Speech delivered at the closing of the First National Plenary of the DAP, held at the CTC Theater, on the

Cuba Fidel Castro · President of Cuba

19 March 1972 · First National Plenary of the DAP · CTC Theater, Cuba

Context
Castro addressed the closing session of the First National Plenary of the DAP at the CTC Theater in Cuba on March 19, 1972, reviewing construction and infrastructure progress.
Main themes
Construction and infrastructure development, self-criticism and learning from mistakes, hydraulic works and dam construction, agricultural harvests and sugar production, revolutionary discipline and leadership, road construction, national planning and resource allocation, DAP organizational work
Duration
~163 min
99th percentile
Words
19,536
99th percentile
Sentences
914
99th percentile
Readability
59
86th percentile
Grade
10.2
23rd percentile
Syntax
3.08
58th percentile
Vocabulary
2.25
61st percentile

Translated from Spanish

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 56%52%
  • Institutional 21%19%
  • Social 12%11%
  • Environmental 6%6%
  • Ceremonial 6%5%
  • Geopolitical 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Not in focus 6%

914 sentences in 244 paragraphs

Comrades:

As you can see, in this Plenary we have had everything: sports, political speeches, analyses and discussions on construction issues; we have even had controversies, criticisms: we have called some comrades "hard-headed". No one should take it in a spirit of hurting or belittling, much less, comrades whom we appreciate very much, nor to take away the morale and authority that we know is needed in this work. We have simply spoken frankly, with complete frankness, when we have given opinions. It has pained us to have to make criticisms, to have to say things. But, in any case, we should be consoled by the idea that there is no progress without struggle, there is no improvement without struggle and without criticism and without discussions; there are no births without pain. And we want that, at least, from this assembly good things come out, useful things for everyone, that we all leave with a better spirit of work. We could not spare ourselves the pains of criticism.

Some comrades, like comrade Dorticós —we are referring, of course, to engineer Dorticós, not to doctor Dorticós. I jokingly told the President a few days ago: any day now they will come here to say that I am speaking ill of you, and that I am criticizing you and everything, because wherever I go I say: this Dorticós, and look at this Dorticós who told me this and told me that. And it turns out that it is engineer Dorticós, whom there is no special reason to censure or anathematize, much less. Comrade Dorticós is a capable engineer, well-prepared, hard-working; we met him when we were going through some plans and we found a person there making maps and doing things, on a Sunday at noon, and in the afternoon, and at night, and at any hour. He lived for that, and was always working! But, logically, I say again that there is no birth without pain, and a good official does not come out without the pains of blows, experiences, and these encounters.

So we are critical, harsh, towards those comrades with whom we have been, at certain moments, thinking of the necessity, the fairness, and the convenience of being frank, of calling things by their name, of pointing out the errors, the oversights, all those things, because it is the only way to learn.

We have all had to learn in life from setbacks, from blows, from adversity. We had to learn to wage war also by suffering and learning in adversity and setbacks. And so too this struggle, which is harder than a war, which is a war of the most complex and difficult kind, we will have to learn based on criticism.

Many of the comrades who are here, or some comrades who are here, were also in the war, in the guerrillas; many times those comrades are the ones I criticize the hardest. Many times the criticism depends on the same trust that one has in the comrades. And, moreover, because it was also like that in the years of the war, when mistakes were made, responsibilities had to be demanded, and the slightest fault had to be criticized very harshly. And that taught us all to find solutions to problems.

So I want to clarify this regarding the criticisms that have been made, or anything that is pointed out, because there are some points where it is necessary to insist, because in our opinion they have decisive importance. But all these criticisms and points have been inspired by a truly constructive and creative purpose.

During the course of the Plenary, many problems have been discussed, and we have intervened many times, we have been exposing many ideas regarding the issues, the problems of construction, the solutions, the experiences that, of course, do not need to be repeated here.

We have to say that the work was divided into several branches, starting with hydraulic issues. It became clear here that we have made progress. Two years ago we had a critical situation regarding the construction of dams.

The 1970 harvest was in the middle. We remember that even in that year of 1970 it was necessary, in light of industrial problems, the low yields of sugar, the eventualities of a harvest, the completion of the harvest in the months of May and June with rain, and maintaining the goal of reaching the targets until the end, it was essential to dedicate practically all the construction resources that the country had to the construction of roads. And if we exclude the dam brigade of the East —I believe also Pinar del Río; Isla de Pinos, of course, which had no sugarcane—, all the other dam brigades were dedicated to the construction of roads; not only all those that existed from the DAP, but all the dam brigades. All the dams in the East were paralyzed, and the four dam brigades went to build roads for the harvest; the dam brigades of Las Villas were paralyzed, and the dam brigades of Las Villas went to build roads for the harvest; the road brigades of Havana almost all marched to the East in 1970, in the northern region, to build roads. All of that created an enormous movement, created a colossal remedialism. We said: we must fight against remedialism, because remedialism disorganizes, constantly for the works, demoralizes the workers.

We believe that remedialism led us to have to do in 1970 a universal remedialism to face that task and try to make many kilometers of roads that, as a consequence of inefficient work, had not been made by the year 1970.

At the end of that harvest we had the multiple problems that you know, of all kinds: in industry and in construction. But above all in the DAP a true chaos had been created. In the activity of the dams, everything had to be reorganized, to reestablish the fronts, to continue the works, to initiate new works. In some regions, work began more quickly.

No one should think that I am a capricious defender of the province of Las Villas. We have no reason to be defenders or critics of any particular province. We do have the duty to refer and point out where there is good work, where the work has been more efficient, where the work, in our opinion, has been done if not optimally, at least better than in other places and worthy of being taken into account.

We remember that the province that was able to restore work on the dams most quickly was the province of Las Villas. The province of Las Villas, in terms of roads, started very poorly. It was the worst. Back in 1967, 1968, 1969. In dams, it started better. They were building the Minerva dam, and then the Lebrije dam. And with relatively few machines they built and finished the Lebrije dam, of Minerva and Lebrije.

In Lebrije, in 1969, a crisis was created. They relied a bit on the historical rainfall figures, raised the dam, and in July such downpours fell that in a few days that dam took 50, 60, 70... It kept rising, and it wouldn’t stop raining. The bottom drain could only handle a limited amount of water, and it threatened to reach the edge of the dam. The neighbors of the Uruguay central, Jatibonico, the Party, the mass organizations, everyone was on the phone asking where the dam was going. And it was already five meters away and then four and then three, and I think it got to two or one already. And the bulldozers at dawn, in the middle of an infernal mud, opening a provisional spillway.

I remember that we arrived at that site one dawn, in the middle of the rains and in the mud, and we saw there hundreds of men doing something incredible: transporting sandbags and placing them on top of the dam, to raise that dam and buy time: one meter more, two meters more, doing a superhuman job. So those men even saw the work they were doing in danger. They and all the neighbors around. That is how the spirit was created, and the two brigades were formed, which were the "Antonio Maceo" and the "Máximo Gómez." The "Antonio Maceo" to build the Alacranes dam, which would be 360 million, and the "Máximo Gómez," the Zaza dam of 1,000 million, 1,020 or 1,030 million cubic meters of water.

The first brigades that were restored to their work, with organization and efficiency, were the dam brigades of Las Villas.

The road brigades of Havana also did a good job in the province of Oriente. They went out, worked, returned, and in August they were already working here in their front. I have said that the brigades of Havana are not a wonder, that those of Las Villas, in terms of roads, work better. But even within these assessments, I must say that they have fulfilled important missions. That time they did it that way, and then they were restored to their work positions. They have not worked with extraordinary efficiency, but they have worked systematically and have been making progress. And indeed, they are filling the province with roads.

In general, in the other provinces, the chaos lasted longer. In Oriente, after the harvest was finished, the comrades from Oriente, in my opinion, mistakenly gathered all the equipment in that area of Holguín, took measures to standardize the equipment that, in our opinion, were a bit idealistic. Because there is nothing worse than taking away someone’s equipment that they are used to using and replacing it with another. Some had a TP-6 loader, and they were given a T-157, one had a TP-8 and was given another, one had a MAZ and was given a ZIL. There was a total change in that idealistic attempt to unify the equipment.

We explained our point of view to comrade Laite. The idea of unifying is good, standardizing the equipment is good. We, whenever we can, do it. But as a rule, we never change and give one brigade’s equipment to another. We never change the equipment of a brigade. First of all, because the brigade is responsible for the equipment it has. If it treated them well, good; if it treated them badly, it must assume the responsibilities and consequences. We believe that there should be a principle that a brigade receives its equipment and knows that with that equipment it has to live, that it has to take care of it, that it has to store it, that it has to maintain it.

We like the procedure we used there with that brigade that is working in Juraguá, which, moreover, was very encouraging to see that it was the first place in Las Villas for two consecutive months. It is not a brigade of new equipment, it is not a brigade of Fiat, of Pegaso, of large machines: it is a modest little brigade that had trucks that were very weak in construction —a small group of trucks—, that did not have rubber loaders, but the T-157, old bulldozers, and that did receive a reinforcement of five ZIL-130 trucks.

It has been very encouraging to see how a brigade of old equipment, of equipment that are not the most famous, the most prestigious, the most productive, is the number one brigade of Las Villas.

We start from this principle: that an old brigade should never be dissolved, because it is already an organization, it is already a spirit, it is already a community, it is already a group of men who know each other. An old brigade should not have its old equipment taken away and be given new ones, just to come and give another the old equipment. When the brigade exists, even if it has old equipment, even if it is poor in resources, it already exists as such a brigade and can be reinforced, it can be given one or two trucks, five trucks, some heavy equipment, some resources. It is important to preserve the brigades and never dissolve them.

In Camagüey the comrades also made their cemetery of equipment. They gathered them all there, and I think that was by the Laguna, or I don’t know what, it was a famous place: Güirabo, and Laguna of what... A lagoon over there. Robertico doesn’t want to say anything. The Lagoon. There they gathered everything. And in Camagüey there were 20 road brigades, and when they reorganized everything, there were 16 left. I said: no; they have to reconstitute all of them, the 21 brigades that existed. And there they set to work to find old junk, the T-157 over here, the bulldozer over there, all that. And they constituted the 21 brigades again. At one point, they were able to give some equipment, or something else.

In Oriente, we cannot really say that they decreased the number of brigades. They even increased them, gathering some equipment, some things. It is true that some of the brigades were ghost brigades, because the equipment was in very poor technical condition.

In Oriente they took the equipment from the El Mate dam. In terms of dams, they made a great effort, trying to gather all those resources: motor scrapers over here, loaders over there, cranes over here, to make four dam brigades.

It is true that in all that universal gathering and reassignment of resources here and there, some brigades actually disappeared, like the one that was building the Palma-Barajagua road, that famous Palma-Barajagua road.

There are two roads here that constitute the shame of the Revolution, or constituted, that made me remember the time of Grau San Martín and that time, when a work would start and would never be finished, never! I remember the little road Mayarí-Cueto. How many times did I pass by there! One day it was finished.

But we were left with two works that never got finished: Palma-Barajagua and Mayarí-Moa. I remember that before the "Flora," the first effort had been made to build roads in the East as well, between Palma and Barajagua, this one from Tunas to Bayamo, which saved that enormous detour. That road was paid for in just a few months with rubber, gasoline, and motor resources. Well, it had its great, terrible odyssey. But why was it never finished? Because of remedialism. A mess arose here: bring all the trucks from Palma-Barajagua over there. Another one arose: over there. Another one arose: over there. The sugar harvest: take all the equipment over there. The coffee harvest: take all the equipment over there. The same thing happened with the little road in the south of the East, similar, although that one was not prioritized as much. This happened with Palma-Barajagua, Tunas-Bayamo, and Mayarí-Moa. The last remedialism with that Palma-Barajagua brigade was a request for it to support Leonero —if I remember correctly, I think it was in 1969. It went over there, and it never came back. The earth swallowed it up! In one of those reorganizations over there, the four large brigades for dams, the Berliets ended up on one side, the bulldozers on another, the motor graders on another; and the brigade disappeared. The force and the brigade that were building the Palma-Barajagua road disappeared! And we said to ourselves: but are we going to be condemned for life to see that monument to inefficiency? What will those neighbors of the Revolution think? Those who saw that one day bulldozers arrived clearing, working, and they started saying that they were going to build a road over there? And they have spent 10 years watching that work start and stop, start and stop. I said to myself: if I were a neighbor around here and saw this, I would say: What kind of revolution is this, and what kind of crazy people are these, and what kind of disorganized and chaotic people are these! Because that work was meant to kill a neighbor's trust in the Revolution. And I saw that finally in 1970 the work was not finished, but the brigade had disappeared. The principle of the disappearance of a force was being violated.

We understand that Comrade Laite is an intelligent comrade, an enthusiastic comrade, a capable comrade, of course; and if not, he himself must have also agreed that that movement was a mistake, especially the unification movement, which created many irritations and many problems. The organizational principles he wanted to apply were correct as principles: standardizing equipment, uniting here, uniting there; but in reality, they were impractical and were going to bring more inconveniences than benefits. I believe that this phenomenon affected the work of the province of Oriente quite a bit in the reconstruction of its dam brigades after 1970. Then, also many of those pieces of equipment —it must be said— had worked in El Mate and were in poor technical condition. And then also that Comrade Laite, when he arrived there, found that the equipment was quite battered. Of course, Comrade Laite was the national responsible. We cannot say that he was to blame for that: it was an organization that had just been created, that was being organized under very rapid, very rushed conditions and, of course, it had to suffer the consequences of all that.

My impression is that that conception and that unification delayed the situation a lot, and then the technical state of the equipment.

A work was initiated in Oriente to reconstruct the equipment. Only those from Construimport will know the secret of the number of parts that the country must have spent reconstructing those pieces of equipment from Güirabo, some of which have still not been finished being reconstructed.

Those factors considerably affected the construction of dams in the province of Oriente.

Now, throughout the year 1971 —that is, in the year 1971— the work continued, we fought —we cannot say that in Oriente there was no fighting—, an effort was made to finish the Pedregal dam —it could not be finished—; it was necessary to move equipment from here, from there. All those circumstances delayed the definitive organization of all those brigades.

Our assessment is that work has been done in the DAP in Oriente: in the matter of dams and roads, a great effort has been made, and we are entering the year 1972 in better conditions for the construction of dams. A new dam brigade was organized with the Combate del Uvero contingent.

In the year 1970 in the province of Oriente, during the month of May, when the little town of Vado del Yeso was inaugurated, we made an appeal to the Party in the province to select the men who were going to work on those costly pieces of equipment. We believed that many of those men distinguished in the harvests, in the work, we should teach them. Take advantage of their human condition and quality, their revolutionary spirit, their work spirit, and teach them to operate those costly machines, and follow the principle of seeking militants, vanguard workers, good people, even young people, with good human and political conditions, to increase the construction forces. That is why the Combate del Uvero contingent was assigned to construction, and the "Turcios Lima" contingent was also dedicated to construction. They began to learn and prepare.

That has been very good, because it meant a great contribution of very hardworking workers, with high political consciousness, to the constructions in Oriente. And now the Buey brigade and the highway brigade are operated by that type of workers.

The old brigades; the 24, Pedregal, La Yaya, Nipe, and Mayarí, those four brigades were in quite disastrous conditions. They were lifted a bit. The Pedregal brigade first, the Nipe and Mayarí brigades later, the La Yaya brigade afterwards, and the 24 dam brigade remains, which is now dispersed, working in Coco del Chato, in Cola de Moa, and in Leonero, which was destined to carry out those works.

Our assessment is that the Pedregal brigade, from the human point of view, from the leadership point of view, from the point of view of its workforce, has improved a lot; from the point of view of its equipment, it received some new equipment, a few; from the point of view of the recovery of its equipment, it has recovered its trucks, quite a few. At the same time that it has recovered its trucks, two E-10011 cranes deteriorated in one year, but they can be fully recovered. In the trucks, the tense work situation, while the general recovery of the equipment was being done, created a special situation. But we believe that this brigade, when its bulldozers are finished being repaired, and with some small reinforcements that have been made, will restore a large part of its construction capacity, that of Pedregal.

We have no direct news, that is, we have not visited the La Yaya dam, but we have news that they have recovered their trucks, that they have recovered an important part of their equipment, they have also received small aids, and we understand that this brigade is also in the full process of recovery, and that with some help it can restore its productive capacity.

The same, in our opinion, applies to the Nipe and Mayarí brigades.

We have yet to resurrect —and it must be resurrected— the 24 dam brigade. That was the last to start repairing its equipment, according to what Comrade Laite said, it is repairing its trucks, and we must not relent in the effort to resurrect that brigade, to have five real dam construction brigades in Oriente, which now have to do one: that of La Yaya; the others have to finish: Nipe and Mayarí; Pedregal must finish its task this year; Buey must recover its delay to finish next year the dam of that name; and the 24, once the current tasks are finished, and once it is recovered, must be assigned some new dam.

From the project point of view, we are concerned about the delay in projects in the province of Oriente. Because the second positions of those brigades still cannot be specified. We already know, of course, that the Pedregal brigade, at the beginning of the next dry season, must support the Buey brigade so that the Buey brigade also finishes and we can free those two brigades in the Bayamo area. What works? The Bayamo dam had been considered, but the Bayamo dam encountered some difficulties, and there are new schemes and new studies.

Work is now being accelerated to try to advance the Cautillo projects; but in fact in that area, neither in Cautillo, nor in Bayamo, nor in the Jicotea, nor in any of those rivers are there projects. The project designers can count, of course, on a period of one year to 15 months to have the new projects in the Bayamo region. Likewise, no one could now assign a second position to the Nipe dam, when it finishes, around 1973 or late 1973, nor to the 24 dam brigade. It is even yet to be decided what the second position of the La Yaya dam will be.

In this sense, those brigades must always be working on dams, and in the creation of new water sources. This entire policy is applicable nationally. The brigades constituted, already constituted, are the ones we will have in the coming years. There will be no new dam brigades; there will be no new resource allocations for the construction of dams; there will be no new resource allocations, unless it is some support, some partial strengthening of the means available.

So those existing dam brigades throughout the country have the mission of creating water supply sources, taking advantage of all the potential water resources of the country; and those dams will not be increased, or at least at this moment, the increase of any of those dam brigades is not contemplated, the creation of any new dam brigade is not contemplated. But neither will any of those brigades be dissolved. They will be dedicated from now on to building dams, creating new water sources for agricultural use, for industrial use, and for social use.

Now: with what criteria should we build the dams? We must build each dam following a priority order: investing our effort where the country obtains the greatest utility, according to its most pressing needs, of an agricultural, industrial, and social nature.

What does this mean? We have to develop the north of Oriente. It seems that this idea led one day the Hydraulic Institute to accelerate the construction projects of the Mayarí River dam. And they worked on that. But if we were to build the Mayarí River dam right now, we would have nothing to do with that water immediately. Make a great effort, a great investment.

As soon as the development plans for the north of Oriente have solidified, as soon as we have the resources and as soon as we have secured the equipment for the installation of new plants and we can determine in which year we need the water, then we have to include that plant in a priority criterion. But we cannot prioritize the Mayarí River when we have a huge rice farm in central Oriente, which can have 5,000 or 6,000 caballerías of rice, which can ensure us the supply of rice that we are currently importing; where if we build a dam and finish it today, the water has immediate use and the product, the fruit of that dam, we can perceive immediately, the economic fruit of that dam.

That is the reason why the entire Cauto and Bayamo basin, the entire basin that starts from Manzanillo, along the Sierra Maestra, reaches the Palma area, the Guaninicum area, the valley that is between the Sierra Maestra and the Sierra de Nipe; all that immense area surrounding the Cauto River must have priority in the province of Oriente in the construction of dams.

In that area, an immense rice plan is being developed, an immense livestock plan throughout the Bayamo area. There are 30 brigades of construction of dairies that are being organized there, many of which are already working; a construction program of I don’t know if 500 or 600 dairies in that area that, in addition, has the dairy industry established, with a capacity of 400,000 or 500,000 liters of milk daily. It is reasonable that we develop the water in that area. It has numerous sugar mills in flat and mechanizable areas; it also has a large vegetable and tuber plan in the Veguitas area and has, in perspectives for immediate development, a large citrus plan in the Contramaestre area.

Then, our hydraulic works have in that Cauto area, in all that area, an important point of priority.

We have the Guantánamo area, where we have excess mills, where we lack cane and land, where sugar yields are very high and where droughts are severe; an important area for citrus production, an important area for vegetable production; an area with abundant population, even with immediate labor availability, that can be employed in the construction of dams, in the construction of irrigation systems, in the construction of secondary and other economic and social buildings. The secondaries are in the category of economic and social works.

There, an important plan can be developed, first, for irrigation for the sugarcane, saturating the mills, developing citrus, and taking advantage of the microclimate of Guantánamo and Yateras and all that area, an important vegetable plan.

That is to say, the second region where the construction of dams provides us with an immediate benefit: Guantánamo.

The third region of significant benefits: the Jobabo region. Because there we have sugarcane in areas where drought scorches the cane and causes notable damage; a sugar mill whose capacity has been significantly expanded; rice-growing areas in that zone. There, the construction of dams in the Jobabo area also provides us with an immediate benefit to the economy.

The same could be said for the north, where the Nipe and Birán rivers are located; mainly Nipe. But that criterion was already taken into account, and the Nipe, Sabanilla, and Tacajó dams were built. If there were more rivers there, we could say: it is convenient to build there. But in that area, the most essential and important thing is the construction of the irrigation system.

That is another area where we can harvest for seven months, with good weather, good mechanizable lands; we have the Guatemala mill, the Nicaragua mill, the old Báguanos and Tacajó mills, and we have the "Loynaz Hechavarría" mill in that entire area; good mills, with large capacities, areas where drought causes us a lot of damage. There we need to work, more than on dams, on irrigation systems.

We have asked the Institute to prioritize the irrigation system of the waters of Sabanilla and Nipe for us to use them in the irrigation of all those areas.

We would not prioritize irrigation at present in the "Guiteras," "Jesús Menéndez," and Argelia areas, because there we have another problem: we have excess cane, we have excess land. We would not achieve anything by irrigating that cane. When irrigating the cane is to reduce costs, to recover areas, to facilitate mechanization, or to build new capacities of mills there, then fine. For now, that is a region where we have excess cane. We gain nothing by building dams there. We need to do irrigation where we have excess mills and lack cane and lack land to plant it. And we have identified the places: Nipe, Guantánamo...

It cannot be said that we lack land in Peru, in the old Jobabo mill; but there the droughts are very bad, the lands are special lands, and the cane gets scorched.

In the Manzanillo region, we can also introduce irrigation in some mills like I believe "Juan Manuel Márquez" and "Roberto Ramírez," which have some cane deficits and where the lands are not abundant and, in addition, need to send cane at times to the old Pilón mill. So there you have another point, in Manzanillo.

And as a general criterion for cane irrigation: where we have excess mills and lack cane and lack land. That is where we must prioritize dams and irrigation systems for cane. This is a general criterion, applicable not only to the East but to any province: to employ irrigation with priority where we have excess industrial capacities, lack land, and lack cane.

With that criterion, coordination must be established between the Hydraulic Institute and agriculture on the projects, the order of the projects for the construction of dams and irrigation systems for cane. I do not speak of rice, because it has virtually been prioritized.

In citrus plans, where the production of water leads to the development of important citrus plans, because it is the crop that can increase the exportable surplus of this country in the coming years. After cane, the crop that can bring the country hundreds of millions in convertible currency, or convertible foreign currency, is citrus.

For citrus, the number one difficulty, one of the difficulties, is the labor force.

With the conception of basic secondary education, the combination of study and work, we will have no problem in the development of citrus plans.

Also in tobacco plans. But in tobacco plans, we can work, and we have been working based on small dams.

So rice, cane, citrus, vegetables. In rice, everything is well defined. In cane, according to the criteria stated earlier. In citrus and vegetables, since they are crops — the vegetable plans, root crop plans — they are crops that cannot practically be carried out without water. Vegetables are planted in dry seasons; they need water: groundwater or water from dams.

With these criteria, the Institute must work, coordinating with INRA the preparation of projects, to employ the five dam brigades.

The one in Guantánamo, apparently, will have prolonged work in that region. The ones in Pedregal, Buey, La Veinticuatro, Nipe, and Sabanilla will be fundamentally employed in the areas surrounding the Cauto basin, Jobabo, and Manzanillo, following these priority criteria.

The "Ignacio Agramonte" brigade, the second position of that brigade will be the Najasa dam. So the works of that dam must be prioritized. Reason? Rice.

In Camagüey, we have land and we have groundwater. We need to rehabilitate the current irrigation systems. The waters of Caonao are there, and there is abundant groundwater, which allows us to expand the areas of cane irrigation in the places that require it. But the immediate second position will be in Najasa. From there, it will be necessary to coordinate between the Hydraulic Institute and INRA the third positions of the Jimaguayú dam brigade.

In Las Villas, we have a similar problem: two colossal brigades, well-equipped, veteran, that are finishing two enormous, very important dams: a sugar dam in the north, a gigantic rice dam in Sancti Spíritus, which will allow us to expand the crops to 3,000 physical caballerías, net, and double the harvests. In our opinion, with the abundant waters of Zaza, we could plant between 4,000 and 5,000 caballerías, have 4,000 to 5,000 caballerías of harvest, harvest! in the area of Sancti Spíritus, and the Lebrije dam frees us to irrigate cane in the area of the Uruguay mill. That dam will also allow for grass crops for the production of meat and milk.

Now, not every day does a dam like Zaza, with such flow, so useful, so necessary, appear. In Las Villas, there is no other similar work. Big rivers? Agabama. But it would not make sense now to work on the construction of the Agabama dam.

We have been analyzing the positions for those brigades. In addition to those brigades, there is a third brigade in the Escambray, which is carrying out the Manicaragua dam. We are looking for new positions for the Zaza brigade. Apparently, the Higuanojo River, south of the Escambray, would serve to ensure irrigation for the entire Banao area; the Higuanojo, and a large livestock plan in the San Pedro area. Instructions have been given to the Institute to study the project for that dam. And a possible new position, since that brigade is very large to work only on the Higuanojo, in a sugar dam, which could possibly be in the Esperanza area, to irrigate an important sugar area of the Cienfuegos and Santa Clara region — it is on the borders of that region.

The "Antonio Maceo" brigade will move on to build the Cidra dam, in the genetic grouping of Matanzas. The Pinar del Río brigade will move on to build the Los Palacios dam, also for rice. That will be the second position. The brigades from Havana, which are working in Mampostón, Jibacoa, Canasí, and Pedroso, will finish those works and move on to dam areas for cane in the Artemisa area, and for livestock in the Bejucal, Managua, and San José regions.

In Havana, we also have a situation of projects. If the two forces we have for dams, the current brigade and the one that is building the first ring and built the Paso Seco dam, the Ejército Rebelde dam, were to be immediately dedicated, in the next dry season, to the construction of dams, surely there would be no projects for those two forces. And yet, in Havana, we have the following situation: it is necessary in this province to raise the yield of the cane, first, because we have excess capacities in some mills; second, because with yields of 50,000 arrobas, it is necessary to maintain the cane areas in regions that cannot be mechanized, in hilly regions, in many of which even the harvester cannot be used. Havana is one of the provinces where the availability of labor force in the future is more critical, where it is necessary to solve problems based on productivity and where the permanence of cane areas in mountainous zones constitutes an economic burden.

But, in addition, that extensive cane in the province of Havana prevents the development of other crops, such as livestock, that is, milk, citrus, vegetables. In Havana, there are already 20 secondary brigades, which can build 40 secondary schools per year; in two more years, in two and a half years, all the secondary schools, the 100, that are going to be built here will be finished, not for the total youth of Havana, but they have the areas of southern Matanzas, Isla de Pinos, and Pinar del Río, where secondary students from the province of Havana will also go. In Havana, about 100 secondary schools will be built.

A tremendous force for the construction of dairy farms has been created, the Dairy Complex is being built. Thus, the need for land for vegetables and citrus becomes tense, the need for land for grass becomes tense, since a force capable of building 250 dairy farms per year has been created. By the way, thanks, fundamentally, to the contribution of the labor force from the rehabilitation plans of the Ministry of the Interior, with which 50 brigades of dairy farms are organized. There are about 5,000 prisoners in rehabilitation plans working mostly on the construction of dairy farms in the province of Havana.

So here it is necessary to accelerate the mechanization of sugarcane crops to take advantage of all capacities, to mechanize and to reduce areas. That is why in the province of Havana, the sugarcane plans, the water supply for sugarcane plans, and irrigation systems must prioritize cane in the matter of projects. But we have, of course, enough force to work on cane projects and on projects for other crops. That is, we have the strength to build. The projects must work intensively.

In Isla de Pinos, capacities of almost 200 million cubic meters of water have been created. There are excess capacities that are not being used at present. That is why this year the activity of dams was reduced, and part of the resources was used in other activities. But already, for next year, the hydraulic resources for the construction of dams in Isla de Pinos must be dedicated to continue the program of the natural utilization of all potential resources.

If that brigade stops now, if it does not continue building dams, the spirit will be lost, discipline will be lost, experience will be lost. It is a region where the production of water sources has gone far ahead of planting. But with those resources, Isla de Pinos will have to finish its hydraulic development, and therefore, the program must continue until the total construction of all the dams that had been projected on the Island.

It will be necessary and, in addition, it will be possible to accelerate the planting of citrus. Isla de Pinos already has about 1,000 caballerías. Isla de Pinos already has five brigades for the construction of secondary schools, and by the end of the year, it will have six brigades. They can build from 12 to 15 secondary schools per year; they will be able to accelerate the planting and care plan for citrus areas.

These will be the immediate tasks of the dam brigades, according to these priorities. But the project planners will have to work intensively or we run the risk of the dam brigades stopping due to a lack of projects.

Unfortunately, for whatever reasons, projects were made in some places and others that, analyzed coldly and objectively, do not constitute the most immediate, most useful objectives in the tasks of dam construction. Someday those works and those projects will also be used. All those dams projected in Pinar del Río will be built, but if we do them now, they do not have the strength to take advantage of those resources, to make all the systems. Pinar del Río must continue to advance in tobacco agriculture based on micro-dams, groundwater; complete the rice program, utilize the water resources created in the Guane, Laguna Blanca, and Cuyaguateje areas, where they have more than enough water to plant a few hundred caballerías of citrus. Sufficient water sources have been created. It would be madness to start working on other dams. We must also work there for rice, in Los Palacios.

That is why we say that once Los Palacios, Najasa, and Buey are finished, we will have practically satisfied the water needs for the entire rice development plan. That is very important. And we believe that by 1973, those three dams, which are: one under construction — Buey — and the second position of Pinar del Río and the second position of Camagüey, could be finished in 1973.

Now, sometimes this criterion has arisen: let’s stop the construction of dams and dedicate those resources to the construction of irrigation systems. Our response has been, is, and will be emphatically: No! They already proposed it to me with the Zaza brigade: not to finish it in 1972, to finish it in 1974, to do the Zaza and do the canal. The answer was: no.

We are going to close the Zaza in 1972. Do not think it was easy to create that monster in two years. We are going to seek the means to create the canal system, the canal. At a certain moment, some nervousness arose: the dam is finished and the canal is not; we are going to lift the session, reduce it... Always the argument of taking resources from the dam for the canal. No. We are going to analyze the situation and adopt the measures. That is how it was done. And that is why we will have in 1972 the Zaza dam, and the canal in July already conducting water in its first phase, that is, the first 17 kilometers.

We must reject those criteria, because the brigades are already specialized brigades. They should not stop, their momentum should not be halted: they should continue building dams, and organize the work and provide the necessary means for the construction of irrigation systems.

Thus, in the north of Las Villas, work is being done on the waters of Minerva. Now we will also have to work on the waters of Alacranes. In the north of Oriente, we will have to work on the irrigation system of Sabanilla and Nipe. In Guantánamo, we will have to work on the irrigation system of the La Yaya dam; we will have to continue working on the irrigation systems of the rice fields in Oriente, on the irrigation systems of the rice fields in Camagüey, and the same in Sancti Spíritus, the same in Pinar del Río, the same in Isla de Pinos. And not only that, but we are already developing a policy to allocate resources for the maintenance of irrigation and drainage systems.

In all these activities, there has been a great deal of remedialism: take the motor grader from here and take it there, take the crane from here and take it there. That has been disastrous. The person responsible for the motor grader or the crane never appears, nor who broke it. Success in construction lies in the discipline of the means, whether in the construction of dams, roads, or irrigation systems. And success in maintenance lies in the discipline of the means.

Here we already have a study, for example, in sugarcane to locate 33 E-652 cranes, which are three in "Urbano Noris," one at such a point, another at another, another at another. The plan for that area will have to account for those cranes, their technical condition, their maintenance: it will be strictly prohibited, it is already strictly prohibited to take a crane from one plan to another, the back and forth, the transfer of equipment. That is what has caused the most destruction, lack of maintenance, deterioration, equipment scattered here, equipment scattered there, without knowing whose they are.

What have we done with the road brigades and the dam brigades? There we have the file of each brigade, of each truck, of each bulldozer, of each loader, concrete mixer, water truck, everything that has been delivered to them; the file. So that at any moment they can be reviewed. That line is being followed with each of the forces that have been created. In the provinces where equipment changes and reunifications have been made, they will have to create the file and apply the principle of equipment discipline.

Returning to the hydraulic field, we must work on the organization of the construction brigades for irrigation systems where we do not have them and where the water is already waiting for the systems; but do not transfer resources from the dams to the construction of systems. The dam brigades will continue to build progressively and create new sources of water for agricultural, industrial, and social use. That will be the line for now that will be followed with those dam brigades. All necessary irrigation system construction brigades will be organized.

We must now work on the organization of the irrigation system of Uruguay: create a brigade there, in the north of Oriente, reinforce the points that need to be reinforced, and leave maintenance organized, with cranes and motor graders, little by little. We know that rice needs 25 cranes. We do nothing by creating those immense rice fields, their systems, and leaving them abandoned. If we do not have the 25 cranes, we give them 15, 16, 17, 18. They will be assigned by plans, and no one will be able to move them from there. The same goes for the motor graders and other equipment. And little by little we will equip them.

And I am sure that with that system, and holding each plan accountable for the equipment and strictly prohibiting the transfer, the swapping, and the remedialism, we will know whom to hold accountable, we will know where to direct the parts, we will know where to go to inspect the technical condition, maintenance, operation, productivity, and utilization of that equipment.

We have had to fight very hard. That is why we insist, that is why we fought battles, that is why we expressed our concern that the equipment for the highway and the dam would get confused. Because we have seen the birth of here from the first brigade to the last, and we cannot forget the piles of anecdotes: the first brigades that worked on socioeconomic roads were working on a road, and then next to it there was a marabou bush, and the agriculture person would come: “Hey, man, why don’t you lend me the bulldozers, I have two acres of marabou to clear?” And there would go the nice guy from the brigade: "Oh, yes, of course!" And he would send one bulldozer, two bulldozers, to do that favor of clearing the marabou. Just imagine what it means to take two bulldozers where there are four! The trucks stop, the loaders stop, the brigade stops, the work is delayed. Another: "There is a little road that is bad here. Please, send me some trucks of dirt." A need arose: take the brigade from this shelter, move it. The remedialism! What is remedialism? Interrupting the work, interrupting the program, to go do other unplanned things. This does not mean total and absolute inflexibility. What we demand is that to divert the equipment from any brigade, it must be well analyzed and authorized at the appropriate level.

Last year we had, for example, the problem of the collection centers: we had to build 300. The means were insufficient. We started organizing the highway brigades: first work on the collection centers and then go to the highway brigades. But those highway brigades cannot have their means distracted, they cannot be employed in any other work without authorization from the sector at the national level. The decision there to touch the means of highways and the means of the large dam brigades is at the national level. At the provincial level, the sector can determine where to locate, for example, a brigade that is working on sugarcane road plans. There are certain resources that at the provincial level can be decided for the use of those means. But the means of the socioeconomic brigades, of the highway brigades and roads, and of prioritized plans, cannot be used in another activity without decisions at the national level. Why? It may seem exaggerated, but the great vice of remedialism could only be opposed by the virtue of rigid discipline, pay close attention: the virtue of rigid discipline. That explains why a highway brigade chief cannot be doing a little favor in an alley there. And I take the trucks from here and... Well, a serious need may arise, they are going to save someone, it is a tragedy, a tiny insignificant detail, well; but even so, we prefer the rigid discipline of the equipment and the means, the rigid discipline.

It is the only way there can be a program, a progress. It is not that it is impossible. Right now, some decisions have been made: to employ a brigade from the Vertientes force in support of the Jimaguayú dam, four scrapers from the Rectángulo road brigade, in support of that dam. That decision was made, well thought out and well considered. It was not made there. The sector in the province cannot make that decision; they have to consult it nationally, the use and destination of those highway forces, which are 10 brigades, cannot be changed. We know where all those brigades are, what their objectives are, and any decision there has to be at the national level. We have no choice but to maintain rigidity in discipline, because we have suffered from the vice of remedialism, which is one of the ones that has caused us the most damage.

So there are possibilities to solve an important problem if we have the information, if it is requested through the appropriate channels and urgently. It can be allocated: there is a critical situation here; this is raised. Then the decision is made.

But we state that there must be rigid discipline in the use of the equipment of all these dam brigades, highway brigades, and socioeconomic roads. If there are some equipment working on the Mayarí - Moa road, that equipment cannot be taken from that objective, except by virtue of a consultation, a proposal, and a decision at the national level.

If there are some equipment working on the Palma-Barajagua road, or on any socioeconomic road, or the one that is making the road to La Sal and Manzanillo, or the one that is making the road to Cayo Espino, none of those brigades can be transferred from their destination — they and their means — without a national decision. At the provincial level, they resolve the employment of the brigades that work on agricultural plans, sugarcane roads, rice roads, and in some places — like in the province of Havana — no brigade can be moved from a sugarcane plan, nor from a citrus plan, nor from any of the road brigades, without consulting the sector in the appropriate meetings. Here in Havana, a stricter discipline is maintained, and in our opinion, thanks to that, the province is filling up with roads. But here to take a brigade from what it is doing, to send it to do something else, it has to be thought about 25 times, 25 times.

Now, there will come a time when there will be no roads to build anywhere; they will be done. In the Escambray in the same way. Progress is being made. There the brigades have their program, the second positions. This aspect of discipline is essential and is a fundamental principle.

So that is the policy that will be followed with the dams and with the irrigation systems. Construction of dams: by the dam brigades; construction of irrigation and drainage systems: by the irrigation and drainage brigades; maintenance of irrigation and drainage systems: by the plans. It should not happen as it did in the province of Havana with the rice fields: every year the DAP built the canals, and every year agriculture, the rice growers, destroyed them. Another year would start: come the DAP to do. No. The DAP makes the system, agriculture maintains it. Otherwise, the DAP's equipment gets tied up, they get tied up doing maintenance work. The DAP brigades are for construction, not for maintenance!

Little by little we will give each plan the means. Your mission in dams, roads, and irrigation systems is to build. That is your mission. The mission of agriculture is to exploit and maintain those systems.

Of course, there will be the agencies that control how they exploit the water, how they utilize it. Control will be maintained over all that. But that is the policy.

We believe that with this, the issues related to hydraulics are clear. And I insist again that an important project work will be necessary, in coordination with agriculture, and following the indicated criteria, or otherwise we run the risk of the dam brigades stopping.

The resources of these brigades work in the provinces, but they belong to the nation. We do not take equipment from a brigade, as a principle. Now we could say: "Well, people from Villa Clara, you finished two large dams. Give us that equipment to send it to Matanzas." No. The brigades must have mobility, and the country must be in a position to be able to employ them in other provinces. It does not mean that we are going to send the one from Santa Clara to Pinar del Río; if necessary, they go, but we understand that it is not necessary for them to go. But we needed to build a dam in Matanzas: the "Antonio Maceo" brigade can go to Matanzas, it is not very far. After all, the people from Villa Clara are building highways south of Matanzas now, and they come from more distant places. That is to say, in the nearby provinces, if it were necessary at a given moment to do something in Camagüey... But, in short, they will be more or less in their region and can be employed by exception — as in this case of Matanzas — in other provinces with their men and means.

In Las Villas at this moment, there were not enough projects, nor was there enough workshop for those brigades. In the meantime, projects will continue to be studied and prioritized in Las Villas; then they will return there to carry out other work.

Regarding roads, some of the related criteria, which are common to both activities, have been mentioned here. We believe that there has also been much progress in road construction in recent times: improvement in efficiency, in the quality of work, without a doubt of any kind. In roads, there were also similar problems in Oriente and Camagüey, and some of them we have referred to.

We understand that in Camagüey, the state of the brigades has been raised and their efficiency has improved considerably. We understand that in the East, the efficiency of the brigades has also been improving. Some of the mountains have been reinforced; others have already gone to work in the plains, in the sugarcane plans. Some new brigades have been organized, which have come into existence under strict discipline. For example: Holguín-Santa Lucía brigade, Holguín-San Germán brigade, Manzanillo-Cayo Espino brigade, Arnancio-Guayabal brigade, Tunas-Bayamo-La Sal-Manzanillo road brigade. In the East, we plan to organize a few more brigades, for example, one in the Banes area, similar to those organized in Manzanillo; another in the Las Tunas area, in the north, to build some socioeconomic roads in that region. In our view, these are the two areas that still need support in that activity. Other needs may arise, but in general, no new resources will be allocated to road construction. In roads, just like in dams, we believe that, broadly speaking, the needs for equipment to organize the number of brigades that allow for accelerated development of road and highway construction in the country are satisfied.

The status of some brigades can be reviewed, and some of them can be gradually and discreetly reinforced, without ambitions or open jaws: some small trucks, some loading equipment; little by little. Therefore, it is necessary to preserve the skeleton, even if it is just the skeleton, of any existing brigade, and as a principle, not to dissolve any.

At times we have merged, we have created a greater force. But no brigade can or should be dissolved.

We will look at the situation of those in the East, one by one; some have been reinforced. And we will see what possibilities there are to improve those brigades that are working on sugarcane plans, agricultural plans, or socioeconomic roads, that need some help, discreet, moderate, and slow as well.

We understand that everyone should do as the Juraguá brigade does: lift their irons, maintain them, keep them active, and wait for the moment when some help, some reinforcement in any sense, arrives.

We believe that the brigades in the East and some in Camagüey will need to be reviewed, and it is possible that some of them will receive some help.

All highway brigades are organized, with new equipment, and the country in general will not allocate, in the coming years, nor create any new highway brigades. In any case, by the end of 1973, we will seek to transfer the Camagüey brigades, which are currently engaged in other tasks, to highway construction: seven brigades from Camagüey, three of which are in rice, one in the Rectangle, two in the Triangle, and one in earthmoving in the city of Camagüey. We hope that by the end of 1973, these brigades will be moved to work on the Camagüey stretch, when the connection between Havana and Cienfuegos and Havana and Santa Clara has sufficiently advanced, so that at a given moment, the Camagüey brigades can meet with those from the East and Las Villas in highway construction. What year? In 1976? In 1977? It will need to be analyzed well, and we will see how the productivity of those brigades increases.

The Eastern brigade will be reinforced with bulldozers and motorized bulldozers, the Eastern highway brigade. A new brigade is being created, a new railway construction brigade, which is currently supporting the construction of the Zaza Canal, and will move in May or June to work in the Las Villas region on the construction of completely new sections. Since in addition to roads and highways, we need to rebuild the central railway and prepare it for trains that can travel at speeds of 150 kilometers per hour. Modernization is necessary. And work will begin in June in the Las Villas region.

We believe that the Melena brigade, Habana-Melena, when it finishes, should also be incorporated into the construction of the railway in the province of Havana. It is possible that some additional resources will need to be allocated to railway construction, but in general, we consider that there is a sufficient number of brigades to develop the country's communications in the next 10 years. The creation of new brigades is not contemplated, except in some areas where there is still some deficit.

It will be necessary to work, at a certain moment, in the pine forest areas, to re-establish or create some construction brigades for paths to protect the reforestation from fires, especially in the Pinar del Río region. And work will have to be done with the sugarcane brigades, in coordination with the sugar industry and INRA, in preparing the fields for the mechanization of sugarcane. There is a huge amount of work left for us, because we cannot stop until we have prepared all the sugarcane fields in the country, organized them into typical fields, with roads, firebreaks, drainage, and irrigation.

Work is already underway on several pilot plans, one per province; small soil conditioning brigades are being organized, managed by INRA: one or two bulldozers to remove stones; some tractors, carts, trenchers, to remove stones, remove logs, and leave the land ready for mechanization.

The DAP, with its sugarcane brigade, will build the roads. It may also be that from the analysis of the situation of all the sugarcane areas, it will be necessary to establish an additional road brigade. The DAP will build the roads. Agriculture will prepare the land. And we cannot stop until the day when all the sugarcane in the country is like a chessboard, perfectly organized and prepared for mechanization, because the country needs to achieve total mechanization of its sugarcane. Thus, this will be one of the activities that the DAP will have, that the road front will have in the coming years.

We believe that with these 192 brigades we have created the structure of a great constructive force, which will have work in sight for at least 10 years, as long as there is a road, a highway to be built in this country. Let us preserve them. Above all, let us lift the spirit of the men, because the main thing in this brigade is the man; it is not the machine, it is the man! And we have already created this force in these years, and with it, we can do what we set out to do.

One of the undoubtedly most important tasks we have is the highway, which in our view is a highway for 100 years. The Central Highway was built over forty years ago, six meters or six and a half. No one would have thought that modern buses, trucks that are much wider than the trucks and vehicles of that time would transit there. And really, when one thinks about it, the traffic on that road is a kind of death ticket, a death ticket that Central Highway. In some places where the highway passes through the Central, it looks like a path.

There was discussion about whether to make it two lanes or three on each side. And it was decided to work at once for many years. This will allow us to use the highway for passenger transport, light vehicles, and cargo vehicles of any length and width. On that highway, we can put trains on wheels. We are already trying to acquire some 350-horsepower wedges, which can pull 60 tons; and we are already trying to obtain information about the existence of wedges with greater capacity, of 400 or 450 horsepower, to carry 100 tons on the road.

Here, there will not be those problems that existed in capitalism with competition between the railway and road transport, because that does not count here at all; the factors, the interests that prevented the exploitation of these resources with maximum rationality do not exist. When we can load 100 tons or more, we can load them on that road without it being a suicide. And they will be able to have their lane, and light buses and other lighter transports will be able to pass on the left with absolute safety, and cars will never cross on the same lane; there will be no level crossings.

Of course, it will have to be built progressively, but we will have a road that will connect Pinar del Río with Santiago de Cuba for all time. And we will also have the one from Santiago to Bayamo, but it will already be four lanes.

At this moment, seven brigades are working, seven forces are working on that highway. One towards Pinar del Río, two from Havana to Matanzas, four from Pinar del Río to Havana, one from Santiago to the West, from the East to the West. Then three more forces from Camagüey will be incorporated. They have 100 Leyland trucks of large capacity and they also have 40 Hitachi bulldozers; they have a good force, several forces. One of them is working in the north: Morón with Nuevitas; and others are currently on agricultural roads. By the end of 1973, we also plan to transfer them.

And then we believe that this emulation that starts here must intensify; all highway brigades must enter into this emulation.

Here, the great emulation between Las Villas and Havana for the red flag at the borders of the provinces has already been agreed upon. Now they will have to meet and see the rules. But essentially, they will have to have the Las Villas section continuous from Aguada de Pasajeros to the limit of Havana, at a definitive grade; and the Havana ones will have from the Monumental to the limit of the province, at a definitive grade, inspected by GRINACO, so that it can certify the state, the quality of the construction.

The Western brigade, which is working towards Pinar del Río, which is now building dams and highways, should also try to participate in the emulation. This brigade has the disadvantage of doing both things, but upon finishing the La Coronela dam, it will be dedicated exclusively to highways.

We already have the experience of when things are combined. The Uvero Combat contingent is currently constructing two dams and secondary schools; but the forces of each brigade are separated —Pedregal, Buey, and the forces assigned to the construction of the secondary schools.

When we were there, we saw a motorized bulldozer from Buey that was giving a little help to the secondary brigades. Let’s say that this is not an illegality, because it was told to comrade Guillén that when there was no workshop at the dam, they could provide help; but we prefer that these changes be made as little as possible. The secondary force will be strengthened, more trucks will be given, the number of brigades will be increased, so that it practically does not need it, and the support of dam equipment to secondary schools will be avoided; only in exceptional cases when they are stopped. And even the support of the Pedregal brigade to Buey and Buey to Pedregal, with their means, must be discussed at the provincial level and proposed nationally. We must still establish discipline and some rigidity there, because we know the inconveniences that the confusion of means brings.

Regarding the brigade that will build the Guantánamo highway, as was raised here, the proposal must be presented with schemes, maps, and everything about what is wanted or intended to be done at the spillway, and coordinate some work between those brigades to make a decision.

In the end, we will have six, seven... Did I say seven? There are eight brigades we have now with Pinar del Río; six here, the East has seven, Pinar del Río has eight. It is not from Pinar del Río, it is from Havana going to Pinar del Río. And with the three from Camagüey, we will have eleven.

When should we aim to finish that work? In 1976, at the latest 1977. I believe it is a kind of commitment that we must contemplate. We should not prolong the completion of that highway beyond the year 1977, from Pinar del Río to Santiago de Cuba. And we hope that by that date, at least the Mayarí-Moa one will be finished. And the Palma-Barajagua one.

As I understand it, Palma-Barajagua is already quite advanced. It was necessary to dedicate two sugarcane brigades, from sugarcane roads, to that task. And we are missing the bridge, a large bridge, with large spans, that will require large cranes. A bridge that was already projected, similar to the one on the Jiguaní-San Germán road, and similar to the bridge on the Mayarí-Moa road. Of course, I think those brigades will finish those roads, at the latest, in 1973, they will have those two famous roads completed.

But in any case, we must never again fall into that shameful situation of a work that is started and never finished. For a matter of principle, for a matter of morality, for a matter of shame, we must not leave any work unfinished. For a matter of respect for the public, respect for the people, respect for opinion, we must not leave any work unfinished. A road that we start, a road that we finish. And then, a road that we finish, a road that we maintain. Roads must be protected from many enemies, among which the worst is neither water, nor heat, nor traffic, but irresponsibility, ignorance, and traveling on a road with grades and equipment that destroy it.

Some advertising has already been done about this: the lack of maintenance also destroys roads. A small hole, and then the Bartlet Pit. Road maintenance brigades are already being organized at the provincial level. We do nothing by building and then allowing it to deteriorate. Every kilometer of road that this country builds, a kilometer of road that must be preserved.

Quality is important, and the comrades from GRINACO will have to work hard, controlling and demanding quality. But, in addition, when building the road we must take care of the landscape. In some cases, magnificent trails were assigned in places where land compensation is needed, on hills, undulating terrain. The trails in flat areas become a calamity. We have that problem on the Aguada de Pasajeros-Jagüey stretch. We already know exactly the land that will be destroyed there, and as a principle, we are already moving equipment in general, where land will be destroyed. What was happening in that area? There are no deep quarries, and even if you work with trucks, you have to haul it from a huge distance, which is irrational. Or if you haul it nearby, the same phenomenon of deteriorated land occurs.

Our island is small. If today it seems that there is an abundance of land, one day there may be a shortage of land. We still do not have a culture of respect and utilization of the land. We constantly see large clearings to put anything. That is why I discussed with Laite the two caballerías of land that he used in the prefabricated plan by San Luis. But when I took a tour of that highway, further back from where the base was, we saw a large clearing there, and I said: What are they going to build here, a stadium? When we were there, they were preparing the camp for 90 men. It seemed really excessive the land that had been cleared and leveled for a camp, unless they are going to make it with a baseball field and I don’t know how many other things. But it seems to me that if they are going to work hard, they won’t have much time to play baseball, and in that case, they can borrow the stadium from Santiago, which is not too far away.

You builders sometimes have a certain disdain for the work of others, and you take a sugarcane field and clear it completely. And sometimes you have to make a 10-meter road and you clear 30 to 35. You clear more than necessary. You have to discuss with the designers, with everyone, and really see that the land is cleared strictly necessary for work and construction. Do not waste land, do not waste earth movement in installations. Sometimes I have seen clearings made in some agricultural areas of very good land, when a little further away the same could have been done without destroying one, two, or three hectares of land. We must take care of the land, lest on one side we build and on the other side we destroy.

Sometimes to make a micropont, clearings are made... and I saw it done here: two hectares of grass cleared to make a little bridge of five meters, and to put materials and a tent and the other, and there it goes: bam!, and they destroy. We cannot have that mentality of destroyers. We cannot feel that disdain for natural resources, nor for the work of others. Always, for temporary facilities and for deposits, use the minimum amount of land. We must keep that principle in mind.

The same thing happened with the oil workers. The comrades from Mining had to intervene because some said: well, right here. If it’s next to the International Hotel, right there in the yard: bam! open the well there, in the name of oil. An oil that hasn’t appeared yet, right? or if it appears, it’s slowly. But we must not destroy that hotel, we must not destroy that beach, where thousands of people from the town will receive some benefit. If you can move 100 meters away, if it is perfectly possible, why destroy the beach, why destroy the hotel, why destroy that cane that is going to be cut there? Coordinate and do not arrive. There are people who when they arrive, they arrive clearing and they knock down fences, they knock down trees: they knock down everything! When there is no other choice but to knock down a field, a tree is knocked down, a building is knocked down. And if it’s the Capitol, if it were even necessary to knock it down, with permission from the Academy of Sciences, we coordinate and knock down the Capitol. The day they tell us that there is gold underneath the Capitol — solid gold! — all currency problems solved. We arrive, send the Komatsu, blow that up and knock down the Capitol. That is to say, no one is going to refuse to remove anything — no one is going to refuse to remove anything — when it is rational and useful to remove it. But we must get used to seeing in the land, in the work of others, our own land, our work, our own wealth.

That is important.

But, in summary, we believe that progress has been made, and that we have ahead of us, with these new forces, magnificent construction prospects.

I do not want to extend my remarks on other tasks.

Briefly regarding Maritime Works, we have already expressed our opinion that they have worked well, that they have provided a great service to the country and, of course, that we must continue to develop that activity because our country is an island, whose volume of trade is increasing and must increase. The development of ports, maritime works, and dredging of ports is essential. Furthermore, in the future we will face more serious problems: goods are already being transported in increasingly larger ships, in tankers of 100,000, 200,000 tons, ships capable of carrying solid loads of 50,000 and 100,000 tons; minerals, sugar, etc. And we must be prepared to respond to the demands of the times and continue to develop, since it is vital, maritime works.

If in the past years dams, that is, hydraulic and road works had the main emphasis and received a large amount of resources, in the coming years we must pay increasing attention to urban hydrology activities. Social development demands it, which will acquire an impressive pace in the coming years.

Construction of housing. It is thought to reach the capacity to build 100,000 houses by 1975. This year we are already working on a program of 30,000. Calculate that by 1970, 4,000 or 5,000 should have been built. That is to say, that this year there are five or six times more housing constructions than in 1970. And next year, 50,000. It is expected that by 1974 there will be about 75,000 houses. But in this we cannot be very rigid, because if the boom in secondary schools, primary schools continues at the pace it is going, there may come a time — around 1974 — when instead of 75,000 it could be 70,000, 65,000, or 60,000; but I do not think we should stop the program of secondary schools, technological schools, and polytechnic institutes.

To better understand, in the province of Oriente, for example, we propose to build in 1973, 20 polytechnic institutes in 20 sugar mills. Fundamental objective: to replenish the staff of the sugar mills.

For years we have been talking about the retirees from the fifties. There are numerous mills that have problems with the workforce. We are still not in a position to have a pre-university level technician there. There are not enough secondary graduates to send there yet, but we can send seventh grade, eighth grade, sixth grade; if not a pre-university technician, a middle technician with two or three years of combined study and work. They will be schools of 500 students, who will work half the time and study the other half. But they will be of the type of secondary schools. So we will have 10,000 young people studying and working around the sugar mills, acquiring both practice and theory.

We plan to do the same in Camagüey with less momentum — Oriente has 40 mills — also building some in Las Villas, in Matanzas, in Havana, and some in Pinar del Río. So we believe that about 50 or 60 institutions of that type will be built. In Oriente there will be 20.

Anyone who has known the problems in the mills, the poor operation of the mills, the lack of knowledge and the backwardness in the mills, realizes the importance it has for the country to take advantage of all installed capacities to solidly increase sugar production without the problems we have had in these years, the importance of making these schools; and that, in addition, allows us to apply the principle of combining study and work, which if in secondary schools is in the field, in technological schools it has to be around the factories. In the future, the kids who go there will come out of basic secondary already — 15 or 16 years old and a secondary level — and will study for three to four years, and we will have pre-university level technicians working in the sugar mills.

Anyone understands that if at a given moment, to make 20 schools of that type we have to sacrifice, let’s say, 300 houses, it is preferable to sacrifice the 300 houses when we have already surpassed 50,000 houses. Although the calculation was to reach 75,000 in 1974, we see that the productivity of the school construction brigades is increasing so rapidly that we believe it is possible for the school program to increase.

To help you understand the importance of this, it is enough to say the following: the census data: the province of Oriente... Kids who will be, for example, in 1977, 12 years old, 12, 13, 14, 15, secondary level: from 7 years there are 89,233; from 8, 85,240; from 9, 79,101; from 10, 76,295. There will be 300,000 kids at that age.

You have seen the problems that the provinces of Oriente, Las Villas, in general, have, that there are 100,000 aged 13, 14, 15, and 16 who neither study nor work. Can you imagine a youth that neither studies nor works? What can be expected of them? Lumpen, lumpen, lazy! Can our homeland offer that example to the world? Of course, where does that large mass that neither studies nor works come from? From the deficiencies of our primary school, lack of facilities, lack of resources, lack of enough teachers and sufficiently prepared teachers, irresponsibility of the family, lack of culture. The kid does not go to school, it is imposed: he does not go to school. He is 11 years old and is in second grade, he is 13 and is in third; and then he is sent to do a little job and then he leaves. Tens and tens of thousands who neither study nor work. Can a better community be made that way?

If a province like Oriente is left with 100,000 of these 300,000, who at the age of 12, 14, and 15... And then at 16 or 17, the Service may come, something else may come. But, well, what a perspective!

Now, imagine that the Law establishes compulsory education up to primary level, by establishing it compulsory up to secondary level: it would require about 600 schools of that type for 300,000.

Now, we were in the Veguitas area talking with secondary and pre-university students. What did they ask for? That the schools being built be for them, that they wanted — those from Santiago — the enthusiasm for those activities was such that they asked for those schools.

We were deeply impressed by the spirit of those kids, certainly. It is a stimulating thing. We realized, it is very clear that in our hands is the ability to shape that new generation, to create the ideal conditions for their moral, technical, and general cultural preparation.

Now, if we allow hundreds of thousands of young people who escape from primary school or secondary studies to drift, who neither study nor work, we will not be able to be that model we talked about for an entire continent. And we must find a solution to this problem.

That is why we give so much importance to these institutions. But in addition to constituting the highest form of education — because a person must be educated for life, it is not education in the abstract, but education in the concrete — in addition to creating a higher form of education, we take it to production.

A poor country, with the problems we talked about, that lacks natural and fundamental resources, that has to produce its economy based on a crop like sugarcane, which is costly, employing many human resources, even when we have mechanized all the sugarcane, even so, that we have mechanized all the cutting of the sugarcane and reduced personnel in the sugar mills, we will still be employing three times more workers than Chile to produce, let’s say, 1,000 to 1,200 million in currency. We have to reach 10 million. That could mean a value of more than 1,000 million pesos in exports; but we will always employ more than 100,000 men: 120,000, 130,000, 150,000. This does not count the industries, the workers who work in the industries producing spare parts for the mills. When we do the math, that will always cost us, it will no longer be half a million, but 130,000, 140,000, 150,000. Of course, it will be a huge step when instead of half a million or 600,000 that we employed in 1970, for example, we make large harvests with 150,000 in total. That will be a fabulous leap in quality.

But even so, we have to establish universal work at its different levels. Even the little primary school kids with their garden, like the Meneses school, working two hours: fourth, fifth, and sixth grades; secondary students working; technological students working in industries, and university students working.

We want to inform you that in Havana all university students study and work. About 12,000 students have joined the workforce here at the University of the West. We plan to extend this system from primary school to university. First and foremost, fundamentally, as a matter of education, but it also results in the incorporation of hundreds of thousands of young people into production; with 1,000 secondary schools like Ceiba Uno, for example, we would have half a million young people incorporated into production by the year 1980. The value of their production would exceed 10 million tons of sugar, so it is clear that this is a path. And one day, the Latin American peoples will do exactly the same.

That education cannot be conceived in the abstract of the past, where a young person graduated from university at 25 years old without having the slightest notion of what it meant to produce a material good. They were accustomed to intellectual work, to consumption. And we understand that this is the worst way to educate. With socialism, with the Revolution, we will move towards a higher form of education.

Now then: all this social activity: tens of thousands of homes, until we reach 100,000; hundreds of secondary schools, primary schools, technological schools; thousands of dairy farms, all of this will require tremendous urban hydrology work, tremendous. We are aware of this, and we state it here so that you can become imbued with that idea, and the organizations that need to cooperate in the development of that activity cooperate.

The time is coming to allocate the necessary resources for that urban hydrology activity: the equipment to set up the aqueducts. But if those needs were raised tomorrow and were in our hands because we do not need many resources to make the pipes available. This requires the support of a pipe manufacturing industry, steel, center steel, asbestos-cement, maintenance means, combating leaks. This requires a whole industry behind all those elements and all those problems that were raised.

The comrades working on that front should know that we are aware of this. And that front will receive the resources it requires.

Likewise, yesterday we expressed the high value that the activities of research, quality control, work, and functions of GRINACO have for all of us. Yesterday we discussed this, and the importance of that front comes to light in all construction assemblies: in DESA, in the materials industry, and it will also come up in industrial construction. We are also highly aware, and as we said yesterday, they will be supported.

And we wish for this assembly to clearly convey the need to support the activities of GRINACO, to respect its indications, to elevate its authority. This will provide us with the information we need for projects, the information we need to build. This will give us quality. That is to say, it will give us economy, it will give us security, it will give us durability. This will also provide us with great savings. Imagine that due to the tremendous boom in construction we start to run out of cement in 1974. What do 200,000 tons of cement mean? That the savings from a consumption of 2,300,000 could mean 20,000 homes, with 200,000 tons of cement.

We, if we lack a little rebar — and we will be lacking it by the end of 1973 — can import a little rebar. But what we cannot do is import half a million six hundred thousand tons of cement. It’s ships after ships. It’s 60 ships loaded with cement disembarking at the ports. We should not even think about solving the problem through imports; it must be solved through production and savings. But 200,000 tons is the cement for 20,000 homes, or it could be the cement for about 150 secondary schools, which provide capacity for 75,000 students. Keep that idea in mind: 1,400 tons, with 140,000 we would have 100 schools; it should be about 135, right? About one hundred thirty-something schools. And I believe that now, with the savings they have made, it should be about 150 schools, really, and about 20,000 or about 20,000 homes that can be built with 200,000 tons of cement. These are not negligible figures. They represent tens of millions of pesos in production that can be achieved with 200,000 tons of cement. I believe this gives an idea of the importance of the quality of materials and the savings of materials.

If we leave here with these ideas, if we leave with the feeling that we have made progress, but that we also need to double our efforts, that we can still advance much more, we can say that this assembly will be a historic assembly for the DAP.

Regarding the importance of efficiency in work, I will show you these data. The problem of productivity, which we had pointed out, behaved differently in different provinces. Of course, this productivity index can be determined: the climate can influence; a year of heavy rains will be adverse, a dry year will be favorable; construction work, excavation, where it is lacking, where the earth has to be transported from a long distance, will reduce productivity; all those factors.

But we pointed out, for example, how Las Villas had achieved a production of two cents per peso spent on salary. In the DAP, 95,622,000 pesos were paid. That was the value of the salaries paid in 1971. The relationship between salaries paid and value executed: the value of production — these values are determined parameters, specific measures, they are not exaggerated in the least; it was seen here how the concrete activity, for example, represented more values than the earth-moving activity, etc. — the value of what was executed was 117,591,000 pesos.

We saw the case of Las Villas, which appeared with 32,845,000, and in Las Villas, it was mainly earth-moving. That is to say, they were not jobs that impact the elevation of values. Here it was seen, when the report was read, that they had contributed 200,000 hours of voluntary work.

Now, how did the relationship between peso in salary and peso in product behave? Pinar del Río, per peso in salary, one peso 16 cents in product. Matanzas, per peso in salary, 99 cents. In Las Villas, per peso in salary, two pesos two cents. In Camagüey, per peso in salary, one peso 14 cents. It is an index of improvement, of course, of work in Camagüey, which sometimes has to transport materials from long distances. In Oriente, per peso in salary, 83 cents in product. Havana, per peso in salary, one peso 25 cents. I do not know if in this calculation they included the highways, but it was already seen that forces one and two paid more in salary than what they produced in pesos. Possibly if that data is included here — this data is from the Ministry of Labor — it is a sign that the road crews did even more.

Now, we have Las Villas with 16,205,000 pesos, produced 32,845,000. And Oriente, with 27,555,000 pesos in salaries, produced 22,944,000. When we pointed out this problem to the comrades from Oriente, they said that if they were making so many thousands of meters of bridges and facing the problems. That is correct: they are now facing the problems, they are trying to make bridges, and they are making them. But we believe that the data should be taken into account, and that in the face of a real situation of data, awareness of the problem should be raised, and not console themselves thinking that they are doing such and such things. We know that they are making the effort, and that they will raise productivity. But what is done is not enough. The fact that 27 and a half million are paid in salary and a little less than 23 million is produced in product indicates how much salary has been paid, indicates the economic efficiency of the work.

We understand that with the Buey brigade, the new road brigades, the improvement of the dam brigades, the recovery of the road brigades, the increase in efficiency, with all those measures, they will considerably raise production. And that is what needs to be stated. Because, look, if the whole island had had the same productivity per peso of salary, that is to say, the same production in work for salaries paid, the value of what was produced by the DAP nationally would have been 193,267,000 pesos, almost 200 million pesos, if all provinces had had the same productivity as the workers of Las Villas. And remember this: that is in 1971, they did not have the highway brigades, they did not have the new equipment; except for companies that already had increases in equipment throughout the year 1971. It will be interesting to see the productivity of Las Villas in 1972, which has equipment..., in earth-moving, the four highway forces, which have about 800 men.

So, 75,676,000 pesos more in works would have been produced if all had had the same productivity. Seventy-five million is more than what Havana and Las Villas together produced, which produced about 32,800,000, and the other 36,177,000. It is clear that instead of 117 million we would have produced almost 200 million.

Now, I am sure that Las Villas could still improve its efficiency much more. We still found problems in the brigades there, no; it is different in the brigades we visited. There are still trucks that are transporting personnel, other trucks that are transporting the engineer, other trucks that are... Of course, these are needs. If a vehicle can be obtained, one of the vehicles that the army delivers, that is not new, a GAZ-63, a ZIL-157, to transport personnel, to put the water tank in that truck and not in a 12-ton truck, not the Fiat or the Berliet with the water tank, but a ZIL-157, even if it is used; if, for example, a system can be achieved that allows the equipment to work all month, if the change of system in the Buey dam can be achieved, if after analysis it is seen that it would be convenient and they do not lose those five days each month, that is 50 days in 10 months that, doubled, are 100 days; 100 days of practically 10 hours are lost with those five days. All of this would increase the productivity of the machines, the productivity of the brigades.

If maintenance is improved, if the percentage of equipment is raised... Although we should perfect this problem of the percentage of equipment, because it counts what is lost due to rain, it counts what is lost due to necessary, scheduled repairs, for maintenance. The real hourly fund is the one that considers those hours in which the equipment should have been utilized by the man; it should not include rain, it should not include the mandatory stops for maintenance, because then one does not know how much is the responsibility of the man for organization, for inefficiency, for all that. This index will have to be perfected to know the real loss of the hourly fund.

I certainly did not like that in the reports of the organization or of some branches it was almost reproached that the lost time was recovered in overtime. We understand, of course, that the overtime should be an extra, it should not be to make up for lost time; but rather we should congratulate the brigades and the workers who when due to organizational problems or efficiency or any type they lost hours and stopped doing tasks, stay there trying to fulfill those tasks and recovering the hours. It seems to me really a bit bureaucratic, a bit bureaucratic, to be worried about that problem of including in the hourly fund the overtime they worked to recover it.

If we are realistic, we have to understand that we still have many deficiencies in many things: lack of knowledge, lack of experience, all those things, and that the workers who propose to recover what is lost really have a very positive attitude. What needs to be said to them is to try to do it in the time they have for it and that what they gain from the utilization of the hours and the equipment in meeting the goals means for them a reduction of the total effort they have to make; because a worker who has to work an hour more, two hours more, has to be making an unnecessary physical effort if time is well utilized, if work is well organized.

I understand that as a methodology these are different things, but we should not discourage the workers in any way. And if the principle were even established that lost time is recovered, that is already a great advance.

There are many brigades that we know — and some have been pointed out here — that have worked until 2:00 in the morning or 3:00 to recover lost time and meet the programs.

Regarding the goals, sometimes it seems that a goal has not been met, that they achieved 95%. We prefer a tough goal that is met at 95% than an easy goal that is met at 120%. We know that when a person sets out to make a hard effort...

Of course, that effort must be realistic, taking into account the situation, the state of resources. It must be realistic, but it should not be a soft effort. It is not honest, when one has all the means, to set a small goal and then appear to exceed it. We must be realistic in our goals; they must be challenging goals, and they must be met.

This data can express to you the importance of efficiency and productivity. Productivity is fundamental in this country. And in future reports, the issue of productivity must be included: how much has been produced per peso in salary spent and how much has been produced per equipment and resources and fuel and materials spent.

Economic efficiency is fundamental. We do nothing by producing 200 million pesos while spending 220 on salaries, because that creates inflation, wastes money, and squanders human resources. What we pay in salaries will be the index that demonstrates to what extent we are making good or poor use of human resources. If we produce two pesos, three pesos, we are making good use of it; if we produce 80 cents, we are squandering human resources.

There have been problems in these years of moving men here, to sugarcane, to other tasks. But to the extent that activity is organized, serious works are being done, roads, dams, I assure you that no one will propose taking a man from a brigade to cut sugarcane, taking a man from a bulldozer, from a crane, from a truck, taking a man from an important work; no one will propose it. If it is proposed, it is because there have been excesses of men, often surplus men, or many idle machines, men who have been unproductive.

I imagine that if the data from 1970 had been taken when there were double shifts in many works, what was paid in salaries compared to what was produced, the situation would be much more serious. Because I know that, for example, in the brigades of Havana, savings were made; by eliminating the double shift, there were two and so many men per machine, and it was left with practically one man per machine. By 1971, there must have been a considerable increase in productivity. Now, this year there should be an even greater increase.

Now, productivity data must be separated: how much was achieved in dams, how much was achieved in roads, how much was achieved in one type of road, how much was achieved in highways, so that we can see with that data which factors are most affecting productivity.

I have gone over the time I had promised you by an hour.

Yesterday we said that we were not comparing you with other workers, that we knew that the workers in this activity are doing hard work. If it is in hydrology, there are the problems of sewage. Here it was reflected what hard work the men have to do. But the men who are building roads and dams and irrigation and drainage systems across almost the entire island, most live away from their families for weeks on end, working 10 hours, sometimes 11, sometimes 12; they lead a hard life, it is hard work.

Construction workers in general already have a 10-hour schedule; they have set a standard. And within the construction sector, those who are in dams and roads, those who are in the DAP, do the hardest work, the hardest jobs, in tough conditions.

When we made criticisms... In general, of course, not everyone is in the same conditions, not everyone is housed, but we already know that we are addressing men who have accepted the decision to work 10 hours, who have a work background already superior to the rest of the workers in the country, who are setting an example. The criticisms here are criticisms of a type of worker who is making a greater contribution to the country. But we should not compare the effort with that of others who are working less. We have to compare the effort we make with the effort we could make if we worked better, more organized, more efficiently, more consciously, if we took care of the machines, if we acted with discipline, with responsibility, if we improved the work. We have to make these comparisons: if we have produced 120 million, if in the same hours and with the same machines we could have produced 200 million.

That is what it is about.

The DAP is a new organization, created quickly, precipitously. It was necessary to improvise many men in the tasks of directing the brigades, in learning the tasks of construction. It has had its ups and downs, it has had greater prestige and lesser prestige. We understand that in 1971, as a consequence of the problems, the destruction of equipment, various deficiencies, the prestige of the organization had declined significantly. We believe that the prestige of this organization is currently on the rise.

Of course, the DAP at one point in its conception was a bit ambitious: it wanted to take everything, to encompass everything. It took every grader there was throughout the country, every roller, every crane, maintenance equipment, equipment of all kinds, and had to bear the consequences of all that.

Then everyone asked it to build the road, to maintain it; to maintain the irrigation system, and for everything that was going wrong, they blamed the DAP, rightly and wrongly.

But apart from this, there were many reasons to criticize the DAP, there were many reasons to point out the deficiencies of this organization. And we know it well. We have practically participated in the allocation of resources, of each of the forces that were constituted from the beginning. And we remember that sometimes the work was terrible, disastrous. In 1971, these brigades were incredible. If we analyze today, despite the problems still, despite the delays in Jibacoa, in Canasí, in Pedroso, despite the bottlenecks in Pedregal and the bottlenecks there in Jimaguayú; despite these problems, the situation is no longer comparable to what we had last year. There is a notable improvement. The Youth last year was a disaster. This year it is moving more than 10,000 meters of earth, it is doing well, it will close the dam.

The one in Havana has also improved, although not yet all that it should. The two major dams, which are Zaza and Alacranes, are being closed without any inconvenience, and Jimaguayú and Pedregal will be able to be closed. But we remember in Havana at a certain moment, in the years 1969 and 1970, it was a disaster: roads, dams, irrigation, drainage, everything, it was a disaster. And today the roads have improved a lot, the dams are improving, the work in irrigation and drainage has improved a lot.

We remember these highways, which gave us headaches. But now the first ring, which was a disaster last year, is today a strength of which we can begin to feel proud. And the words of the comrades who pointed out that they were already working 11 hours were very satisfactory and encouraging here.

That brigade from Habana-Melena was a disaster, and it has improved significantly. Force one and two had ridiculous production, they stopped producing millions of pesos. And we know that this force is now heading towards better work, greater efficiency, much greater production.

The western force has not been optimal or terrible. It has worked more or less well, it has worked with quality, it has been focused on dams and highways. We hope that this brigade improves, it can improve, and we hope that this brigade improves its efficiency and participates along with the others in the emulation.

But I am a witness to the work in almost all provinces: I know well the work of Las Villas, I know the problems of these brigades everywhere. But I know especially those of this province because we have been here longer. Almost all those roads we visit and almost all the works, and we know that there has been a change. From the disaster it was to what it is today, there is a notable change. But we also know that there is still much more to advance, incomparably more. And that even the best brigades can improve, and that even the best province, which is Las Villas, can improve its work a lot, can improve its work incomparably.

We have seen that where men are imbued with a spirit of development, of progress, of construction, almost one hundred percent of the machines are operational and the works advance.

We hope that this organization continues to improve its work, continues to raise its prestige, and that those days are left behind when saying DAP was almost to say a shameful word, it was to say destroyed equipment, unfinished works, disorganization, waste, inefficiency.

The tireless effort of all will be necessary to raise the prestige of this organization before the nation, before the entire people. A prestige that is commensurate with the spirit of sacrifice that the men who have worked on those difficult works, who have done hard work and who are doing the hardest work, have demonstrated.

We hope that you, in the months and years to come, acquire the utmost prestige before the people, before the opinion of the country. That all of you can feel satisfied and proud to work in this organization. That you can feel the satisfaction of seeing how you transform the country, you can have the satisfaction of being authors and actors of the greatest transformation that has ever taken place in any country in Latin America. At the pace at which we can today build roads, highways, dams, drainage, irrigation systems; at the pace at which we can also build in other fronts: maritime works, aqueducts, sewage systems, with quality, we can be sure that we will be doing work that is not being done in any country in Latin America.

We have the means, we have the resources, we have the men. We are waging a decisive battle, a historic battle. And surely in the future nothing will give you greater satisfaction when talking about the works that are being built today, about the works of highways, roads, dams; when talking about the great rice fields; when talking about Buey, Zaza, Alacranes, Jimaguayú, Pedregal, Leonero, Nipe, Sabanilla, La Yaya, about how many dams are being built and will be built; when we have 15,000 or 20,000 million cubic meters of water stored or discovered in the aquifer and exploited; when this country is crossed by roads from one end to the other; when this country is full of schools, technological institutes, dairies, to which water must be brought, to which production must be guaranteed with water, with roads, with drainage, with dams, knowing that you have been the material authors of that gigantic transformation of our homeland.

The forces of the DAP are organized into brigades. These brigades must be like combat units, battle-hardened, veteran; they must acquire that efficiency that at one time our platoons, our columns, acquired in war. It was a great satisfaction, a great pride for our Rebel Army to know that such and such column was going to fulfill a mission, was going to achieve an objective, and that the objective assigned to it was fulfilled. What most resembles our own organization in war are the brigades: knowing that there in Zaza the "Máximo Gómez" brigade is fighting the battle, building that immense canal and constructing the canal and the dam simultaneously in a record time of two years, storing and creating capacities to distribute 1,000 million cubic meters of water. And knowing that this brigade will fulfill its objective reminds us of when a column was going to fulfill a mission in war. Knowing about the highway brigades, about the men who lead them, about the workers who make them up, that when they are sent to such and such point, and they are asked to fulfill certain missions, knowing that they will fulfill them and that they are imbued with that spirit of work. And fulfilling them reminds us of the men of those years of struggle. Nothing reminds us as much of the struggle, of that struggle in difficult days, as the work you are doing throughout the country, that you are there almost like guerrillas, housed in a camp, dedicated to work for weeks on end, Saturday, Sunday, Monday, at all hours. That is what we used to do. And we see that this force is being created.

But that guerrilla army of ours, when it really learned to carry out its task, when it had acquired experience, had learned to fight and to defeat the enemy, precisely achieves victory. All the men must change their functions, their activities, they must learn anew, start a new, more difficult path; the path of building the country, the path of development. But you do not: you have gained experience in these years. You have, however, many years ahead to use that experience. So when we have this battle-hardened army, well inspired, endowed with the will to develop the country, to fulfill its tasks, all that accumulated experience will serve us in the years to come.

Before us lies the transformation of the country: crossing it with roads from side to side, with dams, with aqueducts, with sewage systems, with hydraulic works of all kinds. That is the task ahead of us. With each passing year, we will accumulate more experience. With each passing year, we will have more cadres and better cadres. With each passing year, we will have more leaders and better leaders. With each passing year, we will have better workers, more conscious workers, more revolutionary workers. And the day when this country can no longer accommodate the works that you are capable of doing in dams, in roads, in highways, a whole continent lies ahead! The day when Cuba is not enough for the powerful force that you can create, other peoples may need our experience! Other peoples may need our experience, our spirit, our example.

Let us remember the brigade that went to build hospitals in Peru. It was a source of pride for our country the work of those workers, who built five hospitals in less than a year. They brought their techniques, their cranes, their prefabricated materials, and they made quality hospitals in record time. And they upheld the name of our country.

We know that we are just beginning. We know that we have much to learn and much to improve in our work; new concepts, new ideas.

Here we talked about what we have to do, what resources we have, what resources we do not have; what to do when a lot of concrete needs to be poured; and the batching plant, where it should be, and the mixer, and in another place the crane and in another place the shovel, the MTZ with a shovel. And new construction techniques. Perfecting our concepts, our criteria. We know that we can advance a lot.

And those regions of the country that had greater problems, do not be discouraged. Camagüey, continue the work. Oriente, continue the work.

We believe that the province of Oriente is close to a constructive explosion, a true explosion of enthusiasm. During our last visit to this province, the mood of the workers, the students, the builders was optimal. We know that when the people of Oriente begin to see the first secondary schools being built... The young people themselves, where the first pieces have barely been placed, are already talking about going to those schools.

We believe that in Oriente the conditions have been created for a true explosion of work, of construction, of progress, of enthusiasm. It is a province that has abundant human resources, abundant natural resources. It is a practically virgin province, where everything is yet to be done, and for that very reason, more can be done, and it can be done better even than in other places.

In the province of Havana, there are many things done in the past, with the criteria of capitalism, or with the initial criteria of the Revolution. Today all the criteria have been perfected, have advanced. And we see that in Oriente anything can be done. In Oriente, moreover, there is all that youth, those 300,000 young people of those years. If we add to that those who should be in higher secondary education, in pre-university education, in technical schools, the mass of young people in Oriente who could one day be in those schools could be 350,000 or 400,000.

When we are in a position to establish those schools; when, for example, there are already more schools than graduates from sixth grade, we can then accelerate those who are behind in school, from fourth, fifth, and sixth grades, and take them to those schools. There will come a time when no young person will escape from that terrible category of young people aged 13, 14, and 15 who neither study nor work. The day we have that, no one will pass into that category because those who are behind in school will go to those schools, and will not pass into a prelumped category, which is that category of 13, 14, and 15-year-olds who neither study nor work.

In that province, there are true conditions. And we want to express to the people of Oriente our conviction that the province is close to a constructive explosion that will allow it to rival or emulate any other province in the country.

At the DESA assembly, criticisms were made. And the results have already been seen, in the honor, in the effort that the people of Oriente have put into social and agricultural constructions, and advances are already visible.

In the same way, we expect from our comrades in the DAP the utmost reaction, the utmost honor, to continue along the path of effort and improvement from the year 1971 and to elevate the constructive spirit of the DAP in that province to its highest levels.

We believe that the best phrase said here in this plenary was said by the comrade from Las Villas when he challenged the others. But he said that if they worked as hard as they did, and if they even surpassed them, they would be happy because it would be a victory for the whole country.

In the same way, we who have spoken of Las Villas, of their effort, of their advances, of their productivity — effort, advances, and productivity that can still be surpassed much more by themselves — we say here that if the province of Oriente, which is a province with 3 million inhabitants, with great human resources and great natural resources, moves forward and manages to win in the emulation against the province of Las Villas, it will be a great victory for the whole country.

And we say that if Brigades One and Two manage to win the emulation, that is, if the One and Two forces from Havana manage to surpass the One, Two, Three, and Four forces from Las Villas, and manage to produce more than them, it will be a great victory for the whole country.

We hope for the day when no province is left behind, when no province falls behind. We hope for the day when all make the same effort. And if one had more productivity than another, it should be because it had either better equipment, or better working conditions, or better overall climate conditions. But we hope that the whole country rises to the level of the best brigades.

And we know that if that is achieved, then we do not know where we can go down that path. We believe, although it is not easy, although we will have to be persistent, although we will have to fight hard, that the day will come when these efficiency figures and these production and productivity figures that have been mentioned here as the best will be left behind.

That is what we expect from you. That is the commitment we expect from you.

So, people of Oriente, what do you say?

People of Camagüey, what do you say?

People of Matanzas, what do you say?

People of Pinar del Río, what do you say?

People of Isla de la Juventud, what do you say?

People of Havana, what do you say?

People of Villa Clara, what do you say?

Then, forward!

Homeland or Death!

We will overcome!