"Willy Brandt Speech" by Federal President Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier on October 30, 2018, in Lübeck:

Germany Frank-Walter Steinmeier · Federal President of Germany

16 November 2018 · Lübeck, Germany

Context
Steinmeier delivered the Willy Brandt Speech in Lübeck on October 30, 2018, reflecting on the 50th anniversary of 1968 and its democratic legacy.
Main themes
Legacy of 1968, Willy Brandt and German democracy, authority and its justification, student movement and social revolution, cultural change in postwar Germany, democratization and political participation, Nazi past and generational reckoning, liberal democracy under challenge, Gustav Heinemann, peaceful revolution
Duration
~30 min
82nd percentile
Words
3,595
82nd percentile
Sentences
161
83rd percentile
Readability
43
44th percentile
Grade
12.7
53rd percentile
Syntax
3.23
75th percentile
Vocabulary
2.29
71st percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 43%39%
  • Social 36%32%
  • Ceremonial 12%11%
  • Geopolitical 8%7%
  • Economic 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 10%

161 sentences in 46 paragraphs

"Everywhere, authority and tradition must answer the question of their justification."

I ask for your understanding and refer, in case of critical inquiries, to the office I am privileged to hold, that I begin this speech not with a quote from Chancellor Willy Brandt, but from a Federal President, namely Gustav Heinemann. Furthermore, I add to my statement that the above-quoted questioning of authority and tradition certainly cannot refer to the traditions of the venerable Hanseatic city of Lübeck nor to the authority of Willy Brandt.

That famous sentence from Gustav Heinemann's inaugural speech on July 1, 1969, sounds almost like an early summary of the historically significant year of 1968, which is now exactly half a century ago. I want to place the year 1968, as you have requested, at the center of my speech today, as it leads us, on the one hand, into the political actions of Chancellor Willy Brandt and his coalition at the time, and on the other hand, opens our view to longer, still influential development lines of the Federal Republic's democracy. It is certainly true that today—albeit in a very different way than in 1968—authorities, institutions, and indeed, self-evident truths in liberal democracy are being called into question. For this reason, I believe it is worthwhile to look back at the turning point of 1968, if Willy Brandt's call to "dare more democracy" still has something to say to us today—and I believe it does!

I would like to sincerely thank Wolfgang Thierse and the Willy Brandt Foundation for the invitation to this speech. Thank you also, Mr. Minister-President Günther, for being here! I am pleased that today, certainly not for the first time—but for the first time as Federal President—I have the honor of being a guest in the beautiful Lübeck. Thank you very much for the exceedingly warm welcome!

Let us start with the difficult questions: Was 68 a revolution? Those who were there say: "If there were such a thing, perhaps a half." Or: "68 was not a revolution, but it was revolutionary." Or: "Perhaps it was a cultural revolution."

I did not receive a unanimous answer to this and, to be precise, to any of my questions when I hosted witnesses of 1968 for a conversation at Schloss Bellevue this summer. It was astonishing to observe how quickly the temperature of the conversation could rise in a group of people who were actually getting on in years! For the first time in 50 years, protagonists from both sides sat at one table—Bahman Nirumand, Helke Sander, Peter Schneider, Knut Nevermann on one side, Hermann Lübbe and Hans Maier as conservative critics of the student movement on the other. Wolfgang Kraushaar was also present as a chronicler of the student movement. It took less than half an hour for the old lines of conflict and division to become openly apparent again. There could be no talk of historical consensus that evening.

Daniel Cohn-Bendit once posited the thesis: If 68 had been a revolution, then the 68ers would have had to pose the question of power and decide it for themselves. That did not happen. And therefore, 68 was not a revolution, but a revolt.

I know it is not without risk to want to measure oneself against 68ers in revolutionary theory, so to speak, on home turf. But I would be—five decades later and enriched by the experience of a peaceful revolution in Germany—more courageous in my judgment at least about the revolutionary potential of that time. It seems to me that the question of power was indeed posed—albeit in a different way than was discussed at the time.

It was posed in countless families, at countless dinner tables, between children and parents, between students and teachers, between students and professors. And at its core, it was about a redefinition of authority. Prohibitions and commands, teaching methods and curricula were no longer simply accepted. Those in higher hierarchical positions had to justify themselves. They had to tolerate questions or even dissent. Where authoritarian behavior in education and upbringing had previously been accepted, command and silent obedience, parents, teachers, and professors now had to acquire a justified authority that could only be gained through dialogue. In other words: What could not be justified could not be maintained. This included physical violence and intimidation in education as well as the silencing of the Nazi past. For there was simply no family that was not involved in those experiences, and they were hardly more than 20 years old in 1968—less time than separates us today from the fall of the Wall.

I would also affirm the question of whether the question of power was decided. It was decided, not through a systemic upheaval, but in favor of a new societal model, a new understanding of what "bourgeoisie" means, namely a society of citizens with equal rights and duties who demanded political participation and change. Citizens for whom democracy was more than the definition of a form of state, namely the encouragement to question all those social conditions, to break the subservience to authority that had led to disaster. And it embodied, not least, the hope that Auschwitz would never happen again!

I myself was twelve years old in 1968 and was not suitable—due to my age—for a revolutionary. Nevertheless, I was old enough to be among the first in the following years to feel the societal and political change that had found a catalyst in the student protests of 1968. Like many of my generation, I am the first in my family to graduate from high school and attend university, who experienced that access to education enabled the societal and political participation that we today consider to be fundamental prerequisites of a democratic society.

The beneficiaries of this political change were, of course, not only my generation but also subsequent generations. We all benefit from the opening and democratization of society—it continues to shape our country for the better even today!

If we allow the thought that a fundamental change does not necessarily occur ad hoc, violently, and on the streets, but must primarily be fundamental and sustainable, then I would like to claim for 1968: It was a year of epoch-making significance. It stood at the end as well as at the beginning of a development whose consequences were as groundbreaking as they were sustainable.

The overcoming of the post-war years, which many, especially the youth, felt to be a "time of lead," did not begin only in 1968. The heavy legacy of the fathers, the oppressive shadow of the Holocaust, the shameful re-encounter with the German extermination war in the destroyed cities of one's own country as well as on every trip abroad or to an Israeli kibbutz, along with the longing for distancing, for intellectual emancipation, for example in critical theory—all of this lay on the emotional path of many young Germans toward the epochal year of 1968.

An important milestone had already come a decade earlier. The Ulm Einsatzgruppen trial of 1958 marked the beginning of a legal confrontation with the Nazi past that had not occurred before. The fact that war criminals were unmasked behind the respectable facade of the 1950s, who turned out to be monstrous criminals, had consequences. The retreat into the respectable idyll was cut off at the latest after the conclusion of the Auschwitz trials in 1968.

Fritz Bauer, whose work as Attorney General in Hesse I recently recalled in the Paulskirche in Frankfurt, was indeed concerned with more than just the prosecution of Nazi criminals. He believed in the Federal Republic of Germany as a political community that, supported by its citizens, was capable of improvement. He also believed in the young generation, which he relied on and promoted. He did not expect from them a world revolution, but participation in a liberal constitutional state.

And he was right. The overcoming of the time of lead did not succeed in the sit-ins of the Socialist German Student Union (SDS). The breaking up of outdated structures, the redefinition and legitimization of authority, the opening of society—all of this ultimately meant the drilling of thick boards. It did not succeed in a triumphant revolutionary leap, not with dogmatism, but through perseverance and political persuasion.

The insight that the problems of a modern world cannot be solved by reaching into the ideological mothball chest did not come to everyone. From the 68er movement, after the dissolution of the SDS in March 1970, Marxist-Leninist and Maoist groups emerged, increasingly smaller and increasingly radical. Some of them took the misguided path of a violent struggle, the path into terrorism, with which the Red Army Faction was to engulf the Republic.

However, the vast majority of those radicalized around 1968 found their way out of the cadre organizations to embark on the long march through the institutions. They did not march through, as we know, but stayed—often in responsible positions, in politics as well as in science, business, and culture.

Yes, 1968 was a turning point in German history: It deeply polarized society, generated hostilities, and irreconcilabilities, to which personalities like Brandt or Heinemann, Grass or Böll were also exposed for years.

However, the political potential of the revolt only unfolded after 1968: Not only in party politics and not only in one party—hardly any of the parties remained untouched by the changes. It also unfolded in government action, in the reforms that the social-liberal coalition under Willy Brandt undertook, and not least—this is particularly important to me—in the parliamentary work in the German Bundestag.

"Dare more democracy" did not mean to re-establish the Federal Republic of Germany as a democratic state. It was already a democracy. "Dare more democracy" was meant to encourage the exploitation of the democratic potential enshrined in the constitution. It was meant to say: "Be brave and fulfill what the Basic Law promises you!"

The opening of universities, new co-determination rights in the Works Constitution Act, the lowering of the voting age, the equality of women and men, the liberalization of criminal law and penal execution—all of this was the grasp in reality for what the free constitution promised on paper. And I would like to add right away: Even today, democracy is primarily a promise and not a final state, and this promise is directed at ever new generations: at young people, at students, trainees, and also at those who have become German as immigrants. To them, I would like to say after many hurtful debates in recent months: "Be brave and fulfill what the Basic Law promises you—it belongs to you just as much as to everyone else!"

The already mentioned Gustav Heinemann spoke poetically of "a spring wind of desire for personal participation." It was a change in political culture that was taking place, and particularly the newly elected Federal President relied on the driving force of youth. For the first time, a head of state reached out to the student movement.

"The government can only be successful in a democracy if it is supported by the democratic engagement of the citizens," Willy Brandt said in his first government statement in 1969. "We have as little need for blind approval as our people have for spread dignity and majestic distance. We seek no admirers; we need people who think critically, decide together, and share responsibility."

Brandt outlined a political vision: the ideal of a citizen society. The assumption of office by the social-liberal coalition was also meant to be a message of this speech—the definitive end of the post-war period.

If the impression has now arisen that I want to declare Willy Brandt a 68er and claim that the political and societal fractures for which 68 has become a cipher necessarily led to him, his chancellorship, and a social-liberal coalition, then I want to correct that impression at this point.

Brandt's attitude toward the 68ers, especially toward their politically perceptible core, the Extra-Parliamentary Opposition (APO), was ambivalent. In the generational conflict of the 1960s, he was also an immediate participant, as can be read in the memories of his two older sons, Peter and Lars.

Brandt had an understanding of the desire for change and showed it as well. For him, democracy was a process that could – and must – tolerate movement and a certain unrest. However, he was uncompromising in his rejection of the opponents of parliamentary democracy, particularly the class-struggle contempt for parliamentarism and pluralism found in parts of the student movement. Peter Brandt points out that his father repeatedly referred to his life experience in the Weimar Republic. Brandt saw the helplessness of the democratic rule of law in Weimar as one of the reasons for its failure, and therefore he opposed any questioning of the state's monopoly on violence and insisted on the rule of law. "Riots and violence," Brandt explained, "create a climate that is not conducive to the overdue reforms but threatens to hinder them once again. They therefore play an objectively reactionary role."

Willy Brandt knew that democracy could fail. Brandt, born in 1913, was old enough to have experienced the end of the Weimar Republic as a young man in his early twenties in 1932/33. He was 19 years old when the democratic parties of the Weimar Coalition received only 37 percent of the votes in the Reichstag elections in July 1932, falling behind the NSDAP. This bitter experience left a wound in the collective memory of the young Federal Republic, a shock to the self-confidence that history knows only progress. How could it be that such a brutal, violence-prone, anti-Semitic nationalism became so popular among a large part of the electorate?

It is true – as has often been written – that the Weimar Republic lacked committed democrats. But it is equally true and even more painful that the anti-democrats were in the majority during the fateful months when the Republic fought for its survival. Yes, the destruction of democracy was initiated through democratic elections, and the mockery of parliamentarism took place on the stage of the parliament.

In a text from 1931 that is still distressing to read today, Reichstag member Rudolf Hilferding describes the "tragic impossibility of asserting democracy against a majority that does not want it." This shocking experience shaped the generation of politicians like Brandt or Heinemann, Gerstenmaier or Dahrendorf. But it also remains our political responsibility – the responsibility of each individual – that anti-democratic voices never again gain a majority!

What it means to lose democracy and freedom was shown by another event in 1968, the brief spring of freedom in Prague, which ultimately ended with the invasion of Warsaw Pact troops. It put an end to the hope for reforms, indeed the hope for the reformability of Soviet-style socialism altogether. This also applied to the GDR.

There had been connections between dissidents in the GDR, the group around Robert Havemann, and the APO. However, the events in Prague had a much greater influence. "Finally, something is moving," was the prevailing feeling among Havemann and Wolf Biermann's circle. The failure of the reform efforts under Dubček was an even greater disappointment: "The most tragic event since World War II," as Herbert Marcuse stated. The hope for democratization and liberalization – political, social, cultural – Dubček's ideal of a "socialism with a human face," all of this was crushed by Soviet tanks. In Prague, the gamble of democracy for the states of the former Eastern Bloc failed for years, until the 1980s, when the turning point in Eastern Europe began at the Gdansk shipyards.

What can we take away, with the distance of 50 years? In preparing for this speech, I came across a yellowed newspaper page: Lübecker Nachrichten, April 14, 1968. Following a "short-term call via leaflets," the newspaper reports that two days after the assassination attempt on Rudi Dutschke, several hundred mostly young protesters gathered in Lübeck's market under the watch of the interior senator at the town hall window and the police director in a summery light camel hair coat, as the newspaper notes with unusual detail. One of the young speakers at this Lübeck rally is quoted as saying: "Let us together prove that we take the idea of democracy seriously!" Perhaps that is exactly it: people took democracy seriously! And in the course of this change, for which "68" has become a cipher, much in terms of social opening, liberalization, and renewal has succeeded in our country!

We can affirm this tonight. But we should also keep in mind that it was many generations that contributed to this: It was certainly the courage of the 1968ers, but in the end, it was also the reconciliation with the life experience of the 1945ers, that skeptical, often disillusioned generation between National Socialism and democracy.

And I want to mention another, a third generation, without which lived democracy in today's Federal Republic is unthinkable: the 45ers, the 68ers, and the 89ers! The experiences in East Germany, two decades after the shattered hope of Prague, all that was achieved in the peaceful revolution, contains stories of hope, a yearning for freedom, and great courage. We know this. But the stories of the democratic awakening of 1989 also include the stories of upheaval after 1989 – stories of loss, imposition, and disappointment. I believe that of all the German democracy stories, these have been told too little and, even more so, have been heard too little!

"Not less, but more democracy – that is the demand, that is the great goal." With this quote, I return one last time to the inaugural speech of my predecessor Heinemann and must ask: What is going on today? Where does the new fascination with the authoritarian come from, which is felt all over the world, also in Europe, also in our own country? Where do the calls come from those who scorn the institutions of liberal democracy and their representatives, who fundamentally question our free democratic basic order?

Is this perhaps – as some speculate – the delayed rollback of 1968, the resurgence of old entitlements, the reversal of social opening, driven by the desire for some kind of "healed old world" – even though it never existed – or even for a conservative revolution, as has been demanded in remarkable historical deafness?

I think: no. Fifty years after 1968, we can hopefully rely on the democratic forces of the majority not wanting to turn back from the social opening and liberalization of our country. And that the few who do want to cannot do so anymore! In the last five decades, the political promise of the constitution has also changed the social reality of our country. Equal opportunity, participation, self-determination, or equality are terms that all democrats in the German Bundestag can agree on today. This is a tremendous achievement, and it will be preserved!

However, the cracks in the democratic foundation are now unmistakable. And therefore, it may be worthwhile to look at a small but important difference between the two inaugural speeches, between Gustav Heinemann and Willy Brandt. Heinemann's "more democracy" can also be found in Willy Brandt. But for Brandt, it becomes "dare more democracy."

Yes, this sentence was certainly a signal of departure, and it was perceived that way almost exclusively in 1969. But today we may recognize more sharply that there are two things in this little word "dare": promise and promise, but also a moment of uncertainty and risk.

Our democracy is also not guaranteed for eternity in 2018. The social centrifugal forces in our country have grown significantly in recent years – the contrasts sharper, the walls higher, the tone harsher. We feel again: the open, liberal society is full of contradictions, full of conflicts, full of impositions. It must be able to endure and negotiate this. Democracy includes both: "putting oneself in the position of others" and "accepting dissent" – as you, Mr. Prime Minister, recently formulated it.

In these days, it is increasingly questioned whether the political parties, especially the people's parties, which have channeled and politically supported social change in recent decades, can also manage this under new social conditions. This question arises – of course, not only since the election days in Bavaria and Hesse and not only and not first in Germany. Worldwide, the Western liberal democratic model is under pressure. The growing polarization of societies is giving rise to populists who absolutize the own, dismiss compromise as weakness, for whom the "we" is nothing more than an extension of the "I."

From those who have already written off party democracy, I have not yet heard any truly convincing solutions on how to translate social dynamics into political compromise and responsibility differently and better. I believe it is primarily up to the people's parties themselves whether they will succeed in integrating society even in the face of new centrifugal forces, fundamentally opening old structures to new social realities, and above all, whether they will succeed in once again credibly and compellingly envisioning the future. There is therefore also much for them, the parties, to "dare."

It is good that Willy Brandt adds this not so comfortable little word to the motto "more democracy," which we today readily and carelessly affirm: Dare it! One must muster the courage for democracy. For as solid and mature as it may look in retrospect, its future is open, perhaps more open today than ever. This should not frighten us. On the contrary – democracy is the form of government for the brave. Thank you very much.