Speech by Federal President Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier at the 27th Scientific Congress of the German Association for Political Science on September 26, 2018, in Frankfurt am Main:

Germany Frank-Walter Steinmeier · Federal President of Germany

30 September 2018 · 27th Scientific Congress of the German Association for Political Science · Frankfurt am Main, Germany

Context
Steinmeier addressed the 27th Scientific Congress of the German Association for Political Science in Frankfurt am Main on September 26, 2018, discussing democracy's challenges and history.
Main themes
Crisis of liberal democracy, German political science history, Frankfurt School and critical theory, role of the Federal President, pluralism and democratic theory, authoritarian tendencies, political education, Ernst Fraenkel and Franz Neumann, Weimar Republic intellectual legacy, post-democracy, limits and future of democracy
Duration
~28 min
80th percentile
Words
3,349
80th percentile
Sentences
135
77th percentile
Readability
28
14th percentile
Grade
15.3
78th percentile
Syntax
3.35
86th percentile
Vocabulary
2.25
61st percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 72%71%
  • Social 10%10%
  • Ceremonial 10%10%
  • Geopolitical 7%7%
  • Economic 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 1%

135 sentences in 52 paragraphs

When the Federal President gives a speech at a congress of political scientists, in a sense, a research subject speaks to the researchers, an object of observation to its observers.

I am, of course, aware that studies on the election, the office, or even the person of the head of state – how shall I put it – do not exactly dominate the debate in your field. On the contrary, the Federal President tends to lead a shadowy existence in political science consideration. Even in standard works on government studies, he is usually allotted only a few pages, often just before the index.

However, a few essays and panel papers have indeed been published in recent years, and from this political science evaluation of the Federal President, the incumbent can certainly learn a great deal. For example, that he should not see himself merely as a "figurehead," "monarchical artifact," or "state notary" – one breathes a sigh of relief – but as a "co-guardian" of the constitution, indeed even as a "subsequent and case-specific veto player" in the "contingent separation-of-powers game."

At this point, one is already quite deep into political science, and when it is further stated that the extensive political science disregard and contempt for the office of the Federal President is not justified, since the Federal President – at least depending on the situation and context – can indeed be a highly interesting political actor, one thinks: "At least!" Relief sets in, and one is happy to be observed participating in the congress of the German Association for Political Science.

But seriously: I am pleased to be here with you today. Thank you very much for the invitation! I am particularly glad that you are holding your congress on the limits and future of democracy here in Frankfurt. For this city, where the Parliament of the Paulskirche convened 170 years ago, uniquely represents the freedom movements of German history, the bold departure of courageous citizens into political modernity. It also stands for a tradition in the humanities and social sciences of critical diagnosis of the times, which was primarily shaped during the Weimar Republic by German-Jewish intellectuals. All of this makes Frankfurt an outstanding place of democracy in Germany.

Here at this university, sociologists such as Franz Oppenheimer and Karl Mannheim worked; here, Hugo Sinzheimer developed modern labor law, Hermann Heller the concept of the "social state," and at the Institute for Social Research, Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, and many others laid the foundation for a scientific program that later became not only world-famous as the "Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School" but also an international enterprise – as Rolf Wiggershaus has written. An enlightenment project that aimed to expose the roots of the "authoritarian character" and thereby recognize the dangers of nationalist dictatorship, which – we must admit today – are not completely banished.

In this city, two founding fathers of German political science also received their intellectual shaping: In the 1920s, Franz Neumann and Ernst Fraenkel studied at the then still young Frankfurt University before later teaching in Berlin, among other places, at the German School of Politics, as convinced democrats and defenders of the republic. Both fled from the Nazis to American exile, and both contributed in the early years of the Federal Republic to establishing political science as a "science of democracy" at universities.

Back then, in a time of transition, political science was supposed to lay the intellectual foundations for a stable development of parliamentary democracy and contribute to political education. It was primarily Ernst Fraenkel, with his theory of pluralism, who significantly contributed to the development of a modern, liberal understanding of democracy in West Germany.

I find it important that we keep the memory of this tradition of humanistic, enlightenment, and democratic thinking alive. Remembering also means continually making intellectual resources for the future fruitful again. And especially here in Frankfurt, we encounter truly fascinating chapters of intellectual history, to which our democracy and German political science owe much, but which also have much to say for the future.

To become current: There is hardly a day in these months when someone in politics, media, or academia does not declare the existential crisis of liberal democracy or even prophesy the downfall of the democratic era. A reference to Francis Fukuyama and the end of the end of history is just as unavoidable as the thesis by Colin Crouch that we have long been living in the age of "post-democracy."

And it is indeed true: The new fascination with the authoritarian, the challenge to liberal achievements, the revived resentments against parties and politicians that we are also experiencing in Europe – all of this gives cause for great concern.

Even in our country, we are currently observing the phenomenon of perpetual outrage, a socio-moral rage with which groups are pitted against each other in a culture war. And we are experiencing the recently reasserted contempt for our political order as a "system." A contempt that is usually nothing more than a frontal attack on liberal democracy and its institutions.

I would therefore have no objection if the public dirges on democracy at least served as a wake-up call for all democrats. But sometimes I have the impression that large parts of the debate are driven by a strange lust for downfall.

As much as liberal democracy, the rule of law, and the rules-based world order are under pressure: especially in times of upheaval, hysteria and alarmism are of little use. Or more precisely: They could have dangerous side effects. For one can also declare democracy sick and talk it into depression. I believe we should not underestimate the power of destructive thinking in any case. Too many people feel comfortable in denigrating our country and our democracy!

Moreover, some who invoke the end of democracy conflate and mix very different phenomena in their analyses and interpretations. When "democracy" and its supposedly global threat are discussed, the altitude is often so high that the subject of the debate can no longer be sharply recognized.

Those who want to defend democracies today against antiliberal and authoritarian challenges must look closely and listen even more closely. They must want to understand what is really happening in our diverse societies and political orders, and what we can change and, above all, improve together.

Technological upheavals, cultural tensions, social inequalities, ecological questions of humanity, and international conflicts – all of this will challenge our political order in the coming years and decades. In this time, democratic politics must prove itself. It must think further, it must act more boldly – especially now. And this concerns us all: in society, in political offices, but also in academia.

I want to take up a question that has been on my mind not just since yesterday and the day before and that is also being studied and discussed in your field. I am concerned with the coexistence and opposition of populist and technocratic tendencies in political thinking and action.

We are currently witnessing how representative party democracy is being questioned from two opposing sides. Both populist and technocratic voices – however much their motives and goals differ – both doubt the usefulness and value of parties, parliaments, and representative procedures.

Populist criticism of representative party democracy primarily stems from the widespread feeling that a political elite in established parties, parliaments, and governments on both sides of the national state has become disconnected from the "people" and no longer represents its interests. And we know and hear it every day: The establishment, or more recently also the system, includes media, courts, or central banks, and of course also academia.

Of course, not everyone who dislikes established parties, is dissatisfied with the government, or is angry with politics and expresses this discontent is a populist. For me, the crucial point is that populists claim to be the sole representatives of a supposedly true and unified will of the people. "We are the people; the others are not" – that is the necessary consequence. Anyone who is not for them is considered an illegitimate opponent, a traitor, or an enemy.

The political confrontation in the representative procedure, the mediation and balancing of conflicting interests through compromises – all of this is seen as unnecessary or even harmful from a populist perspective. For the supposedly true will of the people should assert itself as directly and unrestrictedly as possible, if necessary even without regard for liberal achievements such as the separation of powers, the rule of law, and civil liberties.

That is precisely why populist ideas must necessarily be anti-pluralistic, even anti-political, as we are currently observing, and ultimately they lead to a majority rule without an open-ended process of opinion formation and without legal constraints.

We all know that this is not just theoretical play. Populist forces are gaining traction in many liberal democracies, not least – we need only look across borders and also a little at ourselves – in Europe. Even within the European Union, which we like to defend as a community of values, we must witness how elected governments disdain or even restrict classic liberal achievements, such as the protection of minorities, the independence of the courts, and the freedom of science and the media.

Here, political science, here you are called upon to ensure clarity of terms and to enlighten about lies. This is, as I understand it, also part of your profession. I think, to put it more precisely: An "illiberal democracy" is a contradiction in itself. There can, as Jan-Werner Müller just wrote a few days ago in the Frankfurter Allgemeine, be "no democracy without political fundamental rights and intact media pluralism as well as effective legal protection of this infrastructure for collective will formation."

Rule in democracy is not unlimited, but temporarily granted and bound by fundamental rights, and it does not exhaust itself in plebiscitary acclamation without the rule of law and minority protection, as some apparently would like it now. In short: Democracy is either liberal or it is not. For our democracy, the form of government of open societies, knows and protects the people in all its diversity. In democracy, the people "only appears in the plural," as Jürgen Habermas has written. It "does not form a subject with will and consciousness," and it is "as a whole (also) neither capable of decision nor action."

Political subjects are rather the citizens with their diverse interests, beliefs, and backgrounds. They legitimize the state through public confrontations, of course through elections and procedures. But anyone who claims to know the true will of the people and derives an absolute claim to power from it is necessarily mistaken. Or, to put it more appropriately for a Federal President: He cannot invoke the constituted democracy of the Basic Law.

I find it important that we raise our voices when the term democracy is misused and instrumentalized today to justify anti-democratic, anti-rule-of-law politics. And here, politics is called for, but I believe you are also called for: We should sharpen the term democracy again and not leave it to those who pursue illiberal or authoritarian goals to manipulate.

We also know that representative party democracy today is embedded in a global, increasingly complex web of institutions and international agreements. Political decisions, from which citizens are just as affected as by decisions of national governments and parliaments, are also made in European and increasingly international expert committees, commissions, central banks, or courts. And these institutions are not – or not primarily – legitimized through democratic participation and public confrontation, but through expertise and the protection of individual rights.

In this way, as Michael Zürn has written, the liberal elements of democracy can be strengthened, while the republican elements are simultaneously weakened – and there may even be reasons for this in our complex world. However, I believe it remains a particularly important task for political science to question the legitimacy of governance and decisions, and to seek possibilities for democratization beyond the nation-state.

An erosion of popular sovereignty through the diffusion of power, whether in supranational authorities or among global economic actors, provokes populist counter-movements, or at least can provoke them. The protectionist slogan "take back control" was able to gain such momentum also because the question of legitimacy in many decisions was unclear. The deeper the intervention in people's lives, the clearer the democratic legitimacy must be – this guiding principle, which is all too familiar to us, has lost none of its validity.

What worries me no less are technocratic voices that no longer see parliaments as places for political decisions, that relativize the meaning and value of representative party democracy, that want to restrict democratic procedures, and instead further strengthen expert committees.

This technocratic critique of representative democracy actually approaches the issue in a way that is quite the opposite of populism. From their perspective, democratic parties and politicians are not distant and aloof; rather, the accusation is that they are driven far too much by the constantly expressed sentiments of voters. Because they align their policies primarily with short-term particular interests, representative institutions are increasingly unable to effectively address the big future questions, such as climate change.

From a technocratic point of view, therefore, democratic procedures should be accompanied, displaced, or replaced by expert committees, in which it is not about balancing interests and compromise, but – and this initially sounds honorable – about efficiency and optimization. Experts are to find the supposedly right solutions for the complex problems of our time using scientific methods, which then only need to be implemented in the interest of the common good and future generations.

Just like populists, technocrats want to remove political decisions from representative procedures and the multifaceted societal discourse in order to achieve faster and better decisions. However, unlike populists, they do not rely on an allegedly true "will of the people," but on expertise in politically distant institutions. And in the end, technocratic ideas lead to something that Yascha Mounk has called "undemocratic liberalism."

Some time ago, I had the opportunity to discuss the future of the West with several interlocutors in our small series "Forum Bellevue on the Future of Democracy" at Schloss Bellevue. Among them was the Indian-American political scientist Parag Khanna. He criticized Western democracies and said, in essence: "You will ultimately fail because you invest all your strength in legitimizing through procedures. You care a lot about the 'input' into democracy, but do not understand that in the end you must legitimize decisions that will only be acknowledged and valued by citizens if they first come quickly and second actually help in substance."

Behind this lies a certain appreciation for the governance and state model in Singapore. What can be clearly seen in his criticism is a contrast that we find more frequently today in the political science literature: between input-oriented and output-oriented legitimacy of democracy. And I fear that in the end, output-oriented democracy, which no longer takes democratic procedures into account, will be a special case of technocracy.

This is the second threat to democracy that we should recognize. Just as democracy cannot be unrestrained majority rule, it cannot be only expertise without public discourse, without exchange between citizens and decision-makers, and without accountability to voters.

Populist and technocratic ideas fall behind the insight that the great achievement of representative democracy is to peacefully integrate the conflicting interests that exist in every society and increasingly in modern societies.

But if we want to defend representative democracy in these times, it is not enough to uphold values and shout "business as usual!" Populist and technocratic criticism can also draw our attention to grievances and deficiencies – for example, that the concerns of certain population groups are not or not sufficiently taken into account in established procedures and that the resolution of political problems has remained unsatisfactory.

The parties should confront this criticism, reduce the distance to citizens, and seek engagement with their voters. I believe that this dialogue is essential and irreplaceable in democracy. However, we must also have the courage to explore new paths, to take risks, to develop new forms of participation. New paths that do not simply shift responsibility away from democratic institutions, but improve and enrich representative procedures.

I personally remain skeptical whether parliaments and representative democracy will be strengthened in their authority if, as often suggested by advocates of direct democracy, the sensitive decisions are precisely taken away from them. Whether this benefits representative democracy and parliaments remains an open question for me that has yet to be answered.

Nevertheless, experiments with new forms of participation are not an admission of weakness. On the contrary: The edifice of democracy is never fully constructed. It is precisely the strength of democracy that it is capable of self-criticism and self-improvement. And precisely because it can question itself, it is also the only form of government that can renew itself.

The limits of democracy that this congress addresses should not be understood as a fortification behind which we retreat to escape danger. Rather, we should focus on re-examining the future and expanding the boundaries and experiential spaces of democracy.

What I wish for is a broad debate about democracy – about its meaning, its value, about experiences and expectations, possibilities and limits. A debate that includes "the other" and with the "right to justification," as is said here in Frankfurt.

With "Germany speaks" – you may have followed this over the past weekend – "Zeit online" and several other media partners have created a new forum that attempts to bring people of differing opinions into conversation across the entire republic. I gladly took on the patronage of this initiative because it has created a model opportunity to bridge divides and mediate between different life worlds. How else, if not through societal self-understanding, shall we renew and strengthen the democratic consensus in our country?

And for such a debate, we need political science, now more than ever. Not as a rehash of the democracy science of the past, but as a professional and diverse discipline that examines in detail, but also keeps an eye on the big questions of our time – and ideally succeeds in linking empirical analyses with normative arguments.

What we need is a creative and courageous political science that informs and inspires current discourses about democracy, that can contribute with passion and judgment to the enlightenment of society about itself.

In any case, I hope that you will engage even more in public debates, that you will take a stand on the great questions of the time. And I believe that as experts in democracy, you should not shy away from explaining complex political processes. This includes translating research findings into a language that can be understood outside of academia and political consulting.

I know that such engagement does not necessarily advance one in the career logic of the academic world. And I also know that young researchers are under great pressure to publish scholarly articles or write project proposals. But especially in these times, when liberal democracy is under challenge, we need political science not only in the ivory tower but also as a strong voice in a democratic public!

Therefore, I want to make a very small "call for papers" today: Together with the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, I want to invite young political scientists to submit articles on the topic "Democracy of the Future" – not footnote-laden scholarly articles, mind you, but suggestions for the general public and for the broader discussion, which really needs such suggestions.

We agree with the editors of the Frankfurter Allgemeine that the best, most relevant, and most original contributions from your research will then be published in the "Frankfurter Allgemeine Woche." And besides hopefully many readers, I also look forward to discussing these, your impulses, with you on another occasion. Because democracy today needs not only steadfast defenders but also clever, new idea generators. This time is a test for democracy, and therefore it must also be an hour for political science!