligation to respect Argentine sovereignty, causing serious inconveniences and preventing bondholders from receiving the payment made by the Argentine Republic in a timely manner, regarding the restructured debt, thus undermining the sovereign decision of the Argentine Nation to restructure its external debt.

In that presentation, the Argentine Republic stated that "since a State is responsible for the conduct of all its organs, the violations mentioned have generated a controversy between Argentina and the United States," which the Argentine Republic "submits to the International Court of Justice for resolution."

In that presentation, the Argentine Republic accuses the United States of America of not respecting Argentine "sovereign immunities," and the international obligation not to apply or encourage economic and political measures to force the sovereign will of another State.

On the other hand, the Argentine Republic emphasized in that presentation that it provides "the United States with the opportunity to resolve this controversy in accordance with law and justice."

Without prejudice to the actions previously developed and those that may be relevant in the future, the purpose of this Bill is to assert the right of the Argentine Republic as a Sovereign State to pay its external debt, and to implement mechanisms that allow for the collection of one hundred percent of the Holders of Public Securities, under fair, equitable, legal, and sustainable conditions, for which the restructuring of the Sovereign Debt carried out in the years 2005 and 2010 is declared of public interest, as well as its payment under the specified conditions.

By virtue of the public and notorious inability of the Bank of New York Mellon to act as Trustee Agent of the 2005-2010 Trust Agreement, the Ministry of Economy and Public Finance is authorized to take the necessary measures to remove the said Bank and designate, in its place, Nación Fideicomisos S.A.; without prejudice to the right of the Holders to designate a new Trustee Agent.

Furthermore, mechanisms are established to ensure the collection of the holders who adhered to the 2005-2010 Sovereign Debt Restructuring, creating a special account whose purpose will be to apply the funds deposited therein in trust to the payment of the corresponding debt services, authorizing the Ministry of Economy and Public Finance to make such payments. It is also provided that these Holders may opt, individually or collectively, to request a change in the legislation and jurisdiction applicable to their securities, authorizing the Ministry of Economy and Public Finance to implement an exchange for new Public Securities, governed by local legislation and jurisdiction, on terms and financial conditions identical to those of the Restructured Securities presented for the said Exchange.

Notwithstanding this and since the law refers to one hundred percent of the Debt Holders, regarding the Holders who have not yet entered the 2005-2010 Sovereign Debt Restructuring, the creation of another special account is contemplated in which funds equivalent to those that would correspond to be paid for the services of the new Public Securities that will be issued in the future, according to the provisions of Article 1 of Law No. 26,886, will be deposited, authorizing the Ministry of Economy and Public Finance to make the relevant deposits.

Finally, and in view of the significance of this law, its provisions are declared of public order, establishing its entry into force from the day of its publication in the Official Bulletin.

In this way, the Argentine Republic reaffirms its will, authority, and capacity to faithfully comply with its obligations to 100% of the creditors Holders of public debt securities affected by the payment deferral provided for in Laws Nos. 25,565 and 25,827, respecting the principle of equity among creditors, and honoring the trust of the vast majority of Bondholders who entered the 2005-2010 Sovereign Debt Restructuring of the Argentine Republic.

For all the above, this Bill is submitted for your consideration, requesting its prompt sanction.

God save Your Honorability.

MESSAGE NO.

THE SENATE AND CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

OF THE ARGENTINE NATION, ASSEMBLED IN CONGRESS,…

ENACT WITH FORCE OF

LAW:

TITLE I

Chapter One

On the Local Sovereign Payment of the external debt of the Argentine Republic

ARTICLE 1.- In exercise of the sovereign power of the Argentine Republic, the restructuring of the Sovereign Debt carried out in the years 2005 and 2010 is declared of public interest, as well as the payment under fair, equitable, legal, and sustainable conditions to one hundred percent of the Holders of Public Securities of the Argentine Republic; and, consequently, the application of the contracts entered into under the restructurings provided for by Decrees Nos. 1735/04 and 563/10, for the purpose of preserving the collection by the interested bondholders.

ARTICLE 2.- This Law aims to implement legal instruments that allow for the collection of the services corresponding to one hundred percent of the Securities issued under the 2005-2010 Sovereign Debt Restructuring (hereinafter, "Restructured Securities"), in safeguarding national public order and the contracts entered into under said Restructuring, against the illegitimate and illegal obstruction of the collection mechanisms of the funds paid by the Argentine Republic on June 26, 2014, as ordered by judicial orders issued by the Southern District Court of New York in the case NML Capital Ltd. et al v. Republic of Argentina which, as they have been issued, are impossible to comply with, and violate both the sovereignty and immunities of the Argentine Republic as well as the rights of third parties.

Chapter Two

On the mechanism to safeguard the collection of the Holders who adhered to the 2005-2010 Sovereign Debt Restructuring

ARTICLE 3.- By virtue of the public and notorious inability of the Bank of New York Mellon to act as Trustee Agent of the 2005-2010 Trust Agreement ("Trust Indenture" dated June 2, 2005, amended on April 30, 2010), and taking into account the removal powers provided in said Agreement (which provides in its Clause 5.9, among other powers, that when "the Trustee Agent is unable to act...the Republic may remove [it] and hire a successor Trustee Agent with respect to the debt Securities"), as well as the right of the Argentine Republic to ensure the effective collection of its Holders, the Ministry of Economy and Public Finance is authorized to take the necessary measures to remove the Bank of New York Mellon as Trustee Agent and to designate, in its place, Nación Fideicomisos S.A.; all this, without prejudice to the right of the Holders to designate a new Trustee Agent that guarantees the collection channel of the services corresponding to the Restructured Securities, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 5.9 and 7 of the 2005-2010 Trust Agreement, among others, as was duly informed by the Argentine Republic in the "Legal Notices to the Holders of Argentine Debt Exchange 2005-2010," published in the Official Bulletin on June 27, July 7, and August 11, 2014.

ARTICLE 4.- A special account named "Fund Law No. XX.XXX – Sovereign Payment of Restructured Debt" is created, which will be a special account of Nación Fideicomisos S.A. in the Central Bank of the Argentine Republic, and whose purpose will be to hold in trust the funds deposited therein and apply them to the payment of the debt services corresponding to the Securities governed under the 2005-2010 Trust Agreement, in accordance with the provisions of Clause 2 (e) and related terms and conditions of said Securities and said Agreement.

ARTICLE 5.- The Ministry of Economy and Public Finance is authorized to pay, on the corresponding due dates, the services of the Securities governed under the 2005-2010 Trust Agreement in the account Fund Law No. XX.XXX – Sovereign Payment of Restructured Debt created by Article 4 of this Law, where they will be maintained for the exclusive benefit of the Holders until their effective collection.

ARTICLE 6.- The funds corresponding to the payments provided in the previous Article will be distributed through the new entities designated for such purposes by the Ministry of Economy and Public Finance or the Holders of Securities governed under the 2005-2010 Trust Agreement, in accordance with said agreement, with the currencies deposited therein being freely available to the Holders.

ARTICLE 7.- In the event that due to the illegitimate and illegal obstruction of the collection mechanisms of the services of the Restructured Securities, their Holders opt –individually or collectively– to request a change in the legislation and jurisdiction applicable to their securities, the Ministry of Economy and Public Finance is authorized to implement an exchange for new Public Securities, governed by local legislation and jurisdiction, on terms and financial conditions identical to those of the Restructured Securities presented for said Exchange. In such case, the funds deposited in their favor under the terms of Article 5 of this Law will be delivered along with the new Public Securities that are issued, at the time of their placement.

Chapter Three

On the deposit in favor of the Holders who have not yet entered the 2005-2010 Sovereign Debt Restructuring

ARTICLE 8.- The Ministry of Economy and Public Finance is authorized to implement the Exchange of the Public Securities that were eligible and that have not yet entered the 2005-2010 Sovereign Debt Restructuring, in accordance with the provisions of Law No. 26,886.

ARTICLE 9.- A special account named "Fund Law No. XX.XXX – Sovereign Payment of Debt Pending Exchange" is created, which will be a special account of Nación Fideicomisos S.A. in the Central Bank of the Argentine Republic opened by virtue of the good faith of the Argentine Nation, and of its will and capacity to pay under equitable conditions for all its creditors, according to the conventional and generally accepted interpretation of the term pari passu.

ARTICLE 10.- The Ministry of Economy and Public Finance is authorized to deposit in the account Fund Law No. XX.XXX – Sovereign Payment of Debt Pending Exchange created by Article 9 of this Law, on the corresponding due dates, an amount of funds equivalent to what would correspond to be paid for the services of the new Public Securities that will be issued in the future, according to the provisions of Article 1 of Law No. 26,886, in replacement of those that have not yet entered the 2005-2010 Sovereign Debt Restructuring.

ARTICLE 11.- The funds corresponding to the payments provided in the previous Article will be delivered to the Holders participating in the Exchange Operation that is provided under the terms of Law No. 26,886, along with the corresponding new Public Securities, at the time of their placement.

TITLE II

Unique Chapter

On the Public Order of this Law

ARTICLE 12.- This law is of public order and will enter into force from the day of its publication in the Official Bulletin.

ARTICLE 13.- The payments provided in Articles 5 and 10 will be charged to Jurisdiction 90 – Public Debt Services.

ARTICLE 14.- The Ministry of Economy and Public Finance is empowered to issue the clarifying and complementary regulations necessary to implement compliance with this Law.

ARTICLE 15.- Communicate to the National Executive Power.

[1] Order of Judge Griesa dated February 23, 2012, modified by the Order of November 21, 2012; and Order of Judge Griesa (payment formula) also dated November 21, 2012 (ANNEX I).

[2] Decision of the Supreme Court of the United States of America, dated June 16, 2014 (ANNEX II).

[3] Ruling of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation in the case "Claren Corporation c/ E.N arts. 517/518 CPCC exequátur s/ varios," March 6, 2014 (ANNEX III).

[4] It should be noted that certain vulture funds, controlled by Elliott Associates, with practices that have been described as "financial terrorism," had already used this same strategy in cases of sovereign debts issued by Peru, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Nicaragua before Belgian courts, attempting to halt payments of restructured debt made through Euroclear. The courts consented to the strategy of the vulture funds, and both Peru and Congo quickly yielded to the pressure and paid exorbitant sums to those who had not invested a single cent in that country. Nicaragua, however, appealed the first-instance ruling and managed to have the Belgian Court of Appeals reverse the ruling against it. By that time, Belgian legislators had warned that Elliott's judicial strategy and the unpredictability of Belgian court decisions on the matter could undermine Belgium's position in global financial markets. Thus, the Belgian parliament enacted a law protecting Euroclear and, consequently, sovereign debt restructurings, from the actions of vulture funds. See: Elliott Assocs., L.P., General Summary No. 2000/QR192. 12 (Ct. Ap. Brussels, 8th Chamber, September 26, 2000; Red Mountain Finance v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, Case No. CV 00-0164 R, 2000 WL 34479543 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2000); LNC Investments v. Republic of Nicaragua, Brussels Commercial Court, September 11, 2003; Republic of Nicaragua v. LNC Invs. & Euroclear Bank, S.A., No. 2003/KR/334 (Brussels Court of Appeals, 9th Chamber, March 19, 2004).

[5] "Memorandum of Law of the Republic of Argentina in Support of Its Motion Pursuant to CPLR 5240 to Preclude Plaintiff Judgment Creditors From Interfering with Payments to Other Creditors," dated December 12, 2003 (ANNEX IV). This document establishes the correct interpretation of the pari passu clause and expresses the imperative need to issue an order declaring that Argentina could carry out the restructuring of its debt and make payments to other creditors without this implying a violation of that clause, in order to provide the country with certainty that future debt renegotiations would not be challenged by the plaintiffs as occurred in the case of Peru.

[6] Hearing of January 15, 2004 (ANNEX IV). According to Judge Griesa, "[i]t seems to me a very odd interpretation of the pari passu clause." The representative of Argentina was insistent before the judge about the real possibility that Argentina's payments could be questioned in the future by the plaintiffs in the case. He even explained to Griesa precisely that the strategy of the plaintiffs would be to wait for the restructuring of Argentina's debt, and then allege a violation of the pari passu clause—with their erroneous interpretation—and force a default of the Republic due to the payment of the restructured debt (p. 10). Judge Griesa not only stated that sending a letter did not imply a controversy that could be justiciable, but he also expressed that "nothing I have heard or read assures me, in any way, that any of the plaintiffs have intentions of initiating such action" regarding the interpretation of the clause (p. 8), thus disregarding the repeated mentions by the Argentine lawyer about what had happened in the Belgian courts. See also: Allan Applestein, TTEE FBO, DCA Grantor Trust v. The Republic of Argentina and Province of Buenos Aires (02 CV-1773).

[7] Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Republic of Peru, 194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1998).

[8] J. Blackman, R. Mukhi, The Evolution of Modern Sovereign Debt Litigation: Vultures, Alter Egos, and Other Legal Fauna, 73 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 47, 2010, p. 54.

[9] Article 489 of the New York Judiciary Law (known as "Champerty Defense") (ANNEX V).

[10] Order of Judge Griesa dated December 7, 2011 (ANNEX VI).

[11] Order of Judge Griesa dated February 23, 2012 (ANNEX I).

[12] Decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, dated October 26, 2012 (ANNEX VII).

[13] Order of Judge Griesa dated November 21, 2012 (ANNEX I).

[14] Appeal of the Republic of Argentina dated December 28, 2012 (ANNEX VIII).

[15] Decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, dated August 23, 2013 (ANNEX IX).

[16] "Writ of Certiorari" submitted by the Republic of Argentina to the Supreme Court of the United States of America, dated February 18, 2014 (ANNEX X).

[17] Amicus Curiae submitted by the United States of America, Brazil, Mexico, and France (ANNEX XI).

[18] Support provided to the Republic of Argentina in various fields and international organizations (OAS, UNCTAD, G-77, and IMF) (ANNEX XII).

[19] "Who Shot Argentina?" published in U.S. News and World Report, by Mark Weisbrot, co-director of the Centre for Economic and Policy Research and president of Just Foreign Policy in Washington D.C. (ANNEX XIII).

[20] Letter sent by the G-77+China to Judge Griesa, to the Supreme Court of the United States of America, and to Secretary of State John Kerry (ANNEX XIV).

[21] Statement by Alicia Bárcena, Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ANNEX XV).

[22] Hearing dated July 22, 2014 (ANNEX XVI). For illustration, the hearings dated June 27, August 1, and August 8, 2014, are also included in the aforementioned ANNEX XVI.

[23] Lawsuit filed by the Republic of Argentina against the United States of America at the International Court of Justice, dated August 7, 2014 (ANNEX XVII).