Speech by Federal President Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier during his inaugural visit to the Federal Constitutional Court on June 21, 2017, in Berlin:

Germany Frank-Walter Steinmeier · Federal President of Germany

26 June 2017 · Inaugural visit to the Federal Constitutional Court · Federal Constitutional Court, Berlin, Germany

Context
Steinmeier addressed the Federal Constitutional Court during his inaugural visit within his first 100 days as Federal President on June 21, 2017, in Berlin.
Main themes
Federal Constitutional Court, rule of law, Basic Law and constitutional safeguards, fundamental rights enforcement, democratic institutions, legal culture, constitutional organs cooperation, certainty of expectation, judicial independence, bonum commune, German constitutional development
Duration
~15 min
50th percentile
Words
1,739
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Sentences
70
46th percentile
Readability
40
36th percentile
Grade
13.5
62nd percentile
Syntax
3.14
65th percentile
Vocabulary
2.12
32nd percentile

Translated from German

Content
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Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 67%66%
  • Ceremonial 16%16%
  • Social 10%10%
  • Geopolitical 7%7%
  • Economic 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 1%

70 sentences in 17 paragraphs

A few years ago, I read a wonderful article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung titled "Appreciative Interaction of the Constitutional Organs." I am here to tell you: I want to contribute my part so that we can recognize this as a result of our collaboration in a few years. What Günter Bannas may have wanted to note somewhat ironically in his article touches, at least in my conviction, on a very essential point in our constitutional life: The Basic Law establishes a system of mutual moderation and control to keep conflicts between political actors in orderly channels or, where necessary, to steer them. Yes, we know that conflict is not the normal case of our political life and constitutional life.

But the Basic Law cannot, at least not exclusively, deal with this normal case. Aware of the tensions between democratic institutions, but perhaps even more from painful experiences, the Basic Law builds on rule-of-law safeguards. The most effective of these is the Federal Constitutional Court, and not only in disputes between the constitutional organs. No, it enables — and this is not a given even in democratic states in Europe — citizens to have state actions controlled against the standard of the constitution. But beyond these institutional safeguards, our constitution — this is my firm conviction — expects the constitutional organs not to act consciously against each other, but to work together for the bonum commune.

Now, appreciative interaction is significantly shaped by practices and rules, and I suspect that among these unwritten rules is also the regular visit of the Federal President to the Federal Constitutional Court, preferably early in his term. I can now tell you that this has been achieved within the first 100 days of my new office. I am therefore very happy to be here today and I appreciate that you — dear Mr. Voßkuhle — have welcomed me very warmly, along with many of your fellow judges, most of whom I no longer know from my university practice due to their average age, but I have certainly seen and been able to discuss with some of you during previous encounters between the Federal Constitutional Court and the Federal Government. And I am, of course, also here because I recognize the particularly great significance of the Federal Constitutional Court for our legal culture, for the legal consciousness of our population, the shaping power for the constitutional development of our country — a significance that extends far beyond the borders of our country, as I can assure you from my experience in previous offices.

You know, I have traveled a bit around the world before my life as Federal President. And on these trips, I have been asked more than once: What actually accounts for the success of the German rule of law? The question seems simple, but the answer is not entirely trivial.

Law is, first and foremost, an achievement and a cultural accomplishment. A look around the world shows us, however, that this cultural achievement is not as pronounced everywhere as it is with us. So what makes the attractiveness of the rule of law?

I believe, first and foremost, that law creates certainty of expectation. Legal norms shape coexistence; yes, they also direct people's behavior. But adherence to legal norms avoids something that is very important in coexistence: The law provides security even in private matters; it does not allow people to become powerless objects of structures or even the arbitrariness of individuals. This applies in particular to constitutional provisions: They give us the certainty that our freedom will not be restricted tomorrow, that citizens will not be silenced, or that people will be tortured because they have a different religion, for example. And those who violate rules must — and this applies to everyone — expect consequences.

The foundation for this is loyalty to the law and legal obedience, that is, the willingness to actually adhere to rules. And this law-abiding behavior permeates our society from private contracts to the relationship of citizens to the state, but also among state actors themselves. The basic trust of citizens is supported by the fact that they can seek their rights before independent state courts — that is, before institutions that, because they are independent of political influence, can orient themselves solely by the law in their decisions. And this system of "rule of law" is completed by the fact that the Federal Constitutional Court not only decides on disputes between the constitutional organs but also primarily offers citizens the opportunity to assert their fundamental rights: Fundamental rights are not only written on patient paper but are also ready for enforcement. Fundamental rights can be enforced!

If I currently emphasize the "can," then, Mr. President, one might wonder whether this actually supports the success and reputation of the Federal Constitutional Court: Because according to statistics, the determination of unconstitutional, because fundamental rights-violating, state behavior is by no means the order of the day, but rather the exception. What is crucial, I believe, is something else: that legislators and the government know that the Federal Constitutional Court does not shy away from decisions with unpleasant, sometimes far-reaching consequences. Where you see misdevelopments and the need for correction, you draw clear boundaries, and you have done so repeatedly in the past: Most recently, politics felt this with your decision on the nuclear fuel tax law.

In addition, you have repeatedly emphasized the rights of Parliament against the government and have continually re-established this balance between the legislative and executive branches under ever-changing governments or politically practical conditions. With your decisions, for example, on information rights in connection with the European Stability Mechanism or arms export permits, you have simultaneously strengthened democracy as such. You have shown the government: Cutting back on democracy ultimately proves to be too "costly." All of this ultimately leads to the fact that the mere existence of the Constitutional Court unfolds a kind of "constitutional prevention" that prompts state organs to understand the constitution not merely as a mere orientation for political action but to take the content and limits of the constitution seriously when determining the scope for political action. The success of the Federal Constitutional Court does not consist in declaring as many laws, decisions, or state actions unconstitutional as possible. Rather, its existence and its correction options ensure that the state order in Germany predominantly functions according to the provisions of the constitution.

We have already spoken about resistance against the Federal Constitutional Court. It has faced criticism time and again. However, this has not diminished its popularity and the trust it enjoys among citizens. And you have always endured the criticism, knowing and knowing how to deal with it appropriately and confidently, even in public.

The rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, judicial and constitutional review of state actions — a review to which even the legislator is subject — are achievements that elevate our constitutional system and stabilize it in a very special way. They are even completely indispensable because they — in my conviction — are a core essence of the free rule of law. And therefore, it is hardly surprising that dictatorial or authoritarian regimes often restrict the independence of the courts as one of their first steps, adjust rule-of-law standards to their systems of rule, and replace independent officials with more or less compliant ones. Institutional safeguards alone are not enough. It is therefore important to me that it is precisely the rule-of-law consciousness, not only of civil society but especially of the officials, that matters. Every woman and every man must show "attitude" where they stand. And we know from our own history how little self-evident that is.

How important an independent judiciary is in this sense and how much authoritarian systems strive to eliminate this independent legal control as quickly as possible is unfortunately evident in recent developments, not only outside the borders of the European Union. It does not correspond to our Western values development and legal culture if the safeguards of the free rule of law are to be eliminated by a false emphasis on democratic majority relations. Some describe what we see as "hypertrophy of democracy" when core elements of the rule of law are undermined with the argument that one has indeed won the majority in elections and that the people stand behind the government. I am not sure whether "hypertrophy" is really the appropriate description. Because in practice, this policy regularly goes hand in hand with various forms of favoritism and politically motivated dismissals, I believe it is about more than "hypertrophy." Liberal Western democracy, as it underlies European legal cultures and which can be called a common European achievement, indeed includes the separation of powers, the rule of law, but also minority protection, the enforcement of fundamental rights, and independent courts. Where this is not the case, where it is abandoned, the ground of this described common legal culture is also left.

I know, dear Mr. Voßkuhle, dear Mr. Kirchhof, and my esteemed judges, that you are just as concerned and troubled by this development in some parts of Europe as I am. I too view the development with deep concern, and I am glad that you are working within your means in the network of European constitutional courts to strengthen the independence of the judiciary. I can only ask you: Do not relent. You can be sure: You have the Federal President by your side in these efforts.

This is just a small excerpt of the questions that will jointly concern us today and in the coming years. Even if we do not need to be alarmist — and I am not by my East Westphalian nature — we should be attentive and vigilant. The achievements of our free societies and states are not a given. They are being questioned, and they are already facing challenges in other regions of Europe. And therefore, we must advocate for them sustainably and defend them — where necessary.

I am curious to hear how you all think about these questions and look forward to our exchange of ideas that we will have shortly. I am truly eager for the discussions.

Once again: Thank you — also on behalf of my wife — for the warm welcome that we are enjoying here! I am here gladly and, I assure you, out of conviction.

Thank you very much!