Speech delivered at the solemn evening for the Centenary of the Death in Combat of Major General Ignacio Agramonte Loynaz, Camaguey, on the

Cuba Fidel Castro · President of Cuba

11 May 1973 · Solemn evening for the Centenary of the Death in Combat of Major General Ignacio Agramonte Loynaz · Camagüey, Cuba

Context
Castro addressed a commemorative gathering in Camagüey on May 11, 1973, marking the centenary of the death in combat of independence hero Major General Ignacio Agramonte.
Main themes
Cuban independence struggle, Ignacio Agramonte legacy, slavery in colonial Cuba, Cuban national identity formation, Spanish colonialism, social class divisions, fear of slave uprisings, Haiti's influence on Cuba, annexationism and U.S. interests, Ten Years' War context
Duration
~80 min
97th percentile
Words
9,576
97th percentile
Sentences
402
97th percentile
Readability
44
46th percentile
Grade
13.0
56th percentile
Syntax
3.16
68th percentile
Vocabulary
2.48
95th percentile

Translated from Spanish

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 56%55%
  • Social 16%15%
  • Institutional 15%15%
  • Ceremonial 8%8%
  • Economic 4%4%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 2%

402 sentences in 168 paragraphs

Camagüeyans:

We are gathered here tonight for a historic date, which was bitter and painful in the long struggle of our people for independence: the death in combat of Major General Ignacio Agramonte on May 11, 1873.

Some details surrounding this event remind us of that date, that time. For example, this old hospital where the body of Ignacio Agramonte was laid on May 12 of that year.

To understand the events, the importance of Ignacio Agramonte's life and work in the history of the homeland; to understand the significance of this date, one must go back more than 100 years in the history of Cuba, one must make an effort of imagination. The Camagüey of then was not the Camagüey of today; the Cuba of then was not the Cuba of today; the life of then was not the life of today.

In those years that preceded the start of our first great war for independence, our country was a Spanish colony, where Spain had exercised its sovereignty for more than 350 years. There was no nation, in the sense we have today; nor a people, in the concept we have today. The nation was practically yet to be born. A people with true patriotic consciousness was yet to be formed.

Cuba in those years was terribly divided into social classes. Our land was one of the most backward countries of that time. While in other Spanish-speaking countries slavery had already disappeared decades ago, in Cuba, with a population of just over 1,200,000 inhabitants, there were almost 400,000 slaves. 30% of the population was enslaved! They were part of the properties of the dominant classes! Another significant part of the population was Spanish. It was integrated with the metropolis that dominated and exploited us colonially. The rest of the population was Cuban: the descendants of the ancient Spanish conquerors and colonizers and the descendants of former slaves.

Of course, a part of the Cuban population descended from the ancient Spaniards participated to a significant degree in the wealth. While the Spanish population was fundamentally engaged in commercial and administrative activities, a sector of the Cuban population owned significant wealth, owning sugarcane plantations, sugar mills — which, of course, were very different from the mills of this time —, coffee plantations, and also cattle ranches. At the same time, members of this same population practiced the so-called liberal professions: lawyers, doctors, and others.

That sector of Cuban society had the opportunity to study and to educate itself, it had access to knowledge and — partly also — to the ideas of that time. But it did not participate in any administrative or political management, it had no representation in the government of the country.

This was after approximately 50 years had passed since other Spanish-speaking peoples had liberated themselves; and when — much earlier still — an independent republic had already emerged in North America from the former English colonies.

Sometimes it is striking that our country, as a practically unique case, along with Puerto Rico, had remained so long as a Spanish colony. But it is that we did not even constitute a true nation, in the full sense of the word, at the beginning of the century. And where there is no nation, one cannot speak of the independence of the nation.

Nevertheless, it is true that in 1826, at the Bolivarian Congress, the idea and the need to conquer the independence of Cuba was raised. But also at that time, the resolute opposition of the United States emerged, which had long dreamed of the idea of annexing Cuba to its territory at some point.

But even when that sector of the Cuban population that had access to culture and partly to national wealth considered the idea of independence, it was discouraged and frightened by that odious institution that was slavery.

During the first half of the last century, the Cuban economy had prospered, in a sense as a consequence of the Slave Revolution in Haiti, followed by a struggle that involved the almost total destruction of the wealth in that country. And benefiting in part the Cuban economy from this, sugarcane and coffee plantations developed considerably.

But the development of sugarcane and coffee plantations was inextricably linked to the development of slavery, and for decades the introduction of slaves into Cuba increased extraordinarily; the number of slaves had grown extraordinarily. And the institution of slavery weighed tremendously on the history of Cuba because, in the face of the idea of independence, the fear of slaves arose, the fear of slave uprisings, the fear of the repetition of the events that had taken place in Haiti.

The holders of wealth were virtually a small minority, in front of the enormous number of slaves. And the metropolis, knowing this reality, stirred up fear, and told Cubans that the struggle for independence would be accompanied by the uprising of slaves; and even hinted that, if the struggles for independence began, ultimately it would resort to abolishing slavery and would use the slaves against that Cuban social class that could long for independence. And as these social and economic factors are what determine the course of history, they also determined it in our country, in the sense of prolonging the hour of Cuba's independence.

But this factor was also the foundation and basis for the emergence of one of the most dangerous political currents of that time, the annexationist current, which was linked to the expansionist desires of the United States and the particular interest of the southern states, which aspired to have in Cuba a slave state that would help them with their representation in the Senate to maintain their status quo in the United States.

That current was extremely dangerous, and it was based precisely on the idea that the only way to sweep away the Spanish administration, to rid oneself of Spanish domination, to acquire some political prerogatives, and at the same time maintain slavery, was to unite with the United States.

And naturally, that current was significantly participated in by that Cuban social class that owned the wealth, that owned the sugarcane and coffee plantations, although not all of it. There was always opposition, there were always proponents of opposing views, supporters of the idea that, even if it was necessary to wait a long time before Cuba aspired to independence, the nascent Cuban nationality could not and should not be sacrificed by uniting this land and this people with the United States of North America.

As the years went by, an event emerged that had decisive importance perhaps in the fate of our country, which was the Civil War in the United States, which began in 1862 between the industrial northern states and the slaveholding southern states.

That civil conflict contained the expansionist policy of the United States for a certain period of time, which during and after the war had to invest its energies in the reconstruction of the country. But at the same time, it meant a death blow to the annexationist movement within Cuban society, since the slavery issue was a determining factor in the annexationist idea, that objective could no longer be fulfilled from the moment that, due to the civil war, slavery was abolished in the United States.

It was the time of Lincoln who, without a doubt, earned deserved prestige for his life, conduct, and ideas throughout the world. It was also a moment of considerable political prestige for the United States in the world, and even among the liberal currents in Cuba.

And as the decline of annexationism emerged, another political current began to arise called reformism: the aspiration to obtain from Spain certain political prerogatives, certain changes in favor of Cubans, without war, without independence.

And that current was in full swing years before the outbreak of the war of 1868. Even Spain's actions, with the abrupt frustration of reformist aspirations, are supposed to have directly led to the revolutionary outbreak. But that outbreak could not be an easy or simple thing in the midst of that set of adverse circumstances.

Who could initiate that war with the idea of independence? It could not be precisely the slaves. The slaves were chained, locked in barracks subjected to the worst oppression, without access to study, without access to ideas and political culture, without any social prerogative. It is not that the slaves did not rise up. More than once they rose up and fought heroically against their oppressors. But they were barbarically repressed.

The social sector that could champion the ideas of independence, once the annexationist and reformist movements had failed, was that social sector that had access to national wealth, to study, and to culture. And the representatives of that social sector were the ones who effectively, acting in a progressive and revolutionary manner, initiated the struggle for independence.

But that struggle could not break out in a perfect way, in an idealized manner throughout the country. The factors that would determine the participation of the different regions of the country in that war would be influenced by social circumstances and geographical and topographical circumstances.

It was very difficult for armed struggle to break out in the western part of the country. In the western part of the country was the capital, the center of domination of the metropolis, the bulk of its forces, and the most adverse geographical conditions. But, in addition, it was also the region of the country where there was the most fear of the consequences of the struggle for independence, due to the fact that it was the region with the highest percentage of slaves. 40% of the population in the west was enslaved. 46% of the population in the province of Matanzas, located in this region where sugarcane plantations had developed considerably, was enslaved. There were very few independent farmers, owners of agricultural plots.

The situation was not the same in the eastern region of the country.

The East was the province with the lowest percentage of slaves: 19%. Next was Camagüey, with 21%. And then Las Villas, with 25% of the enslaved population.

It was logical that the leaders of the independence war emerged precisely among those eastern landowners, Camagüeyans, and Villareños, where the social problem of slavery was less frightening. And especially in the eastern region, where slavery was concentrated fundamentally in the regions of Guantánamo and Santiago de Cuba. In the jurisdiction of Bayamo, Manzanillo, Tunas, Holguín, Jiguaní, and Baire — in those jurisdictions is where the war for independence precisely begins — the enslaved population barely reached 6% of the total and the number of modest independent farmers was high.

And, therefore, the leaders of the Cuban sectors were less imbued with those fears that paralyzed Cubans in the western region of the country.

The war had to break out, and it did, precisely in the eastern and central regions.

There were, however, Cubans in favor of independence in the western region. And there was also in Havana a Revolutionary Junta made up fundamentally of those Cubans who had been disappointed by the reformist path. And there were, of course, Revolutionary Juntas in the East, in Camagüey, and in Las Villas.

Those Revolutionary Juntas initiated their contacts, tried to come to an agreement. The representatives of the East and Camagüey met: they agreed on the path of independence and the need to fight for it; but they did not agree on the necessary conditions to initiate the struggle; they did not agree on the date, the moment when that struggle should begin.

But among the Easterners themselves, not everyone agreed on the moment when the struggle for independence should begin. And in that situation, it is a historical fact that Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, in all the meetings that preceded the outbreak, was one of the most determined and most impatient to initiate the combat. He believed that the conditions at that moment were favorable and that Spain should not be given the opportunity to initiate persecution and repression.

And it is in this way that, in the early days of October 1868, Céspedes and other patriots gathered at the El Rosario sugar mill, in the jurisdiction of Manzanillo, agreed to start the struggle on October 14. Later, they found themselves needing to advance it by four days, because the Spanish authorities — it is said — had received news of the conspiratorial activities and were preparing to arrest the revolutionaries.

And thus the war broke out on October 10, 1868, in La Demajagua.

That outbreak surprised the rest of the country; not the Easterners, who had received news of the agreements made at the El Rosario sugar mill. It completely surprised the Camagüeyans, who had no news of those agreements. And it surprised, of course, the rest of the country.

In those days, the main leader of Camagüey was Salvador Cisneros Betancourt, who was precisely in Havana discussing with the Revolutionary Board of that city when the events of October 10 occurred. Thus, a coordinated uprising of the various revolutionary elements in the different regions of the country could not be achieved.

Céspedes' uprising was successful. The flames spread throughout the province of Oriente. They took the city of Bayamo, they took Jiguaní, they took Baire, they attacked Holguín, they attacked Victoria de las Tunas, although they could not take these last two localities. Some Camagüeyans, on their own initiative, rose up as soon as they heard news of the events in Oriente on October 11, 1868.

The Revolutionary Board of Camagüey decided to promote the uprising for November 4 of that year. And indeed, 76 Camagüeyan patriots rose up in arms that day.

But, undoubtedly, the struggle arose independently in Oriente and in Camagüey. In a way, the foundations of the discrepancies that later occurred were laid.

The uprising in Las Villas took place on February 6, 1869.

Neither Cisneros Betancourt nor Ignacio Agramonte were among the 76 that day, because they, as leaders of the Revolutionary Board of Camagüey, had remained in the city responsible for important tasks. However, on November 11, Ignacio Agramonte joined the revolutionary forces that had risen in arms.

But the beginning of the struggle in Camagüey was not easy either. There were some discrepancies among them. Some revolutionary leaders with prestige listened to the promises of the Spaniards, paid attention to peace efforts. The role of Napoleón Arango in those dealings is well known. The influence he exerted was even dangerous.

There was a real danger that a large part of Camagüey would lay down their arms as a result of those negative influences.

But it was precisely at that moment that the figure of Ignacio Agramonte rose, on November 26, 1868, at the meeting in Minas, and he had a decisive participation, an attitude, a gesture. He exclaimed: "Enough of the scheming, the foolish delays, the humiliating demands: Cuba has no other path than to conquer its redemption by wresting it from Spain by the force of arms!"

He managed to prevail with his ideas and rally his companions to the struggle, and the armed uprising in Camagüey was consolidated. That was the first extraordinary service rendered by Ignacio Agramonte to the fight for independence.

It would have been terrible for the rest of the revolutionaries; possibly the uprising in Las Villas would not have occurred, and certainly Spain, concentrating its forces, could have crushed the eastern patriots in a relatively short time if the armed uprising in Camagüey had not been consolidated. And that was undoubtedly the work and merit of Ignacio Agramonte.

Then came, amid that complex situation, other problems, other difficulties regarding how the struggle would be carried out, regarding how the union between easterners, Camagüeyans, and Villareños would be achieved, in relation to the points of disagreement in the conceptions of one and the other.

Céspedes, undoubtedly a revolutionary, an indisputable patriot, when he rose in arms on October 10 had, among other things, the magnificent gesture of granting freedom to his slaves. But at the same time —according to his ideas— what was urgent at that moment was to wage war. He assumed the title of Captain General. He expressed his revolutionary aspirations in the Manifesto of October 10. But essentially he proposed the idea that the Constitution to be adopted and the fundamental social measures should be established once the war was over, once independence was achieved.

The Camagüeyans, led by Agramonte, had other conceptions. They were in favor of organizing the Republic from the very beginning of the struggle. They were in favor of creating republican institutions. They were in favor —in parallel with the war— of changing colonial institutions, colonial legislation, and adopting new laws and new ways of life. They were also opposed to the powers that Carlos Manuel de Céspedes had assumed at the beginning of the struggle.

These were the real, historical facts.

Unfortunately, these differences —natural and inevitable in any struggle— later served as a framework for the adoption of criteria and trends in the approach to historical events, so that later many Cubans showed themselves to be supporters of one or the other: in short, that some Cubans passionately labeled themselves as Céspedes supporters and others as Agramonte supporters.

We understand that this is truly regrettable: it distances men from their true dimension, and distances historical events from the circumstances in which they took place.

It may be easy now to make judgments, to analyze, once historical events have taken place; and to say: "This one was right; this one was not right." Historical facts must be judged very carefully, and they must be analyzed very seriously and on solid bases. But based on those facts, it is undeniable that discrepancies arose that undoubtedly influenced the subsequent course of events.

The Camagüeyans and the easterners made efforts to unite. The Camagüeyans and the easterners made concessions, although it is historically true that the easterners made more concessions than the Camagüeyans.

In Guáimaro, a liberated town, the representatives of Camagüey, Oriente, Las Villas, and Havana met to organize the Republic, to create a constitution, to establish certain forms of government, to reconcile opposing criteria. And there was born the historic Constitution of Guáimaro, the election of the President of the Republic, of a General in Chief, and the establishment of a Chamber of Representatives.

I repeat that we must be extremely careful in judging events and historical facts. But it is a reality that, despite the purity of principles, the patriotism and honesty of the Cubans, those institutions did not function, and under those circumstances they could not function as they had conceived them, as they had idealized them.

It was very difficult for republican institutions to function adequately under those conditions of war. Discrepancies arose between the Executive Power and the Legislative Power, although in reality, and according to the Constitution, the supreme power was held by the Chamber of Representatives, which could appoint and dismiss the President of the Republic, appoint and dismiss the General in Chief, and had full powers to intervene in the course of the war.

Céspedes was in favor of a more centralized command, of concentrating as much power as possible to direct the war. An opposing view prevailed, and undoubtedly, these facts and the complexity of the circumstances brought numerous difficulties.

An adequate synthesis of the best viewpoints of each of the parties would have been ideal.

But we repeat that history is not made at will, it is not made to the measure of men's desires, but of circumstances that often escape the will of men.

In any case, it is admirable that effort, that endeavor to constitute a Republic in the midst of the wilderness, that effort to endow the Republic in the midst of war with its institutions and laws. Whatever the inconveniences, difficulties, and results, the effort was admirable.

There were other important issues being debated. The Revolutionary Committee of Camagüey, and later the Assembly of Representatives of the Center that replaced it, were in favor of immediately abolishing slavery. And indeed, on February 26 —before the meeting in Guáimaro took place— the Assembly of Representatives of the Center decreed the abolition of slavery.

The Camagüeyans —and among them, of course, Agramonte— were not in favor of waiting for the end of the war to legally abolish slavery. They were in favor of abolishing it immediately.

It is true that Céspedes took into account the situation in the west of the country; it is evident that he tried to avoid, at the beginning of the conflict, the inhibition of the Cuban sector in the west. That is why he did not want to decide on his own that important issue immediately. He, for his part, did grant freedom immediately to the slaves he had under his jurisdiction and declared in his manifesto of October 10 that all men should be free and equal.

But the representatives of the center, partly made up of young people with more advanced ideas, more progressive ideas, more radical ideas, were in favor of the immediate legal abolition of slavery, and they abolished it by decree.

However, there was one point where confusion still persisted: it was the issue related to annexationism. The annexationist current was strong in the city of Camagüey. This had its roots in various historical factors, but among these, one of no small importance was the great influence that "El Lugareño," Gaspar Cisneros Betancourt, had exerted among the Cubans of Camagüey, who had founded a newspaper in New York and had been a fervent supporter of the separation from Spain and the union with the United States.

At that time, separatism and independence were not absolutely differentiated for all Cubans. They saw the Spaniard, felt the Spaniard, lived under his oppression, under his abuses, under his injustices, and hated him deeply. They longed, first and foremost, to separate from Spain; but there was still confusion about Cuba's ultimate destiny.

Many Camagüeyans saw El Lugareño as a great patriot. And it is said that when he died at the end of 1866, when he was buried in the city of Camagüey, practically all the Cubans in the city accompanied his remains to the cemetery in a grand display of mourning.

It is natural that his influences still persisted in 1868, and that for a part of the Cubans, but especially for a considerable part of the Camagüeyan Cubans, the idea of separatism and independence was not fully clarified, and that many of them considered annexation as logical and natural.

That is why it is a historical fact, which we should not shy away from, but simply explain, that in the spirit of the members of the Assembly of Representatives of the Center there were certain annexationist tendencies. And indeed, on April 6, four days before the Assembly of Guáimaro, they signed two documents on their own, one addressed to a U.S. senator, Banks, and the other to General Grant, President of the United States, where the idea of annexationism was hinted at.

This point was not addressed in the Assembly of Guáimaro, but a request had been presented, signed by numerous people, in favor of annexationism. And finally, once the Chamber of Representatives was integrated, on April 30, an agreement was signed in which annexation to the United States was proposed.

Undoubtedly, that constituted a historical stain on that Chamber of Representatives, which is explained by the reasons indicated earlier, by the confusion of ideas, by the enormous prestige that Lincoln's figure had at that time, the prestige of Grant himself, who had been a prominent general in the conflict against the South, by the influence that the ideas of El Lugareño still had, and by the influence of some members of that Chamber, coming from Havana, like Antonio Zambrana, who was the one who most ardently and firmly defended that annexationist agreement.

But by those days Ignacio Agramonte was no longer in the Chamber; he was occupied with his military duties at the head of the Camagüeyan forces.

We can say with absolute calm and absolute certainty, and despite the influence exerted by other members of the Assembly of the Center that determined the adoption of certain agreements: Ignacio Agramonte was never an annexationist!

There is no historical precedent in his life, there is no precedent in his ideas and political criteria, that allows the slightest suspicion of annexationism in Ignacio Agramonte. And whoever said those immortal words: "Let our cry be forever independence or death," could not be an annexationist.

But, moreover, even those who then made some mistakes cannot be judged with today's ideas; we cannot, with our current thinking, be judges of the attitudes of those men. It suffices to cite one example: the case of Jerónimo Gutiérrez, representative from Las Villas, who on July 4, 1869, delivered a speech with a frankly annexationist tone. And years later, that same representative, who had been a leader of the uprising in Las Villas, died heroically fighting for the independence of Cuba.

The fact is that those annexationist residues quickly disappeared during the course of the war. The illusions vanished, and the United States and its policy helped to make them disappear.

Barely initiated the conflict, the Spanish navy contracted with American industrialists for the construction of 30 fast gunboats to exercise surveillance around the coasts of Cuba and to impose a blockade.

Naturally, the Cubans in exile, led by Morales Lemus, fought to prevent the United States from delivering those gunboats to Spain. Even on that occasion, the Pera government assisted our compatriots in the diplomatic effort, as the Pacific War between Chile and Peru and Spain had not yet concluded.

Military actions had ceased, but peace had not been signed. And based on those facts, the Peruvians demanded from the United States — with which they maintained diplomatic relations — that those gunboats not be delivered to Spain.

However, at the end of 1869, in a message to Congress, the President of the United States defined the policy regarding Cuba. The Cubans, naturally, aspired to the recognition of belligerency. The United States opposed the recognition of belligerency and agreed to deliver the 30 gunboats to Spain, which, naturally, patrolling the coasts, would hinder the satisfaction of one of the greatest needs that the Cubans had: the need for arms.

Later, in 1870, the President of the United States made a statement openly adverse to the armed Cubans, hostile and absolutely pejorative and unjust. All those events increasingly opened the eyes of the few armed Cubans who had some illusions regarding the United States.

At that time, curiously, the United States was not directing its annexationist ambitions towards Latin America. During those years, they had their eyes set on Canada, aspiring to seize Canada. They had a serious diplomatic conflict with England: they had presented a huge claim for the damages caused by a cruiser called The Alabama, supplied by the English to the Confederates, to the northern states during the course of the war. They had presented against England a huge claim of billions of dollars, and they aspired for England to satisfy that demand by handing over Canada.

It was precisely because of those circumstances, those pretensions regarding Canada and the conflicts they maintained for that reason with England, that the United States adopted that policy regarding Cuba, avoiding at that moment to become hostile to Spain. Had those circumstances not intervened, there is no doubt whatsoever that the United States would have taken advantage of that war of 1868 to try to seize Cuba as they had previously done with Louisiana and Florida and as they wanted to do later with our own homeland at the end of the war of 1895. But their pretensions were different at that moment.

And if we analyze the historical facts as they occurred, today we can say that it was preferable for us that situation; their difficulties with England, that they delivered the gunboats to the Spaniards, that they did not recognize the belligerency of Cuba, and that they did not help us. Because the help of the United States would have been self-interested, and with the sole and exclusive purpose of seizing Cuba when they could still do so.

Those realities dispelled all remaining illusions, gave time for a spirit, a consciousness, a Cuban soul to be forged. They provided an opportunity for the ideal of independence to take root in the hearts of those fighters, of those patriots in a definitive way. And although the struggle was very hard and the road very long, the results are a thousand times preferable to the fate that this land and this people would have had.

These were the circumstances. And it was in this very harsh war that the patriotic consciousness of our people was formed, in which those giants stood out.

It was amid those vicissitudes that the extraordinary personality of Ignacio Agramonte developed.

As we said, he had been appointed chief of the Camagüey forces in mid-1869. He immediately began to organize those forces, successfully fought several battles. But, months later, he went through one of the hardest and most difficult periods of his revolutionary life.

First, while in the fields of battle, he received the news of his father's death, and of the state of abandonment in which his family in the United States, that is, his mother and his brothers, were left. Shortly after, conflicts arose with the Executive, and as a consequence, he submitted his resignation as commander of the Camagüey forces. Weeks later, he suffered the misfortune of having his wife and son captured by Spanish troops. The feelings of affection, tenderness, and love that Agramonte felt for his partner are well known, and he had to endure the harsh blow of seeing her in the hands of the Spanish forces.

But, in addition to that, the region of Camagüey was going through a critical moment in the war: the forces were weakening, the Spanish offensive and repression were intensifying, the betrayal of Napoleón Arango was becoming evident, and even some close friends of Ignacio Agramonte presented themselves to the Spaniards. Those were hard and terrible days of adversity.

But at the same time, Céspedes and Agramonte were gradually coming closer, and there are various events that demonstrate this. Céspedes was proposed to once again appoint Agramonte as chief of the Camagüey forces, and Agramonte was proposed to accept command. And both agreed, and on January 13, 1871, Agramonte assumed command of the Camagüey forces again, which were in a deplorable state. He made it a condition that he be given broad powers and independence to act, and Céspedes granted him those broad powers and that independence. Thus, Agramonte claimed for himself, in order to lead the war at the front of the Camagüeyans, powers similar to those that Céspedes proposed to lead the war for the entire nation. And both agreed on that point, and Agramonte received the powers he demanded. He immediately set to work organizing the Camagüey forces.

It has been written and spoken about his extraordinary qualities as an educator and organizer. Throughout his command, he organized workshops of all kinds to supply the Camagüey forces, organized, disciplined, and trained the cavalry and infantry of Camagüey and Las Villas, instilled a magnificent fighting spirit in those forces, and prepared them for battle. Agramonte himself did not have a military profession; but since the war began, he dedicated himself to military studies, and to teaching the officers and fighters. It is known that wherever there was a camp of Ignacio Agramonte, there was a military instruction center, there was a school.

He instilled in the Camagüeyan patriots his spirit, his example, his extraordinary virtues. And as soon as he took command, he made the Spanish troops see that Camagüey had combat capability, that Camagüey was not demoralized, and that Camagüey was preparing to develop its spirit of resistance, that Camagüey was preparing to carry on the war.

One of his first actions was precisely the attack on the tower of Colón or El Pinto, very close to the city of Camagüey, with the fundamental objective of signaling life to the Spanish forces, and raising morale.

After that, many other battles took place. But above all, there was that event that has gone down in history as one of the most extraordinary military actions; an event that lifted spirits in the Cuban camp in difficult moments, that practically electrified everyone. And it was the rescue of General Julio Sanguily on October 8, 1871.

This event is well known to all Cubans. An unsurpassable feat in which, with 35 men, facing a column composed of forces three times larger, Ignacio Agramonte, as soon as he received the news of Sanguily's capture, gathered the few men nearby, initiated the pursuit of the enemy, instantly attacked, and rescued General Julio Sanguily from Spanish hands — that is, from certain death.

This was undoubtedly one of the greatest feats recorded in our struggles for independence, and it has become a proverbial military event, which at that time even awakened the admiration of the Spanish forces.

There were many battles of Ignacio Agramonte at the head of his troops, and above all, there were many cavalry charges. That action is also remembered, which Martí spoke of, against Captain Setién, that fearsome Spanish chief, known as "The Tiger," who sowed terror and repression in Camagüey, until he encountered the Camagüeyan cavalry under the command of Ignacio Agramonte, who, in a machete charge in which he even personally fought against "The Tiger," destroyed that guerrilla and completely liquidated it, including its leaders.

Throughout the year 1873, numerous battles were fought by the Camagüeyan forces, which were gaining more and more experience, aggressiveness, organization, discipline, and effectiveness, until May 1873, when another notable military event occurred: another Spanish troop was wiped out by Agramonte's cavalry: the forces of Colonel Abril, who died along with other Spanish leaders in a charge by the Camagüeyan cavalry.

It was precisely this military action that motivated the desire for revenge among the Spanish troops, and that motivated the sending of a column of 700 men to Jimaguayú, to try to avenge the defeat. Historical reality shows that at that moment the Spaniards were very far from having the real possibilities of obtaining retribution.

In Ignacio Agramonte's camp were 500 revolutionary soldiers; filled with enthusiasm, filled with morale from the great successes achieved. They knew that terrain like the back of their hand. In that well-defended camp, they had a military instruction school and decided to engage the Spaniards in combat if they truly attacked in force.

Thus, the battle of that day was prepared. In an area of pastures, surrounded by hills, in a rectangular shape — a true death trap for the Spanish troops if they penetrated there, facing Agramonte's battle-hardened soldiers, and especially against their fearsome cavalry — Agramonte gave the pertinent instructions. He gathered with the cavalry. Then he went to inspect the ranks of the infantry of Camagüey and Las Villas, still suspicious that the Spaniards would seriously commit to that military action. And at a certain moment, crossing from one side to the other of the pasture to give instructions to the cavalry, he suddenly encountered a Spanish company, which, without being discovered yet, had penetrated through the Jimaguayú pasture, hiding in the tall guinea grass.

And in those circumstances, unexpectedly, Agramonte — accompanied only by four men from his escort — suddenly found himself in the midst of that Spanish company, which later received the reinforcement of another company, and died in that action from a bullet that pierced his right temple.

That was the battle in which that extraordinary patriot, that extraordinary leader and revolutionary Ignacio Agramonte lost his life.

It is known how the Cubans did not even have the consolation of preserving his corpse. Because when the few survivors of his escort gave the alert, the Cuban cavalry, following Agramonte's previous orders, was already heading to another point. And the curious thing is that the Cubans searched the field for hours, found the corpse of one of Agramonte's aides, did not find Agramonte's corpse, and assumed that the Spaniards had taken him.

And the Spanish column that had retreated, hours later discovered that Agramonte had died there, from the documents that one of their soldiers had seized, and then sent a patrol to retrieve Agramonte's corpse.

Thus, the Spaniards were left with his mortal remains, which they took to the city of Camagüey, precisely to this same site, on May 12, to later take them to the cemetery where they cremated his remains and scattered them. His comrades-in-arms, his family, his compatriots, and his people were left without the consolation of keeping the remains of El Mayor.

The Spanish authorities claimed at that time that they had done so to prevent profanations of that corpse; but there are more than enough reasons to suspect that they wanted to erase all traces of Ignacio Agramonte's corpse, because even after his death they feared him, and did not want to leave his compatriots the flag of his corpse.

These are the painful events that took place on a day like today, 100 years ago.

The consequences of Ignacio Agramonte's death were, naturally, incalculable. They constituted a severe blow to the Camagüeyan revolutionaries and to all Cuban fighters.

Naturally, that success, the result of chance and fortune, emboldened the Spaniards. It is true that those effects were not immediately felt. First, because that was a truly organized and trained troop; and because of the magnificent selection made by the government of Ignacio Agramonte's successor, sending General Máximo Gómez to lead those forces, who was one of the greatest and most capable leaders of our struggle for independence.

No one understood the revolutionary work of Ignacio Agramonte like Máximo Gómez: in the extraordinary quality of those troops, in the extraordinary leaders that Ignacio Agramonte had formed, among them the villager José González Guerra, who wrote extraordinary pages of heroism; Enrique Reeve, ("El Inglesito"), Manuel Suárez, Gregorio Benítez, and many others; that formidable and fearsome cavalry, that battle-hardened and experienced infantry.

Máximo Gómez took command of those forces and immediately resumed combat in the region of Camagüey. But the revolution had lost one of its most promising and brilliant men, at one of the moments when it needed him the most.

A reconciliation had virtually taken place between Céspedes and Agramonte. One more proof: this is demonstrated by the fact that Céspedes, who had reappointed Agramonte as chief of Camagüey, later also made him chief of Las Villas. And Agramonte was preparing to carry out the invasion of Las Villas. This was later accomplished by Máximo Gómez under very difficult conditions: at the beginning of the year 1875, with 700 infantrymen who had only 13 bullets per rifle, 300 cavalrymen from Camagüey, and 150 cavalrymen from Las Villas, he invaded the region of Las Villas, crossed the trocha, and carried out an extraordinary offensive that led his forces to the region of Cienfuegos, facing numerous Spanish troops.

Part of the work that Agramonte had done in Camagüey made that extraordinary campaign of Máximo Gómez in Las Villas possible.

But the death of Ignacio Agramonte had other effects, which were truly painful. That same year of 1873, on October 27, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes was removed from the Presidency of the Republic. Historical events have shown that from that moment, disastrous political events occurred for the Cuban forces. A precedent had been set. Regardless of the mistakes that Carlos Manuel de Céspedes may have made, there is no doubt that that step represented a crucial moment in the Cuban Revolution.

We can ask: would Ignacio Agramonte have agreed with the removal of Carlos Manuel de Céspedes? Would Ignacio Agramonte have accepted that precedent? There is historical evidence that upon the death of Ignacio Agramonte, his feelings and attitude towards Carlos Manuel de Céspedes had changed extraordinarily. And there are letters from Carlos Manuel de Céspedes where he expresses with enthusiasm and gratitude the signs of affection he had received from Ignacio Agramonte during those times.

Following the death of Ignacio Agramonte, another truly unfortunate event occurred: the capture, almost mortally wounded by his own hands — since he preferred death to falling into the hands of the Spanish — of Calixto García Iñiguez, in San Antonio de Baja, jurisdiction of Manzanillo.

These events determined others. First, and before Calixto García was captured, the first seditious attempts had already occurred in the Cuban forces in the jurisdiction of Tunas. A colonel of Vicente García's forces, Sacramento León, had virtually rebelled against the command of Calixto García — who had received command of the Eastern forces. That was the first seditious attempt, against which the Chamber — once again — behaved weakly, because instead of acting, instead of applying the law when it was time, that Chamber — which had been so severe and energetic with Carlos Manuel de Céspedes — showed tolerance towards sedition and decreed an amnesty.

With Ignacio Agramonte dead, Calixto García captured, sedition tolerated and amnestied, what was strange about the events that occurred later, when Vicente García sowed the seeds of discord and sedition in the Cuban field, promoted the events of Lagunas de Varona, and determined the replacement of Salvador Cisneros Betancourt from the Presidency of the Republic? Would these events have occurred if Ignacio Agramonte had not died on May 11 in Jimaguayú? The actions of Máximo Gómez were paralyzed in Las Villas, as a consequence of the paralysis of the eastern reinforcements that, on their way to that province, were stopped and disoriented in Lagunas de Varona. This contributed to the outcome of military operations in the province of Las Villas.

Máximo Gómez, with his natural inhibition — because, despite his extraordinary merits, he always acted with the timidity of not having been born in Cuban territory — with the stellar figures of Ignacio Agramonte and Calixto García gone, without having yet acquired the renown that Maceo and other leaders later had, we can say that Vicente García, who had great merits as a soldier, but who undoubtedly made great mistakes as a patriot and revolutionary, practically became the master of the field. And the worst part is that later, in the most critical days, when the Cuban forces were most exhausted, when Martínez Campos launched his offensive from the West to the East in 1877, again, in Santa Rita, Vicente García promoted his third sedition, bringing complete demoralization to the insurgent ranks, which, in a state of exhaustion and fatigue, faced a very difficult test, becoming victims of those discordances, of those convulsions.

Would those events have occurred if Ignacio Agramonte had not died on May 11, 1873, in Jimaguayú? Those who knew him and all of us who have received impressions, reports, and ideas about his character, his virtues, his integrity, his conduct, are completely sure that Ignacio Agramonte would have been an insurmountable bulwark against those disorientations and those mistakes.

But there is something more: the removal of Carlos Manuel de Céspedes occurs, he is humiliated, and he is even denied the right to leave the country, and he is abandoned in the San Lorenzo area of the Sierra Maestra, near Santiago de Cuba, while he was fiercely pursued by the Spanish, without escort, committing in reality — it is hard to say — a political crime by those same representatives who had been weak against the seditionists, and the death of Céspedes occurs at the hands of the Spanish, despite the fact that it was a foreseen event, of which Cisneros Betancourt became aware, which he informed to the Chamber without it taking any measures, resulting in those painful and lamentable events. Would Ignacio Agramonte have acted this way, so chivalrous, so dignified, so virtuous? Would he have allowed that undignified conduct against Carlos Manuel de Céspedes? No, we are sure he would not! And that is why we said that the death of Ignacio Agramonte constituted a terrible loss for the Cuban Revolution.

And in the midst of those extremely difficult circumstances we spoke of, in the midst of that general demoralization that led to the Pact of Zanjón, another eastern colossus, Antonio Maceo, with his truly immortal gesture, saved the glory, saved the idea, saved the flag.

He knew how to maintain discipline in his troops; he knew how to give an unsurpassed example of order, of sense of duty, of humility, of respect for the law and the institutions of the Republic; he knew how to reject with disdain any suggestion of sedition. And when, like a sea, the Spanish forces advanced from West to East, flooding everything; when the Pact of Zanjón had already been signed on February 10, 1878, Maceo refused to comply with that agreement and continued fighting. Barely recovered from serious wounds, he carried out brilliant and victorious combats against the Spanish forces, and on the very day the Pact of Zanjón was signed, he virtually annihilated the San Quintín Battalion, one of the best units of the Spanish army near Santiago de Cuba.

He met with Martínez Campos in Baraguá on March 14; he signed the immortal Protest, and maintained the war, against all the Spanish forces combined, until May.

These are truly impressive facts of history; facts of such greatness, of such heroism, of such moral, political, ideological, and material merit, that they make all Cubans feel proud of them.

Thus ended that conflict. It is true that it did not culminate in the independence of Cuba, but the blood shed, the sacrifices made, were in no way in vain: they forged the foundations of the homeland, created a soul, created a nation, forged and tempered a people. And in such a way did they revolutionize our country, that things could never return to how they were before. So much so that two years later, Spain was even obliged to officially abolish slavery.

One of the consequences of that war was the definitive disappearance of the odious system of slavery.

And in that tremendous war, the composition of the Cuban people changed completely. At the end of that war, after 10 years of struggle, there was no longer a sector of the Cuban population that possessed wealth. Throughout that war, many families were eliminated, murdered, and the vast majority of them lost their fortunes, in some cases because they rose up in arms against Spain, and in other cases because they were confiscated under any pretext. A large amount of that wealth passed into Spanish hands.

And that is why those who waged the new war, those who fought the war of 1895, constituted another sector of the Cuban population. It was no longer the wealthy sector of our people, since there was no longer even a wealthy sector. They were the cadres, they were the officers, they were the fighters of the Ten Years' War; they were the young people who emerged in the following years, who had been born and had grown up in those years of war. They were the leaders, those who had distinguished themselves in the previous struggle. And those problems of the early years of the war of 1868 did not arise again, because experience had already accumulated. And the Cubans were fortunate to have that extraordinary genius, that patriot who is impossible to measure, whose feelings and talent go far beyond the ordinary: José Martí.

Martí gathered all those experiences, synthesized them, and pointed out the path and the methods by which the definitive war should be carried out. And with his profound and extraordinary long-range vision, he was able to foresee the problems that could arise and the dangers that threatened our homeland.

And what a great difference! By 1895, there was not the slightest trace of confusion. No one at all spoke of annexation. No one had the slightest hope in the United States. And when Martí revealed the innermost part of his thoughts, he said that everything he had done up to that day and was doing was to prevent the United States from taking over Cuba, and that with that force it would further fall upon the brother peoples of Latin America.

And we already had the clear and extraordinary thought of Maceo, synthesized in those two phrases: on one occasion, when someone had suggested the idea of annexation to him, he replied that, although he believed it very unlikely, that would be the only time he would be on the side of the Spanish; or when he said that it was preferable to win or fall without help than to incur debts of gratitude with a powerful neighbor.

How the revolutionary thought of our people had been forming, demonstrating that revolutionary ideas did not come into the world perfect and pure, that revolutionary ideas are acquired by a people along their path and through their experience! And that is why it is so interesting to see how the revolutionary ideas of our people were formed, how they were enriched with the best of universal thought throughout all times to become what they are today.

And one of the things Martí did in 1895, starting from the experience of 1868, starting from reality, was to organize a party. And even before 1895, he organized the Cuban Revolutionary Party to wage war and to lead the revolution. And Martí was elected as a delegate of that Party, with the relevant powers.

Martí made a party — not two parties, nor three parties, nor ten parties — in which we can see the most honorable and legitimate precedent of the glorious Party that today leads our Revolution: the Communist Party of Cuba, which is the union of all revolutionaries, which is the union of all patriots to lead the Revolution and to make the Revolution, to closely unite the people. Because it was disunity that killed the idea of independence in the war of 1868 to 1878, and it was precisely unity that gave victory to our people; unity, which made the war of 1895 possible; and unity, which made the consolidation of the Revolution in 1959 possible.

What would have become of our homeland in the face of the imperialist enemy? What would have become of our homeland in this harsh struggle if we had not united closely? The enemy wanted to divide us.

The enemy wanted to sow discord. But he could not achieve it. And that is why one of the factors that gave our revolutionary process extraordinary strength was unity. And that is why, as in 1895, we are today united in a revolutionary party, because we know that the struggle has not concluded by any means, and that we have a long task ahead.

But today we feel secure, we feel strong, we feel invincible. We know that those historical evils will not return to our homeland. We know that there will be no divisions, we know that there will be no Zanjones, and that the flag of Céspedes, of Agramonte, of Máximo Gómez, the flag of Martí and Maceo, the flag of Baraguá, that flag waves firmly in the hands of our people!

They began that struggle more than 100 years ago. We continue it.

They started to unite the people in the heat of battle. They gave the first cry of Independence or Death. They decreed the abolition of slavery, they made that odious form of the exploitation of man by man disappear, through which some men were the property of others.

And we have eradicated all forms of exploitation of man by man! We have completed that step of Céspedes, when he freed the slaves; and that agreement of the people of Camagüey, when on February 26, 1869, they decreed the abolition of slavery. We have gathered the best of our history, the best of the revolutionary thought of our people, and the best of universal revolutionary thought.

Other ideas prevailed at that time. They were the ideas that were concretized with the French Revolution of 1789. Today there are other ideas, much more advanced, that inspire revolutionaries, and that were the result of their long struggle for liberation — of which that French Revolution was but a stage — and that are the ideas of socialism and the aspiration to create the true brotherhood society that is the communist society.

Those are our beautiful flags today.

And how useful it is to delve into the extraordinary history of our people! How many teachings, how many lessons, how many examples, what an inexhaustible quarry of heroism! Because no people on this continent fought more for their freedom than the Cuban people. No people suffered more, no people sacrificed more.

There were a few hundred thousand inhabitants. The Cuban population itself barely reached a million, discounting the Spaniards and those in their service. In the Ten Years' War alone, 80,000 Spanish soldiers died on this land; in the Ten Years' War alone, Spain mobilized 200,000 soldiers against our people. Spain mobilized more soldiers against the people of Cuba in our struggles for independence than it mobilized in the entire rest of the continent combined.

Against that power, against that force, our compatriots faced. Against that power, against that force, Ignacio Agramonte and the men of his generation fought. Against that force, our people fought and paid a very high price of blood, sacrifice, and tears.

And our people resisted it. And in the face of setbacks, they did not think of abandoning the struggle, but were more determined than ever to continue it.

And the riches of Cuba were exterminated, and the populations were devastated. Horrific crimes of all kinds were committed: from the murder of those Camagüeyan sisters, Juana and Mercedes Mora, with all their children, to the unspeakable execution of the medical students. Crimes of that kind, similar crimes were committed by the thousands, by the tens of thousands, but they did not manage to crush the idea of independence, the idea of freedom in our people. There was no force. And there will be none! There was no power. And there will be none!

And this centenary today is a lesson, because on a day like today Ignacio Agramonte died. And on a day like tomorrow, they cremated his remains and scattered them in the air. It is said that his corpse was desecrated. It is said that a barbarian struck him with a whip when they brought him to the city of Camagüey, dead for hours. They did not allow them to pay the slightest tribute to their desolate companions. They were not allowed to see the remains. Even the Cubans were not allowed to see the victory in 1878; they were not allowed to see the victory in 1895. However, none of that could prevent the unstoppable advance or the definitive victory of our homeland.

A hundred years ago they scattered the remains of Ignacio Agramonte, without the slightest respect. But on a day like today, almost nine million Cubans pay the tribute and homage he deserves!

On a day like today, our victorious Revolutionary Armed Forces in the Sierra and in Girón pay tribute. On a day like today, our troops parade through the place where he fell. On a day like today, our planes, our tanks, our cannons, our weapons — that are revolutionary weapons and liberating weapons like those he organized, like those he forged! — pay their respect.

And if we want to know how our tanks should be in the hour of combat: they must be like the Camagüeyan cavalry of Ignacio Agramonte in the rescue of Sanguily!

Today we do not have cavalry. Today we have tanks. And they will be in combat, if the time comes to defend the homeland, as the fighters of Ignacio Agramonte were against the "Tigers," against the "Abriles," and against any enemy.

This is the lesson we can gather on a day like today. And we, the Cubans of this generation, must be inspired by those examples, and fight!

Our immediate tasks are different: it is the fight against backwardness, it is the fight against poverty, it is the fight against underdevelopment. There lies our most immediate objective; there lies our struggle.

Just as they watered the fields of the homeland, the fields of Camagüey, with their blood, let us water them with schools, let us water them with hospitals, with housing, let us water them with factories and farms in these Camagüeyan fields!

And if we lift our gaze in this province, we see how they are already being built by the dozens. And we can say with satisfaction that each year we can remember dozens of glorious names with the schools that are being built in this single province.

And if we want to know how the Camagüeyans should be in this fight against poverty, in this fight for development, in this fight for the Revolution: Like the soldiers of Ignacio Agramonte! And charge with the machete, as his glorious cavalry charged in that epic struggle!

Long live the glorious heroes of the homeland!

Long live the immortal memory of Ignacio Agramonte!

Homeland or Death!

We will overcome!