We must aim to provide predictability and to continue improving what we have achieved so far.

Argentina Cristina Fernández de Kirchner · President of Argentina

28 April 2014 · Government House

Context
Fernández de Kirchner addressed governors from 17 provinces at the Government House on April 28, 2014, to sign provincial debt relief extensions and announce new economic measures.
Main themes
Provincial debt relief program, FONDEAR economic development fund, wheat export authorization, withholding refunds for wheat producers, productive financing, provincial fiscal management, public sector credit expansion, SUBE card for domestic workers, economic growth since 2003, intergovernmental cooperation
Duration
~42 min
91st percentile
Words
5,077
91st percentile
Sentences
167
84th percentile
Readability
55
77th percentile
Grade
12.6
52nd percentile
Syntax
3.39
89th percentile
Vocabulary
2.07
22nd percentile

Translated from Spanish

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 84%82%
  • Social 6%6%
  • Institutional 4%4%
  • Ceremonial 4%4%
  • Geopolitical 1%1%
  • Environmental 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Not in focus 2%

167 sentences in 52 paragraphs

Cristina Fernández de Kirchner announced at the Government House the payment of the refund of part of the withholdings to registered wheat producers and the authorization to export half a million more tons of that cereal. In addition, she signed the extension of the Provincial Debt Relief Program and the decree creating the Fund for Argentine Economic Development. A SUBE card for domestic workers is also being created. Monday, April 28, 2014.

Thank you, thank you very much, everyone, but we really have a very special day today; we have representatives from 17 Argentine provinces, no less; 16 governors and governors, a Chief of Cabinet, we are here for the Federal Provincial Debt Relief Program, a task that began back in 2003, when many provinces had quasi-currencies, when they had a very high level of debt in foreign currencies, which prevented them from developing any type of activity, and during, first, Néstor's government, which rescued – during his administration – all the little papers; there were almost ten types of currencies in the Republic of Argentina. I believe one of the first rescues was carried out in the province of Entre Ríos, when he went to lift the strike that lasted three months, when they were paying teachers with little papers and almost late, in addition to with little papers.

I mention these things because then they say we are worse than in 2003, but it seems to me that there is no way to look at it that way. I will continue to insist on this because I will not allow them to install that chain, no longer of discouragement, but of lies almost bordering on scandal and ridicule because we all live in Argentina and we were not on vacation, nor are we on vacation.

That is why today we are once again implementing this Federal Debt Relief Program, which began in 2010. Until that moment, debts were increasing more and more because an interest was applied, an adjustment by the CER, by the famous CER Coefficient, and obviously, the interests. Well, we launched the Debt Relief Plan in 2010, which involved the elimination of the CER, an annual rate of 6 percent, a payment term of 20 years, and also, three years of grace period to pay capital and profits, a term that expired in 2013. The total amount we financed was 65 billion pesos, because there was also significant production that we did, and this last December, 2013, we refinanced again – this time every three months. That is why today we are signing again, governors, Minister of Economy, and President in exchange for increasing and improving.

In 2013, the provinces also received an additional 2 billion pesos, and by today's signing, they receive another additional 1.8 billion pesos, which also means a positioning of the provinces in terms of indebtedness.

Please, if we can move to the next level, there we are, this will mean a saving per province, in the next three months, from Santa Cruz down to the province of Buenos Aires, of almost 1 billion pesos, which obviously the different provincial administrations will allocate to improve the provision of their services. In exchange for that, what do we require? Information, unification of information, so that finally Argentina has consolidation of its provincial, municipal, and national data, which allows for increasingly effective and efficient management. But this Federal Debt Relief Plan for the provinces means overcoming the situation that was experienced for a long time in the Argentine provinces and improving their indebtedness positioning, which also allows them to be creditworthy because it substantially improves their financial situation.

Also, on this day – by decree – we have created FONDEAR. What is FONDEAR? It is a fund of more than 10 billion pesos, intended to finance productive projects, technological innovation, with rates suitable not only for small and medium-sized enterprises but also for large companies. This will also mean growth in terms of credit for the entire sector, which is good to say: this is for productive financing only. This sector was, in 2003, 7.7 percent of GDP, of a GDP substantially much lower than the current GDP, half – here Minister Kicillof points out to me academically – so we are at 7.7 percent in 2003, to finish, in 2013, at 16.9 percent of GDP, which is obviously double that allocated to the productive sector, and fundamentally sustained the growth of that financing not by the private sector, but by the public sector. With what? With the Bicentennial Program.

Now I will read the figures so I don’t make a mistake: Bicentennial Productive Financing Program, through which we placed in the market – between 2010 and 2013 – 5.86 billion pesos; lines of credit for productive investment that could be made through the modification of the Central Bank's Organic Charter and that meant for the second half of 2012 and for 2012 and 2013, 53.7 billion pesos and 23 billion pesos for the first half of 2014, investments from the ANSES Sustainability Guarantee Fund that were previously managed by the AFJPs and that now not only allow for more pensions, allow for the Universal Child Allowance, allow for pension mobility, twice a year, without also financing the productive sector, by the famous item K, which reached in 2012-2013, the sum of 44.677 billion.

The investments of insurance companies, which we also modified, in what is called item K, it was pure coincidence that K fell and that were 19.9 billion in 2013, and 2.5 billion until April 2014. This, not counting the other famous K Bonds, all the rates and bonuses, that are available from the Ministry of Economy, from line 400, from Banco Nación, but the offer to the productive sector, and the entrepreneurs know this, the business chambers know this. Today we are accompanied by the Vice President of the UIA, the head of ADIMRA, the head of CAME, the head of the CGE. They all know that everything related to credit for production has been essentially sustained by the public sector.

You may ask what the difference is? A lot, because we will now see a graph that represents how the financial sector has moved in the Republic of Argentina. The line that goes up… we start from 2003, when we were all down and out, as you can see it clearly indicates where we were. Look at how much the financial sector has grown in relation to GDP. I do this to provide hard data, consumer credit from the financial sector grew by 545 percent; on the other hand, the sector for productive growth, for productive credit only grew by 221 percent. Why do private banks do this? It is very simple, everyone knows it: first, because the spread, the difference for consumers is much higher than what they can charge you compared to what they can charge a businessman. Why? Because in a payment of 100 pesos or 200 pesos that they charge you at a fifty percent rate and commission fees, this goes unnoticed, but in a credit they give to Urtubey, or to CAME, or to the CGE, they cannot charge an annual rate of 45, 50, or 80 percent. In consumption, then, since there are millions of consumers, they also diversify the risk, so the rate – according to capitalism, since they like to talk about it so much, but seem to know little – should be lower. Why? Because the lower the risk, the lower the interest rate should be, however, the risk is lower because they lend to millions of people, who they know will pay them back, and if those who do not pay them back are very few, yet the rates they charge those consumers are much higher, plus the credit card fees, etc.

On the other hand, those who lend or can lend to the productive sector always have to be lower and always have much more risk that the company will not do well in the productive venture. That is why the State is so omnipresent in the issue of productive credit and we would like – and we have done so, starting from the modification of the sacred Organic Charter of the Central Bank – to obligate banks to lend 5 percent of their bank deposits to the productive sector.

That is why, also, when we talk about price growth, or price increases, this is related. The next one, the previous one, please. If you have someone who lends you so much for consumption and has so much for production, evidently, that difference you see between the highest and the lowest is what generates that it is much easier for the producer to raise the price than to produce more because there is much more guaranteed demand than supply. So, why would they produce more if they are necessarily going to come to buy more? That is why it is important to understand these fundamentals of the economy, of macroeconomics so that we are not misled and to understand why these things happen and who produces them. And yet, one often sits down to talk with entrepreneurs, whether from the production or financial sector, and the first thing they raise is the increase in prices. Well, if we do not want there to be more price increases, we must first lend more to production, the financial sector, and producers must produce more because they have guaranteed consumption from a model that has ensured that millions of workers consume.

I wanted to take this example because it is important to know these things to empower people with knowledge, economics is not difficult, economics is easy to understand. Arturo Jauretche always said that when you meet an economist whose words you do not understand, it is not that you are stupid and he is intelligent, it is that he wants to mess with you. Because economics is much simpler and you can see it clearly.

If we move to the next slide, we can also clearly see, for example, how the manufacturing industry has grown. The manufacturing industry is the green color, it had 9 percent and now has 24 percent of credit, you can see it there. You can also see how commerce increased, which came from 5 percent (that is the orange line) and went to 12 percent. Construction decreased, because it is natural, it had practically 65 percent of credit, and so we also see how the different segments of activity are formed.

Also, the primary activity, which we will address next, regarding wheat, also had a strong increase in its financing. It is the slightly purple line, which you see there, which went from 8 percent in 2003 to 17 percent in 2013. As you can see, we have improved, but notably the profile dedicated to the production sector – whether manufacturing, primary, and also the marketing activities, which are the ones that also demanded investment and generate services and labor. Perhaps the tertiary service sector is not the producer, but it generates a lot of employment, a lot of labor, and hundreds of retail businesses have opened. Supermarket chains multiplied their outlets due to this phenomenon, not phenomenon, that is when it rains, from nature, or when it thunders. This is not a phenomenon; these are active policies taken in defense of workers, users, consumers, Argentine entrepreneurs, and also Argentine primary producers, as we will see at the end when we address the issue of wheat.

Also, today we are recognizing the workers – and I say workers because the universe of employees in private homes is fundamentally women – today we are, after having regulated the law, which certainly faced some degree of resistance from both friends and foes, I must say, but we finally managed to regulate its sanction and today we are delivering this identification card, which the workers show with great pride. A card that is established by law and that will allow the worker to have everything, not only to use it as a means of transport, like the characteristic SUBE card, but to have all her data, labor record, her ART, if she has her health insurance, her remuneration, all her rights.

I know that many people were horrified by this, as they were horrified at some point by the Rural Labor Statute, which we restored in 2011, also expanding rights that had been repealed during the dictatorship in April 1976, one of the first things that the military dictatorship and Martínez de Hoz repealed was the Rural Labor Statute that had been enacted by Perón and Evita, and we really restored it. And today we restore a right that never existed in the Republic of Argentina, such as the right of domestic workers, and we should really feel proud as Argentines.

I want to tell you something: in developed countries, domestic workers are among the best paid. I know a well-known journalist, who is not one of our supporters, I won’t name her, but she was a correspondent for a newspaper that also doesn’t like us much in Washington, and she told me, when she was more friendly with me many years ago, that she had to move to Argentina because when she had a baby she couldn’t live in the United States because if she had to hire a nanny, her salary wasn’t enough. One of two things: either the nanny was very expensive or the newspaper paid her little. It could be a combination of both.

But the truth is that it is very expensive, and only people with a lot, a lot of money can afford to have help at home in developed countries. Well, we also want to start restoring rights that have never been recognized.

And finally, we are also addressing the issue of wheat; symbolically, on May 1st, the wheat planting begins. We also announce that we have authorized the export of half a million more tons of wheat than we had already authorized. This half a million will also be done with the counter-agreement that if wheat for internal consumption runs short, those who are authorized, who are actually the large exporters, must buy at the internal and domestic price at their own cost.

An opposition leader told me the other day that there were 3 or 4 million registered. In reality, there are not 3 or 4 million because the harvest was 9,200,000 tons.

But what is important is that we are not only authorizing the export of half a million more tons today, but we are also establishing two measures, reaffirming one, the CEPAGA, which is this certificate in which 10,000 wheat producers have registered, to be more exact, 10,519 producers, to whom we will return 206 million pesos, with an average of 20,400 pesos per producer.

What does this mean? Each producer had the obligation to register and write the number of tons they had produced, and based on that, the withholdings were returned; it was for small producers, obviously not for large producers, and we are fulfilling that.

In reality, there are 30,000 registered producers, not in the CEPAGA, in general, in the economic activity, but only 10,000 registered, and they will receive an average of 20,400 each, which is equivalent to 105 percent of the cost of the herbicide or 29 percent of the cost of urea; urea is an essential fertilizer for wheat, or 31 percent of the seed and seed treatment.

And now I want us to look at the previous topic, please. This is the history because there has always been a great discussion since the year... since always with the issue of the famous rates of export duties, which generated a great conflict back in 2008, when it seemed that we were the inventors of the export duties.

This is the graph of the history of export duty rates on wheat taken since 1970. Look at what happened, it goes up, it goes down, it goes up, it goes down. This, first issue, for those who demand predictability from our Government and long for past times: look at what those curves were that went up and down and that never exactly knew how much it would be. And notice a detail: in the 1970s, look at the rate that was there, 50 percent. Do you know that in the 1970s, the record revenue, rather the record production of wheat occurred with a rate of 50 percent? It was the harvest of 76-77. The rate was 50 percent, and the record for the entire decade reached 11 million tons.

The following year, 77, Martínez de Hoz, already president, almost president, I should say, it was a lapse, Minister of Economy, lowered it to 5 percent; his grandfather or great-grandfather, I believe, was the founder of the Rural Society, lowered it to 5 percent. However, the lowest harvest of the entire decade occurred with a rate of 5 percent. I think it was a little more, just over 5 million tons at that time.

You might ask what the reason was, some climatic reason, there must have been something? No, very simple: with the 50 percent, the dollar had skyrocketed due to the monstrous devaluation of the Rodrigazo, so it was profitable for them because of the exchange rate difference. When the famous table of Martínez de Hoz came out, it was no longer profitable for them, and they stopped producing, and that’s why. And they recovered production again, but it never reached the record of 11 million, it went back down after that; look at how it goes down, back down, they recover 8 million tons in what I believe... that is the production of 78-79.

Notice how it oscillated. And then one says, “Well, evidently there wasn’t much predictability.” Because look at how it was going down, and the lower the retention, the lower the production.

We then moved to the 1980s, where it reached 20-something percent. I often hear that many people are promising that they will lower the withholdings, that they will eliminate all the withholdings, that at the same time they will raise the 82 percent mobile, that they tell businessmen that they will give them the adjustment for inflation and early amortization, that at the same time they will... Well, look, I’m having Axel, the Minister of Economy, do a little calculation to see how the numbers add up because all those things together, just in a broad sense, don’t add up for me at all. They give me something, really, well, something strange.

Notice that in 1989 the withholdings reached, we are talking about wheat, export duties at 33 percent, they fell to 3 percent in January 1991, the 1990s. What was the behavior of the 1990s? In the 1980s, where some say they will remove the export duties on everything, there were always export duties on wheat. In the 1990s, it went from 3 to 93; one puts zero, practically no export duties were collected on wheat, not on corn, practically very little, 3 or 6 percent on soybean.

Now, there is no record in all of Argentine history of a level of indebtedness on the verge of bankruptcy and on the verge of selling and auctioning off the fields as in the 1990s. However, the export duty rates were at zero. As you can see, not everything is so predictable, nor does everything fit so neatly together, at least, not with what they want to tell us.

Now let’s go to the year 2002, when the government that preceded us was the one that installed the export duties and raised them to 20 percent on wheat, and then Néstor raised them to 28 during the last part of his term, to be clearer, in November 2007, he raised them to 28, it was a very short period, and I lowered them back to 20, where you see, to 23, where you see the period of stability. If one compares the ups and downs, the most stable period is precisely in the last decade regarding the export duties on wheat. And it is not a coincidence that in 2007, the harvest of 2007-2008, when Néstor had already raised the export duties to 28, the record wheat harvest in history in Argentina occurred with 16,400,000 tons of wheat. Can you hear me? Record, 16 million.

Last year, this year, we produced... let’s go to the next one, please, we produced the lowest harvest in recent years, not in history, but in recent years with 9,200,000. What was it due to? Fundamentally to decisions made by the producers, there were climatic commissions, decisions made by the producers to switch from wheat to barley because they thought they would be able to export more because it wasn’t required for the internal market, when in reality they had very poor results due to the quality of the barley. Argentina is not a barley country; it is a wheat country, just like Ukraine. But the curious thing is, if you go back to the previous one, please, for a minute, if one observes this and reasons, one observes that the conditions for someone to have greater profitability do not depend on the amount of export duties, but on the macroeconomic conditions, among them, the exchange rate, among them, types of investment aid that can be made for... And if reasoning doesn’t work for them, at least do it for superstition. Because notice that when the withholdings were highest, they earned more. So, if it doesn’t enter through reason, let it at least enter through superstition, I say. I say this because many times decisions are made that have to do with what they read or with cultural issues or with confrontation or with the differences or with the debates they may have with a government without responding to economic logic, which is what any producer must have, whether manufacturing, primary producer, seller, merchant.

If I didn’t dedicate myself to politics and only focused on the economy, I wouldn’t care a bit about who is in charge, what party it is, if the policies they implement make me earn money. But this doesn’t happen in the Argentine Republic.

So, for that reason, I also want to show, look for those who say, and this goes for users and consumers, for those who say it is possible to disconnect the issue of withholdings or export duties in terms of wheat or corn, for example, linked to the internal market.

Last year, it was thought we would have 13 million tons and, therefore, we would have a great surplus, why? Because we need for internal consumption approximately 6.5 million, 7 million tons. 6.5 million for internal consumption between flours, seeds, and also half a million tons for seed. We granted more export permits than we had actually produced, and it was produced... the price was disconnected, and you see... do you remember what the price of bread and flour was at one point? It was that we allowed, due to the information we had been given that we had greater surpluses, we authorized a greater amount of exports, and we ran out of flour. Immediately when we ran out of wheat or flour, the price of bread skyrocketed because it shot up to international levels.

That’s why... and also think when they tell you they are going to eliminate the wheat withholding, how they are going to maintain the price of bread, not at a European international price, but at the price here inside. And to all those who produce pigs, poultry, to those who have feedlots, if they disconnect the price of corn from the internal price, how they are going to maintain it, especially corn, where we really have a much larger surplus than in terms of wheat.

These things are important to know, to understand, to explain without the need to confront or fight or insult each other, but simply with pencil and paper to do the math on reality, which is the only way to reach agreements. The rest, we can say we are going to raise the 82 percent mobile, that we are going to eliminate export duties on everything or progressively, that we are going to discount high incomes from rents, that we are not going to charge taxes to businessmen, that we are going to... But if I add all that up, how do we maintain what is currently in effect, which is more than 6 percent of GDP for education, how do we maintain the Universal Child Allowance, how do we maintain pension mobility, how do we also allow state funds to help companies when they really have problems like what happened to us in 2009 when we sustained 1 point of unemployment, the Secretary General of the CGT present, Antonio Caló, must remember that we had 1 point of unemployment sustained by the REPRO plan, which was to pay part of the salaries to the employers of the workers so that they wouldn’t lay off people.

So, what is important, one who has the responsibility to manage and, fundamentally, to tell the truth to the people, and to understand all businessmen that the fate of the country is tied to their fate, and there are the numbers, there are those who require and demand from me many times predictability. Look at what Argentina was like before... regarding wheat alone, what the curve was that went up, up and down that seemed... give me the previous one back so no one forgets. Look at what the era of predictability was like under all types of governments, dictatorship, from another political party, from those who said they were Peronists, in short, of all colors.

I think it is important that producers also understand this, and especially young producers. Young producers who do not know the history of the country because they don’t have to know it either, are people who get up very early every day, who look at the sky to see if it rains because, really, one told me something very funny: there is only one thing worse than withholdings, he told me, which is not raining.

So yes, the truth is that the producer, which is also something we have to modify, because we can’t keep looking at the sky, we have to start investing in irrigation to avoid the volatility of the weather and depend especially in a country like ours, so rich in water resources.

So, I think it is important that we know this story, the recent history, I am not talking about what happened in 1810 with Mariano Moreno and Belgrano, as I like to do, I am talking about what was happening in 1970. Look: 50 percent export taxes on wheat, record wheat harvest; then they lowered it to 5 percent, and since they introduced the dollar table, and we are talking about a… at this moment I don’t remember, but in the 70s the price of a ton of wheat, if I remember correctly, was 70 dollars, right Casamiquela?, today it is just over 200 dollars.

This means then, that looking at that, I believe that we should not listen so much to what the leaders say, but rather look at the numbers, the papers, do the math and, above all, how were you as a producer in 2003, in 2001, how were we all in order to differentiate today.

And do you know what happens? Because I was wondering when I looked, finally, right?, what happened, because in 2008 we all got into a fight over the issue of the countryside. And I said, but look, if it was the moment of greatest wheat production. And really, if one looks at all the curves of the crops, it has been an exponential growth.

But look at wheat, record harvest in all of history and we got into a fight. What happened? It’s as if there were a phenomenon that the more I have, the more I want to have without realizing that many times those conditions that bother you, because it’s true, you might like to pocket without paying export taxes, but do you know what happens? If it is not paid, the exchange rate cannot be maintained and if the exchange rate is not maintained, the country goes down the drain, it can last as long as the harvest did in 76, but you see that afterwards, boom, down it goes. Because things like that do not last too long.

So, where we all need to aim, leaders, businessmen, producers, is to provide predictability, stability, to guide, in not wanting to take advantage and in knowing that what we need to continue maintaining and improving is what we have achieved so far. The great challenge is to improve and deepen what we have, but to improve and deepen what we have, we need to look at this history, see what needs to be corrected but also what we need to continue with in order to keep doing it.

I don’t even want to talk about the country’s debt reduction that we received in 2003 because that would be another story that would take another half hour but that everyone knows: the country in default, not precisely by the one speaking to you nor by Néstor Kirchner.

That is why today I wanted to present this aid measure to the Argentine provinces, 17 Argentine provinces, with the creation of FONDEAR, this fund of more than 10 billion pesos for Argentine businessmen at favorable rates, with this recognition to the women who work in private homes who, at the same time, look at what we still lack. When they tell me that we lack, and of course we lack, how could we not lack, if in order for them to plant more wheat, I have to return this to those who already have and I have to just be giving a card to those who have nothing.

Look at what a country we still have to build. I hope that whoever follows me can do it much better and can do it by improving and providing greater and better equality for all, which is what will make us a fairer and more equitable country.

Thank you very much and a heartfelt kiss to all.