Conference of Ambassadors: the speech of President Emmanuel Macron.

France Emmanuel Macron · President of France

28 August 2023 · Conference of Ambassadors · Paris, France

Context
Macron addressed France's ambassadors at the annual Conference of Ambassadors in Paris on August 28, 2023, outlining foreign policy priorities in a shifting global order.
Main themes
French foreign policy priorities, fragmentation of the international order, Western influence and its challenges, geopolitical context, anti-Western sentiment and resentment politics, BRICS expansion, multilateral institutions' legitimacy, European security, France's role in global affairs, diplomatic strategy, energy crisis and transition, development and international solidarity
Duration
~146 min
99th percentile
Words
17,528
99th percentile
Sentences
752
99th percentile
Readability
47
55th percentile
Grade
12.4
50th percentile
Syntax
3.14
65th percentile
Vocabulary
2.15
36th percentile

Translated from French

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 54%51%
  • Economic 16%16%
  • Institutional 10%9%
  • Ceremonial 8%8%
  • Environmental 6%6%
  • Social 4%4%
  • Technological 3%2%
  • Not in focus 5%

752 sentences in 118 paragraphs

Ladies and gentlemen ministers,

Prime ministers,

Mr. Vice President of the Council of State,

Ladies and gentlemen parliamentarians,

Mr. Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces,

Ladies and gentlemen ambassadors,

Ladies and gentlemen directors,

Ladies and gentlemen, in your ranks and capacities,

Ladies and gentlemen, dear friends.

I am pleased to see you here, at the beginning of this working week in Paris, and under the authority of the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, Catherine COLONNA, the Minister Delegate for Foreign Trade, Olivier BECHT, the Secretary of State for Europe, Laurence BOONE, and the Secretary of State for Development and Partnerships, Chrysoula ZACHAROPOULOU. Each of you has dedicated yourselves to serving the French people, and I thank you for that.

The difficulty of this speech is twofold, and it increases each year for your servant. First, it is evident that speeches are always too long, and as we reread them, we realize that we do not speak about certain regions or certain areas, and thus, it is always a poorly tailored suit, trying to be as exhaustive as possible and subjecting you to an exercise that is still bearable.

The second difficulty is that as the years go by, we are faced with two risks. The first is the risk of repetition. I will try not to do too much of that today, but please excuse me if that is the case. The second—more serious—is the risk of contradiction. I have also made sure to avoid that, even if circumstances sometimes change and lead us to revisit certain elements that we may have previously engaged.

In any case, one thing is certain and intangible: the commitment that is yours, the diplomatic arm that you represent, is important for our country. And the French people deploy the energy, talent, and ambition that allow our country to once again be the leading destination for foreign investments in Europe, a country of innovation, rapidly transitioning to carbon neutrality, a major player in security in Europe and the world, and an essential partner in development and international solidarity.

All of this is the result of your commitment and your work in an increasingly complicated context. And I wanted to start, before getting into the heart of the matter, by saying a word about this context, which has, in fact, hardened since my first speech before you. But I believe that the fundamentals of this disturbed and increasingly fragmented world remain. The means we give ourselves before trying to outline four priorities that are, for a good part of them, in continuity with what we have been deploying in recent years.

Indeed, I consider that the international context is becoming more complicated and poses the risk of weakening the West and, more particularly, our Europe. We must be clear-eyed, without being excessively pessimistic in this context. First, there is an objective dilution of our population, our produced wealth, and our share in global exchanges. This has been even truer since the 2008-2010 crisis. It is the result of the emergence of major international powers that are asserting themselves. This has been reinforced by the energy crisis, our Europe not being a producer of fossil fuels, at least in the short term, which also consolidates the strategies we are pursuing.

Next, there is a gradual questioning of our international order, its principles, and its various forms of organization. It must be said that the West had a predominant place and still has a predominant place, with first the rise of war, including on European soil, and I will return to this in a moment. The policy of fait accompli, which is increasingly imposing itself from the fringes of Europe to the African and Asian continents, is also at play.

A form of rising politics of resentment, which feeds here on reinvented or fantasized anti-colonialism, there on instrumentalized anti-Westernism, the denunciation of a double standard that we have sometimes nurtured—it must be said—by adjusting international law to what we thought, and forgetting that the sovereignty of peoples was one of the prerequisites for our action, and a growing contestation of the United Nations Security Council, as well as many of our international organizations. We cannot ignore this. From the International Monetary Fund to the World Bank and beyond, more and more countries, in an increasingly uninhibited manner, consider that these structures are less and less legitimate in imposing certain rules on them and that, moreover, they were created in a world where these countries did not exist, which is true, and that they represent a past order, but do not reflect the geopolitical reality, even less the demographic reality and perhaps sometimes military, of today.

This is reflected, without exaggerating the reality, by symptoms such as, for example, what we have seen in recent days with an attempt to expand the BRICS summit. We must remain clear-eyed about the reality of what it entails. Nevertheless, it reflects a desire to create an alternative order, or at least something that would replace what was previously called an international order, seen as too Western, or at least the rules that have become less legitimate. All this, in an increasingly tense Sino-American context, which, it must be said, also disrupts our international law, as it has manifested itself in recent months by a blatant questioning of our international trade order; the first and second trading powers deciding, in fact, not to respect the previously established trade rules, which is a new fact, but one that we cannot completely ignore either. A form of new protectionism is rising; it is here.

All of this leads to a risk of partitioning the world, to a weakening of the international order based on law, to a weakening of the democratic idea, as we see with the rise of this illiberal moment, and fundamentally to our existing mechanisms of cooperation and partnership. And this is at a time when we are confronted with increasingly global challenges that require more coordination, whether it is peace and stability, climate, biodiversity, the fight against poverty for development, but also artificial intelligence and digital issues or the fight against tax evasion.

Each of these subjects requires a more cooperative and established international order. This is the paradox in which we live. And our strategy must aim, as much as possible, with clarity, to face this new order, but to provide solid responses to it. So, in this context, we must have a fairly simple diplomacy: to pursue our interests. Starting from there: our security, our economic, technological, diplomatic, and cultural interests.

It is to do so while also defending our principles, and this is what, I believe, sometimes differentiates us from other countries. A certain aspiration to the universal and thus, in this regard, the defense of human rights, human dignity, partnership with humanitarian actors, the defense of international law, and respect for the sovereignty of peoples. And then, it is to build this diplomacy on a path of independence that means that even if we have allies, if we belong to solid organizations like our Europe, we have a willingness to engage in dialogue with all and to build a diplomacy of trust, plural balances—and not equidistance—allowing us to build concrete solutions to the challenges I mentioned and this ongoing fragmentation.

To achieve this, we have given ourselves, in recent years and particularly even more so in recent months, the means. I want to thank both the administrations and the parliamentarians present here, as we have made strong, coherent choices in the face of this international context.

As I said a year ago, right here, we have reinvested in our diplomacy, almost reversing three decades of constant staff reductions since that year, and we will continue to do so. I also mentioned this during my visit to the Quai d'Orsay on March 16. It was necessary to rearm diplomacy. In doing so, we have provided resources, but also allowed for the addressing of new issues: influence, communication, the renewal of working methods, facilitating interdisciplinarity, and the crossing of skills. I do not want to repeat what I said on March 16. I refer you to the expression made.

Next, we have also strengthened our solidarity investment. By providing more resources: our official development assistance has reached a record level of 0.55% of gross national income in 2023, as we committed to in 2017 and as the law, passed under the previous five-year term, had provided, which now allows France to be the fourth net contributor to the global effort in terms of solidarity investment. At the same time, we have undertaken a profound reform of our French Development Agency.

The City of Development is preparing and deploying. The Presidential Council for Solidarity Investment has made clear decisions in this regard. We have set up a laboratory, new experimental methods, another form of implementation on the ground, changing the rigidity of our geographic priorities to give ourselves, there too, much more flexibility and to serve a policy of more concrete partnerships and solidarity investments, with, there too, a real investment.

And then, in parallel, we have established a military tool, even more credible—our armed forces have always been strong and solid—through the two military programming laws, both based on solid strategic exercises. At the end of these two programming laws, we will have doubled the budget of our armed forces, which is unprecedented in contemporary times. We will have doubled it while also facing new risks and conflicts, from cyber to space, through the high seas, while also looking at the new spheres of conflict, but by reinforcing the strengths of our armed forces, consolidating a complete model, independence, and making the French army the most effective army in Europe, which is our goal. I commend the commitment of our military personnel, but also the close partnership between our military and our diplomats in this regard.

That said, and to deploy the coherence of these investments and our action in the complex context I mentioned, I would like to focus my remarks on four axes.

First, if we want to defend our interests well and properly, we must have a policy of security and stability in the new context, particularly regarding the war in Ukraine. Next, I would like to return to our strategy of European independence and the pursuit of our economic, technological, and strategic interests. Then, I would like to develop, before you, the fact that France, in this context, must seek to be a trusted partnership power, both geographically and to refound this international governance. I would like to conclude with a few words on our policy of influence and outreach in coherence with this strategy. All of this is, as you can see, in continuity with the remarks I have made before you in recent years and the action you are conducting with great commitment.

I must also mention the challenges that are ours. I want to say in advance that I will not cover, as I jokingly mentioned, all geographical areas. That would be impossible, and I will have the opportunity in the coming months to return to one or another. But, before I delve into these four themes, I want to renew, in a more specific way, my thanks, especially to all those who have had to experience critical situations. France and the diplomats you are have faced particularly difficult situations in certain countries in recent months. Whether it is Sudan, where France has been exemplary, including in the evacuation of our own nationals and the nationals of many of our colleagues, or Niger at this very moment. I commend your colleague and those listening to us from their posts. You have reminded us that being a diplomat is a commitment, sometimes risky, that requires the sense of responsibility you have always demonstrated in these difficult situations. As in previous years, we had to experience this in Afghanistan or elsewhere, and I think it is good to recall this in the context we are in and that will continue to recur.

I mentioned Afghanistan; obviously, I could talk about Ukraine and several other theaters of operations. Security and stability above all, as I said. Our collective security and that of France, its allies, and its European partners is, of course, first and foremost, challenged by the Russian aggression in Ukraine. I have had the opportunity to speak several times on this subject before you last year, and I have done so again in recent months, particularly in Vilnius. We must not lose sight of the uniqueness of this conflict. It is based first and foremost on the fact that in Europe, war is returning.

The second thing is that it comes very clearly, trampling on and violating the popular sovereignty and territorial integrity of a European state. And in this regard, violating international law. It has been aggravated by multiple war crimes, attacks on civilian populations, and scenes that we have seen and on which, by the way, we are working through cooperation among our magistrates, our police, and our exemplary gendarmes. Furthermore, because it involves a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, which is also a nuclear power. This changes the terms of the effectiveness of a diplomatic response and the nature, obviously, of political-military engagement.

In the face of this, France, Europe, and our allies have had, I believe, an appropriate response. First, it was immediate, united, and effective. I say this all the more because it is the result of a French commitment, since France held the Presidency of the Council of the European Union at the beginning of the war. And I think what our diplomacy has done has been particularly useful and I believe has created a significant element of surprise. The Europeans did not divide, reacted quickly and appropriately: a policy of sanctions, through multiple sanctions packages against Russia to weaken its capacity to sustain the war effort over time, a policy of support for Ukraine, humanitarian, economic, military, which has continued up to the commitments made in Vilnius by France, the Europeans, and the allies, with Europeans being the primary supporters.

If we sum up the investments being made in Ukraine in terms of humanitarian aid, civil and military support, it is indeed the European Union that is the primary supporter of Ukraine. I say this while acknowledging the very valuable support of our American allies, but also reminding everyone of the strength of our own support. And then ensuring that we have no escalation policy. What has marked the boundaries of this support is that we have always ensured that we are never directly engaged in a conflict against Russia, against its territory and its population, which is obviously a difficulty. And all this, while ensuring, in parallel, to avoid a partition of the world and to prepare for the day after. And I think we have been right to have this policy for nearly 18 months. Ensuring to avoid a partition of the world is simple; it is to prevent a narrative from taking hold that would say: this is your war as Europeans, it does not concern us. For all the reasons I mentioned, this war is a war that affects the whole world, because it touches our ability to uphold international law, our principles, and particularly the integrity of borders.

Therefore, it was essential to continue to work in all international forums to ensure that this war remains at the heart of our concerns, with a clear condemnation and diplomatic action from all, and to avoid division. And I want to salute, here too, the work of all the posts; it must continue around resolutions at the United Nations General Assembly where we have gradually reduced the number of votes aligned with Russia or instances of non-participation or even abstention.

We must continue to convince, to explain, and the upcoming meetings will be key in this regard. But above all, as we did on the sidelines of the G7 in Hiroshima, to enable Ukraine to convince all partners alongside us. And French diplomatic action has also been a support for Ukrainian diplomacy and a work of persuasion so that, when we talk about peace, which comes up in all proposals around the planet, this peace is well understood in the same way by all. It cannot be a ceasefire recognizing the status quo, because that would prepare for tomorrow's war, or worse. But it is indeed a lasting peace, that is to say, respectful of the sovereignty of the Ukrainian people and international law. And in this order, we can build, by involving more, as has been done in recent months, all the geographies of the planet to create a viable situation over time, thereby consolidating, I believe, the efforts we have made and avoiding a partition of the world.

France's action has also been reflected in a particular commitment to the International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor the risk of proliferation going in this direction. The coming months will continue to be structured by these axes. And we will have to continue a significant effort to avoid a division of the international order around this conflict, to continue support and to mark, precisely over time, an unalterable character of support for Ukraine and its resistance and war effort, and to prepare this lasting peace. This work, we will continue through various diplomatic efforts that are essential. France will continue to engage in parallel on short-term humanitarian action, as we have done with the reception of refugees.

I thank all the work that has been done on national soil by the Ministry of the Interior and all the relevant ministries on the subject, and on humanitarian aid in Ukraine, in support, and we will have to continue the preparatory work for reconstruction, which is also essential. But this lasting peace and stability that we must prepare also requires work from us, Europeans. I also wanted to have a word. I have gone into more detail on this subject and I will refer you to the speech I gave in Bratislava at the GLOBSEC conference, on the consequences of the duration of the war in Ukraine for our security architecture and the way of thinking about the stability of European security.

But very clearly, we know that there will be a before and an after the war in Ukraine. And what seems essential to me is to integrate into our diplomatic action and our work the consequences of this war to prepare for the lasting peace I mentioned.

First, we have to prepare to do this as a member of NATO. This is what we have been doing as solid allies from day one. The best proof, and we must defend it everywhere, is that we were the first country to be able to deploy so quickly and effectively on NATO's eastern front. A few days after the start of the conflict, France was deploying in Romania, providing confidence-building measures on this eastern flank. This is the strength of our model. And we have also continued to strengthen our participation in NATO missions regarding the Baltic States, such as air policing. We have reinforced the effort of our defense industries and we must continue this essential work for a war economy over time, as this war continues but also as it raises the terms of a new engagement and thus an adaptation of our industry, our industrial, technological, and defense base in France and Europe.

You can see that we must think within NATO of a greater European involvement. This has been underway since 2019. I have had the opportunity to return to this several times, but in my view, there is a concrete translation that we must pursue in the coming months and years that is absolutely essential. The European pillar and a greater European defense within NATO is not the enemy or the problem of NATO; on the contrary. It is what makes our Europe a trusted element, particularly for our American allies. We must take more responsibility for our own security and the instabilities in our neighborhood. This is what is being asked in the burden-sharing by the Americans. This is what is essential for us. In doing so, we must strengthen our technological and military autonomy, produce more, standardize more for the European defense industry, and think more about our defense in European terms.

All of this is a form of exiting the geopolitical minority of Europeans within NATO. It must be thought of as such and embraced as such. And it is also for this reason that the post-war period in Ukraine must be translated into new treaties to regulate armaments, all types of armaments and military activities that affect Europe, and we must have the will to be designers and signatories of these treaties tomorrow, where I recalled in December 2019, in a widely commented speech, Europe was in a way a geopolitical object, but not a subject. Everything that affected us, when it came to intermediate armaments or others, affected our soil, but we were not signatories to the treaties. And the non-compliance by one or the denunciation by both affected us without us being able, in a way, to do anything other than express our indignation. We must build this new international order that directly affects us through our military involvement, and, by the way, the military programming law is at the heart of this strategy, as it is designed for France to be a framework nation for new NATO deployment coalitions, which is unprecedented.

What we have begun to do, particularly in African theaters of operations, is, in this regard, totally unprecedented, especially with the Takuba Task Force, and foreshadows what we want to do.

We must therefore continue to convince all our European partners of the necessity of this strategy through bilateral or European defense cooperations, through greater strategic and operational intimacy, which we have begun with the European Intervention Initiative and which we must deploy in the coming years through new capability cooperations. In this regard, I want to emphasize the importance for us of the cooperations built with Germany, whether it concerns the future aircraft or the future tank. We know that debates can sometimes be difficult, that challenges can arise at times. We are uncompromising on the strategic nature of these partnerships decided right here in July 2017 with Chancellor Merkel at the time, but we must pursue them over time and build new capability partnerships, whether in space, maritime, or cyber, because that is how we will strengthen this European pillar of defense for all allies.

Beyond this framework, we must think of a European stability that is not solely security-based and that, in a way, does not occur solely through NATO. This is the heart of what we proposed with the European Political Community. This is a proposal from May 2022. It is an old French idea, since it is roughly what François Mitterrand proposed with the European Confederation. It did not come to fruition at the time because Russia was involved, and it may have been too early, given the return of history, to propose such an alliance and an open partnership so quickly. But this European political community, proposed in May 2022, which has already had two initial meetings in Prague and Chișinău, and which will have a new meeting in Granada in a few weeks, is already a French victory, but it is also primarily a European victory. It is the idea of saying that Europe must think of itself as a broad geopolitical continent, not simply through military alliances structured by history, in an absolutely non-conflictual manner with its neighborhood, but to structure themes of immigration, energy, security, innovation, connectivity, etc., and that, fundamentally, we need to build strategic intimacy, more convergence to consolidate a geopolitical Europe. We must continue to advance on this front, and this forum will be absolutely decisive if we want to build a lasting Europe in peace.

Then, beyond that, there is obviously our European Union which, in the coming months, but I will have the opportunity to return to it specifically, will have to undergo a double movement that is not incompatible, but which will require some audacity and certainly some institutional changes. It is that we, as Europeans, must think both of more integration of our policies; I will return to this when I talk about autonomy - but we can see it clearly in terms of defense, climate, technology, and economy, the heart of Europe needs to be more integrated if we want to face the current challenges.

If we want to be stronger, more stable, we are committed to a path of enlargement, particularly regarding the Western Balkans, because it is impossible to have a Europe that is somehow riddled with geopolitical instability, interference, and a kind of endless process that feeds despair and divisions. The risk would be to replicate what we have already done, that is to think of enlargement without integration. I can easily testify that a Europe of 27 is quite complicated to evolve on essential issues. A Europe of 32 or 35 will not be simpler, to put it mildly. Therefore, we need a certain boldness to accept more integration on certain policies, perhaps even several speeds of this Europe. I had the opportunity to talk about this five years ago, and I will return to it in a few months, but it is clear that the European Union will be a pillar of this stability and order to come. But you see it, in my eyes, moving from NATO and the European pillar in defense, through the political community to the European Union, the challenges are significant to think about the post-conflict and we must think about it now and structure it now. This will require greater geopolitical and military lucidity from Europeans, a willingness to have more autonomy, a desire to preserve our union, and to maintain a dynamic of deepening for the members who are ready to go in this direction among us; not all, but somehow having this attractiveness allowed by the boldness of a few.

This obviously only holds if, in the months and years to come, we remain firm on the doctrine, the strategy that is ours regarding Ukraine and Russia. Russia cannot, and must not, win this war, because then it would mean instability on European soil and because then it would be the end of all trust in the principles of international law. This means that for us, Europeans, and for our allies, and I hope also sustainably, it will be a considerable financial, diplomatic, and capacity investment for the years to come, which must also re-examine certain fundamentals, because we cannot act as if this effort does not exist, but we need this constancy, because otherwise everything I have just mentioned would have much less relevance. Our security and humanitarian interests as Europeans do not stop there, and I would like to say a few words on two or three concerning issues in this regard.

We will continue to be very vigilant about the security and political situation in the Western Balkans. In this regard, we have built with Germany a new roadmap and a new proposal regarding the differences between Serbia and Kosovo. I believe this roadmap is good. It has been supported by a European negotiator and our representative. We therefore expect a clear re-engagement from both parties, that is to say, a re-engagement on the expected municipal elections, a Serbian re-engagement in the relevant institutions, a recognition of the municipalities, precisely in the North by the Kosovar authorities, a pacification of this situation, and I say this because France and Germany have committed and have also had movements of openness, particularly on visa policy or other economic elements, which will be reviewed if there is no policy of responsibility from both parties. But we will continue with our German partners to be very vigilant on this subject and on everything that touches on the stability of the Western Balkans.

Then, we will also continue to be engaged in the Caucasus, after the war of 2020 that we condemned, as you know. The humanitarian situation is currently particularly concerning in Nagorno-Karabakh. In this regard, I will have the opportunity to exchange this week with Prime Minister Pashinyan and President Aliyev, we will demand full respect for the Lachin humanitarian corridor and we will again take a diplomatic initiative in this regard on the international level to increase pressure, but nothing can justify the humanitarian situation currently experienced by the populations in Nagorno-Karabakh. We will also continue to engage. It was our intervention that allowed the establishment of a European mission after the summit of the European Political Community in Prague, which for the first time led to a common text signed by both parties recognizing the borders of 1991. We will also continue to engage in discussions for a peace treaty and to clarify both territorial and passage issues, but in the very short term, the humanitarian situation remains absolutely essential.

Finally, speaking of security and stability issues, I do not want us to forget here the importance and continuity of our fight against terrorism. Even if national news, we must congratulate ourselves, through the very good work of our services and our internal security forces, has allowed us to thwart many projects on our soil, and if the nature of terrorism has changed in recent years, we must remain extremely vigilant. And I say this here with a lot of strength and clarity. We are still involved in the international coalition in the Levant, and this involvement is praised, important, and I want to pay tribute to the memory of our two soldiers who died in Iraq in recent weeks precisely in the context of the missions they carry out on Iraqi soil in this regard, whether it is cooperation, training, support, and also the fight against terrorism. Therefore, we must continue to be involved in this mission in the Levant because it does not disappear, and we must strengthen the work we have been doing for the past few years of political and military stabilization throughout the region in support of Iraq and its sovereignty. This is what we have established with the Baghdad Conference, which will hold its third edition at the end of November, and to which I will go as I do every time, and which precisely allows us to consolidate a regional agenda in support of Iraqi sovereignty. In this regard, we will also strengthen our involvement on two specific issues without being exhaustive about the region that I wanted to mention.

The first is Syria. Indeed, we can see that all the countries in the region are trying to re-establish dialogue with Syria, to reintegrate it into various negotiation or partnership forums. We will have, among others, an essential element, which is the fight against terrorism, and I will return to the Baghdad Conference with this point that I will highlight, whether it is our dialogues with Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, as I mentioned, Saudi Arabia, or others. Any reintegration into regional bodies must imply increased cooperation in the fight against terrorist organizations and groups on Syrian soil and in the region and lift any ambiguity but must also be accompanied by a political process allowing refugees to reintegrate with guarantees of protection, recognition, and political and economic security on Syrian soil.

The second point I wanted to address is Iran. I welcome the progress made in recent weeks, but perhaps experience teaches us, I cannot celebrate with much enthusiasm, because we know that first, agreements can be fragile, that sometimes those who conclude them denounce them, and that those who sign them do not respect them. This makes us humble about the nature of the agreements that can be signed in this matter. I want to simply say regarding Iran, first, that France will continue to have a clear policy and no weakness, with a very firm demand that our four nationals who are arbitrarily detained be released. Nothing justifies the detention of four French nationals today in prisons and in unacceptable conditions in Iran. The second thing is our wish for a clear, transparent framework for nuclear activities. The return of the JCPOA is a very good thing if it is followed by confidence-building measures and good oversight by the competent international agency, but we must continue to frame these activities and find a path that is essential for the entire region.

The third element I do not want to forget is also to frame the destabilizing activities that Iran has carried out in recent years. This is an essential point for all our partners. A re-engagement must therefore also involve a clarification of Iran's policy towards its direct neighbors, towards Israel and its security, towards Lebanon and its stability; and in this regard, I want to particularly thank Jean-Yves Le Drian for the mission he is conducting at my request and that of the Prime Minister for several months now. We must imagine Sisyphus happy, Mr. Minister, but who consists of finding a political path. We must find this in the short term. But I think that, in any case, one of the key elements of this political solution in Lebanon will involve a clarification of the regional interferences, including that of Iran.

Finally, speaking of stability, security, and the fight against terrorism leads me obviously to mention Africa. We do not have only a security approach in Africa; I want to be very clear here and I will return to this in a moment. We do indeed have a security involvement because there were terrorist risks - and there still are - and because there is a demand from sovereign states for us to come and help them. It is in this context that the Serval operation was first decided, followed by the Barkhane operation. I say this with a lot of strength because if we forget it today, if we yield to the inadmissible arguments of this baroque alliance of so-called pan-Africanists with neo-imperialists, we are living among the mad. France intervened as early as 2013 because states asked us to intervene, because they were simply being cut in two. If France had not intervened, if our soldiers had not fallen in the line of duty in Africa, if Serval and then Barkhane had not been decided, we would not be talking today about Mali, Burkina Faso, or Niger. These states would no longer exist today within their territorial limits. I can tell you this with certainty. And so when I sometimes hear even French political leaders explain to us that Barkhane would be a defeat, I say, do not take the arguments of the enemy; because at that moment, you are doing a disservice to everyone. You are paying a strange tribute to our soldiers. We must strongly defend the legitimacy of these operations: we went to help friendly and partner countries defend their soil and fight against terrorism at home. Is this a reproach we should be made? Is it wrong to have done this? Please, no. And so, we must be demanding, rethink new partnerships, and not yield to any form of contemporary paternalism. Finally, we must not start to reverse everything and consider that now we could no longer help a state that wants to defend order at home, on a legal basis - and that is the framework in which we intervened in the region: sovereign request, request from ECOWAS.

We are in the process of changing this framework. I refer you to the speech I delivered here last February. Why? First, because we should not remain too long engaged in the fight against terrorism and because the nature of this conflict is changing. Because the very nature of terrorism is changing throughout the region, because we are seeing a rise in ethnic factors, because there is a political and economic crisis that is taking root in the Sahel and is, in a way, creating a long-term crisis, of which the new forms of terrorism are a consequence. It was entirely relevant to have the action that we have undertaken, but it cannot last in the same form. It must be adapted. This is what we decided a few years ago in a first adjustment of our framework, what we decided at the beginning of the year through a policy of restructuring all our bases, of streamlining and partnership. And this is what we are doing and on which we will go even further in the coming months. Why? Because a stable military presence, in a way, is an argument used by our enemies in the context of information warfare to weaken us, even as the heart of the response must be political by the African states, and thus France cannot be a substitute, and the military response cannot replace the political response. Therefore, it must first be a political response. Our military presence must, in fact, be structured on the basis of partnerships requested by African countries, whether it is training, equipment, etc. We are completely rethinking the framework of this partnership, including the military capabilities we provide, including the training programs we have reopened. And within the framework of the military programming law, the minister and the Chief of the Defence Staff have proposed a completely different scheme on which we will go even further. It is essential to continue down this path with new partners: Benin, to name just one in the Gulf of Guinea region, Kenya with which we are also building new regional operations and relying on regional forces to ensure security.

In the case of Niger, this is exactly what we are doing. If you allow me to return beyond this overall doctrine to what we experienced this summer: it is a coup d'état against a democratically elected president, from a minority ethnic group, who has led courageous reforms, economically, politically, in all areas, for his country, clarifying almost all domains, who is engaged on all the international agenda that is ours and that of the United Nations, and who has been taken hostage in the presidential palace by coup plotters for now a month. So, it has been said that France was too engaged in support of President BAZOUM. I hear the newspapers, I read the comments sometimes from other capitals. But what would we do if a coup like this happened in Bulgaria or Romania? Would we say, we would go say: "we should not engage too much? We will watch, because the coup plotters have proposed a Prime Minister to us? There you go, we will engage, that’s the right policy. We should not be too extreme, we are not at home." That’s what other capitals want to do. And we would like to say that democracy is a good idea for Africa, that we do not apply a double standard. It is unacceptable. We have an honest man, democratically elected, courageous; courageous because for the first time in such a context, he does not resign, at the risk of his life and that of his family. And we are being told that the right policy today would be to abandon him. Because it has become fashionable. Because, in fact, we should produce locally now, even when it is coup plotters. And from Washington, passing through other European capitals, I have heard voices, I have listened to newspapers, I have read opinion pieces that explained to us: "Do not overdo it, it is becoming dangerous. It is becoming dangerous." No, we must be clear, coherent. Otherwise, who will listen to us? In which African capital can we say that we have a partnership policy with a leader if when he suffers this, we cannot be supportive? Therefore, I believe that our policy is the right one. It is based on the courage of President BAZOUM, on the commitment of our diplomats, of our ambassador on the ground, who remain legitimate, despite the pressures and despite all the statements from authorities thanks to the commitment of our internal security forces and our military.

Now, we must be clear. We are not engaged. We must not yield to a narrative used by the coup plotters that would say: our enemy has become France. The problem of the Nigeriens today is the coup plotters who put them in danger because they abandon the fight against terrorism, because they abandon a policy that was good economically for them and that they are in the process of losing all the international funding that was allowing them to escape poverty. That is the reality. If we do not say it, we, with courage, who will say it? Therefore, we must pursue this policy firmly, move away from lies and easy solutions. Our policy is simple: we do not recognize the coup plotters, we support a president who has not resigned, alongside whom we remain engaged, and we support the diplomatic and military action of ECOWAS when it decides to do so, in a partnership approach that is the one I presented last February. Neither paternalism nor weakness, because otherwise we are nowhere. We must continue to support him strongly and I call on all the states in the region to have a responsible policy because we must be clear: if ECOWAS abandons President BAZOUM, I think that all the presidents in the region are pretty much aware of the fate that awaits them. And the weakness that some have shown towards previous coups has fueled regional ambitions.

There is an epidemic of coups throughout the Sahel. But what is it based on? On the weakness of military systems, on a lack of effectiveness. The policy that we must conduct in support of the entire region, I will return to this in a moment. And so, I think we must be clear on this point. The period is very difficult, it is especially difficult for the Nigeriens and for our forward posts, but we must, firmly, also avoid any double standard, remain true to our principles and have this policy of clarity. That is the first act "security and stability" on which I wanted to return through these different chapters.

The second major interest that is ours, when we talk about France, are our economic, technological, and strategic interests that serve the agenda I have defined for the country to strengthen our independence in all its meanings, immediate and long-term. Independence does not mean autarky, but it means that when we have partners, we choose them. We cannot sustainably be a power, have even a diplomacy, sometimes strong and credible military actions, if we have economic, technological, or material dependencies on one or another. Would I dare say that we have experienced this in the recent period, we Europeans, and all this has led us to a wake-up call. This must inform our approach in all respects and our diplomacy. It is the key to sustainable security, especially since we are at a moment of international reallocation of resources and innovations. And what is happening today will determine the world in 10 years, 15 years, 20 years.

First, there is a predation on rare resources and materials. We must not be naive; the Chinese started this before us. We watched them play Go, we wondered what the game was; now we are beginning to understand. But there are rare materials and resources that we, French and Europeans, must have access to in order to diversify and not depend. Next, on two major subjects, green industries and new technologies including artificial intelligence, there is a moment of massive investment and reallocation of productive forces that will determine a lot about our ability to be independent, to create jobs in our countries, but also to have sovereign civil and military technologies in the future. And this must absolutely structure our diplomatic approach in this area.

That is why, if we want to be independent, we need a French and European strategy for strategic autonomy. Six years ago, I used the term a more sovereign Europe in the Sorbonne speech. It was said that it was a nice French idea, for the most modest, the most positive people; others said it was a French nonsense and it would not happen, that we were doing this for our own pleasure. I note that there has been a wake-up call in the last five years, which is our collective victory. First, this idea has been adopted by all Europeans. So it is "sovereignty," it is "strategic autonomy," everyone deals with it in their own way. I myself do not understand the 50 shades of gray in this matter, and by the way, according to the capitals, I am told that one prefers the other. In the end, I believe we all understand what it means. It means mastering our destiny more through what we produce, what we buy, and the constrained dependencies by diversifying. Therefore, in recent years, from defense to technology and energy, we have crystallized a real European awakening and implemented real policies with results.

In terms of defense, we started with the Defense Fund, the European Intervention Initiative, and we need to go much further. We also started, from Covid and afterwards, with what we have done in health production, through what we have built on semiconductors and green technologies, through founding acts of the Commission and investment policies. This was unthinkable five years ago. Unthinkable. We must consolidate this. For me, the keystone. It is the Versailles agenda, which we, as Europeans, built in March 2022, which consolidates this strategic autonomy in all the areas I mentioned: semiconductors, green technologies, digital, etc.

On this basis, obviously, the Franco-German partnership is key. I will go to Hamburg in a few weeks to have a discussion particularly on artificial intelligence with the Chancellor, but the Franco-German tandem is absolutely decisive in this matter at a time when we are experiencing a shock that is shaking our Europe. Therefore, I will not spare my efforts to re-engage, consolidate, so that we have an increasingly strong convergence of views. We all Europeans need to move much faster and stronger.

I would just like to mention a few aspects of this strategic autonomy that is key to our independence. First, we must have a clarified European energy policy. We have laid the regulatory foundations with Fit for 55 and the Green Deal. They are the right ones. But finally, we must now develop the instruments; we have not finished the work, to be a diplomat in turn.

Essentially, the work we must conduct is that which allows us to be more independent, to be more decarbonized, and to continue to create jobs and industry on European soil. These are the three objectives. To do this, we need more renewables, more nuclear, more electrical integration in Europe. We do not all agree on this agenda, so we will need to relaunch and multiply efforts. But I will be clear: more coal in Europe is not good for this agenda. More fossil dependence in Europe is not good for this agenda. A regulatory complexity regarding hydrogen, to know what color it is when produced with low carbon, is not good for this agenda. I am for the free movement of low-carbon electrons in Europe. I think it is a good policy if we want the European energy future. The more low-carbon electricity we produce in Europe, the stronger and more independent we will be. That is the strategy we must pursue. We will still have a lot of work in the capitals and in Brussels on this subject. It is essential. There is a work of conviction and re-engagement with our German friends. We do not agree on this subject today. I think it is a real concern and that it would be a historical mistake to deprive ourselves of nuclear power or to slow down investments in nuclear and nuclear innovation in Europe. Our priority should not be to divide ourselves over different energy models, but rather to strengthen the integration of the European electrical network, which is absolutely essential, because we will have to electrify more and more.

The second element is to have clear industrial policies. We have started to do this, but we need to multiply our efforts, to go much faster and stronger. In this regard, I refer you to the speech I delivered in The Hague on our new European security doctrine. It is a "simultaneously" that I also believe in. Obviously, we need a strong single market policy and therefore more integration, from digital to various industrial fields, but we need a clear industrial policy where we help and invest, because the Chinese and Americans are doing it. Today, if I had to summarize in perhaps a somewhat blunt formula, Europe tends to over-regulate and under-invest, too slowly. A true competitive European industrial policy means having more innovation, more investment, and less over-regulation. And so we must implement what we have committed to, but above all, we need more European economic strength at the continental level, more speed of execution and power, whether it is in green technology, artificial intelligence, or otherwise, to be able to compete with the Americans and the Chinese. We have started with the actions that have been taken since the rather direct expressions I had at the end of last year, following the Inflation Reduction Act. We were right to do so. We must go faster and stronger because we are not yet up to date and we are too divided as Europeans.

The third element is that we need a more realistic trade policy. I have said it, Europe cannot be the last continent that continues to make old-generation trade agreements. There are two new facts that we must integrate into our trade policy: our strategic interests and the climate. Our strategic interests mean that when the United States and China decide that green technologies imply not respecting WTO rules, we should not be the last to do so. We need a trade policy that defends the European productive base. I do not want to prepare a France and a Europe where we can only buy technologies that are built either in China or in the United States. That is not serious. And so, we must integrate this into our trade policy. We cannot have European electric vehicles taxed at 25% when they arrive in China, and Chinese vehicles taxed at 10% when they arrive in Europe. I say this with a lot of respect and friendship for our Chinese friends; you know my approach and my policy in this regard. Reciprocity will go through this. It is not naivety; in fact, we are not respected when we are naive. We need a trade policy that is consistent with our industrial strategic interests. We need a trade policy that is consistent with our climate strategies. It is not possible to ask our industrialists and farmers to respect standards and negotiate trade agreements with powers that do not respect them in order to import what we have banned from producing at home. No one can understand this in France. We cannot defend such an option. This is what fuels populism everywhere in Europe, and it is what is preparing an absolutely catastrophic agenda, which is raising the extremes everywhere in Europe.

That is why we will continue to oppose trade agreements that would allow the importation into European soil of products that do not meet our health and climate standards, whether it concerns carbon or biodiversity. This is what makes us a prescriptive power in this area. I remind you that it is because we were the first to push for the ban on imported deforestation that we put pressure on many powers to avoid having these practices.

Then, the last point is that we need a much more integrated and united Europe in this regard. This European strategic and strategic autonomy agenda must be at the heart of the upcoming European agenda and, in my view, of the 2024 deadlines that will structure the European debate. Everything I am mentioning here is about a Europe that is more lucid, more sovereign, more integrated, and more united. This agenda must be clarified absolutely, and it will require structural reforms. But you can see well that our independence and the defense of our economic, technological, and strategic interests depend on this European agenda that is carried, defended, and, if I may say so, enhanced in the months and years to come.

On a bilateral level, I expect three main things from you, beyond the missions you know perfectly and that you carry out every day. We must continue to strengthen our efforts in terms of exports. You know that France's trade balance is not good. It is not good, mainly due to our energy dependencies. That is also why a strategy moving towards low carbon and the exit from fossil fuels is a good strategy for France from a commercial point of view. We have strong axes that we continue to consolidate, which are weakening during this period due to sometimes over-regulation. We must remain cautious about our balance in agri-food, but we must strengthen our agri-food policy for exports because, despite the commitment and investment of all our producers, the European regulations we have accumulated in recent years are sometimes a source of fragility compared to other major powers. We must be lucid in this regard. But we must intensify our economic diplomacy and support for exports. On Thursday, a France Export plan will be presented in this regard. I want to thank the involvement of the entire team of France Export, Business France, BPI, the CCI, AFD with Proparco, and all the diplomatic posts and economic services. What I wanted to say here is to continue to intensify support for medium-sized enterprises, SMEs, and startups. French Tech is a strength. It must also be so in exports.

Secondly, also have this work by sector that has presided over the work that will be presented on Thursday because increasingly, as we see, the large groups that are a strength in exports must pull the smaller ones. It was less of a French reflex, it must be said, than among other large Europeans. We need to push it, intensify it. We increasingly need an integrated offer because in many countries, it is the response to such challenges on hydrogen that is developing in many emerging and intermediate countries, it is such a response to another challenge, etc. The France team must be structured by sectoral approaches.

Thirdly, also include in your criteria the creation of jobs in France. This diplomacy must serve the reindustrialization of France and job creation. Sometimes, your servant first, I tell myself that I have spent a lot of time helping a large group, which is wonderful, of which I am not sure it needed me, and which will not create a job and more value in France. Sometimes it is more useful to help those who will, through this export strategy, create jobs or a site in France because they will export. This is a criterion that must be in the prioritization of things because we want the good of humanity, we want to work towards it, but we want first to reduce unemployment at home. This is one of the objectives I set for this France Export plan.

Next, I want us to better mobilize through our exports, our diasporas, our dual nationals, the vital forces we have in the Nation. With Choose Africa, we have built mechanisms, involving all the actors present here, to help African diasporas in France to invest and carry their entrepreneurial projects on African territory and to build many more projects. This must be at the heart of all the posts present in Africa. And then with the Maghreb Fund, we have also deployed an approach so that all dual nationals can multiply projects on both sides of the Mediterranean. This is, for me, a project at the heart of our Export strategy that must be promoted and pushed. These two elements should not be seen as anecdotal or secondary.

The second key element on a bilateral level is new investments and the attractiveness strategy. I will be very brief in this regard; I know that several campaigns have been presented to you this morning. Choose France is an event that works well. For four years, we have been the most attractive country in Europe. We must strengthen our efforts, consolidate this policy. It obviously involves all the work we do at the national level, but I also count on your mobilization. The next edition will take place in May 2024. Here too, we must continue, sometimes emphasizing this or that country or region or this or that vertical. I think it is very important to prepare these meetings well with all the posts.

And then the last point on the bilateral level that I wanted to emphasize is the securing of our inputs. We must integrate into the economic diplomatic roadmap the aspects of rare earths, rare materials, and critical minerals. Following the mission that was entrusted to Philippe VARIN, we have an interministerial delegate who is in charge of this subject, Mr. GALLEZOT. It is very important that the roadmap is clear for all posts and that we integrate it into our diversifications. In this regard, it is an aberration that I was the first French president to go to Mongolia when we see what potential it has for some of these critical materials. There are many other countries with the same potential. So we must have this mapping and, through our diplomacy, ministerial trips, and our parliamentary diplomacy, strengthen the key links with the countries that allow us to secure access to these materials, minerals, or rare earths, because it is an element of the diversification of many of our productions, and therefore of our independence.

Speaking of independence and our interests leads me finally to conclude on this second aspect concerning immigration. This is always a delicate subject when we talk about it in a diplomatic context and when we are the President of the Republic because we feel, in a way, that we are being led to play two different tunes: the national tune and the international tune. And indeed, it is our own organizational difficulties that lead us not to be sufficiently well organized and effective in this area. And this is really what I have asked the Ministers of the Interior and Overseas and the Minister of Europe and Foreign Affairs in this regard, and I thank them for the improvement in the work that has been carried out in recent months.

What do we want in terms of immigration? First, we want to control our borders, those of Schengen, and within Schengen, our internal borders when there are risks that justify it, as our treaties provide and as we are doing in a context of terrorist risk. We want to reduce uncontrolled flows and obviously fight against smugglers and illegal immigration. And we want to combat all forms of non-cooperation within Europe that lead to the explosion of our internal organization under the action of illegal smugglers who circumvent the right of asylum and who, in a way, thrombose our organization. This means that we have unsustainable delays, people who stay too long on our territory, and even those who have come illegally through smugglers and must be returned home, and when the instruction is done after 18 months, we cannot return them. I quickly summarize the troubles we have been experiencing for years. We want to do this within a framework that respects our principles and values, the right of asylum and the protection of freedom fighters, the desired economic migrations, and the family reunifications that we often talk about while forgetting that most of these are linked to many French men and women who marry non-French nationals and want to bring them back - when we look at the reality of the figures. So behind this, we need to be much more effective, more resolute, but also clearer. A bill will arrive; we have a European action that we have engaged under the French presidency that goes in the right direction - the Tourcoing summit allowed us to strengthen the mechanisms for protecting our common borders. We will continue this effort.

But I wanted to emphasize two points in this regard because at the same time as this effort, we obviously want to maintain our attractiveness, that is to say, allow the circulation of talent. I say circulation, meaning attracting the best students but then allowing them to go serve their country and come back; that is the logic of partnership. We want to continue to have the best researchers, the best entrepreneurs, the greatest artists, and to shine, so we must be an open power. How to balance the two? By having clear objectives and functioning instruments. So for that, the first point is that we must implement the Hermelin report on visa policy. I say this because it somewhat does a post-mortem on what we did not manage to do well when we decided to tighten our visa policy towards states that were not fully playing along on the migration issue. We did it, and it troubled many families who were actually nurturing the link and the relationship, who had nothing to do with the non-compliance with these migration policies. It hardly troubled those who maintained the links, and it deteriorated our reputation and image, without much improving our effectiveness, if I take stock of what we have done. Nevertheless, that does not mean we should move towards laxity. No, we must have a policy of rigor but one that allows us to condition intelligently and simplify our visa policy when we are dealing with people who sustain the bilateral relationship and who are well-known. In short, as often, we are not effective enough with networks of delinquents and we create too much turpitude towards those who love France and who sustain the bilateral relationship. That is what needs to change.

The second element is that we must have a clarified European policy; that is what we are currently working on, in terms of control and conditionality of our aid and our visa policies at the European level and Schengen, because none of this works if we have partners within Schengen who do not apply it, which we also experienced when we tightened our conditions, when some neighbors liberalized the same conditions, allowing entries into the Schengen area. So this policy must be European, at least within the framework of the Schengen area, and that is exactly the debate we will have in the coming months. There is the balance that is not an ambiguity, which is the refusal of a kind of spirit of ease: we want to continue to be an attractive and open power, but we want to fight against illegal immigration, smuggling networks, and what today harms the tranquility and security in certain neighborhoods or areas of our country. And so European policy, visa policy, and also French policy: this will be the framework of a bill that will be presented, in any case, that will continue its parliamentary journey in the coming weeks under the authority of the minister.

The third element I wanted to return to is our role as a trusted partner power. I returned last year, in previous years, to what we have called effective multilateralism and in this context, the role of France as a balancing power. Our challenge, we should not take it on alone, is that in this increasingly fragmented world, we need more international cooperation and to avoid a partition of the world into this duopoly, and in a way, the fragmentation of the world. In this regard, I want us to strengthen our action around a few elements of partnerships that I deeply believe in, which while defending our interests, our principles, and those of sovereignty, allow us to dialogue with each and every one.

First, the renewal of our geographical partnerships. I will be very brief because on the first, I have already expressed myself many times, it is Africa. I mentioned Africa on the security issue. But from the speech in Ouagadougou in November 2017, to the conference held here on February 27; through the various speeches I have given and the important Montpellier Summit which may have sometimes seemed baroque to some: I think it is quintessential that our partnership with Africa must be based on a profound change of objectives, methods, and interlocutors. We still tend too much to only speak with the capitals and those in power. Of course, we must do that as everywhere; it is the work of ambassadors; but perhaps more than elsewhere, we need to speak, strengthen the link with civil society, the opposition, and all expressions of the vibrant forces. It is absolutely essential. If we have been caught off guard on the African continent, it is because we had a device that was too set and so intimate with those in power that it ended up not seeing the rest of society. And at a certain point, when society moves, we no longer have sensors; that is a reality. When I see the amounts of solidarity investment, partnerships, the strength of the teams we have in many of these countries, it is unacceptable. So we must step much more outside the beaten paths and strengthen work with civil societies, with all partners, have a much more focused agenda on education, health, agriculture, climate, and thus the fundamentals of solidarity investment that we have defined within the framework of the Presidential Council. Moving away also from purely geographical priorities that create effects of resilience, of habit, and in the end, the cake eaten no longer had flavor. And ultimately, we were doing a policy that people did not see and did not understand was France; they did not thank us. We must be lucid; we see today that anti-French sentiment is largely manipulated by networks of neo-imperialists in Africa, but there are also many places where people do not know that it is France that is doing this or that.

So, we must strengthen our link with civil societies and all actors, including those who may seem the most marginal. We must strengthen in our verticals the points I have mentioned. We must have a much more training-oriented approach, economic development, and also strengthen our action through culture, sport, and all these levers. In this regard, I want to emphasize the importance of the Africa 2020 season which, from innovation, technology to culture, completely changed, I believe, the cross-view we have with the continent. We will have Africa Creation in Paris on October 6, 7, and 8, which is a very important event for which I ask for the mobilization of all posts in Africa. And I want us to finalize within six months the establishment of the House of African Worlds, which is also a very important project in this regard. Within the framework of this effort and partnership, I really encourage you to continue this change of method to go much further to both have more influence, more effectiveness, and strengthen the links.

I want to emphasize our agenda in support of and in service to democracy in Africa. On this subject, we have a difficulty which is our past. We have digested it; I say this in Ouagadougou. I was born after all the decolonizations. And we cannot say: the African continent is wonderful; it is a very young continent. 70% of this continent was born after decolonization, even more than 70%, and continues to have a dialogue completely complexed by post-colonialism. It is a manipulation. We must be lucid. We must not fall into the side of ease, of habits, of a post-colonialism that we have nourished after colonization. But we must assume to have a real policy of support for democracy. And in this regard, the initiative of Achille Mbembe, the fund we have set up, and its very open action are an important element on which we must rely. So, we must rely on it intelligently, that is to say, in a partnership manner, not by digesting it or Frenchifying it, but by accepting that it is open and in service to all. As on many other points, we want our policy to follow this philosophy. And I think it is very important.

The second element of geographical partnership I wanted to emphasize is the Indo-Pacific. Since May 2018, we have a strategy for this region because we are an Indo-Pacific power, because we have one and a half million inhabitants in this region and 8,000 military personnel. So, our Indo-Pacific policy, I will recall the terms both for us, for our partners in the region, and more broadly. It is a policy of demand and engagement with China. I have had the opportunity to give several speeches on China; I will not go further here. We made a trip, I think, that was important a few months ago to China in this regard.

France does not have a policy of hostility towards China. We have a policy of engagement; we want to improve the terms of exchange on the economic level; we consider it a great partner on the technological level and beyond. We know that the issues of peace and climate, to name just two, need China to find a solution. We are lucid about these political evolutions and what differentiates us in terms of principles or other points. And so, it is a policy of demand and engagement. I say this because we are on the brink of an important year since 2024 will mark the 60th anniversary of our diplomatic relations and points of rendezvous on much of our agenda. And so, we must continue this line which, I think, is a pragmatic line. I say this because we have never had naivety; we have never been in formats, I would say, of complacency with a more aggressive Chinese policy. And we have always said, with much respect, but also with demand, what went along with strategic autonomy.

We are the first European country to have said on communication technologies: this is a matter of national sovereignty. We will not let you deploy certain components. We did it respectfully. Then, we Europeanized this approach. It is this line that we must maintain. And so, our Indo-Pacific partnership is to fight for a free, open, peaceful Indo-Pacific. Our grammar is to preserve the freedom of sovereignty without a spirit of conflictuality, but by reinvesting from a military point of view our presence, by reinvesting in joint exercises, which we did again last summer, by relying on our overseas territories. I think this is a very important element of our Indo-Pacific policy.

It is through French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, Réunion, Mayotte, our French Southern and Antarctic Lands, to have precisely a proximity that values these strategic presences and deploys cooperations. This is what we announced again in Nouméa a few months ago regarding a joint military academy and deployments. This is what we are doing in French Polynesia on aspects of infrastructure or economic development. This is what we are doing in Réunion on our regional partnerships in the Indian Ocean and integrated diplomacy. And so, the Indo-Pacific partnership has allowed us, as we saw again this summer, from Papua New Guinea to Vanuatu, to completely reconvene the relationship, because you have many states in the region that do not want to be locked in, so to speak, in the choice between the United States and China. This policy of an open partnership, not submissive, not equidistant, I always take this precaution because afterwards I always have several chronicles or comments that say that I am equidistant between the United States and China. I will not redo the whole chapter: they are our allies, we share the same values, and we do not have the same relationship with China.

What the partners in the region understand, and I have been able to test it, is this third way. So, there are plenty of people who hate it. I like it, and my interlocutors understand it well; it is effective. So, the people in the region like it when we tell them that with France, they have a great country that is a diplomatic, military, and economic power, which, it is true, is not a great demographic power, which is diluted in the current world, but which is a spearhead in Europe, because the country has reliable partners, and which offers them an alliance that is not conflictual with China, but which is also not about giving everything to it. This policy is a path for the future. Believe me, my experience is a form of common sense. And so, we must have a military agenda, humble, in proportion to what we are, a diplomatic agenda, a climate agenda, an economic agenda, a cultural agenda, which is extremely fruitful and which also relies on our overseas territories. And that is also why we need to engage much more in our regional diplomacy, our overseas communities throughout the region. I think that is an absolutely key point.

It is the same spirit that I want us to develop, by the way, in the Caribbean, as in the Amazon. In the Caribbean, I am pleased that Martinique has joined CARICOM. We will do everything we can to ensure that Guadeloupe can do the same. It is a very good way to build regional partnerships and integration in this space. In Latin America, then, I have heard many comments about the summit this summer in the Amazon, but it turns out that today, we have not left the treaty. So I wanted to go there, to be the only European head of state, alongside European ambassadors, to explain how we finance the Amazon. We have an Amazonian power through Guyana. So I say it solemnly, France is a candidate to join the organization of the Amazon Cooperation Treaty and to give it a full place and, moreover, to have a representation closely associating French Guiana. This is very important, and we must play our diplomacy through our overseas territories. And so, I really hope that Brazil and all the powers in the region will accept our candidacy request and allow us to integrate into this format.

Then, I think we need to rethink our partnerships in the Maghreb and the Mediterranean very deeply. I believe, indeed, that in recent years, we have deployed many initiatives with civil societies, as I mentioned for Africa, but also with the Maghreb. The Summit of the Two Shores, the cultural season being organized for 2026, multiple partnerships in culture and entrepreneurship. But let us be realistic, bilateral relations are not at the level they should be. I will not here recall each one: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, but also other countries in the Near and Middle East. So, what is this due to? There are many discussions each time. I cannot say that it is a lack of commitment from France with many of them, including in the efforts we have made on memory issues or economic issues. There is also a crisis in the region and its organization where hostilities are not absent. There are multiple and heterogeneous difficulties. And so, beyond what has been done with civil societies, we will take several bilateral initiatives. I wish to re-engage with several of these countries in the coming months. To consolidate what we have done with the Baghdad Conference, which is very structuring for the Near and Middle East, and I hope that by the end of the year, under the authority of the minister, an intergovernmental recovery agenda will be consolidated with the entire region or more broadly.

But we can see that issues of environment, climate, and co-production must allow us to rethink a regional agenda on terms different from those in which we live. But beyond this geographical approach, when I say to make France a trusted partnership power, it is also about taking risks in international governance. Indeed, there is a crisis in this international governance, as I explained in my introductory remarks, because there is an increasing challenge to the United Nations Security Council, the IMF, the World Bank, etc. I mentioned it earlier in very direct terms; it is what I hear everywhere. It is enough to open the window to see a flood at that moment.

And some play on this; we must be realistic. The Gulf countries today look at us and say, "You are here with your principles, your rights, your rules, your IMF criteria. Who are you? An old continent, demographically declining, energy-dependent, technologically uncertain. We will work with India and China, less demanding than you, and many developing poor countries that prefer our agenda. We bore them less with our criteria." This is what is happening in many countries where you represent France. When we cannot find money at the IMF, we now seek it from Gulf powers or elsewhere, or from certain other deep pockets that propose another agenda with different criteria, different values. I do not overestimate what the BRICS+ summit meant. I did not see people knocking on the door of the G20. It is the African Union that we will take. But this tells us something, that if we do not know how to reform the structures that are currently ours, which uphold international law and rules that, it seems to me, are good, the risk is that destabilization maneuvers will take hold, and thus this partition of the world that I mentioned.

So, my first point in this regard, if we want to be trusted partners - I want you to make proposals to me and for us to have the audacity to be the actors of a profound reform of global governance. In particular, the IMF and the World Bank, we must reform their governance. It is no longer possible for there to be around the table systems that are essentially determined by the members of the board and that it is only the rich countries. If we do not reintegrate many of these countries that are not there today, then we will allow an alternative order to be created, and we will move towards the marginalization of our own system. We must move towards greater efficiency of this system, but we must also reform its governance.

Next, I wish for us to work as Europeans — and I will propose this to a few heads of state and government — on new formats with India, Brazil, and South Africa. We must not confine ourselves to existing formats. And I think it is very important with the major emerging powers, and those who carry them, to create new formats and to look at the elements of international governance and the climate and energy agenda, beyond the relationships we have with the United States on one hand, with China on the other, and the structures in which we are. So, we must have audacity, and I welcome all your suggestions in this regard.

In this regard, we have started a very structuring path, and I want it to pave the way for the months and years to come, with the meeting that took place last June in Paris, the Paris Pact for People and the Planet. Our summit for a New Global Financial Pact in Paris led to this declaration that we called the 4Ps. This is convenient; it works in both Shakespeare's language and Molière's language. I believe a lot in what we have built because we built it, first, by designing the agenda with poor, developing, middle-income, and emerging countries. We said, fundamentally, there are 4 simple principles. We should not have to choose between fighting poverty and fighting for the climate. This relaxes everyone because they all felt that they were being lectured on how to respect our climate agenda without further helping them to fight poverty.

Secondly, the path taken is a national path. It is not dictated from Brussels, Washington, or any other venue. And so we build partnerships to support a national trajectory. Thirdly, we need a concessional shock; we need more public money, as we have done for ourselves, but we must push the agenda everywhere. And this is what we have done with a push on the World Bank and the IMF, which led to announcements and new guidelines at this summit, and that we will have to implement because it is clear that we cannot resolve the agenda of fighting poverty and for the climate if we do not put in more money. Fourth point, we need much more private money, and therefore we need to have a much stronger leverage effect from our action. This applies to all our development banks, our multilateral banks, and our institutions. If there is no leverage effect, there is often a displacement effect. And so, mobilizing private money is essential on this agenda. Our agenda, these 4Ps, is what must structure our action in the coming months. It is, in essence, the construction of a new international public and private consensus around this agenda: poverty, climate, biodiversity. So, I hope it can punctuate the upcoming meetings that will take place.

We will have the Paris Peace Forum on November 10-11-12, which will provide a meeting point on this subject and consolidate. We will set up a small follow-up team, also mobilizing heads of state and government representing all the concerned countries, because it must not be a strictly Parisian initiative. And we will have a meeting point at the summit that we will organize just before the Olympic and Paralympic Games, where we have a summit, precisely, on sustainable Olympic development, in July 2024 in Paris, with the 4Ps at the heart of the agenda. This is absolutely essential in my eyes.

So, this agenda will also be punctuated by several initiatives that I wanted to recall here. We must continue, indeed, to federate around this agenda in a very concrete way. In particular, at the request of the World Food Programme, the first summit for school feeding will be held on October 18 and 19. France is organizing it, hosting it, and so we will mobilize the entire planet around this very important agenda. We will also sponsor the replenishment of the International Fund for Agricultural Development on December 14 and 15 in Paris, with a target of 2 billion, which is also very important in the context of the food crisis we are experiencing. It serves the FARM initiative that we launched from the very first days of the war in Ukraine, particularly to strengthen the production capacities of developing or middle-income countries. You see, this trusted partnership goes through this 4P initiative and the milestones I have just outlined, which are, in my eyes, essential.

Concretely, beyond the meetings I mentioned, we will obviously continue to implement our climate agenda, always linking climate and biodiversity, which are absolutely inseparable, but with, again, several meetings that will mark the coming months. Obviously, COP 28 will be the key meeting at the end of the year. As all the signals of an aggravated climate crisis multiply, it is our capacity now to achieve results that is at stake. And what is happening on climate is totally illustrative of what I have been telling you all along. We see some emerging countries using, in a way, the political argument that it is the responsibility of Westerners, and therefore, we will not ultimately make too much effort. And where there is a lot of money to be mobilized among some emerging countries or among some states currently benefiting from the windfall of hydrocarbons, there is under-investment because, in a way, there is a form of diplomacy of resentment or stigmatization towards Europeans and Americans. We must absolutely not yield to that, but it goes through this re-engagement and this trusted partnership, particularly on the theme of climate. From the meeting that will be organized by Kenya in a few weeks, and I salute the commitment of President RUTO. France, of course, will be by his side.

We will, precisely, implement the Paris Pact for People and the Planet and set up, from the Nairobi summit and for COP 28, new financing options, mobilizing the World Bank and the IMF together, multiplying simpler and faster instruments, and mobilizing the private sector. Next, we must build new ambitions in the energy sector. France will carry a very clear agenda with deadlines for phasing out oil and coal because that is where we need to focus our efforts. Ultimately, the heart of the battle must be the reduction of dependence on oil everywhere, but especially the reduction of dependence on coal, particularly among the major emerging economies. I refer you, I have already mentioned it several times, but there is a very good scheme made by AFD that shows the impact. We must stop over-investing politically in small projects in developing countries or middle-income countries where we sometimes put a lot of political and media pressure. The heart of the battle is that the major emerging economies move away from coal. That is the heart of the battle for the next 10 years. And so, we must redouble our efforts. This is what we have engaged, I believe, with a lot of strength through our just transition partnerships, known as JETP, in South Africa, Indonesia, Vietnam, Senegal. And so, we will continue to implement these agreements, but we will especially now put more impact on oil and coal.

We must go further in partnership with these major emerging countries on carbon storage, renewable energies, green hydrogen, and nuclear power. Then, there is all the work on biodiversity and forest preservation, which are both carbon sinks and treasures of biodiversity. These tropical and primary forests have been a focal point of our diplomacy for several months. We launched, with the One Forest Summit in Libreville last March, a diplomatic action that we had begun in Sharm el-Sheikh, which is absolutely essential, which fundamentally states that on 14% of the planet's surface, which essentially includes the Amazon, the Congo River basin, and Southeast Asia, we have 14% of the most valuable primary and tropical forests. We have 90% of the ecosystems for known vertebrate species and 75% of irrecoverable carbon. And there, we have created all the mechanisms of the Earth for reforestation. We do not value the preservation of these species. And you can see it, every time we deforest in these areas, we regress enormously, because we massively release irrecoverable carbon, we destroy ecosystems for biodiversity that are often also completely irrecoverable, and we take a terrible step backward.

So we have built a new method. We will finalize it for COP 28 with the valuation of biodiversity credits and a better functioning of the carbon market. We have established conservation partnerships that we began to implement with Gabon, with Papua New Guinea, last summer, with the mobilization of public and private funding to preserve these spaces in connection with indigenous peoples. And we will continue this; this is what we also want to do in the Amazon, through our own territory, but also with our main partners, particularly Brazil.

Finally, in terms of climate, there is all the work on the oceans, which is a fundamental issue, both for the climate and for biodiversity and sovereignty. The past few months have been marked by very significant advances, the BBNJ agreement for the high seas and negotiations on plastics, and France has played a key role in this. I congratulate all the negotiation teams in this regard, as these agreements had been blocked for a long time, and we have managed, particularly through discussions with the G7 and others, to make historic progress. All of this paves the way for the United Nations Ocean Conference that we will host in Nice in June 2025 and that we are co-organizing with Costa Rica. It is an event that must be prepared now, because there is a diplomacy of the oceans to be built, just as we have begun to have a diplomacy of forests. And these are extremely important levers, first because they resonate with people, because they build new pathways. We are much more credible than our competitors, and I believe they allow us to mobilize our diplomacy in both innovative and effective ways.

Finally, I want us to mobilize these partnerships at the level of cooperation and trust for two final subjects. One, I would say very quickly, is obviously the fight against international inequalities and for a fairer international taxation. We must complete the work done in recent years on the minimum tax and digital taxation. The work is not finished, and we must continue to engage with the blocking elements on the international level and, obviously, technology, particularly artificial intelligence. In recent years, we have been at the heart of real diplomatic innovations. With the Tech for Good summits, we have begun to have a real new form of partnership approach. We have brought together states, NGOs, businesses, and all stakeholders involved in technology, which crystallized from the Christchurch Call in May 2019, which took place right here and is now being followed up. And I want to truly acknowledge the partnership with our New Zealand friends. We must follow the thread of this partnership that allowed for the removal of terrorist content in one hour. We must continue the work to combat hateful content, information manipulation, and fundamentally establish a digital public order. This is absolutely essential. We complemented it with an initiative last November for the protection of children online, which is key, and we will hold its second meeting during the Paris Peace Forum.

It is exactly the same method, that of the multi-stakeholder process, that we want to have for artificial intelligence. We are trying to build a common framework in Franco-German cooperation, and then the G7 took it up in Hiroshima. Europe has begun to regulate; our challenge is to invest more as Europeans to be competitive compared to the Americans and the Chinese, and therefore to first have an investment and competitiveness agenda and to think immediately about regulation and to think about it at the right scale. The regulation of artificial intelligence can only be effectively done at the international level. We cannot regionalize its regulation. That would be a mistake, because if Europe goes too fast and too far in terms of regulation right now, even though we are not a driving power today, we take a great risk. Then, because there is everywhere a wake-up call on the need for regulation, we must engage with that and, in a way, take the initiative. The British have held an important first summit, which France will be represented at in early November.

During the Paris Peace Forum, we will hold an important summit on regulation, and the G7 has decided that the regulatory bodies will be established in Paris. Indeed, the global partnership for artificial intelligence that was created under the Canadian presidency of the G7, which we consolidated in Biarritz under the French presidency, has its office linked to the OECD. And this is an opportunity: the OECD, the global partnership for artificial intelligence, UNESCO in its cultural and ethical dimensions, must be places for thinking and designing a regulation of artificial intelligence, and Paris is naturally its capital. But we must do this now in very close association with all partners and in a multi-stakeholder approach that I mentioned. We must think about regulation from the design of the instruments, by design as we say in good French, and as broadly as possible, in an approach as the OECD knows how to do, very inclusive to be effective and also by case types, that is to say, the fight against information manipulation, the most sensitive productions. This is a key agenda for us on which we will follow this method.

So you see, all these partnerships are key, and I am not exhaustive on the method to be adopted. One of the last ones we will try to deploy during the Paris Peace Forum will be our agenda for the poles, where we will hold both a scientific and diplomatic meeting to try to reconsolidate the international strategy we must have for the North Pole and the South Pole.

Finally, and I will conclude on this, all of this is obviously served and accompanied by an agenda of outreach and influence. You know it; it is at the heart of your approach to what we have been doing for years, sometimes decades, and of the commitment that is yours. In this period, we must, more than ever, strengthen our collective investment in the French language and culture, because I believe it is an agenda in service of our country's interests. It serves the geopolitical, economic, and strategic agendas that I mentioned. The more we speak French, the more we build intimacy and a good understanding of who we are. I also think it is a useful agenda for the regions where we develop it. In this regard, we must continue to deploy the reform of the AEFE that we launched, which allows us to train many more and more effectively French and non-French children in our language with our methods and to consolidate France's role as an educational power as well as the importance of the French language. I had the opportunity, last July, to gather all the Alliances françaises here, and I want to acknowledge again their work, which is essential in this regard, that of our French Institute and all its structures around the world, but also of our museums, our cultural institutions through their diplomatic strategy, their actions, and the initiatives they take, whether in France or abroad. We must redouble our efforts and proposals; and with the enthusiasm of the first day, I want us to double our efforts. France is expected on this subject in all areas, and therefore the promotion of the French language, but also and especially the promotion of our artists, the artists from the countries where you serve, the possibility of moving, students as well in the training we develop, is a tremendous lever of influence.

In this regard, I want to highlight a flagship point, which will be the Francophonie Summit in October 2024. For the first time in a long time, France will host it. The idea is also to de-institutionalize it as much as possible because these summits have aged too much, to show how decentralized they are—I remind you that Francophonie is a format that was invented by non-French heads of state and desired out of love for France by non-French heads of state—and to try to build new pathways where youth will be at the heart of the project we carry. This summit will take place at the International City of the French Language in Villers-Cotterêts, which we will inaugurate on October 19, and which must also be a place of support for you, of training, of pedagogical and cultural support, of action. There will be artist residencies, but also academic ones, and it must really be an important place of work.

Alongside the work on language and culture, I cannot obviously fail to insist on this point, the work on our influence. We mentioned it at the Quai d'Orsay last March; the minister has returned to it several times. It is at the heart of the roadmap of the military programming law. It is a delicate subject because it is a continuum. Influence is a notion, I would say, that lives in society and has its place in the common register. It is to be well regarded, maximally loved, understood, and, if possible, followed. It has now become a diplomatic function because there is counter-influence. And so it has entered the heart of the missions, and I want to truly acknowledge what the Quai d'Orsay has begun to do, both at the level of the central administration and in raising awareness among posts. We must continue this work through the transformation of the digital tool, the approach, the search for allies, and partners. There is a continuum in the military, as we can see; we have seen it in the most important theaters of operations, because it is difficult to conduct a military operation over time when there is counter-influence being exerted on our soil, in our own information networks, and in the countries where we operate. Then it obviously touches on the subject of information, because the influence exerted by one power or another, depending on the rules it uses and its transparency, sometimes distorts free, neutral information and completely changes the shaping of public opinion. I say this because the subject of influence is key to the effectiveness of our diplomatic action, for the functioning of democracies, both abroad and at home. And that is why it is a very sensitive function, and I will have the opportunity to return to it in a more structured way in the coming months, because it requires—and we have done this for France—structured and clear democratic and jurisdictional controls, an action that is readable by all but also greater effectiveness and a departure from naivety.

And if I speak of international action, I just want to say a few words here. We must continue to be much more effective. Today, there are great imperial powers that are more effective than we are and that structure a function of influence through all channels, social networks, underlying administrative channels, and others, which we need to analyze closely and counter. Therefore, we need to make an effort in organization but also in doctrine, instruments, and massive investments in all areas of influence, and we need to do it quickly because we are suffering the consequences. When I hear about anti-French sentiments in many African countries, it is the result of a counter-influence and disinformation strategy; it is very well done. It sometimes uses what was done by those who were our friends; they knew how to fill football stadiums at little cost and make French presidents applaud. They are now doing it with other ideas. But, they are organized, they do it on social networks. We know the instruments, but we need to be careful. We have rightly clarified our instruments, standardized them. That is very good. We are sometimes, at least in this regard, powerless, and therefore we must be much more effective.

And then, we must think, as I said, about the role of public broadcasting internationally, and of France Médias Monde, which is a tremendous lever for influence. But we need to be clear about the place we give it and the role it plays. Because when it is the only lever of a press considered free, it has a very important function; it faces propaganda. And when this propaganda is taken as it is, it is a concern because it sometimes threatens France directly - we just experienced this again in Niger. The framework of its intervention must be thought out because this organization is seen by many states as a state entity, which it is no longer, I assure you. It is read as such and is used by the powers that contest us as the fruit of French imperialism in the informational field. And so, we have built an equation that is rather losing: that is to say, we have an instrument that is built with independent editorial teams - which is obviously the framework of what we believe in to have a free press - but which, therefore, totally forbids itself from doing any work of influence, and which, in countries that see it as a state instrument that does influence, is seen as the justification and legitimization by other powers - which do real influence for governmental purposes - of what they are doing. I say this in my own words; this is what I experience; and in my opinion, this is what many diplomats in those countries experience. Therefore, in my opinion, this is not our best use of the common instrument. I really ask that we tackle this issue with courage. The general states of information should allow us to think about this, but the journalistic independence to which I am very deeply committed and which I will defend, in France and elsewhere, with great strength, must not prevent us from reflecting on a new world in different geographies. The proper use of public money and the responsibility that are mine compel me to open this essential reflection work, which must be at the heart of the agendas of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Culture in the coming months.

Finally, this influence, and I will conclude on these two points, will pass in the coming months through sport and history and memory.

Sport is an obvious thing, but it is better to repeat it. On September 8, the Rugby World Cup will be hosted in France. It is a diplomatic event, an event of influence, but we will have many leaders, particularly from the Southern Hemisphere, who will be in Paris. And so, obviously, this needs to be prepared, valued, and consolidated within the framework of our sports partnerships across all the regions I mentioned. And then, the Olympic Games will open on July 26, and in one year, to the day, the Paralympic Games will open in Paris. And these Olympic and Paralympic Games are a tremendous diplomatic rendezvous for influence. First, of France's ability to host, its gastronomy and its offerings; our representatives are working to ensure that the French art of living, our gastronomy, our capacity to welcome, are valued and fully recognized. But the legacy of Paris, in terms of inclusivity, sport, school sports, and health sports, will be at the heart of these events, along with the Olympic sustainable development summit that I announced, which will take place just before these events.

Finally, our influence will also pass through our history and our memory since the coming months will be marked by the 80th anniversary of the Liberation and the landings in France. It will start in Corsica in a few weeks, and it will continue from spring and summer 2024, with many interspersed events that we will have to organize, in Normandy and Provence, which are the two epicenters, but with almost all French territories being involved in these memory and history events. And this at the very moment when the last generations of survivors are leaving us and where there is, for us, a very significant work of history and memory that we are doing with many historians, the involvement of the Ministry of the Armed Forces on this subject and of the Ministry of National Education, but also with work internationally since many of our allied powers, as well as from the African continent and the Pacific continent, have been involved alongside us in the liberation of French territory and these landings. And so, we will have to prepare these diplomatic events with great care. This is the mission I have entrusted to Ambassador ETIENNE, who is leading this mission with several historians, military personnel, and administrative staff to prepare the events and commemorations.

That is what I wanted to say, Ladies and Gentlemen Ambassadors, at the beginning of this week and before your work on both the international situation as I see it and some of the great perspectives that are ours. There is a lot of work to do.

Of course, I did not speak about certain areas, certain countries, but I have already been too long, so you will not hold it against me. I will have the opportunity to return in the coming weeks and months to several of the topics mentioned here or some that I have not developed enough. In any case, I want to reiterate my trust and support for the missions that are yours. They serve the agenda of France and the nation, its economic strength, but also its moral strength. They carry, in an extremely troubled moment, as you have seen, the paths of our interests, our independence, and our principles to which we must not yield anything.

I count on you. Long live the Republic and long live France!