Speech by Federal President Horst Köhler at the "Impulse 21" Conference on November 27, 2008, in Berlin:

Germany Horst Köhler · President of Germany

30 November 2008 · "Impulse 21" Conference · Berlin, Germany

Context
Köhler addressed the 'Impulse 21' security policy conference in Berlin on November 27, 2008, speaking on Germany's security policy strengths, weaknesses, and tasks.
Main themes
German security policy, Bundeswehr reform and deployment, alliance loyalty and NATO, national interests and foreign policy, civil-military relations, European Union enlargement, development cooperation, multipolar world order, peace dividend and defense spending, public support for military, cooperative foreign policy, post-Cold War adaptation
Duration
~14 min
49th percentile
Words
1,699
49th percentile
Sentences
86
56th percentile
Readability
39
33rd percentile
Grade
12.9
55th percentile
Syntax
3.02
50th percentile
Vocabulary
2.23
56th percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 74%72%
  • Ceremonial 8%8%
  • Social 7%7%
  • Institutional 7%7%
  • Economic 4%3%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 2%

86 sentences in 24 paragraphs

"German Security Policy – Strengths, Weaknesses, Tasks"

I am pleased to have accepted the invitation to speak with you today. We Germans would do well to think more thoroughly and discuss how we define, protect, and assert our interests, and how we can help make the world more peaceful and secure. Corresponding decisions should follow this debate, and those decisions should lead to consistent action. Bringing all of this to fruition is a considerable challenge for all who, like you, are engaged in and knowledgeable about security policy. But that is precisely why I am here with you today: I believe "Impulse 21" can be a valuable forum for the public awareness and opinion formation that Germany needs. I hope the conference encourages you as security policy experts not to relent in the search for the right path, which also means: the Sisyphean task of educating and convincing.

My contribution today will consist of three remarks under the headings Strengths, Weaknesses, Tasks.

First

Strengths: Germany has adapted to its international responsibilities far better than some critics would like to admit. Who could have blamed us if we had initially withdrawn into ourselves after reunification? With the shaping of internal unity and the rebuilding of the eastern federal states, there was and still is, believe me, much to do. And yet, Germany has vigorously and in a spirit of partnership advanced the enlargement of the European Union. Our country has increased its contribution to development cooperation and its support for the work of the United Nations. And we can confidently say: Germany has also taken on more responsibility in security policy step by step.

Our country does this with soldiers who understand their craft and who know: the missions have become more dangerous; our soldiers are increasingly finding themselves in combat. Yet, strategic success depends at least as much on the prudent mediator, the credible ambassador of our values, and the knowledgeable builder-helper. I believe our soldiers are exemplary in meeting all these challenges – also thanks to mission tactics, thanks to internal leadership and political education of citizens in uniform, and thanks to a third strength: Germany and the Germans are rightly convinced that a cooperative and as civilian as possible foreign and security policy is the indispensable basis for lasting peace. We have practiced this for many years, and today we discover that such a policy is particularly important in a multipolar world: a policy that relies on anchoring in value alliances and their institutions; a policy that respects the small and the weak and does not come across as boastful, but seeks to win; a policy that honestly keeps the advantage of the other in mind and is bound by ethical principles.

After the Second World War, we renounced all power and violence politics to slowly regain trust and respect. But the Federal Republic and its Bundeswehr have simultaneously stood strong and reliably with NATO partners against the threat posed by the Soviet Union.

Second

Weaknesses: Some declared the end of history in 1989. We Germans have remained grounded – and were nonetheless glad about the end of division and threat. We had lived for more than 40 years with a bleeding border right through our homeland; thus, the expectations for a peace dividend were naturally high. In fact, we are currently spending significantly less money on our security and defense than we did before 1989. Is that still appropriate today, in light of new threats? The everyday realities of deployment at home and abroad raise questions that you as experts know better than I do, and which we should not shy away from.

The reorientation of the Bundeswehr from territorial defense to an army in deployment was necessary and has overall been successful. However, the Germans tend to keep this transformation somewhat secret from themselves. Therefore, there is a danger that the Bundeswehr may gradually be burdened with greater responsibilities than the necessary solidarity of citizens with their fellow countrymen in uniform would warrant.

But there is another dimension to consider: No army in the world wants to rely solely on modern weapons and equipment during its deployment; it also wants to be accompanied by support from its citizens, by empathy for their dangerous service. There must not be "friendly indifference" towards the Bundeswehr. The Bundeswehr makes a vital contribution to the good future of our country.

Alliance loyalty is a great asset. We Germans owe our freedom and unity to it. But alliance loyalty alone is not enough as an argument when citizens rightly demand convincing reasons for the most difficult military interventions. Naming such reasons can strengthen the understanding of interest-political necessities. But this presupposes that we convincingly define our interests, advocate for them, and then pursue them decisively. This, in turn, requires a healthy measure of self-preference (Peter Sloterdijk). Here, too, normalization would suit us well. For example, it should not happen that we send soldiers into a mission for which there is no clear or a false, because overly ambitious, goal, because then we also have no accurate concept of success and failure and, in the end, perhaps not even a clear idea of when and how the intervention should be concluded.

We should also not allow ourselves to pursue good goals with insufficient means. This would also damage our international credibility. Overall, it holds true: What is necessary must be politically communicated and enforced convincingly, also and first and foremost with the domestic population, because in democracies, military engagement abroad stands or falls with their acceptance.

Third

Tasks: This requires – and with this, I begin my third point – political education, so that citizens learn to appreciate the value of the institutions, alliances, and especially the people who protect and enforce freedom and rights even better. We can all do something for this, each and every one in our own sphere of influence. What we need is attention, solidarity, and gratitude for our soldiers. And we should honor those who fall in the fight against terror and violence and who risk their lives and health for the community of Germans and for a better and safer world.

The international financial crisis once again shows that a solution to the global challenges of humanity is only possible within the framework of a cooperative world order. This is also a great opportunity. I am convinced that NATO can play an important role here. If necessary, NATO must further develop the culture of mutual listening and the willingness to cooperate that is necessary for this.

I would wish that the alliance understands itself more as a community of values and as a political alliance again. And thus also as a central place for strategic consultations in the transatlantic relationship. I hope that the NATO summit next year in Strasbourg and Kehl will send a strong signal for a new international security architecture. More than ever, security must be understood not only in terms of military and terrorist threats but also in terms of the threat to our values and freedom posed by poverty and climate change. I see the opportunity for NATO to develop into a central pillar of a connected security architecture, in close cooperation with the United Nations – this is very important to me – but also with the European Union. Shaping this challenge with conceptual strength would also secure NATO an important, credible role for the good development of its member states and the world as a whole for the next 60 years of its existence.

A specific area where I believe changes should already be initiated in Strasbourg and Kehl is disarmament. I do not believe that we will achieve peace and security in today's multipolar world through more armament. I think Hans-Dietrich Genscher pinpointed a particular danger, and I quote: "The danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons is increasing, also due to the unlawful, unrestrained development of the nuclear capabilities of the major nuclear powers. The withdrawal from already made agreements means a regression to old thinking. Who could ignore the call to action from Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, Sam Nunn, and William Perry for complete nuclear disarmament?"

I share Hans-Dietrich Genscher's view. I believe we urgently need to give this issue the necessary intellectual and political attention.

And we will also have to confront the question of how much the so-called "new wars" in the poor countries of the world differ from everything for which our armies were established.

Today, we are also dealing with wars that smolder for decades in remote parts of the world and flare up violently again and again because they are economically lucrative. These wars are fought because militia leaders and warlords have linked themselves to the world markets for drugs and illegally obtained raw materials. These conflicts are fueled by the flood of cheap small arms, the collapse of state orders, and the lack of opportunities for generations of young people.

These conflicts raise the question: What are our values worth to us? And, in practical terms: What must be done to effectively protect our values and credibly convey them to our own young people?

Despite some unresolved tasks: Germany and the Germans have done quite a bit well in foreign, security, and development policy overall. We can demand that our good experiences be taken seriously. We admit, however, that we also have deficits. We Germans are generally regarded as conceptual thinkers, but we have not yet sufficiently made ourselves aware of the external conditions for our freedom and prosperity in the 21st century. And that is why we are still not doing enough to name, discuss, stabilize, and nurture these factors. Many nations look to us and hope for our contribution. We will be asked to make sacrifices. We will still have to learn to face this reality and endure the associated pains.

Security policy is a difficult and, above all, complex terrain. It requires insight and willpower. These must be cultivated in our free democracy. It also crucially depends on your mediation, your commitment, and your persuasive power. I wish you much success in your discussions today and your further engagement, and the public attention you deserve.