Speech delivered at the solemn event commemorating the 30th Anniversary of the Triumph of the Revolution, in Santiago de Cuba, on January 1, 1989.

Cuba Fidel Castro · President of Cuba

1 January 1989 · Solemn event commemorating the 30th Anniversary of the Triumph of the Revolution · Santiago de Cuba

Context
Castro addressed a crowd in Santiago de Cuba's main square on January 1, 1989, commemorating the 30th anniversary of the Cuban Revolution's triumph.
Main themes
30th anniversary of the Cuban Revolution, January 1 1959 triumph, Santiago de Cuba, revolutionary struggle, Batista's fall, military history of the revolution, defense of victory, General Cantillo negotiations, Sierra Maestra campaign, Cuban people's sacrifice, historic memory, future generations
Duration
~63 min
96th percentile
Words
7,467
96th percentile
Sentences
199
89th percentile
Readability
36
26th percentile
Grade
17.5
91st percentile
Syntax
3.63
97th percentile
Vocabulary
2.20
49th percentile

Translated from Spanish

Content
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The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 72%71%
  • Ceremonial 12%12%
  • Social 10%10%
  • Institutional 4%4%
  • Economic 3%3%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 1%

199 sentences in 85 paragraphs

Compatriots of Santiago and all of Cuba —I believe that is how I addressed you the first time after the triumph of the Revolution—:

It was decided to hold the official commemoration of the 30th anniversary in the City of Havana. It had been a long time since such an event had taken place in the capital; we also did not want to face the difficulties of commemorating in the city of Santiago de Cuba, where a great effort would have been necessary for the transportation and accommodation of the numerous guests who would participate in that commemoration, but I proposed to the comrades who were organizing the anniversary program the idea of visiting Santiago on this day and at this hour as a truly special wish. It seemed to me that we would not be commemorating the 30th anniversary well if we did not at least meet here with the people of Santiago to convey to them a fraternal greeting.

I do not come to recount the grand task carried out by the people of the province of Santiago de Cuba over these 30 years; that was done a few months ago, on July 26; I have not come to recount the work of the Revolution in 30 years; I remember that was done when the 25th anniversary was celebrated and at the moment when Santiago de Cuba was proclaimed Hero City and decorated. I came to share with you this glorious day and to remember with you that date, from this very balcony, and in this very square, where 30 years ago we celebrated victory, in an act perhaps not as solemn, perhaps not as well organized as this one —you will understand how those moments were—, but truly moving and historic; I think many remember it and that many will have heard about it from their parents or teachers. Truly, that was a historic day, and I think it will also be an unforgettable day, not only for us —it is explained— but also for future generations.

January 1 was not only the culmination of a long struggle by our people over many years, over almost 100 years at that time; we did not only perceive victory that day, it was not only the day of victory, it was also a day of great decisions, fundamental decisions, and a day of great definitions, a day of great teachings, a day of great learning, because on January 1, victory was not only achieved, but it was also necessary to defend the victory.

In the early hours of that day in 1959, while we were in the town of Contramaestre —more precisely at the sugar mill located there—, we received what we could call the first rumors that the regime had collapsed, or rather that Batista had fled. It was not long before those news began to be confirmed. We immediately realized what was happening, since this was preceded by a series of important events.

The war was already won. Three days earlier, an interview had taken place that had been requested, previously, around December 25, by the head of the enemy troops in the eastern region of the country, General Eulogio Cantillo. This officer was not characterized by being repressive or by bloody acts, and, in the interest of historical truth, it must be said that during the time he was directing operations, and especially during the last offensive against the Sierra Maestra, this military man was not characterized by bloody repression; rather, he was regarded as a relatively decent military man.

There had already been some exchanges of communications with him at other times, fundamentally related to the release of enemy prisoners in the hands of our troops, before and after the offensive. Even before the offensive, he had sent a seemingly chivalrous message, expressing his concern and regret for that operation, which in his opinion was unbearable, irresistible, that he was about to launch with 10,000 soldiers, and the support of artillery, armored units, and, above all, aviation, against our strongholds in the Sierra Maestra. He even expressed that it saddened him to think that people he considered valuable would be lost.

We thanked him very modestly, and with great modesty, we told him that we were waiting for his army in the Sierra Maestra and that, of course, if they managed to overcome the stubborn resistance they would encounter and exterminated every last rebel, he should not grieve over it, since someday even the children of the very soldiers who fought against us would look at the Sierra Maestra with admiration. I did not want to tell him what we were sure would happen, that the offensive would be defeated, despite the extremely small number of men we had at that moment, which did not even reach 300, and that is why I said that with modesty we thanked him and conveyed that response.

Later, there had been other contacts, especially at the end of the offensive, which turned into a military disaster for the tyranny; in the return of enemy prisoners, contacts were made again. So there were these precedents.

Throughout the war, on numerous occasions, we sent messages to the troops and to some leaders of the Batista army. Around December 25, this military man requested to meet with us, the meeting took place on the 28th. We were already preparing to advance on Santiago de Cuba, and he told us that they had lost the war —they frankly acknowledged it— and that they were willing to put an end to the conflict. We told him that the issue now was to see the practical way to end the war, and in reality, we were generous with them, because we told him: the army has sunk, perhaps a number of military personnel who have not been complicit in the crimes can be saved, and I proposed that to end the conflict in a decent way, there should be a rising of the troops from the eastern province —the former eastern province—, fundamentally the troops of the garrison of Santiago de Cuba, and that we would give it the form of a revolutionary-military movement that would end the conflict, adding that such an act would immediately lead to the collapse of the tyranny.

We warned him, as we had always warned throughout the struggle, that we were resolutely against any coup d'état. That was a constant preaching throughout our war, based on the experience of Latin America and Cuba itself, where great struggles took place against tyrannical governments, and at a certain moment, a group of military men would always appear overthrowing the government and presenting themselves as saviors of the country.

Taking that experience into account, throughout the war we maintained a policy of rejection, condemnation, and discouragement of any military coup, and we had warned that if a military coup occurred, we would continue the war. We made these statements at different times, we made them when we had 100 men, when we had 150, when we had 200, and we reiterated them until the end of the war. The agreement was reached to carry out the uprising in Santiago de Cuba at 3:00 PM on December 31. That military man insisted on traveling to Havana; we were opposed to him traveling to Havana; he claimed that he had a significant number of contacts, he even argued that he had a close relative in an important military position —he was in charge of one of the western regiments—; we advised him not to make the trip; he insisted on the necessity of the trip, on the convenience of the trip, so we warned him of three things: first, that we did not want a coup d'état in the capital; second, that we did not want any collaboration to help Batista escape; third, that we did not want contact with the American embassy. Those were three things we warned him about and that we said we would not accept; he solemnly committed not to do any of the three things.

He traveled to the capital —perhaps that same day or the next— and then strange news began to arrive, confusing messages that we had to wait —that we had to wait at least until January 6. Of course, we were not willing to accept that change in the agreements we had reached, since our troops were advancing everywhere, conquering city after city, the retreat of almost all the troops in the former eastern province was cut off, and we saw that it was the opportune moment to liberate the city of Santiago de Cuba, to deal the final blow to the regime in the city of Santiago de Cuba. We were not going to wait six or seven days for these optimal conditions to be wasted. It was always a principle of the rebel forces not to lose a single day, a minute, or a second, and, above all, not to waste the most psychological moments, and therefore we sent a message to the one who remained as chief of the garrison, expressing that we did not accept unilateral changes to the agreements reached nor the confusing explanations that were given to us, and that if the garrison did not rise in the afternoon of the 31st, operations against the city of Santiago de Cuba would begin.

This was clearly warned, and indeed, the forces were moving towards Santiago de Cuba when, in the early hours of the first day, the news we were speaking about earlier emerged.

What did the Army want to do at the last moment, undoubtedly advised by the United States? Carry out a coup d'état, confuse the people by saying: "Batista is gone, the tyranny is over, a democratic era begins," maintaining the military apparatus, maintaining the system, and thus preventing the triumph of the Revolution. It was a crude attempt to repeat in the history of our country what had already happened before and what had happened so many times in many countries in Latin America. So we were not surprised by what was happening.

Furthermore, I understand that our people, through the constant preaching that was done throughout the period of the war and through the broadcasts of Radio Rebelde, were also alert to this situation.

They carried out the coup, helped Batista escape, and conspired with the American embassy. They proclaimed a government to take charge of the situation. It should not be forgotten that on the first day a government was proclaimed. The coup plotters appointed a magistrate of the Supreme Court, named Piedra, as president of the republic. In reality, that government did not even take office.

That same day, the decision was made, without losing a minute, without losing a second, to denounce the coup and give instructions to all the rebel forces to continue operations; we did not want a single minute of truce between the revolutionary forces and the enemy forces.

On that first of January, an event took place that we had already foreseen on July 26, 1953; in our plans, following the attack on Moncada, was to call the people to a general revolutionary strike, and that morning the time had come, precisely, to call for the general revolutionary strike. I believe that constituted an exceptional event. All the unions were in the hands of official leaders committed to the tyranny; there was no official leadership organization of the unions working with the Revolution.

From Radio Rebelde, immediately after denouncing the coup and giving instructions to the leaders of the rebel columns, the people were called to the general strike. At the same time, a proclamation was transmitted for Santiago de Cuba, with instructions for the city to be completely paralyzed from 3:00 PM, except for the power plant to maintain communication with the population, and we warned them that we would proceed to attack the city. All those decisions were made successively throughout the day of January 1.

Camilo and Che were given instructions to proceed towards the capital without stopping, without giving truce, while the rebels approached Santiago de Cuba. Even, a reconnaissance group that was sent along the Central Highway received orders that as soon as they reached the hill of Quintero, where an enemy battalion was stationed, they should give them five minutes to surrender or open fire; there could be no truce.

In that situation, we were approaching the city of Santiago de Cuba from the north, from Palma Soriano, when the first contacts requested by the leaders of the Santiago de Cuba garrison emerged. The police chief immediately joined; the commanders of two frigates, quite powerful due to their armament, that were in the port of Santiago de Cuba, joined; the head of the Naval District joined, and the leaders of the garrison tried to contact us. This was happening in the afternoon. The first contacts were made, and I told the chief of the Santiago de Cuba garrison that I wanted to meet with all the officers of the garrison.

Those steps were very important because we did not know what was going to happen in the capital: if they managed to maintain the loyalty of a large part of the army, if there would have to be fighting in the capital of the republic, because the coup plotters could count on a significant part of the officer corps and the troops.

The ability to liberate the city of Santiago de Cuba was of enormous importance; being able to seize the weaponry that was here in Santiago de Cuba was decisive, in our view; and above all, to save blood, because undoubtedly the fighting would have been violent.

We estimated that the fighting around Santiago de Cuba — this is before the coup — would last about a week. We had already prepared the uprising of the city in the final phase of the battle; more than 100 weapons had been introduced into it, from the last ones occupied in Palma Soriano. We already had all the ideas on how to carry out the operations concerning Santiago de Cuba, which would have culminated successfully, without a doubt, but which would have cost a number of lives, perhaps a high number of lives.

That is why I believe it was decisive, fundamental, and something for which we had to strive, to occupy the city without fighting if possible; if there was no other alternative, to carry it out by fighting, but the circumstances that made violent fighting around and inside Santiago de Cuba unnecessary were fortunate.

Anyone might suppose that the revolutionaries had the desire to take the Moncada barracks and surrender it by force, as we surrendered many other enemy positions; but in those circumstances, no one should be carried away by emotions and must try to resolve the objectives with the least possible cost in lives. And that happened that day.

If one analyzes things from a distance, one realizes that the enemy army had lost all capacity for resistance at that moment; the demoralization was already total. In fact, it happened that the patrol reached the hill of Quintero, continued on, no one resisted, arrived, and penetrated the Moncada barracks.

It so happened that comrade Raúl went there to organize the meeting agreed upon with the officers of the Santiago de Cuba garrison, entered the barracks, spoke to the officers, took out a portrait of Batista, tore it in front of all of them, and also spoke to the troops. He went with the officers to the meeting they had with me. We did not propose surrender to them — because, I repeat, the situation was very confusing at that moment — we did not want to humiliate them; we proposed that they condemn the military coup. I denounced the maneuver of the coup plotters; I denounced who had been their chief up to that moment, Cantillo; I informed them of the agreements we had reached, the breaches that had occurred; I urged them to disobey Cantillo's orders and join us, and they accepted. I would say it was really a generous proposal on our part and, moreover, absolutely correct, since the events in the rest of the country were not yet defined.

We were interested in the frigates, we were interested in the tanks and the artillery that were in Santiago de Cuba, and we were also interested in those who knew how to handle those weapons.

Although that force had already lost all capacity for resistance, the enemy continued to maneuver. They sent a plane to Isla de Pinos — that was its name then — to look for a group of officers who had conspired against Batista, mainly to look for a colonel who, in fact, was not involved with Batista, had acquired some prestige precisely for having opposed him, for having conspired, and they had him imprisoned there on the Island. Since that officer had another aura and had fought against the regime, they sent for him in an attempt to rally the army. The group was called "Los puros," as it was known nationally.

They sent for Barquín, who also had a lot of friendship and relations with the Yankees; they took him to Columbia and handed him command of the army — all of this on the very first day.

They carried out this movement in combination with the American embassy. And, indeed, the man arrived at the Columbia camp in the evening hours.

When we were gathered here with the people of Santiago de Cuba, the situation had still not been decided, although Camilo and Che were advancing towards the capital in the evening hours. It would be necessary to historically specify at what exact minute they set out; but I do remember, although I cannot specify the exact time when this colonel, the new chief of the army in place of Cantillo — Cantillo stepped aside and handed command to this officer — wanted to communicate with me by phone, and I responded that at the Columbia camp I would only speak with Camilo when he was in command of it.

All these events were occurring that night; and we, as soon as we finished the act here in the Plaza, took the tanks, took the artillery, and advanced towards Bayamo. We had to see what was happening with the troops in Bayamo; the situation was not totally defined, and it was not known what could happen; we were accumulating forces. Upon arriving in Bayamo, I met with those troops, spoke to them, and they joined us; there they had heavier tanks and larger caliber artillery. All of this was happening around January 3 in the morning hours. I was coming towards Havana with a column of 1,000 rebels and 2,000 Batista soldiers, the artillery, and the tanks.

Although journalists and historians have done many investigations, have done very good work collecting historical events from those days, I think it is necessary to specify more things and more details: at what time did Camilo leave for the capital, at what time did Che leave, what day and exact time did he arrive at the Columbia camp and La Cabaña respectively, at what moment did they control the situation there.

So on the 2nd, while our forces were heading towards the capital as quickly as possible, in view of what could happen there, the troops of Camilo and Che were advancing along the road and surrendering garrisons without fighting. The coup plotters' attempt to bring out a leader, a figure from prison who could rally the army and lift the morale of the army was of no use.

I do not remember the exact date, but by the 3rd things began to become defined, and it became evident that there would be no more resistance. Of course, responding to the call of the Rebel Army, through Radio Rebelde, a general strike occurred, and the country was paralyzed from one end to the other in an impressive manner.

That strike played a very important role; it was a tremendous blow, it finished demoralizing the enemy forces, saved blood, saved lives. The workers of the radio and television chains tuned in to Radio Rebelde, and at one point Radio Rebelde was broadcasting to the entire country by radio and television, through all the stations. The people mobilized everywhere and in the capital itself.

All these were important events because they helped to liquidate the enemy maneuver and allowed for the victory of the Revolution, the full and total victory.

It can be said that within 72 hours all the garrisons in the country were controlled and the weapons were in the hands of the people; in a few days, tens of thousands of comrades were armed. It could be said that the army was disarmed, if not totally, because some units remained armed — especially those units that had agreed to support us — those that committed to us and that for a time kept their weapons, until in a later period of the Revolution it became impossible to keep them armed, when imperialist conspiracies and counter-revolutionary plans began in our country.

Camilo and Che fulfilled their missions, and at a certain moment they already had control of the military forces of the capital. Then our journey to Havana transformed more into a political tour than a military one.

All those things, or the vast majority of these things that I have mentioned, occurred on the first of January; it was not only the day of victory, but the day of the counterattack, of the counterblow, of the general strike, of the advance, to defend the victory; that is why it was a day of fundamental decisions and important definitions.

In recalling all this, I do so with the intention of highlighting the important role that the city of Santiago de Cuba played that day; the fact of knowing — as the enemy knew — that they faced a combative, rebellious, heroic population was a very important factor in the softening of the morale of the Batista troops stationed in Santiago de Cuba.

There were about 5,000 men; the forces with which we prepared to take the city were 1,200. No one should really think that was few; it was going to be the time when we would have the most troops, it was going to be the time when we would have the best ratio between enemy troops and our troops: we had just over one for every five enemy soldiers. We always employed the tactic, of course, not of facing one against five; we would strike in parts and create situations on the ground that were favorable to our forces.

But we counted two armies: the Rebel Army and the army of the people, the men, the women, the workers, the students, the youth of Santiago de Cuba, and that pressure the enemy could not withstand.

That fact and what happened in Santiago de Cuba on the afternoon of January 1, the popular overflow of the city, the impressive act of that night, the denunciation we made of everything that had happened, of the disloyalty of that military chief, of the maneuver, played a very large role in those events and must have considerably influenced the total demoralization of the enemy forces also in the capital of the republic, which was 900 kilometers away. But our small army, quick, energetic, had also advanced those 900 kilometers.

I have often tried to calculate — it is not easy to do so accurately — how many men with weapons of war we had that first of January; it was around 3,000; the forces of the Batista army, including the Navy and the Police, were at that moment around 80,000. So I want to highlight the role not only of the combatants but the role of the people and the workers that day.

It is not that the city had been liberated passively and was only dedicated to applauding or expressing joy; the city had had a prolonged participation, of many years, to make that day of liberation possible. Although our people also had a lot of participation over the years, active and heroic everywhere and, of course, also in the capital of the republic, due to a series of historical circumstances, Santiago became a protagonist of great importance in that struggle.

Other cities like Bayamo, like Manzanillo, like Guantánamo, also played important roles throughout our war of liberation; but in Santiago we had begun our struggle on July 26, 1953, and since then the solidarity of Santiago with the Revolution began to express itself.

Santiago had influenced us even before July 26, because when the coup d'état of March 10 occurred, the only city in Cuba where there were significant popular movements and where the coup of March 10 took the longest to consolidate was Santiago de Cuba.

Santiago had influenced us, we can say, throughout our lives, as the eastern provinces did, due to their prominent role in the history of our homeland. That history begins even when there was no nation, when foreign invaders occupied the island. It was here in these eastern regions where the indigenous people, extraordinarily peaceful and kind as they were, offered the first example of bravery and heroism in the face of foreign invasion. The first cities were founded here, and when the germs already existed, when the feelings of nationality began to form, the struggles for independence began in these provinces. The first and second wars of independence — the third, if one wants, in the case of including the "little war" — all those events take place in the eastern provinces. The cities of these provinces played a singular role in our liberating struggles and, among them, prominently, Santiago de Cuba.

In this eastern region, the former province of Oriente, one of the most admirable, astonishing, and instructive events in our history took place, the Protest of Baraguá; it was led by a son of this city of Santiago de Cuba: Antonio Maceo. From this city came that group of lions, the children of Mariana Grajales and many other illustrious fighters and patriots.

Those eastern traditions played a great role in the history of our country. I believe that one of the successes of our generation and our revolutionary group was to be convinced that those traditions of struggle, dignity, rebellion, love for freedom and independence remained alive in this region of the country. We thought that such feelings existed throughout the country, of course; but that here, in these eastern regions, they were maintained with more strength. It was a success because it helped us to direct our struggle, to select the stage and geography of our struggles, the ideal topographical stage and the human stage of our struggles, which were closely united here.

These are not words to be spoken in Santiago de Cuba on the first of January; many years ago, more than 30 years ago, they were evidenced by the facts, because when we organized with Western youth, magnificent, selfless, disciplined, brave, heroic young people, the attack on the Moncada, we only recruited one Santiago native. This was related, of course, to the idea of misinformation, to the idea of removing all suspicion regarding our plans; but we had chosen precisely Santiago de Cuba and the garrison of Santiago de Cuba to attack, simply for one reason: if we did not recruit Santiago natives, what was the reason? Simply because we counted on the city of Santiago de Cuba, with all the Santiago natives, from the very beginning.

We knew that we would have the support of Santiago de Cuba; otherwise, what sense would it have made to attack the Moncada and try to seize thousands of weapons? For whom were those weapons? For the Santiago natives. Such was our confidence in the heroic traditions, in the bravery, in the spirit of rebellion of this city, that it influenced us even long before the Moncada, because it was the part of the homeland that we knew best, it was the part of the homeland where a good part of our childhood developed, the part of the homeland with which a great part of our best feelings and our affection was linked. But Santiago de Cuba and the eastern region influenced long before we were born; they influenced the life of the country, they influenced the history of the country.

I have always thought that one of the most beautiful, most glorious histories is the history that our people have written over more than 100 years. And I believe that if there was a heroic war, a war much more heroic than any other war, that was our Ten Years' War; an equally extraordinary war was the last of our wars for independence in the last century. And I believe that this rich, wonderful spring of history, we must make it known, let the children, the adolescents, the students, the youth, the people know it; that it is never forgotten, because from that history emerged the Cuba of today.

Many times I have explained to foreign visitors how Cuba was the last to free itself from Spain, how at the moment when Bolívar, San Martín, O'Higgins, Sucre, Hidalgo, Morelos, and so many other patriots were writing the history of the independence of America — which was a huge world that fought united against colonialism in tumultuous moments of the history of Spain, in moments when the Napoleonic invasion had occurred and when, even, a French king had been imposed in Spain — in that exceptional juncture, the movement for the independence of Latin America began, and all those countries fighting, more or less simultaneously, achieved independence. And at that time Cuba was a slave society, Cuba was a slave society! There were hundreds of thousands of slaves, mainly in the western region of the country; the Spaniards were the owners of the administration and commerce, they had absolute control of the armed forces and internal order; and the so-called criollos were the owners of the sugar and coffee plantations, they did not want to hear anything about independence, they were terrified by the idea of independence, especially after the uprising of the slaves in Haiti, which was, by the way, the first country in Latin America to free itself before Bolívar, long before Bolívar; it rose up against the powerful French empire, against none other than the troops of Napoleon Bonaparte. And here the criollos lived terrified by the idea that a similar uprising could occur, and they thought that anything that dreamed of independence endangered their privileges as a privileged social class.

That is the origin of annexationism; it was at that time that a whole social sector began to look to the North. It was those circumstances that also originated an annexationist sentiment on the part of the United States; it was the southern states in contradiction with the industrial states of the northeast; the southern states, which opposed the cessation of slavery and wanted to have a slave state more associated with the United States.

In the past, when they deceived us in every possible way, they told us, for example, that Narciso López had been a precursor of independence; and, in reality, later historical truth proved that Narciso López arrived in Cuba stimulated, sponsored, and supplied by the slaveholding states of the southern United States, and that there were no such ideals or independence purposes, but rather annexationist purposes. Fate wanted the defeat of those expeditions to help the future independence of the homeland.

That flag that we salute with so much respect, with such deserved and profound respect, was first raised by the annexationists. And today it is our sovereign flag because our independence fighters made it sovereign, they made it heroic, they made it immortal starting in 1868.

See what lessons history offers, when confusion reigns, what things can happen; however, our people were able to emerge from all that confusion. The annexationist movement lasted a long time, and the annexationist sentiment continued, even, in a certain way throughout the republic. What are all those who abandoned the homeland, all those bourgeois, landowners, rich sectors or confused sectors, or confused people, but the reminiscence of that time of slavery, when the rich did not even want a homeland?

Nevertheless, in our history, outstanding men emerged, men who, despite having wealth, wanted a homeland, and were willing to sacrifice wealth for the homeland, such as: Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, Vicente Aguilera, Ignacio Agramonte, and many others. They began their liberating struggles here, in these provinces, which were where there was less slavery; the vast majority of the slaves were in the western region of the country, which was where the sugar and coffee plantations had developed the most in the first half of the last century.

The independence struggles begin here, where there were more free peasants, fewer slaveholders, where the rich are less reactionary, where those landowners were able to develop a national sentiment, an idea of national identity and an idea of the homeland; although when the War of Independence began, there was still a certain confusion in Cuban political thought, which manifested itself in the first months of the war of 1868 — we have already spoken about this topic on another occasion, on the occasion of the centenary of the Grito de Yara. But see the importance of ideas, of concepts, of clarity of thought at each of the decisive moments in history; because there are still, even, remnants of those times, although to an infinitely lesser degree. Above all, once again, the identification between the interests of exploiting classes and anti-patriotic feelings, pro-imperialist feelings occurs. Hence the importance of history and the importance of ideas.

I believe that a day like today it is right to remember how noble and patriotic ideas, rooted in the population of the eastern regions of the country, played a fundamental, decisive role in the last war of liberation.

I had forgotten to mention, among the great historical events that originated in this province, the immortal feat of the invasion led by the troops of Maceo and Máximo Gómez.

All these facts and all these factors produced a tremendous influence on our history and a tremendous influence on our last struggle for liberation. I think that on that first of January 1959, all these ideas and all these feelings come together and are synthesized.

It must be said that this spirit has continued throughout these 30 years. What made possible the historical feat of the internationalist missions of our revolutionary people? What made possible the conduct of our men in Cuito Cuanavale, the impetuous advance of our forces on the southwestern front of Angola, the victorious actions of Techipa, Calueque, and others, which led to the recently signed peace agreements? What made possible this wonderful internationalist spirit, this selflessness, this exemplary solidarity of our people, of the Cubans, their conduct in the face of every difficult task, in the face of every challenge? It was those feelings that began to be sown in Yara, those patriotic feelings and, in addition to patriotic, internationalist feelings; those feelings that were sown in Baraguá, those feelings that continued in Baire, those feelings that continued in the Moncada and the "Granma," and that emerged brightly on that first of January 1959.

The history of a country is not written in a day, the feelings of a country are not forged in a day. Our feelings and our history were not forged in a day; but I do have the conviction that those feelings have been able to reach a very high degree, a very high degree! of which today we can be proud, and I am sure that our ancestors, those who fought in our wars of independence, our mambises who sowed that fertile seed, those who fought and fell throughout our history, those who fought and fell in the Moncada, in the "Granma," and in the Sierra Maestra, and those who have given their generous contribution of blood in the noble and unsurpassed internationalist missions carried out by our people would also be proud of it.

The heroic and glorious Protest of Baraguá was not in vain, when it taught us revolutionary intransigence, when it taught us loyalty to principles; the blood shed by Martí was not in vain, when it also taught us revolutionary intransigence and loyalty to principles. I am sure that they dreamed of a people like this.

That is the meaning of a first of January, which no matter how much it is mentioned or repeated, one does not come to grasp in all its moral and historical dimension. In light of this, all the more reason it gives us satisfaction that flag, that title of Hero City granted to this city and with it to the eastern provinces of the country.

Today we remember that XXX anniversary, perhaps more calmly than that day, but more aware than ever of our strength, more believing than ever in the infinite moral qualities of our people, more convinced than ever that these provinces will be invincible bastions of the Revolution, as all of Cuba is today, where the seed of your example grew abundantly; more united than ever our peoples with these historical ties, which is not in vain that the city of Havana sent us Martí, fallen in Dos Ríos, whose remains are kept with such love in this city, and it is not in vain that Santiago sent to Havana Antonio Maceo, whose remains are today like a temple for our western compatriots.

That is why, comrades of Santiago, veterans of our struggles, young men and women, adolescents, students, workers, eastern fighters, we are very pleased, very pleased, that here, in the city of Santiago de Cuba, we begin the fourth decade of the victorious Revolution.

Those who dream that the Revolution can ever be defeated are mistaken; those who dream such delusions ignore that this Revolution, which is the continuation of the history of our homeland, its highest stage — we could say — will reach 40, will reach 50, will reach 60, and will reach 100 years, and many more years, of that we have no doubt.

Perhaps it will be necessary to renovate this building more than once, perhaps it will be necessary to strengthen these balconies, but I have no doubt that at each of those historical dates at 40, at 50, at 60, at 100 years of Revolution, someone will come here to speak to you about the first of January 1959 What were we on that first of January, apart from the bravery, the courage of our people and our fighters; apart from the yearning for freedom, apart from the desire to build a new homeland?

How many engineers did we have, how many designers, how many agronomists, how many veterinarians, how many teachers, how many professors, how many doctors, how many specialists, how many officials, how many cadres, how many members of the Party and of our Youth, how many unions, how many mass organizations? None of this did we have when we faced one of the most glorious pages of our history, which have been these 30 years, in what began as a struggle against the privileged in our country, against the puppets, against the mercenary army, against landowners, landlords, and exploiters of all kinds, and ended up being the struggle against aggression, threats, blockades, and the powers of the most powerful empire in the history of humanity. Here we are, because we have known how to resist these 30 years, what perhaps very few believed, what perhaps no one in the world could imagine; here we are after 30 years of hard, brave, intelligent struggle of our people in the face of all threats and against all risks, that was our greatest feat. And with what we have today, we could not even dream then; there are hundreds of thousands of teachers, professors, technicians; tens of thousands of engineers, designers, agronomists, specialists of all kinds; tens of thousands of doctors we have today to look after the health of our people, ten times more than the doctors who left us here at the triumph of the Revolution. We possess an enormous intellectual and technical force, a healthy, vigorous, magnificent youth that has been able to write the feats of these decades; a youth that I am sure is getting better and better and is increasingly capable of firmness and heroism.

With that and with the extraordinary experience accumulated by our people in these 30 years, we have what we need to face the future, and if much has been done — mistakes aside, deficiencies aside — it is more what we will be able to do in the future, because I am sure that with what we have today, we can turn every year into two years, into three years, into four years. That is what we are trying to do at this moment.

That first of January was a day of definitions, in which something had to be said that still needed to be said, because the history of deception had been very long, the history of politicians throughout the mediated republic had been very long; it had to be said that this time it was serious, that a coup d'état could not be confused with a revolution, one of the great things that our people learned that first of January, as they confronted the maneuver and dismantled it; because our people wanted change, our people wanted a revolution, and the changes had to be deep, the changes had to be fundamental, the society of exploitation had to disappear, and to the people we said: This time the Revolution has triumphed, this time the postulates of the Revolution will be fulfilled!

I will never forget that this was the essence of what we proposed on the first of January, how following the events of the attack on Moncada, the essential principles and primary objectives of our Revolution were proclaimed, twice here in Santiago de Cuba: there, in the room of a hospital when we were judged for the events of Moncada, and here on the first of January. Today, with the deepest conviction, I say that our Revolution will move forward, our true Revolution because it is a socialist revolution and because it is a Marxist-Leninist revolution.

Socialism, something that could not even be spoken of yet on the first of January, in the midst of the McCarthyist spirit that had prevailed in this hemisphere and the frantic anti-communism of the media and orientation organs of the people and all the bourgeois institutions, in the midst of the existing confusion. But it did not take long for the Revolution to speak of socialism, because if it was said: there will be a true revolution, there could be no true revolution in our country that was not socialist. That is why on April 16, just two and a half years after the first of January and when our fighters were preparing to face the mercenary invasion, and perhaps the imperialist aggression, the socialist character of our Revolution was proclaimed. And not long after, it was not only spoken of socialism, but the Marxist-Leninist character of our socialist Revolution was proclaimed.

Today, 30 years after that first of January, we can assure that our people will always be faithful to the principles of socialism! that our people will always be loyal to the principles of Marxism-Leninism! that our people will always be loyal to the principles of internationalism! That unwaveringly faithful to those principles we will fight and work to make our Revolution better every day, to make it more efficient every day, to make it more perfect every day.

And in these times of confusion in which our Revolution, which so frightens the reactionaries in the world and which so frightens the empire, stands as a beacon of light before the eyes of the world; in these moments and on this first of January, we can affirm that we are aware of the enormous responsibility that our revolutionary process has today before the peoples of the world, before the workers of the world, and fundamentally before the peoples of the Third World, and that we will always know how to be up to that responsibility.

That is why, with more strength than ever, let us say today: Socialism or death! Marxism-Leninism or death! that is what today means what we have repeated so many times over the years:

Homeland or Death!

We will overcome!