Speech by Federal President Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier to open a discussion with historians on the 150th anniversary of the founding of the German Empire on January 13, 2021 ...

Germany Frank-Walter Steinmeier · Federal President of Germany

17 January 2021 · Discussion with historians on the 150th anniversary of the founding of the German Empire

Context
Steinmeier opened a discussion with historians on January 17, 2021, marking the 150th anniversary of the founding of the German Empire proclaimed on January 18, 1871.
Main themes
150th anniversary of the German Empire, historical memory and commemoration, continuity between Empire and Nazi catastrophe, democracy and parliamentarism, militarism and anti-parliamentarism, national identity, freedom movements of 1848, European peace order, reunified Germany's democratic traditions, historians' interpretations of the Kaiserreich
Duration
~21 min
67th percentile
Words
2,471
67th percentile
Sentences
99
62nd percentile
Readability
37
29th percentile
Grade
14.3
70th percentile
Syntax
3.35
86th percentile
Vocabulary
2.29
71st percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 63%63%
  • Ceremonial 12%12%
  • Geopolitical 11%11%
  • Social 11%11%
  • Economic 2%2%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 1%

99 sentences in 37 paragraphs

Helmuth Plessner spoke of the "delayed nation," Michael Stürmer of the "restless empire," Volker Ullrich of a "nervous great power," and Thomas Nipperdey of the "power state before democracy." Historians have repeatedly characterized the German Empire as a problematic case in German history, not only, but also on commemorative days.

Commemorative days come uninvited, noted Gustav Heinemann on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the founding of the German Empire. Fifty years ago, the unification of the Empire was commemorated in a country that was once again divided. The lack of festive spirit was understandable in this context. But Heinemann's discomfort ran deeper. He saw no reason to celebrate a founding of the Empire that, a century earlier, had indeed ensured the external unity of Germany, but had done nothing for the internal unity and freedom of its citizens, nor for external peace.

On the occasion of the commemoration of the Empire proclaimed on January 18, 1871, in Versailles, German post-war society – especially after the division of the country – found no relationship on either side of the inner-German border.

Today, in the midst of a pandemic and under conditions of travel and contact restrictions, one might say: Commemorative days sometimes come not only uninvited but also inconveniently.

A demand for a national celebration of the founding of the Empire is, in my impression, truly present today. And those who still associate something with the day of the proclamation of Wilhelm I as German Emperor in the Palace of Versailles likely harbor at best mixed feelings about an event whose triumphant gesture was intended not only to humiliate the defeated war opponent France but also to establish an empire that would once again end in war with France.

We Germans stand today in a relationship to the Empire as we do to the monuments and statues of kings, emperors, and military leaders from that era. They are present in the cityscape here in Berlin and in many other places, but they exert no formative power. It seems to be a silent backdrop that says nothing to most people anymore. Rebuilt architecture like the Berlin City Palace, which refers back to the Prussian-shaped Empire, must first find a new identity and purpose in democracy – which is difficult, as we know and see.

Our perspective on this era of German history is fractured, already by the wars that forced unity, but above all by the catastrophes of the 20th century. There is no unclouded view back at the Empire, past genocide, two world wars, and a republic destroyed by its enemies, and there cannot be.

Yet it is precisely this that makes the look back so necessary, interesting, and instructive. Continuity and inevitability are not the same. Yes, there is the military road that connects all wars from 1871 to 1945. But that does not mean that there were no paths that could have led in other directions and to other developments, paths that could have been taken. Those who read history only from the end overlook every chance for insight, they miss opportunities for action and also personal responsibility.

National Socialism no longer stands as an "erratic block" between Germany's present and its past since we have begun to finally take a closer look at it, since it is no longer denied what happened in the "house of murder," of which Golo Mann wrote in 1958 that it stands as a "cursed house" in the memory of the Germans. "Let us not deny what has taken place in it," Golo Mann demanded. "But let us also not believe that all paths of German history necessarily led to this bad end. And let us not think and act as if we have no past at all […] History is not dead. Through what has been before us, we have become what we are."

We gain a lively awareness of our present also and especially through engagement with and, yes, also the debate about history. Those who want to defend parliamentarism and democracy in our country must know their history and conditions as well as those of their opponents, must sharpen their senses for historical continuities and breaks, and look further back into the past, into the time of the freedom movement, the Vormärz, and the revolutionary movement of 1848.

And those who think they can treat National Socialism as a marginal note in German history largely ignore the preconditions in the form of militarism, national arrogance, anti-parliamentarism, and anti-Semitism, whose roots also lie in the Empire.

There are good reasons for our meeting today: Each generation is faced with different questions and has its own questions about history. The question of which tradition the reunified Germany aligned itself with thirty years ago has been answered. It is the traditions of freedom, democracy, and a European peace order. But that does not make the engagement with the history of the Empire and its founding obsolete.

On the contrary: This era must be questioned anew today. It is worthwhile to trace its lines of tradition and breaks in its own history – especially now in our days, in a time when we are asking very similar questions about the present. Questions like:

The rise of the German Empire to a global military and economic power resembles in some ways the rise of China today; modernization and rapid changes back then were a cause for insecurity that fueled nationalism and populism; we are experiencing similar reactions today in the wake of globalization and social change; and not least, for example, Christopher Clark and Hélène Miard-Delacroix see parallels in the personality and governing style of Wilhelm II to the outgoing US president. When I also look at the erosion of the international order, the question arises: Is world politics threatened by a regression into national egoism and brutal power logic, with all its consequences internally and externally – a power politics that once led to a world war?

The small circle that comes together here today has gathered a multitude of new answers and insights. I thank you very much for following our invitation and, as far as possible, coming to Berlin, the old capital of the fallen Prussia.

It seems to me that there can hardly be a differing opinion about the Prussian authorship of this commemorative day: The German Empire, as it was proclaimed on January 18, 1871, was – apart from the hoped-for unification of the German states elsewhere – a Prussian foundation. And nowhere else, except perhaps Potsdam, is the legacy of Prussia and its heirs as present as here in Berlin.

Yes, much has once again emerged before our eyes, newly emerged, as a double-faced, historicizing-modern reconstruction, like the Berlin City Palace of the Hohenzollerns.

What could illustrate more vividly how history can reach into the present than the idea of the Humboldt Forum? A place whose name recalls the Prussian Enlightenment tradition, but also a place where the imperial legacy of German colonialism is to be examined and questioned, and which now, even before its opening to the public, provokes discussions. Dealing with history in the present, including our colonial history, remains a challenge and a demanding learning process at the same time.

Double-faced like the newly arisen palace seems to me also the realm of the Hohenzollerns itself. In the brief half-century of its existence, it stands between reaction and modernity, allowing such different characters as Heinrich and Thomas Mann to discover completely opposing things in it; one understood it as a bastion of violence, the suppression of freedom, while the other still valued it in 1914 as a "social empire" worthy of defense in a "great, fundamentally decent, indeed solemn people's war."

So thoroughly and publicly as Thomas Mann, hardly any German has revised his judgment later. When he made a confession to the Weimar Republic in 1922, he declared that democracy was more in keeping with German culture and tradition than the Wilhelminian obscurantism.

In fact, the long-awaited and previously failed unification of the Empire, as Bismarck had finally enforced it in the interest of Prussia, unfolded an impressive dynamic – the revolution from above favored progress in economy, science, technology, and culture.

In legislation and jurisprudence, the Federal Republic of Germany still stands in the tradition of the Empire. The Civil Code as well as the beginnings of administrative jurisdiction or Bismarck's social legislation laid the foundations of German legal history. It continues to have an effect in the basic structures to this day, even if numerous layers of necessary adjustments have been laid over it.

The general suffrage for men introduced in 1867 in the North German Confederation and in 1871 in the German Empire was considered the most progressive of its time. Perhaps it most clearly explains the ambivalence of the political development of the Empire.

For Bismarck, the right to vote was primarily to serve selfish purposes. He had hoped to win the votes of the conservative male rural population. He did not want a democracy in which the elected representatives of the people determined government action. You all know the quote: "Not through speeches and majority resolutions are the great questions of the time decided […] but through iron and blood," thus Bismarck formulated his attitude and also his contempt for parliament and democracy.

Now it may be a trick of history that Bismarck's intention was only partially fulfilled.

The right to vote significantly contributed at that time to the politicization of society, to the strengthening of the opposition, to the emergence of the party system, and also to the parliamentary development of Germany. I think of significant representatives from very different political directions like Ludwig Windthorst, Eugen Richter, or August Bebel.

But these parliamentarians gained prominence primarily in opposition to the government, as the assumption of governmental responsibility was denied to them. In Bismarck's world, the government controlled the parliament and not the parliament the government.

Despite the right to vote and the Reichstag – there was no democratic process that could resolve the social conflicts and thus hold the nation together. The internal unity of the Empire had to be guaranteed instead by repelling external enemies and excluding alleged internal foes. This happened, depending on the circumstances of the time, to the detriment primarily of the Polish and Catholic segments of the population, but also of the Social Democratic opposition – and ultimately of the formally equal Jewish population, which was nevertheless exposed to increasing anti-Semitism.

What conclusions one can and wants to draw from this development is a very current question: A nation is not based on ethnic and religious homogeneity, and patriotism is not a privilege of the right wing. General suffrage alone does not make a democracy. If the democratization of society, the emergence of civil society, the exercise of freedom of expression, the claim to co-determination, if all this finds no correspondence in the possibilities of participating in parliament, if parliament remains permanently excluded from the government, the mere periodic exercise of the right to vote can also support an authoritarian regime. Such a directed democracy, however, will not be able to hold a society truly stable together in the long run.

To the question of why the German Empire – despite its progress and borrowings from modernity – was not a permanently successful foundation, there are of course far more than one answer, and we will certainly hear some very different ones in this round today.

One, however, is almost undisputed: The glorified founding myth of "war," but above all the specifically Prussian manifestation of militarism.

There were resistances against a unification of the Empire fought for by Prussia in three wars, proclaimed on French soil, and paid for with the enmity of France from the very beginning. The proclamation of Wilhelm I as German Emperor even caused discomfort within his own family. The Crown Prince feared the consequences of Bismarck's blood-and-iron policy, which – as he said – had made the Empire "great and powerful," but had also robbed it of its friends, the sympathies of the world, and its "good conscience."

According to Heinrich August Winkler's analysis, the social significance of the military and its officer corps, but especially the sole command authority of the Prussian king, represented a piece of absolutism that extended into the present of the German Empire. The heaviest burden for the Republic that followed the Empire was indeed that Parliament was only called to account when the old elite was at an end. And thus, the responsibility for the military defeat of the German Empire in World War I was to be laid at the feet of the democratic forces. What later served as the "stab-in-the-back legend" to mobilize the far-right enemies of the Republic was from the outset a heavy burden of the Weimar Republic and thus of democracy.

This burden, which was primarily the contempt for pluralism and democracy by the imperial state and its elites, was something that had not only affected the Weimar Republic but had a lasting impact. "The German answer to liberty, equality, fraternity, the quintessence of Western democracy, was, to put it succinctly, order, discipline, and inwardness," Heinrich August Winkler has put it succinctly. For Wilhelm II, Parliament was the "Reichsaffenhaus" (Imperial Monkey House). This rejection of democracy as foreign and un-German has proven to be fatal. It is not historical amnesia when Germans grapple with and must grapple with the legacy of the Empire. An Empire whose assessment can only be ambivalent.

Therefore, the question arises: Do we need today – in a time when current political practice often involves a rather uncritical and apologetic reference to the Empire – do we need a "historical-political intervention"? Must we defend ourselves against current neonationalist tendencies, possibly in a different way than we are doing? Those who fundamentally deny the question must do so with great confidence in the resilience of democratic institutions – and not just in their own. Those who consider this question alarmist may also ignore the contempt with which the enemies of democracy confront their institutions. The sight of imperial war flags on the steps of the Reichstag building, the images of its attempted storming a few months ago, and that of the Capitol a few days ago should certainly protect us from self-assurance. Democracy needs not only self-confident defenders; it also needs enlightened, wise, and resilient defenders.

The question of the legacy of the German Empire – extending into the present of the Federal Republic of Germany – remains important. We should not stand perplexed and embarrassed before the remnants of that time. We should understand and contextualize them, bring them to new discourse, and learn from them for the present and the future.

That is what I want to do now with my guests.