Speech at the Munich Security Conference 2020

France Emmanuel Macron · President of France

15 February 2020 · Munich Security Conference 2020 · Bayerischer Hof, Munich, Germany

Context
Macron addressed the Munich Security Conference on February 15, 2020, discussing his vision for a more sovereign, united, and democratic Europe over the next decade.
Main themes
European sovereignty and strategic autonomy, future vision for the EU, weakening of the West, China's rise, Russia and Turkey as regional powers, Africa's demographic growth, US withdrawal from Europe, eurozone integration, European defense and security, democratic reform of EU decision-making, European neighborhood policy, climate and environmental sovereignty
Duration
~79 min
97th percentile
Words
9,425
97th percentile
Sentences
454
98th percentile
Readability
53
71st percentile
Grade
10.9
32nd percentile
Syntax
2.95
41st percentile
Vocabulary
2.08
22nd percentile

Munich Security Conference Translated from French

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 59%56%
  • Ceremonial 18%17%
  • Institutional 9%9%
  • Economic 9%8%
  • Social 6%5%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Not in focus 4%

454 sentences in 64 paragraphs

Conference Hall, Bayerischer Hof, Munich, February 15, 2020.

Wolfgang ISCHINGER

So it’s my great pleasure, my privilege this morning to welcome, to say to President Emmanuel MACRON “Welcome, Mr. President.” Actually, we were talking about this type of event a year ago and I’m glad that while it didn’t work out last year, it’s now working out. So welcome again, Mr. President. For those of you who don’t speak French, you might be well advised to have your headphones around because I would imagine that Mr. President is probably going to use the French language, so be prepared for that. Also, I want to say that I am particularly grateful to President MACRON for having agreed to the kind of format that I like, that my team likes, and I know all of you like. This is not one of his major speeches; he has given one at the Ecole de guerre, many important speeches in the last three years. But today he has agreed to just discuss issues and take your questions, so let’s give him a round of applause and we will start.

So I’ll try to do this in English and the president will respond in French or English or German, I don’t know. So, Mr. President, yesterday in this hall, Frank-Walter Steinmeier delivered a policy speech, a very pro-European speech, “Europe has the destiny for Germany,” a strong commitment to Europe. So you’ve made important speeches about your vision for Europe, so let me ask you the question in this way: what kind of EU, what kind of Europe do you envisage if you look 5 or maybe even 10 years ahead? What kind of Europe would you like to see where you and your partners can create a stronger, a better, a more respected Europe? Tell us about your vision.

Emmanuel MACRON

Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador, and I greet all my colleagues and friends who are in this room.

The question is vast, and I will try to answer it somewhat quickly and therefore necessarily approximately. When I look at the world as it is being shaped, and this is the theme of this conference this year, there is indeed a weakening of the West. Fifteen years ago, we thought our values were universal, that we would dominate the world sustainably, that we were dominant in terms of technology, in terms of military power. When I look at us, indeed, in 10 or 15 years, we will be increasingly challenged by other projects and other values that are emerging. The emergence of China, of course, must be taken into account; we have regional powers that do not share our values but are in our neighborhoods — Russia and Turkey, we will probably come back to that. We need to have a strategy. We have a neighborhood that is a tremendous source of opportunities if we decide to take care of it. It is Africa: because when I look at Europe over the next 30 years, it seems rather that we will lose population, that we are struggling to stabilize; Africa is exploding demographically. And there is an American policy that started several years ago, not just under this administration, which is also a form of relative withdrawal, at least a reconsideration of the relationship with Europe, and we need to face that as well. All of this convinces me, at least reinforces my belief that we need a European strategy that is to re-emerge as a strategic political power. And so I see a Europe that is much more sovereign, united, and democratic.

In ten years, I see a Europe that will have built levers to establish its technological, security, and defense sovereignty, on migration issues, in terms of food, in terms of climate and environmental issues, and in its relationship with its large neighborhood, particularly its Russian policy, its Middle Eastern policy, its African policy. I see a Europe where we will have decided, therefore, in a core that is to be defined, and in a sovereign manner, to put much more together, to build a real sovereignty of the eurozone to be credible in this environment. And we will also have managed to modernize our common decision-making rules, with a powerful, credible Europe with what I just said. It can no longer be a Europe where we keep the rules of unanimity for everything, where we have one commissioner per country, etc. If we project ourselves ten years ahead, we must accept that in the heart of Europe we put much more together and, well, that we accept having a core of Europe. And so I see this Europe, according to the choices of sovereign countries, in several circles: a much more integrated core that, on the key functions I mentioned, decides to put much more together; partners who remain in a policy with a common market, common rules, and real convergences; a common neighborhood policy, but with less close and less together access, and a stabilized neighborhood policy.

But I think we are at a moment of truth for Europe, and I will stop there, because indeed Europe is the means for us to protect our values, our collective preferences that obviously have a lot in common with the United States of America — this taste for freedom that has always put us side by side in wars — but which is not quite the United States of America. And which means that we must indeed have a European freedom of action, a European independence, a capacity to build our own strategy because we do not have the same geography, because we do not have the same relationship to equality, for example, to social balances, not quite the same relationship to culture, to authors. There are European specificities that must be defended. And we have a neighborhood policy that is our own. The relationship with Mediterranean policy is a European policy; it is not a transatlantic policy. The policy with Russia must be a European policy; it cannot simply be a transatlantic policy. And so that is how I want us to project ourselves, I hope, in ten years: a Europe that will have managed to build the terms of its sovereignty on these major issues, of greater unity, of greater democratic vitality, and that will also know how to regain a certain taste for the future. I want to conclude this point by saying that I, like you, watched and listened to President STEINMEIER's speech, and I wanted to say how much I found myself in sympathy with President STEINMEIER's speech. It did not surprise me, but I found that he had strong words in this regard.

Wolfgang ISCHINGER

Thank you very much, Mr. President. Let me remind all of you that if you want to ask a question to the president, the best way of doing it is using the electronic way through the app. If all goes well, there will be somebody to check, and the questions should appear here on my iPad. So write your questions down and I will also try to address this or that, questions that I know personally. So be prepared for that. We’ll go to you and to the audience in just a few minutes. On the bilateral theme, France and Germany, I would think that you must have been quite frustrated with what some of my friends in France and surely the media have called the response from Germany to your proposal. So now, yesterday interestingly enough, and you alluded to it, the president of Germany and the foreign minister of Germany came up with a positive response to your invitation to start a strategic dialogue on defense and nuclear. So tell us a little bit about your frustrations with Germany at this moment.

Emmanuel MACRON

I’m not a man of frustrations, you know. No, I think this is a permanent story between our two countries. I remember several approaches or proposals made by Germans, years ago, waiting for French answers. Joska FISCHER made a great speech waiting for French answers. We have a story of proposals waiting for answers. I mean first, I think that at the European and the bilateral level we’ve worked very hard together during the last two and a half years, three years - with the SCAF [FCAS] and a lot of projects, and I do thank our ministers present here for working together to make the impossible possible. Let’s say, three years ago, let’s imagine “we will make the future aircraft in common with Germany,” a lot of people probably would have said to me “it is not possible.” It’s happening and we are progressing. So, we’ve launched a bilateral approach and we’ve launched a series of new initiatives at the European scale: on batteries, on universities, Europe of defense - with a lot of initiatives - and we will probably refer to that.

I think the big question mark now we have together is the magnitude of the answer on the speediness. And for me, the main challenge we have in front of us is our ability to address the core European perspective. I think today that the crisis we are facing is a crisis of European democracies and European middle classes. Today in our countries, people are starting to doubt Europe, sometimes even the idea of democracy - the extremes are rising - and our ability to provide a common response. So what perspective do we give to Europe over the next 20/30 years? That is what is at stake, and so I have no frustrations but impatience, and I think that today, in Franco-German relations, the work we need to do is to know how to give a new dynamic to the European adventure. We have succeeded in building a solid, new European team. I welcome the presence of our commissioner Thierry BRETON, the presence of the high representative BORELL, there are other commissioners, a Greek friend who is also here, but we have a team with President MICHEL, President VON DER LEYEN at the European Commission, the new European Parliament which is completely renewed, with perspectives, and we have seen it in recent weeks. The Climate Plan, the perspectives on 5G, which build a new European ambition in which I fully identify. But the key for me in the coming years of what we must do at the European level, of what I have tried to propose in the Sorbonne speech and what we must advance is 1) to go much faster at the European level on these elements of sovereignty that I mentioned earlier and how, in technological terms, we invest much more strongly, much more quickly in our companies, our innovations, and our regulation to build European solutions. 5G, the cloud, artificial intelligence. We must have these rules of sovereignty; that is clear. How, as Europeans, we meet the challenges that worry our populations, climate, the relationship to borders. We have been unable to resolve our migration issues for years. We must resolve them as Europeans, and all our peoples see the importance of the climate challenge, they are both afraid, afraid of change or afraid that it is not changing fast enough according to some or others.

It is at the European level that we can change things; it is the right scale, it is the right market. So, I want us, in Franco-German cooperation, to move much faster, much stronger, with much more ambition to succeed, and the key to that is to take risks. We have managed to do it in the past. If the French and the Germans do not take risks on these issues, nothing moves forward. And it is about changing our relationship; I believe that it is, fundamentally, about the future and investment. We are becoming a continent that no longer believes in its future. Today, I look at the European (inaudible). We will discuss a budget in a few days at the European level; we will find an agreement, we will defend it. But the question is whether we will have a budget at 1.06, 1.07, or 1.08% of European GDP with returns and rebates, etc. This is not commensurate with everything that needs to be done. I look at what is behind this. We have China investing massively. Public money, under rules, with visibility, which is complicated to see every day, but investment in digital, in technology, in a climate strategy that should not be underestimated, moving very quickly in recent years. It is investing in its future. We have the United States of America making the choice to significantly increase public spending, at unprecedented levels; investing in its defense, investing in its technology, and investing in future choices. And I look at Europe: at the consolidated, aggregated level, we continue budgetary consolidation. I am talking about the aggregated level; I am not talking about a budget between states, but at the aggregated level, that is true. And at the same time, we have managed to regulate market actors with post-crisis rules. We have not regulated the financial markets that primarily finance the Anglo-Saxons. We have managed to regulate market intermediaries, banks, and insurance companies, which are key to financing continental Europe, and thus we have seen a contraction in public and private financing in Europe for the past 10 years. This (inaudible) is crazy, and it is crazy in an environment of low or nearly zero interest rates because the result of all this is that we have savings in Europe that continue to increase, and since we have not finished building an integrated financial Europe and a true Europe of capital markets and finance, this savings does not circulate in Europe to be properly allocated to the places that are our priorities, and today, we are under-investing in our consolidated priorities, and that European private savings are financing American bonds. This is what I was saying earlier to some; the result of this strategy is that the Americans are investing much faster in future choices, and the Chinese are too. If they are right, in 10 or 15 years, they will have the industries, the standards, and the structures that allow them to embrace the future, while we will have fallen behind. If they are wrong and they go bankrupt, they will have gone bankrupt with our money, so it is a game where we lose every time because we are not investing enough in our own future.

And so we must regain this taste for the future, this capacity to invest, and I tell you very simply also because politically, it is the only way to reconcile the European middle classes with our future, and for me, this is a very important point politically. The financial crisis of 2008-2010 was managed in Europe much more slowly than in the United States, and it was managed by adjusting on the middle classes. Let’s be very clear. We asked Italy, Greece, and Spain for unprecedented efforts in history. This had never happened in peacetime, and we adjusted on the middle classes; we lowered salaries, we lowered pensions, and we pushed for forced privatizations, generally managing to sell these assets to the Chinese. Then we had the migration crisis that shook - and I speak in a country that took these risks on the migration crisis - but that shook our middle classes, which raised demographic and cultural concerns. The reality is that today, in Europe, let’s be clear, what was the heart of our democracies, our middle classes, have doubts about the European adventure because they say to themselves: “in this continent, when there is an economic or financial problem, it is us who pay”; “when there is a migration problem, it is us who adjust, and there is no more solidarity.”

There was a North-South divide over the financial crisis, an East-West divide over the migration crisis. How do we recreate a taste for the future, a taste for solidarity among us for the middle classes? Because Europe is a political adventure that is democracy, individual freedom, progress for the middle classes, “social market economy,” as one would say to quote the good authors in Germany. If there is no longer a perspective for the middle classes, there is no longer (inaudible), and that is why you see the democratic doubt emerging and the doubt about the European adventure. This is the issue that we must address in Franco-German cooperation. So I have no frustration. I have impatience because I think it is a question today of the speed of our reaction and the clarity of the response we provide to our citizens. If the Franco-German couple cannot provide, along with all European partners, a clear response to these challenges, to these issues, and a future perspective for the middle classes, we will have made a historical mistake.

Wolfgang ISCHINGER

Mr. President, if you allow me. I would like to go back to your most recent (inaudible) speech, the one at the Ecole de guerre a week ago, and let’s (inaudible) you said, and I (inaudible) down that French nuclear forces strengthen (inaudible) European security and also had an (inaudible) European dimension (inaudible). Now, I am old enough to remember the 1974 (inaudible) declaration of NATO when (inaudible) members explicitly stated that French and British nuclear forces could (inaudible) and I quote from the text, 1974, contributed to the overall strengthening of the (inaudible) alliance that the nuclear state (inaudible) would make the necessary contribution to maintain the common defense. So when I look at that whole text and what you said last week, I hope it is okay for me to ask the question: what’s new? What’s new in what you said or what are you (inaudible) at, where would you like to go on this question of nuclear strategy and nuclear defense for Europe, for France in the 21st century?

Emmanuel MACRON

It is the question of the relationship between a European ambition for defense and NATO that you are implicitly raising. I am - I believe very deeply that we need to have a stronger European defense. That is why I consider what we have managed to achieve in recent years: a European defense fund, enhanced cooperation, the establishment, as I proposed at the Sorbonne, of a European intervention initiative to bring strategic cultures closer together; these are historic and extremely important steps to have European funding, to have common capability projects - the SCAF or the MGCS are great examples of Franco-German cooperation - and to have a common strategic culture behind it. I think we need this for the reasons I mentioned earlier regarding sovereignty. Sometimes, this has been misinterpreted or misunderstood. This is not a project that is against NATO or an alternative to NATO, but I have said, for me, European collective security has two pillars: NATO and European defense. It is not an alternative, but it is the logical consequence of the situation we have seen in recent years. We have an American partner who tells us, “you need to invest more in your security,” which is true. We have the United States of America telling us, “you, Europeans, since the fall of the Wall, have disinvested thinking that peace was there. The world has changed. I am not the sheriff of your neighborhood.” And when I look at what has been done, including under the Obama administration, it is already a strategic repositioning of the United States. The choice to be less invested in the Middle East, to reposition itself much more in the Pacific, and to say, “Europe must take its responsibilities in terms of neighborhood.” But I think we need NATO very clearly. But we need to build in coherence with NATO and for ourselves and in response to the American demand, a capacity that gives us credibility with the American partner, that is to say, we are putting ourselves in a position to protect ourselves and carry out useful actions and to have freedom of action. I say this because it is also very important to have a foreign policy. If we do not have freedom of action, we do not have credibility in foreign policy, and we cannot be a “junior partner” of the United States of America because sometimes we have disagreements that we must assume. On Iran, we have disagreements. If we have not built real financial, economic, and military sovereignty, we cannot have our own diplomacy. We experienced this with the JCPOA. So, we need this European defense.

In this context, I wanted us to advance on many things, and the proposal I make, what is new in what I said last week… Nothing new regarding NATO: France contributes within NATO, in terms of nuclear matters, to strategic reflections; it does not participate in exercises, and it will not participate more, that has always been the case. But I say, now we must enter into a strategic dialogue with all partners who wish to, including on nuclear matters. In this context, we are ready to have joint exercises because the goal is to build a common strategic culture. The step for me that we are at the European level is to say, “France believes in a European defense.” And so we are ready to take this step and propose to all partners who wish to enter into an unprecedented strategic dialogue and to look at a common culture on this subject. And I think that is a very important element, and that is what is new in the context of this European defense and in this articulation between European defense and NATO.

But if you allow me, this implies looking between us, as we mentioned with some, at the unthought things we have. And I think that Europe has unthoughts regarding military power. And we are at a moment in our history where we must address them. There are two major unthoughts: there is a German unthought, if I may say so, and there is an unthought from Eastern Europe. And it is up to us to look at them in relation to our history, in a very unembarrassed, very respectful manner, and to see how we can address them. We built Europe on the abandonment of German military power. That’s how we did it at the beginning. And then we built things by allowing the two allied powers - Great Britain, France - to build a military power equipped with nuclear capabilities, not Germany. But Germany has managed to have a debate about nuclear power. It had it indirectly, that is to say, with the United States of America. And in a way, the idea settled in Germany that one could talk about American nuclear power, but not about European nuclear power or French nuclear power. Because the idea of power is only thought of through the lens of the United States of America and its shadow. And I think that today, in a very unembarrassed manner, we must say, "If we really want a sovereign Europe, a Europe that puts itself in a position to protect its own peoples, how do we think about the relationship to power, including in Germany?" It is a debate. I speak of it as the French President and I speak of it with all the weight of our common history, but with our capacity to transcend this history. And I know that it is a debate that is not simple in Germany, at all. But I think we must have a calm debate on this subject. But the relationship to power cannot simply be made through the intermediary of the trusted third party that is the United States of America. It must also be thought of in European terms. And on the other side, in Eastern Europe, since, fundamentally, the fall of the wall and even the enlargement, there is another unthought which is the idea of saying, "Western Europe is the one that abandoned us, Western Europe is the one that left us to be invaded and accepted that a curtain fell in Europe in '47." And so it said, "I have endured a relationship to power that was that of the Soviet Empire. I prefer a relationship to power that is the American relationship because they did not let me down." I am simplifying, but I believe that is really how it has been experienced. And the question regarding our European adventure, this reunification of Europe that we have been living for the past 15 years with our partners from Central and Eastern Europe, is the question of how we rethink our security together and therefore our common trust. And so it is a real good subject. But all this to say that many of the concerns that may have arisen regarding this ambition for a European defense, or what I may have proposed anew, are also linked to these European unthoughts that we have and that we must overcome because we are entering a new era. I apologize for my somewhat long and complete answer, but the subject is important enough to detail.

Wolfgang ISCHINGER

Very, very, very important. And if I may honestly add, I think you are absolutely right that of course you have in France, because you have been a nuclear country for so long, you have a certain culture or knowledge and discussion. This country is a country which has renounced nuclear weapons. We have included for that particular reason much greater difficulties, embracing the issue and understanding the complexity. So it’s not an easy discussion. Before turning to questions from all of you, let me ask one last question. You have said, Mister President, when you spoke about Russia, you have said and I quote, "pushing away Russia from Europe," unquote, would be a major strategic error. Now, my question (inaudible) one, after your recent visit to Poland for example, do you expect our East European partners and (inaudible) to support you in this vision of a new and invigorated different kind of relationship with Russia? And what do you think President ZELENSKY would want to say about this? He will speak in the other room in about an hour. In other words: isn’t the unresolved Ukraine Donbass issue a huge obstacle to any kind of renovated relationship with Russia at this moment? So let’s share with us your views about how to deal with Russia as we go forward?

Emmanuel MACRON

I will try to look at where we stand with Russia to see where we can go. In recent years, we have indeed increased distrust towards Russia, and Russia has given us many good reasons to increase that distrust. We can return, if you wish, in the rest of the exchange to the reasons and the history of this relationship, but that is how it is. I look at these last years with the same degree of distrust; we have been weaker with the Russians. In 2013-2014, we decided to say: we set a red line for the Russians regarding chemical weapons in Syria. But we did not enforce it. Huge mistake. And so we have the right to be distrustful of Russia; it is a strategy, it is the one we had for years. If we are distrustful and say we do not share the same values, the same principles, we must be strong. I believe that after 2013-2014, we were distrustful and weak, meaning we set red lines but did not enforce them. The outcome, look at what happened in the months that followed: they continued in Syria, the American withdrawal I think was, even if it is relative and was later corrected, a mistake in Syria because it left room for other powers. And in the same way, we let them advance on many theaters of operations. As they sensed our weakness, they then acted in Ukraine. So, I hear the distrust of all our partners, ours too. The person you have in front of you was a candidate in the presidential election who suffered a massive attack a few days before the first round, of which I know where it came from. So I am not crazy! I just know one thing: to have distrust and be weak while being neighbors - because I also look at our geography, the big difference we have with the United States of America when we talk about Russia is that we share the same space; we do not have an ocean between us - in the end, that does not make a policy. It does not make a policy; it makes a totally ineffective system. The outcome is that we have accumulated frozen conflicts, systems of distrust, conflictuality in cyberspace, sanctions that have absolutely changed nothing in Russia. I do not propose at all to lift them. I am just stating the fact: our sanctions and counter-sanctions cost us at least as much as they cost the Russians, if not more, to us Europeans, not to everyone, for a result that is not very positive.

So what I proposed, seeing all this, is not to suddenly say things will change; you will see, let’s embrace, as we say in French, in the blink of an eye the relationship will change. No. But I just asked what our credible long-term strategy with Russia is? There is a first scenario, to continue to be uncompromising and distrustful, but in that case, we must be brutal. We must assume conflicts, we must assume enforcing borders and go for it. Is that the collective choice? I did not see people rushing into the room to say let’s go. Not a credible choice. There is a second choice which is to say we are demanding, we concede nothing on our principles, on frozen conflicts, but we re-engage in a strategic dialogue that will take time. But we re-engage in a strategic dialogue. Because today the situation we are in is the worst. We talk less and less, we multiply conflicts, and therefore we do not put ourselves in a position to resolve them. These things will take time, but I believe it is a path that is at least credible.

I consider that, in doing so, you will have noted, it has been more than 3 years since we had a meeting in the so-called Normandy format on Ukraine. You spoke of Ukraine and President ZELENSKY. We are re-engaging the dialogue, and as a result, President POUTINE accepts what he had not done for more than 3 years, a summit in the Normandy format, and we have results that we had never had in common. We are working with the Chancellor, President ZELENSKY, President POUTINE, and just after this summit, we had prisoner releases like we had never had before, the recognition, by the way, of the necessity to articulate local elections with elements of security that were not even in the Minsk agreements, and therefore a step forward. On this, no naivety, we will have other pitfalls, other problems, but it has recreated a dynamic that we will continue with the Chancellor and with a next summit in Berlin that we want for April. So when I look, and we are on a very short time scale, we are re-engaging something. Then, for me, this strategic dialogue with Russia must rest on a capacity to resolve these frozen conflicts, a capacity to think about cyber, space, military relations, thus this security architecture, our ability to articulate on many external conflicts. Look at what is happening in Syria; we disagree with Russia on what is happening in Idlib, which is unacceptable. This disagreement is not related to the initiative that France has taken or to what we propose; it is historically related to our weakness and our abandonment of the theater of operations. That is the result. So we can see that, in any case, we need to re-engage this dialogue with Russia in the long term but also hold it accountable for its role. Russia is a permanent member of the Security Council; it cannot constantly be a member that blocks the advances of this Council. And I am pleased that President POUTINE has accepted the idea of a meeting in P5 format this year.

So that is the approach I wanted us to advance. This approach, one, it must, it will be constantly coordinated in a European manner, obviously in Franco-German terms as provided for by the Aachen Treaty, but also with our partners. I have had many discussions with my Polish counterparts on this subject. They have, of course, concerns that history and geography document. But when I ask them what else and better can we do, they recognize that if we can find ways for increased trust dialogue, it is also good for them.

I add one last point. If I put myself in Russia's shoes, what are its future prospects? I think we must always reason like that ourselves. Russia has built an incredible military armada in recent years. It has continued to invest when we had stopped, made massive investments, it has innovated a lot, and we must recognize that on the military level it has acquired capabilities that we did not think it could acquire 20 years ago in maritime, also in land, space. Is this strategy sustainable for it financially? I do not believe so. Because simply it has a gross domestic product that is that of a medium-sized economy. So if I put myself in Russia's place, I say the strategy I have had in recent years gives me credibility today; is it sustainable in 20 years? I am not sure. Then, it has maximized its role in all regional crises due to our weakness and our disagreements — Syria, Libya, on certain African issues and elsewhere — is that sustainable? And then, what are its options? The "standalone"? Complicated. Huge country, declining demographics, it needs allies. The alliance with China? We have rather pushed it in that direction collectively after 2013-2014 for good reasons; I do not believe that this alliance is sustainable for Russia. First, because Russia has never culturally projected itself into this alliance. President POUTINE, and I would say the political conservatism he has created, is not a political project that is built within this alliance. And because above all, I think that Chinese hegemony is not compatible with the sense of Russian pride, if I can put it in very politically incorrect terms. So I think we need to seek ways for a European partnership; we need to seek ways for a partnership. I said in Poland: I am not pro-Russian, I am not anti-Russian either; I am pro-European. And it turns out that when I look at our geography, we have something to do together. And so it is up to us to build this security architecture, this mutual trust. And I think it is also giving a strategic option to Russia that has value for us.

Wolfgang ISCHINGER

Thank you very much, Mister President. A little late this afternoon after the lunch break we will have Serguei LAVROV right here, and we can ask him, I hope somebody will ask him the question of how sustainable this Russian foreign policy is? And maybe we’ll quote what you just said to him and see how he reacts.

Emmanuel MACRON

I thank you for helping me to promote the initiative with Russia.

Wolfgang ISCHINGER

I have a number of questions on my iPad from the audience. With your permission, the first question comes from Anne-Marie SLAUGHTER, where is Anne-Marie in the audience, somewhere? Way back so I’ll read it to make this brief. Question to President MACRON from Anne-Marie SLAUGHTER who comes from Washington, former senior official of the State Department, now chief executive of the New America Foundation. So question: you speak eloquently and compellingly of a European strategy, not an EU strategy although you point out a need for a different EU to be effective. When you speak of a European strategy, are you still including the UK?

Emmanuel MACRON

That is a very good question. The formats are multiple because when I talk about a European strategy, there is obviously the European Union, but we have this possibility that we have given ourselves to move forward with a few states that want to go further if others do not want to follow. That is why, by the way, on defense issues we have established enhanced cooperation, which is a good method. Then we have the format of the European Defense Fund, and we have also taken an initiative that is intergovernmental, a European Intervention Initiative, which includes several European states, not all, and states that are NATO members and others that are not, I think of Finland. In this context and in this Europe of defense, yes for me the United Kingdom has a place. It has a place because it is an extremely important allied power with which we share two things as French: a permanent member of the Security Council and a nuclear power. And the military relationship is structured by bilateral agreements: Lancaster, Sanders are not dependent on, are not impacted by Brexit, and I have said this several times. And so yes for me this Europe of defense implies integrating diverse formats, gradually building a more integrated strategic culture, and it implies including the United Kingdom through current treaties and future initiatives. I also think that we will have to build coordination formats with the British in the future on strategic plans. I think we will need to create a form of European Security and Defense Council. We did it with the Aachen Treaty bilaterally, we will convene it in the coming weeks with the Chancellor. I think we need it in Europe to coordinate on major strategic issues, and I think we will need to regularly involve the United Kingdom in such a Council. So yes.

Wolfgang ISCHINGER

The next question it is very hard for me to see with this light on but I think it’s Matthias (inaudible), he’s tall enough to stand up and be seen so Matthias your question.

Matthias

(inaudible)

Mr. President, one question to the short term, one to the long term. In the short term, are you afraid that Russian intelligence and Russian AI could manipulate the next election in France to the advantage of Marine LE PEN? And the question to the long term, in a post-POUTINE era, could you imagine that the old dream of our “AMEURUS” alliance, an alliance between America and Europe and Russia could develop, or is that a dream?

Emmanuel MACRON

On your first question, I will not enter into the debate about whether an intervention would favor this candidate or that candidate. What is true is that until now, Russia's strategy has been rather to support political movements in our countries that were anti-European and also anti-immigration, very conservative on social issues, and on which they could think, somewhat inaccurately, to build an alliance. Especially, it seems to me, partners who could weaken European integration. I believe this is a clear strategy, it is acknowledged, and it is linked to the fact that from Russia's point of view, the interest has long been to say: "better to have 27 divided states than 27 states together when you are their close neighbors." I can understand this strategy. It is not the one we pursue, which is why we need to re-engage in a strategy that says: "We, united, can have an approach with Russia that builds something, even if we have disagreements on values, on functioning." I think Russia will continue to try to destabilize. Either through private actors, or directly through services, or through proxies. I do not believe in miracles. I believe in politics, meaning that human will can change things when we give ourselves the means. I do not believe, however, that changes are spontaneous and that suddenly the light was there and things will change overnight. So yes, there will always be destabilization strategies. We, in France, do not have the habit of making public the assignments, so to speak, and therefore when we manage to trace where the attack comes from, we have never made it public. Some other countries do. However, we obviously investigate and have a dialogue with countries when we know it comes from them. Sometimes, these are public services, I would say, to remain discreet. Sometimes, they are private proxies or private actors. So I think Russia will continue to be an extremely aggressive actor on this issue in the coming months and years. And by the way, in all elections, it will seek to have strategies of this kind or it will have actors who will do so. We must be wary, by the way. It is not just Russia; there are many other countries where there will always be actors who will do so. There are ultra-right conservative actors in America who have also been very intrusive in European campaigns and European strategies, with means that are not legal either. So we need to be quite ecumenical on this subject.

So, what should we do? We need to strengthen our technological defenses, our cooperation between services, and our legal systems. Because the truth is that we have very few antibodies against these attacks. And I believe this is a huge weakness of European democracies. I make this parenthesis, but for me, in Europe today, by the way in all democracies in the world, the mutations of the media-technology system are such that we no longer have the antibodies to protect democracy. And that is one of the biggest issues we have ahead of us, that is to say the possibility today that private actors use deep fake technologies, manipulate, penetrate, disseminate information at very high speed, of all kinds, without traceability, in hyper-mediated democratic systems where everything circulates immediately with an effect of emotion and intimidation in democracies, is today not compatible with systems that have been built on the basis of values, for freedom of conscience, of the press, of the circulation of information that was that of the end of the 19th century. Because that is our system. We protect freedom of the press, freedom… which is very good. Freedom of circulation with laws that date back to the 19th century, which we have adapted a bit but whose foundations, at least in France, are these. I think we have enormous vulnerabilities in this area. And we do not have the speed of intervention in technological and legal terms to stop these strategies. This is for me the biggest point. So Russia will continue to be an actor on this issue. And I think that, by the way, in the initiative we must lead, we must build the strategy of de-escalation, but also of common transparency that we will do on this subject. And I think that in the coming months what we should try to do with Russia on this point is if Russian private or public actors engage in such strategies, in all our democracies or those of our partners, we must establish a rapid action methodology, but perhaps also a much clearer and stronger attribution system and a system of sanctions and reciprocally. That is why I think we need to re-engage in dialogue on this point, to combat these new forms of destabilization, even online criminality from both public and private actors.

On your second long-term question. I think nothing is impossible. I think nothing is impossible and many of these issues will also be structured by the direct and indirect consequences of the Chinese strategy. We can see how much the Chinese strategy of the last 10 years determines the American strategy today. Which is, by the way, normal and entirely legitimate in commercial terms, in strategic terms, etc. And so, if China continues its rise and continues to have a policy with a real infrastructure strategy, digital and a real strategy of expansion with a logic of outposts, if I may say so, in the Pacific, in Africa, in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and now in Europe, it is obvious that this will strengthen the interests and alignment of interests of the other great power, which is the United States, and this as China catches up with or perhaps surpasses it economically and especially European and Russian powers to face and build regulations. So I think the path you described is absolutely not impossible, but it depends: 1) on the future of China and its strategy and its success and 2) first and foremost on the European capacity to provide a response. If Europeans have a common strategy already, they can then claim to have a strategy with the Americans.

Wolfgang ISCHINGER

Thank you, Mr. President. Unfortunately, I have to say that our time is rapidly evaporating so I think we have time for maybe one and a half last questions. One I read and one I think goes to Joe (inaudible). So if somebody could give a microphone to Joe (inaudible) while I read this question to you. This comes from the Berlin Bureau Chief of The Economist, Tom NUTTALL. Where are you Tom? Somewhere in the room. The question is the following. Now that the European Commission has revised its methodology for EU enlargement, it’s about the Balkans, will France lift its veto on beginning (inaudible) talks North Macedonia and Albania? If so, when?

Emmanuel MACRON

First point, if you allow me, I reject the term French veto.

No, no, no, no. I know very well, Mr. Ambassador. I reject the term because I salute the great courage that consists of hiding behind France when there are disagreements. But I can tell you that several states were against the opening of negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania. And I add to that that a significant number of states were anyway against the opening of any negotiations with Albania. And I think it would have been a disastrous mistake to decouple the two subjects and to open negotiations only with North Macedonia. Parenthesis closed, to make history fairer regarding the last council. I first said, "We have a precondition which is to change the rules of discussion on enlargement because they are far too bureaucratic, technical, non-visible, and we need to make it more political, that is to say, have a discussion for enlargement when we open it, which is differentiated, reversible, clearer." This means we must be able to move much faster with a country that is clearly advancing, we must make clearer investments in a country that has opened negotiations and is progressing, and we must also be able to go back if that country is not progressing. It should not be, once we have opened negotiations, a bureaucratic teleological system, if I may say so, or teleological, because I read it, there were many people who did not understand a few months ago, it is not "theological," France being a secular country, I preferred to say... I had seen in many articles that it was said "the President has a theological vision of enlargement." Teleological. Moreover, fundamentally, where the end goal is already written from the beginning, no. We must be able to go back if it does not work. The Commission has done remarkable work, I thank it, I salute it. And so this precondition is lifted. Now, I am also rigorous. We are always very rigorous with each other when it comes to commission reports on this or that budgetary subject, in the process, we are all waiting for a report from the Commission in March on the two countries. So we must see what the Commission will say about the state of expected progress in Albania, in North Macedonia, on the subjects. And based on that, I consider that the preconditions I had set, if the results are positive and trust is established, we must be in a position to then open negotiations. But on this point, I draw your attention to two very simple remarks. The first, the strategic objective that is ours in the Western Balkans with enlargement is fundamentally to anchor them in Europe. I share this strategic objective. Is opening negotiations for enlargement the right method towards them? Go today to Serbia, President VUCIC is doing a tremendous job and he is a leader for whom I have a lot of respect and he has a lot of leadership in his country. The towers that are being built today are Russian and Chinese, they are not European. And so it is great to open negotiation books but it does not change people's lives. And so we must also be more credible, that is to say, we need to invest in terms of culture, education, infrastructure much more than we are doing. We open negotiation books, it has been 5 years since Serbia started with us. And I write you the story, in 2 years we will say we must now give, Serbia must join the club because it is rightly becoming impatient. But we will have let the investments of others take place. I find that we have a policy that is very theoretical on this subject. I prefer realpolitik in this matter. If we want to anchor the Balkans, we must invest there, reinvest in infrastructure, education, languages, culture while we have not changed much — I have also seen what we were doing on the French side and we are changing this policy — rather than simply opening negotiation books with great hypocrisy. Because all those who say we are opening negotiations with Albania, North Macedonia, tell you the second after, "But be careful, they have no vocation to integrate for 15 or 20 years." We are not reasonable, we are mocking the people and that is the collective hypocrisy in which we are, everyone. We are despairing the peoples by telling them in 15-20 years they will integrate. It is not true. So if we are here, it means they must enter. The second remark, we Europeans have a problem, we only think of the neighborhood through enlargement. It does not work at 27. We are moving too slowly, we have rules of unanimity everywhere, we are too heavy. Do you think it will work if we are 30, 32, 33? We all say, I think there is a convergence, we need a common European foreign policy. Do you think that enlargement will facilitate the common European policy towards Turkey or Russia, to take just two examples? So we are not coherent. And I add that those who tell us "Make enlargement faster" are the same who then say "I am for the budget at 1%, no more." So, I said earlier, a slice of bread that is getting bigger and bigger with the same amount of butter. In the end, people no longer feel the butter. This means that the implicit strategy behind Europe is that we think of Europe as a large market that is expanding and not as a political power. A political power has collective preferences, it has minimums of convergence and homogeneity and it must think in an adult way about its neighborhood policy which is not necessarily to be integrated into the club right away. And I believe that we must change that too.

Wolfgang ISCHINGER

Thank you. Not the last word but the last question goes to (inaudible).

Unidentified speaker

Mr. President, two quick questions which allow for quick answers. One thing is that the core issue of Europe for the last 60-70 years has been who leads and who follows. Now the question is would you like to be led by Mrs. MERKEL or would Mrs. MERKEL like to be led by you? The second question is, in the strategic culture that you’ve painted, this defensive unity that you want, what language would we all speak, all 27 nations?

Emmanuel MACRON

On the first question, I would like to disagree with you on the observation. I think the DNA of the European Union is not to be led by anyone. I believe that the founders' project for Europe and what has allowed us to live in peace for 70 years is precisely that we have broken with two millennia of what medieval law called translatio imperii, the transfer of empire, that is to say, successive hegemonic policies. For 70 years, we have built an unprecedented political construction of cooperation without hegemony. Without hegemony. And so there are states larger than others that are core but it is false to say that there is hegemony. I believe this is very important and therefore there has never been a German chancellor leading a French president or leading others. And I hold this idea very dearly because it preserves the DNA of this European Union, the fact that it is not a project of hegemony, therefore conflictual. That is also why we live, which is our treasure that we must not forget, an unprecedented period of peace in Europe. Our continent, which had always been crossed at most every 20-30 years by civil wars, has lived in peace for 70 years. So I do not want to lead Chancellor MERKEL nor be led by Chancellor MERKEL because that would be contrary to the very European idea. What I know is that the Franco-German couple is the condition for the possibility of European ambition. It is not sufficient but nonetheless, as we function historically, demographically, economically, strategically, when Germany and France agree on something, that is not sufficient to carry a European dynamic. But if Germany and France do not agree on something, it is sufficient to block everything. And so what I want is for us to build, we continue to build the Franco-German agreement that allows us to move forward and that we do it with more and more ambition and speed. I believe that is the key for us to respond to contemporary challenges, it is the degree of ambition and speed. And I know that Chancellor MERKEL is also aware of this and we have a permanent dialogue but in this spirit of mutual respect and cooperation which I hold very dearly.

Then, we may be, you see my spirit of resistance in this current debate, but we may be arriving at this paradox that at the time of Brexit the language of the 27 will become English. More seriously, I think that — Umberto ECO had a very nice saying that I often quote, he said "the language of Europe is translation." And it is true. And you know what, even on strategic and defense issues, that is not a problem, on the contrary. Because the concepts in each of our countries have a history and different sounds. And so I think we have a common Esperanto which is English and which allows us to move forward, to work, etc. and which we practice and that is very good. But I think it is very good to maintain multilingualism in Europe and I do not believe at all that one language should impose itself on the other, because that is the sense of hegemony that I mentioned earlier, but because it also allows us to respect our differences, our untranslatables, and to move forward. We do not necessarily have the same cultures, the relationship to debt is not the same, I have often said, between Germany and France because the connotations of that word are not the same. There is a sense of guilt in the German vocabulary when we talk about debt, there is not at all that in the French vocabulary. But if we continue to translate our languages, we can work together because we can explain our differences. It may take more time but that is not a problem. So I hope that we continue to have all the European languages but that we simply build the spirit of responsibility and the awareness of the world that lead us to go faster and stronger together. I believe that the key is lucidity about our strategic environment and the taste for the future that I mentioned earlier.

Wolfgang ISCHINGER

Thank you very much, Mr. President.

Emmanuel MACRON

Thank you. Thank you very much.