Joint statement by Mr. François Hollande, President of the Republic, and Mr. David Cameron, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and Mrs. Angela Merkel, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, on the agreement on Iranian nuclear issues, September 10, 2015.

France François Hollande · President of France

10 September 2015

Context
Hollande, Cameron, and Merkel issued a joint statement urging U.S. Congressional support for the Iran nuclear deal reached by the P5+1 powers in 2015.
Main themes
Iranian nuclear agreement, nuclear non-proliferation, diplomatic negotiations, sanctions relief, IAEA verification, uranium enrichment restrictions, plutonium pathway closure, Middle East regional security, Israel's security, Iran's nuclear program, ISIS and common threats, reimposition of sanctions
Duration
~5 min
18th percentile
Words
657
18th percentile
Sentences
28
16th percentile
Readability
32
21st percentile
Grade
14.6
72nd percentile
Syntax
3.18
71st percentile
Vocabulary
2.30
74th percentile

Translated from French

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 100%96%
  • Economic 0%0%
  • Social 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Institutional 0%0%
  • Ceremonial 0%0%
  • Not in focus 4%

28 sentences in 10 paragraphs

The American Congress will vote this week on the support it will provide or not to the agreement that our countries, along with the United States, Russia, and China, have reached with Iran to limit its nuclear program. The moment is important. In a time of increasing uncertainty, this is a major opportunity to demonstrate what diplomacy can achieve.

For more than ten years, the Iranian nuclear program has been a source of concern. Iran has maintained that its objectives are strictly civilian: all countries have the right, under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Yet, over the past two years, we have faced an alarming expansion of the Iranian program: a growing stockpile of uranium, partly enriched to 20%; an increase in the number of centrifuges, with more efficient next-generation equipment; a deeply buried enrichment facility at Fordow; and the near completion at Arak of a research reactor capable of producing military-grade plutonium. And of course, the IAEA had only limited visibility on certain aspects of the Iranian program.

The threat was serious not only for the security of Iran's neighbors and for Israel but also for our countries. A nuclear arms race in the Middle East would have been a new devastating factor in an already unstable regional situation.

Our common responsibility was to confront this threat. The long history of unsuccessful nuclear negotiations with Iran hardly led to optimism. But two years of arduous and in-depth negotiations resulted in an agreement that closes all possible pathways to an Iranian nuclear weapon in exchange for a gradual lifting of nuclear-related sanctions.

We fully support this agreement because it achieves the objectives we set. It closes the pathway of enriched uranium that could be used to make a bomb by requiring Iran to reduce its stock by 98%, to decrease the number of its centrifuges by two-thirds, to limit the enrichment level of uranium, and to cease using the buried site at Fordow for enrichment. It closes the pathway of plutonium through modifications that must be made to the Arak reactor so that it can no longer produce military-grade plutonium. Finally, the IAEA will have broader access, not only to Iranian nuclear facilities and the entire fuel cycle but also, if necessary, to any undeclared site.

In return, nuclear-related sanctions will be gradually eased but only to the extent that Iran fulfills its commitments and the IAEA is able to verify this. We have also agreed on provisions for the reimposition of sanctions if Iran significantly violates this agreement.

This is not an agreement based on trust, or on any hypothetical evolution of Iran in ten or fifteen years. It is based on meticulous, detailed, verifiable, and long-term controls. Iran will have serious incentives not to cheat: the near certainty of being caught in the act and the ensuing consequences would make this option a losing choice.

We unequivocally condemn Iran's non-recognition of Israel's existence as well as the unacceptable language of Iranian leaders regarding Israel. Israel's security is, and will remain, a matter of the utmost importance to us. We would not have concluded this nuclear agreement with Iran if we did not believe it eliminates a threat that weighed on the region as well as on the non-proliferation regime as a whole.

We did not conclude the nuclear agreement in the hope that Iran's foreign policy will change in the near future. But this agreement addresses the threat posed by the Iranian nuclear program and can make Iran aware that cooperation with its neighbors is preferable to confrontation: although we do not share the same interests as Iran, we face some common challenges, including the threat posed by ISIS.

We are convinced that this agreement provides the basis for the definitive resolution of the issue of the Iranian nuclear program. That is why we want to implement it fully once all national procedures are completed.