Speech delivered at the central event for the 35th Anniversary of the Victory of Playa Girón, held in Matanzas, on the

Cuba Fidel Castro · President of Cuba

16 April 1996 · Central event for the 35th Anniversary of the Victory of Playa Girón · Matanzas, Cuba

Context
Castro addressed a crowd in Matanzas on April 16, 1996, commemorating the 35th anniversary of the Bay of Pigs (Playa Girón) victory and proclamation of Cuba's socialist revolution.
Main themes
Bay of Pigs anniversary, socialist character of the Revolution, U.S. imperialism and aggression, Cuban revolutionary justice, social reforms, solidarity and internationalism, anti-Cuba blockade, popular revolution, historical memory, CIA deception at the UN
Duration
~66 min
96th percentile
Words
7,925
96th percentile
Sentences
253
93rd percentile
Readability
50
63rd percentile
Grade
14.0
67th percentile
Syntax
3.38
88th percentile
Vocabulary
2.17
42nd percentile

Translated from Spanish

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 71%56%
  • Ceremonial 10%8%
  • Social 10%8%
  • Economic 5%4%
  • Institutional 4%3%
  • Environmental 1%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Not in focus 21%

253 sentences in 95 paragraphs

Dear compatriots:

After an afternoon filled with so many memories and emotions, with so many beautiful things we have seen, with so many wonderful words, it is difficult to speak here today; but it was essential that we gathered, because a day like this could not pass forgotten.

Many things are commemorated this afternoon, and many important things; but, first of all, we must remember that on a day like today, an afternoon like this, the socialist character of the Revolution was proclaimed. That was, we could say, the first great salvo of artillery in response to the aggression.

That afternoon we remember with infinite pain how we buried our fallen comrades in the repugnant and cowardly bombing of the 15th, a bombing carried out by planes painted with the insignia of our Air Force, to confuse, to deceive, to surprise.

We remember the dawn of that day, for we had spent the night awake, as a ship was approaching from the eastern area and the comrades from that region were on alert, especially in the area between Maisí and Baracoa, when we saw planes flying low over the Command Post, a house in Nuevo Vedado, that were going to bomb Ciudad Libertad. Almost immediately they fired; but I also remember that not even 20 seconds had passed when our anti-aircraft artillery responded vigorously to the fire, despite the fact that they were young militiamen, inexperienced, with little practice in the use of those weapons, and one of those planes —already deliberately planned by the enemy— headed towards Miami, landed there and claimed to be a defector from the Cuban Air Force, that the revolutionary aviation had rebelled.

They were not Yankee planes with Cuban insignia, but rebel planes. That same infamous lie was proclaimed at the United Nations, and in such a way that they did not even tell the representative of that country at the United Nations the truth of what had happened; he was a person known for relatively decent attitudes and perhaps they feared they could not count on him to tell the truth.

That is how they do everything, and that is how they have acted throughout history in each of their aggressive wars.

Those were difficult days of Girón; we knew that imperialism would not forgive the Revolution we were making.

What Revolution was it? It was a revolution of justice. All those laws mentioned here and that Fernández mentioned were simply laws of justice, in a country overwhelmed, exploited, humiliated, where peasants lacked land, where American companies were the powerful owners of the best lands in the country, where theft was constant, where people were killed, tortured, murdered, where the number of illiterates was enormous, where almost 60 children out of every 1,000 live births died every year, where there were no schools, where there were 10,000 unemployed teachers. A colony where a brave, heroic people resided, who had fought for a long time so that the great neighbor would not take over, and where, because agrarian reform laws were made, urban reform laws were made, and because, in short, social justice began to be applied, they decided immediately to liquidate the Revolution. But first they believed they could liquidate it by taking away the sugar quota, or that they could liquidate it by cutting off the oil supplies; that is, by not selling or not allowing oil to be sold to Cuba and a series of similar measures, against which the Revolution sought formulas to fight and survive.

They would not forgive that as an example for the peoples of Latin America who were in similar conditions to ours; but they also believed, with contempt, that they could crush us. They did not realize that it was a different revolution, that it was a popular revolution, a revolution of the people, by the people and for the people, that overthrew one of the best organized and best trained armies that they had here in the hemisphere.

They did not understand that, and immediately set about organizing subversive groups. Relying on landowners, henchmen, and others affected by the Revolution, they managed to organize up to 300 groups, supplying them with weapons, resources, money, political encouragement, support of all kinds; they began to carry out sabotage throughout the national territory, apart from the economic blockade to try to starve us.

At that time, the socialist camp existed, the USSR existed. We all know what happened later, but despite that, as proof of what solidarity and internationalism meant, they supported us, they helped us, and although we disagree with the vast majority, if not with everything they did later, we are grateful for what they did for us at that moment. It was of great importance.

We did not want to mix the international situation and the Cold War with our Revolution, but we were not willing to renounce the Revolution.

Our first weapons were not bought in the socialist camp; we went to Western countries to buy weapons. In some places we bought rifles, grenade launchers, ammunition, rifles that were modern, automatic, some tens of thousands; we also bought cannons, ammunition in a European country. And what happened? When the second ship was unloading, sabotaged from the outside, it exploded —and it exploded twice, because it was prepared to explode at least twice— and killed in a matter of seconds more than 100 workers and soldiers who were unloading that ship. While they were preparing the plans for aggression against Cuba, they wanted to prohibit or prevent us from acquiring weapons.

We had no relations with the Soviets, there were no diplomatic relations, but we were determined to defend ourselves, we were determined to fight, and that is how the first weapons of socialist origin were acquired; well, they were of different origins: some were Czech, others were weapons seized from the Germans in World War II, and others were Soviet weapons that arrived through Czechoslovakia.

In a short time, really, a large quantity of weapons arrived in Cuba. Possibly thousands of ships brought weapons to our country and no ship ever exploded again. We conducted all possible tests, even dropping boxes of ammunition, boxes of grenades from thousands of meters, and not a single box exploded, not a single projectile exploded. That could not have been an accident.

Weapons arrived, but we did not have the people prepared for the use of those weapons. We had learned to handle a little artillery and tanks that had remained in Cuba at the triumph of the Revolution, and thus we began to arm ourselves, but we had to organize the cadres. That is why the importance of what Fernández explained, that thousands of cadres had to be prepared in a matter of weeks or months, because we did not know how much time we would have.

When imperialism saw that the Revolution was resisting, it accelerated the plans for the mercenary invasion, and we already knew, after all the measures they had taken against Cuba in every way, of a subversive type, sabotage, armed actions, that they, as soon as they had the first opportunity or the first organized force, would strike, to do in Cuba something similar to what happened in Guatemala; but no one could know when or how. We did understand that they were going to use that variant, and in the meantime, we organized feverishly throughout the country.

The first FAL rifles that arrived were sent to the mountains; we were already preparing to fight in the mountains if an aggression came, the concepts of what we later did on a large scale were already present, we already knew that even if the Yankee army arrived here, the Cuban people, with a few tens of thousands of rifles, could fight and could resist. No one doubted that. But then, when a torrent, we can say, of armaments of another type arrived, hundreds of anti-aircraft pieces, hundreds of artillery pieces of all calibers, hundreds of tanks —or at least they seemed like hundreds to us; I could not say how many there were on April 17, 1961, but I can assure you that there were enough to crush ten Giróns simultaneously, in a little more time, that yes— the population was mobilized throughout the country and, fundamentally, the capital; a large number of weapons were concentrated there, because it was logical that any enemy aggression would try to take the capital of the country. Tens of thousands of militiamen were mobilized.

There were a few Czech and Soviet instructors, and when they saw that, they said: "Well, this is impossible, it takes at least two years to train all these people." We told them: "No, everyone has to be trained and at full speed." So we invented something that was to ask the militiamen to teach what they learned in the morning in the afternoon, in matters of tanks, artillery, anti-aircraft, whatever it was. And so they did. In the end, those small groups of instructors became convinced that, in this way, it was possible to train hundreds of thousands of people.

We recruited many young people for artillery, anti-aircraft, and infantry battalions in universities, in workplaces, everywhere, while we accelerated the training of the rebel troops that had come down from the Sierra Maestra or had joined throughout the country. Personnel was really prepared at great speed, because we can say that the bulk of that armament arrived a few weeks, if we can say, a few months before the Girón invasion. And the Cubans, as you know, learn quickly, learned to handle those weapons.

As for aviation, they had left us some Sea Fury, other fighter equipment whose name I do not remember well at this moment, some B-26 and three training Jet aircraft; but, in reality, the personnel of that aviation, except for a small group of patriotic spirit that had been imprisoned almost entirely because they had refused to bomb the peasants in the Sierra Maestra, had fought alongside Batista, and therefore, we had more planes than pilots, and training a pilot takes time.

The training of cadres was very important, extremely important, as I said, and in that our comrade Fernández provided us with exceptional help, as he was the one who taught everyone here how to march, because the rebels did not know how to stand, how to salute, how to march —here I see another veteran, Carreras, who helped us a lot, in this case with aviation— and since he had studied at an academy, he taught us the formal things, the organization of a platoon, a company, a battalion; because we had platoons, companies, battalions, and columns in the Sierra Maestra, which could be larger or smaller, but did not have prior academic preparation. Many recruits who went to the Sierra as volunteers received training. To tell the truth, of every 100 who arrived, with the daily visits of bombing planes, the lack of cigarettes, shoes, clothes, and food, 90 returned; because the Cuban was braver for combat and heroism than for organized and disciplined work, and those Minas del Frío were hardly resisted by anyone, and not because of the cold, because it was warm there; almost every morning, we had the visit of the planes.

We had to start from scratch to organize the great army we needed. Other officers also helped us, those who had been imprisoned for rebellion against the tyranny, or because they had a revolutionary conduct and had joined us; but a number, really, very small for that. Fernández was tasked with directing the cadet school. He humorously recounts that they had to climb the Turquino twenty times, which does not please many people; but we came with the fever of the Turquino and believed that anyone who did not climb the Turquino a thousand times at least would not be a good revolutionary —I think Fernández must have a record in that— and those who were going to be cadres, those who were going to the cadre schools had to pass those tests.

Thus the first course was made, as he explained, the second course was already here in Matanzas. We considered them a good force, a shock force towards the center, no longer just in the capital, and we were preparing at a great pace.

But, when would they come? We did not have as many intelligence means as we had later; we gathered news, we read. But to show you how they controlled the press when they wanted: in the United States they gave instructions to the press not to talk about the organization of the expedition; but something always leaked. What plan could it be? Would they try to form guerrilla groups in the different regions of the country? They had already formed them in the Escambray, and more than once the Escambray was cleaned; they really introduced weapons throughout the island. We wondered: What could the plan be, a generalized guerrilla war? It is always more difficult to capture a small group than a troop; we wanted them to send us all together, of course. But, what would they do? And we took measures, in every cove, in every small beach of the country, we placed a platoon of militiamen; not a single place was left. And, of course, in all the provinces forces were being prepared.

If they decide to launch it in one direction, which place will they choose? We thought, for example, of Isla de Pinos, now Isla de la Juventud, to create a kind of Taiwan; there were the prisons and thousands of counter-revolutionary prisoners and war criminals, so what we did was send tanks, infantry, cannons, and turn Isla de Pinos into a fortress.

Could it be Escambray? It made some sense; many groups had organized there and they even had up to 1,000 armed men in Escambray, who were experts at evading the forces. I will not call them cowards; there may be people who are mistaken and very mistaken who even possess personal courage, not personal morality; one should not underestimate the enemy; but those were the opposite of us in the Sierra. We in the Sierra were always on the offensive, organizing ambushes, organizing strikes, and those in Escambray were always fleeing from the revolutionary troops, and they had some peasant support, minority support, but support nonetheless, it would be about 10%, 15%, or 20%, no one could say for sure. But there the war had developed differently than in Sierra Maestra; the intense political work that had taken place in the eastern provinces did not occur; there were even abuses committed by some of the groups in that area. Escambray was politically weak and that is where the counter-revolution began, people affected by revolutionary laws, politically backward people, or former members of Batista's army went there.

And, I repeat, they sometimes had up to 1,000 men; we would conduct clean-ups of one type or another, reducing them to 70 or 80, and after a few months, with encouragement from abroad, they would rise again; but always with the same conception, on the defensive, trying to escape, waiting for the Yankee invasion to come. There was a moment when the Revolution concentrated 50,000 men in Escambray —to give you an idea of their strength— from all the provinces, and most of the capital; the entire Escambray was surrounded, divided into four parts, and cleaning began, sending a squad house by house. Possibly Escambray was at one time their preferred place, a mountainous area, where motorized forces had to advance along the coast, an airport, and with a certain base of internal support; but Escambray became another impregnable fortress.

We kept thinking and we had Girón left. In Girón there was nothing; from the first year the Revolution began to build roads, to improve the lives of charcoal workers, of families, it made three fundamental routes: the one that goes from Australia to Playa Larga, Yaguaramas-San Blas —and the other place, Almeida, you must remember—, Covadonga-San Blas, that one had the shape of a V; we were building, and quite advanced, two tourist centers; schools were being built, and an airfield was created. The airfield was necessary for the enemy, both for supplying weapons and for bringing in the provisional government, which was the real plan to try to legalize their crime.

Thus, those days of much activity on the part of the Revolution approached, for the reasons I explained earlier, of sabotage, armed groups, bandits in the fields; but waiting for the main event and with the corresponding uncertainties, how and where, whether by dividing that force they were training abroad or concentrating it, that was key. It was therefore very important, and although these things are always explained, much has been written, although there are still important parts left to write, it was necessary to clarify that problem and be prepared for both variants: if small groups, resistance to all the groups that landed; if concentrating them, enough force to destroy them. That is where we were, and waiting at any moment for the invasion, when the bombing on the morning of April 15 occurred. That was a colossal mistake by the enemy, because by attacking us on the morning of the 15th, by inventing all that about being rebel planes, by employing a force of some consideration as an air weapon, it immediately gave us the idea that the invasion was a matter of 24 or 48 hours, and although we had part of the country mobilized, we immediately mobilized the entire country and all the weapons.

On the 16th, 35 years ago today, and I believe at this same hour, more or less, after burying our comrades, a great act was organized with tens of thousands of armed militiamen at the corner of 12 and 23; they filled 23rd Street for many blocks. There was a state of indignation, as one could imagine, tremendous; the people were enraged, the Revolution had advanced a lot, we knew that was the price they wanted to charge us for the Revolution, that although many of our measures were simple measures of social justice, they could also be rightly called socialist measures.

All this process of aggression against Cuba accelerates the revolutionary changes. Socialism had to come someday, but many things had to be done first; it had not been considered that it was the moment to speak of a socialist character. There was a lot of struggle against anti-communism, as anti-communism was the main ideological weapon of imperialism in the midst of the Cold War, but socialism was not spoken of. That day, based on the realities, based on the acceleration of that process, based on the enormous number of social justice measures we had taken, we considered ourselves entitled to proclaim the Revolution socialist. That was acclaimed throughout the country by tens and hundreds of thousands of armed men, and if in Sierra Maestra we fought for the overthrow of tyranny and also fought for social justice, we fought, in short, for the liberation of our country, starting on April 17 our people fought already, with arms in hand and at the cost of their blood, for socialism.

It was really the moment to give that energetic, brave, defiant response, because Girón occurred when we were surrounded by American squads, and as if to say to them: If you want to land, land, we do not fear you, and our idea and our purpose is this.

Such an event precedes the battle; we will not repeat how it developed. Many comrades write one detail more, one detail less; one tank more, one tank less. I have lost two tanks. Yes, that one from the replica in which I got in with five shells; it was what was left, lucky that. Well, those are stories and anecdotes, what for?

They did not have to be used; when the enemies saw a few tanks advancing at full speed down the road, already darkening, they abandoned their anti-tank barrier and disappeared. This was upon arriving at Girón, from the north, because the advance occurred fundamentally from the west and also from the east.

I said that I have lost two tanks because I was also in one of those when the "Houston," over there in Playa Larga; I have not found that one, it has been lost to me. And another called "Stalin," one of those big ones that had a 120-millimeter cannon, with which we went along the coast of Girón on the morning of the 20th towards the east, capturing prisoners, and our people ended up colliding with those advancing from Cienfuegos, despite all the warnings that were given to them, without tragic consequences, fortunately. In the footprints of time, facts and even objects are lost. We did not want the invaders to escape in the end in the American squadron. That possibility will have to be written about someday.

But, well, in general, about Girón, each one tells one thing or another: the hour, the place, the minutes, what happened at each moment; there are commissions from MINFAR studying the facts in detail. That is why, every time there is a book, a statement, one detail is missing or another is missing.

There may be a detail that time has transfigured a bit and is not remembered well —Almeida knows that, because Almeida has a great memory and likes to write a lot about history, from time to time he asks me for some papers; when they give me a minimum chance to write something, I have nothing left at all because everything is already published —, but many comrades participated and in a very brave, very heroic way, with a total selflessness and determination. And all forces participated, cadets, militia leaders, militiamen, police, who had a very hard fight there, to the west of Girón; peasants and peasant women also participated.

The aviation participated very prominently; the navy did not participate to a greater degree because our ships were in Havana —those frigates we loaded with four mouths that looked like a hedgehog, just in case they were attacked from the air; the frigates from Havana, there were the forces, we did not have a naval base here in the south—; the regular artillery troops from Managua and other units of the Rebel Army, coming from the capital, who brought the first tanks, participated prominently.

In all this picture, what were the decisive things?

First, the attack advanced 48 hours, gave us time; one cannot explain how they did that. They wanted to make a second attack, but they had already failed in the first attempt, they cannot destroy more planes because there were anti-aircraft pieces protecting the three airports; that is why they cannot destroy all the planes, the airports were further reinforced.

They spoke and thought, as I said, of a second air attack on the morning of the 17th; they did not carry it out, it was useless, because on the 17th at dawn all our planes were in the air and heading to Girón to attack the enemy squadron, the fleet that brought the invaders. That was a decisive factor.

Another important factor was to quickly understand the enemy's strategy.

Fernández, I have to review your interview that I read in the newspaper, because when you talk about the paratroopers, they started dropping the paratroopers quite early, because they dropped them in different places; we knew quite early that they had already dropped paratroopers.

They drop the paratroopers, and when they decide to do it, we immediately realized that this was the main direction. It was clear, if they drop them by Covadonga, San Blas, Yaguaramas, Pálpite and some over here, they wanted to take the three routes with the paratroopers and secure them, dropping them in both directions of the road from the Ciénaga de Zapata.

That swamp cannot be flanked, it cannot be skirted; whoever tries to cross it sinks, and they had tanks and anti-tanks —they had almost 100 easy-to-handle anti-tanks, they were recoilless guns—, it would have been very difficult to recover that position advancing along the road, very difficult; even if we had to recover it on foot through the swamp, it would have been extremely costly. That is why, when news arrives in the early morning that landings are taking place, immediate mobilization began in that direction.

The most experienced unit we had at that moment was the one from here, from Matanzas, and Fernández was asked to direct it immediately to the area of operations, to the area of Playa Larga, which was the closest. But at that same hour, all the tanks in Havana were being mobilized, all the cannons, all the anti-aircraft, all the battalions, everyone mobilized. Well, the ships too, every unit had to be ready to advance.

There were only five trucks for the tanks, the rest had to be carried on their axles and it was many kilometers, the Highway did not exist, and so they set out at full speed; but the problem was that the presence of enemy aviation was active and numerous.

We did not know how many planes they would have, we could not know, whether it was 20, 30, 40, or 100, nor who was piloting them, because when they ran out of Cuban pilots they started putting in American pilots. That is why all that armament of tanks, artillery, infantry, was accompanied by anti-aircraft, and there were quite a few, and, moreover, with instructions to advance as far as Jovellanos. Not knowing the number of possible planes in the air, we could not risk sending that troop by day, beyond Jovellanos, towards Girón; they were asked to camouflage themselves as best as possible and to wait.

The aviation attacking the squadron; our soldiers enduring the air attacks, because we had no more planes, and the important thing was to leave the enemy without a squadron. That is why there were casualties, because of that and because of the deception of bringing the Cuban insignias.

As it was getting dark, the torrent of tanks, artillery, and everything began to advance in that direction, while the people from Villa Clara were also mobilizing; that is to say, what is now the Central Army —or it already was, since it was founded on April 4— was mobilizing with all means to attack in the direction of Covadonga and Yaguaramas; and indeed, they fought without respite, because I believe that the third important element was not to give them a minute of respite. Since the idea was to bring in the provisional government, call the OAS, and the OAS intervene immediately —which were four soldiers from each of the Latin American countries and all the rest Americans—, we could not give them time to establish a beachhead and land their provisional government. That was the reason why not a single minute of rest was given during all that time that the combat lasted.

They were lucky —I am not going to explain it now— because we were without communications; communications had to be made from one town to another by telephone, nothing could be said over the radio. We really didn’t even have radios. The tanks had them, some trucks, some communications, but the rapid movements that had to be made on the road, in those civilian vehicles, those vehicles did not have —except for internal communications— communications with the force.

They should have lasted, at most, 42 hours, that is the calculation, for a maneuver we had to make. But they deceive us, and they deceived us twice —the Americans, it was not the mercenaries.

When the burial took place, I was speaking, I was about to finish, a notice came that a squad was approaching from the west of Havana, some boats, landing craft and so on. I said: “What? How strange is that! It seems they want to start in Havana.” The landing at Playa Larga had not yet taken place.

I remember I finished that quickly, with the National Anthem and I don’t know if even a “Homeland or Death,” because I still don’t remember if by that date...—Almeida must know, we would have to check the old papers (THEY TELL ME YES, BECAUSE THIS WAS SAID IN "LA COUBRE"). It was said in "La Coubre," this was long after "La Coubre." So I finished quickly because I got the message that they were over there, and I said: “Ah, well, this starts today, early, from the west of Havana!” They organized that maneuver, that was organized by the Yankees.

When we were on the night of the 17th to the 18th in Pálpite, in that area, I received news of a landing from the west of Havana, and I said: “Well, is that confirmed?” They said: “Yes, confirmed, contact has already been made with the enemy.” And filled with resignation I had to —I was waiting for some tanks for that maneuver I told you about— surround Playa Larga from the west and continue advancing eastward towards Girón before dawn. The ones from Girón would have run into our tanks, they would not have been able to join. But they were delayed because they were coming along their axis; we had to wait at least half an hour or an hour there, and if it was going to be the main battle in Havana, it lost importance. I said: “All this is very strange.” But, well, when I arrived in Havana, I found that there was no landing.

I warn you that it was a great disappointment, I assure you, because we had the bulk in Havana; the frigates were there with all the cannons, the ships. Only 10% was mobilized here, if we exclude aviation; 10% of the means we had. I said: Well, what is going to land over there in Havana? They are going to take a colossal beating because Havana is close; it took four hours of travel by road to get from Havana to this point.

They made two maneuvers on us. The first did not have much effect because it was soon confirmed that there was nothing; but the second did have the effect, in my opinion, that the thing that lasted 68 hours should have lasted perhaps less than 48, 46, 44. Every time one remembers that, Fernández, it hurts because if the beating was great, we would have liked the beating to have been quicker and better. When I remember it, it always hurts, but, well, what more could be asked for?

We had casualties, more casualties than they did, and it was logical because our people attacked, attacked openly and attacked on straight roads that they could not flank; they attacked through a swamp and because they were treacherously hit by an aviation that had Cuban insignias. That was how those days were.

It has already been explained, and it has been explained many times, what each one did: the Rebel Army, the Ministry of the Interior. Our armed forces were already made up of everyone who was armed, but properly the militia was still classified, although the armies were already being organized in all the provinces or in all the main regions; we did not have a higher level than battalion; when Girón our highest level was the battalion level.

I sincerely think that what happened at Girón was a great feat of our people, and not only for what they did, but for what they were willing to do, for the certainty one has that the Yankees would have been defeated in Cuba, although the price for us would have been very high, that we would have been the first Vietnam.

I am mentioning hundreds of thousands of weapons; we had enough to take away from them for every one of our weapons 10 from the invaders, as it was in the struggle for liberation in Cuba: of every 10 weapons we had, we had taken 9 —approximate calculation, right?— from the opposing army. Cuba would have resisted, but thanks to its heroism it prevented that war.

And that was not the only danger: there was war against the subversive, war against terrorists, war against bandits. There were times when we had groups of bandits in all the provinces of the country; there were mercenaries, mobilizations all the time because dangerous plans and news were coming and the whole people had to be mobilized; the October Crisis, which I think was really the champion among champions, because the bravery shown by the entire nation in those circumstances is unparalleled, has no precedent; pirate attacks for years.

We have had to invest many resources and many sacrifices defending this country over these years of Revolution, incessant and increasingly rigorous blockade by the United States, disappearance of the USSR and the socialist camp. It seems that we won some lottery out there, that one no longer knows who to blame: if Christopher Columbus, who discovered us; if the English... Well, they left us here and we are really happy. This was the place that was meant for us, and history is what made this people; but a difficult, difficult, difficult history: first, the European conquest, the practically complete disappearance of the indigenous population, then slavery —hundreds of thousands of slaves, this was one of the provinces where there were many, a slave society—, the attempts at annexation by the United States throughout the centuries.

The struggle of our people in various wars of independence to become what it is today constitutes the raw material from which this people was made; the Ten Years' War, ten years fighting as they fought, I remembered today when they handed over the machete; the invasions. When Latin America freed itself from Spain, it was all together, almost at once, and Spain had more soldiers in Cuba than all those it had together in Latin America, up to 300,000 men under arms fighting against a small country.

All those historical factors, in my opinion, have made possible what Cuba is today; those historical factors and the Revolution. Because what did they want to take from us on that April 16, what did they want to take from us with that mercenary invasion, since they could not take it from us with the blockades of fuel, food, machines, with subversive plans, they wanted to take it from us by force, through invasion: they wanted to take everything that today is a source of pride for our country.

I was reading a statistic: infant mortality, 7.5 in the first quarter. That is incredible, truly. I do not expect that we can maintain it; one would have to be too optimistic; but never at a date like this would we have had an infant mortality of 7.5.

As a health index, how many peoples in the world, rich peoples and peoples with resources, have that? In Washington, more than 30 die for every 1,000 live births. Of course, those who die are mainly the children of the black population; but also whites, as there are many poor whites there. Although, in worse conditions, the others.

The two million and so students in the education systems, the almost 9,000 primary schools we have today; the more than 150,000 children in child circles or preschool; the hundreds of thousands, more than half a million students at the middle level, all the special schools, all the art schools, the sports schools, everything that was seen here today. What would have remained of our public health, of our education, of our culture? What would have remained of this country if they had been able to take it over then?

Our struggle today is even more meritorious, if you will, because we fight alone. Before, there was a time when we were alone, but we believed we were accompanied; some lessons, like the October Crisis and others, taught us. The accelerated retreat, at full speed, of that little brigade that was left out there. Well, but by that time it was no secret. A long time ago we knew that we Cubans and only we Cubans had to defend the country and that we could defend the country, and using the correct tactics to defend the country, which is not the little game of Clausewitz's war, but the war of the whole people, that is the truth.

That is how we made the Revolution, that is how we have defended it, and that is how we can continue to defend it. There is no comparison.

It is true that these neighbors of ours are getting crazier or are crazier every day; they are becoming more ungovernable, they are becoming more confused in politics; they are becoming more clumsy. That can lead them to make mistakes, big mistakes. That must be taken into account.

Should we be scared? How could fear be conceived after all we have lived through!

They will have their world, the world they are looking for, that world that will be increasingly ungovernable, because I am convinced that some governments, or many municipal governments in our country, know more about politics than the American administration, govern the municipality better than the government of the United States governs.

It is chaos what they have: the country divided between reactionary currents and other more liberal currents, between more sane people and less sane people; developing ethnic phobia, developing fascist feelings and trends and with enormous power. They cannot even govern themselves or do not want to govern themselves, due to the disorder of hundreds of billions of dollars in drugs; that disaster of a criminal movement that grows every year; that hatred of the poor; that desire to end pensions, to end the social conquests that, in one way or another, the American people achieved over decades, since the time of Roosevelt; that habit of wanting to govern the world, of telling every government what it has to do, of insulting presidents, of those who say they are friends; those declarations of proconsuls by American ambassadors, that behavior demonstrated here with the incident of February 24, an incident that could have been avoided, an incident that we foresaw, an incident of which we warned them dozens of times. And we know a little more about things; but it is always necessary to reserve a few truths, it is useful; one must always be gentlemen, even when one has to fight against indecent people.

You have already seen the behavior, the times they violated airspace, the increasingly daring adventures over our capital, which no country in the world allows; inventing that those planes were in international waters. They are planes that have war designs, that were bought from the government of the United States, which used them in Vietnam. They have attacked us many times with planes and have even waged biological warfare against us. They have used every means imaginable against our country, and the insolence with which they try to condemn us at the Security Council. What happens is that we have morals, very high morals, we speak the truth and always tell the truth; with the truth and morality we will be invincible, we will win battles in all fields in which we have to fight. And we hope, we are patient, we have known how to be patient, as patient as necessary, as far as decorum can be reconciled with patience. We are not warmongers by any means.

We are pleased to celebrate here the 35th anniversary that we celebrate today; we are pleased with all the lives that were saved; we are pleased with our children who have grown up healthy, educated, and cultured; we are pleased with our wonderful youth; we marvel at our heroic people. Yes, long live, and may it live a long time!

We already know that to live with dignity in this world one must fight, and you see every day on our television what happens in the rest of the world. The other day the images of some Mexican immigrants being savagely beaten; something that produces indignation, repugnance, in a woman, and not one blow or two, but five, six, ten. That in front of television cameras, what will it be like outside of television cameras?

Chasers, police, horses, dogs everywhere, strikes every day, beatings every day of the people everywhere, the same among the developed as among the poor, but worse among these; theft and more theft, drugs and more drugs, loss of sovereignty and more loss of sovereignty. It is a shame what is happening in the world, but it cannot be lasting. More and more people are becoming aware, rising up, getting bored, getting tired of seeing a world hegemonized by a power capable of telling the lies it tells, as it did here in Girón, and the ones it tells around the world; it would be endless here to try to refer to them, even as an example of the lack of scruples and morality that exists in the heart of that empire.

But whatever the difficulties of the Cubans may be, they are not greater than those of others when we compare the indices of our country with what is happening in the rest of Latin America and in the countries of the Third World: well subdued and constantly repressed.

Martí said that freedom was very costly and that it was necessary to resign oneself to living without it or to decide to pay its price; that is an idea, I don’t know if I said it exactly. Our independence costs struggle, sacrifice; our dignity, our honor, our right to progress, our tomorrow, our future, all that which they want to snatch from us costs a great deal. But you and we, men and women, boys and girls, all of us; those of us who have had the privilege of feeling the pride and the sense of what dignity and honor are, of what the homeland is, of all those beautiful things for which it is worth fighting, are determined to pay their price, because we will never resign ourselves to living without them.

I do not want to be more extensive, but I also do not want to forget to mention this province, which welcomed us today with its traditional hospitality, its achievements and its advances; which can already be referred to in a fact, for example: in 1995 the province acquired 87.5 of the production value it had before the special period. It grows, advances, works, progress is visible. They are engaged in their hard battle for the harvest, not always accompanied by good weather, but always accompanied by the will to grind until the last cane. Tourism is growing significantly, oil is growing, citrus is growing, they are breaking records in potatoes.

Today we have in the country almost half a million tons of sugar more than last year, but we are not yet satisfied, we must take into account the risks of the weather; there are times when it behaves splendidly. Look today, some very dark clouds at 5:00 PM and a splendid sun at sunset on a day like this, which deserves it so much.

May the climate help us a little and may the tremendous forces that our compatriots have unleashed in recent weeks throughout the country be maintained, to reach the end of this battle, which will be like an index that demonstrates the progress and advances we are achieving, despite the difficult circumstances.

Now we face not the mercenaries of Playa Girón, but another type of mercenaries more dangerous than those of Girón: those who want to make the blockade harsher, those who want more needs for our people, those who want to make it difficult for us to recover little by little from that great disaster, from that tragedy, which was the disappearance of the socialist camp, and turn us into solitary soldiers as a people, and in this case I do not include the hundreds of millions of people who sympathize with Cuba. They turned us into solitary soldiers of the most just cause of humanity and into clean soldiers, moreover; into pure soldiers.

We will fight, we will resist, despite those adversaries I referred to who have threatened us for so many years.

Helms-Burton Law —possibly all of you pronounce it as badly as I do, because, listen to me, we have received so many things in English that even "good-bye" is forgotten, although that "good-bye" is not a bad thing, or, as the peasants used to say back in Birán, "gurbai" —; they even threaten us with their weapons, they dare.

We do not want struggle, we do not want war. We do not have to play the role of the brave; I believe that even they do not doubt the courage of our people. We want peace, and I repeat the idea: we will work for peace to the limit of what the honor and dignity of our country allow, and our sense of responsibility, because we do not want a victory like that of Girón, nor a hundred victories like that of Girón. What we want is peace, the health of our people, the well-being of our people, the life of our people, which we will only risk without hesitation when it is at the price of sovereignty, independence, honor, freedom, and I am completely sure that all of you agree with this principle, with this idea.

Today we have paid tribute to our martyrs. With this we have paid, as a comrade said, tribute to all those who have fallen before and after the triumph of the Revolution; with this we pay tribute to the first mambí soldier who fell in our wars of independence; with this we pay tribute to those who have died and to those who will have to die; with this we pay tribute to our heroic people.

I try to imagine for a moment that moment when the battalion of militia leaders from this historic school marched towards the battles of Playa Girón and did not stop until they took that culminating, key, decisive point of the battle. Men more or less young like those who are here, men and women like you, people like you, went to fight, went to combat, went to death, separating from their homes and from the loved ones they cherish most in this world. A significant number died in a short time, a significant number were wounded in a short time, and if there is something we can long for, desire with all our soul on a day like today, it is that you and all our compatriots are always equal to those fighters, men and women, to that people who have written one of the brightest pages in history, because future generations will not think about the size of the neighbor, but about the size of this small country, which has known how to resist for 35 years and is willing to resist another 35 years more, and 35 times 35 years.

Let us say with pride today, that the anniversary is commemorated in which the socialist character of our Revolution was proclaimed for the first time; let us reaffirm once again as then, confident of victory:

Socialism or Death!

Homeland or Death!

We will overcome!