Words of the President of the Nation, Javier Milei, at the IERAL, from the province of Córdoba.

Argentina Javier Milei · President of Argentina

30 October 2024 · IERAL talk on monetary policy · IERAL

Context
Milei addressed the IERAL institute in Córdoba on October 30, 2024, presenting Argentina's unconventional monetary stabilization program and its results.
Main themes
Monetary policy and stabilization program, inflation reduction, fiscal deficit elimination, crawling peg exchange rate system, quasi-fiscal deficit, libertarian economic policy, Argentine economic crisis, remunerated liabilities, price controls removal, Convertibility Plan comparison, money demand recomposition
Duration
~81 min
98th percentile
Words
9,703
98th percentile
Sentences
407
97th percentile
Readability
58
84th percentile
Grade
10.9
31st percentile
Syntax
3.20
73rd percentile
Vocabulary
2.04
15th percentile

Translated from Spanish

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 89%86%
  • Ceremonial 5%4%
  • Social 3%3%
  • Institutional 3%3%
  • Geopolitical 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 3%

407 sentences in 80 paragraphs

Good morning everyone, hello to all: I imagine that there are few places where I play so locally as here. Today's talk will basically focus on what monetary policy is, looking towards the future. For that, the talk has three parts: one part, where I will basically describe the initial conditions, the situation in which the Argentine economy was at the moment we arrived. On the other hand - in light of what we are implementing and the success it is having - what I will explain is the diagnosis that we developed, and as a consequence of that, the economic policy package that we designed, and - very particularly - the monetary issue.

I want to point out that we are facing a historic event, a non-conventional way of lowering inflation, and that is why I believe this is an environment that warrants discussion about what we are doing, because although it is still premature, when one has historical awareness - one understands - the characteristic of the achievement.

When we arrived, wholesale inflation, which is the one that leads, was at 54% monthly. That is to say, that - annualized - gives 17,000%. And in the last number - of wholesale - it was 2%, that is, an inflation of 28%. And I think it is worth discussing and analyzing because - systematically - it was said that we do not have a program. So, the question is: how did they manage to bring it down? The truth is that to my knowledge neither Toto's team nor I have been studying with Copperfield on how to do magic. So I think it is worth discussing.

What happens is that, after so many years of collectivism, I believe that the population, I would say, and more than anything in the profession and the communicators lost the notion and awareness of what a stabilization program is - especially - from a liberal perspective. A stabilization program has a fiscal program, a monetary program, and an exchange rate policy. Now if you want to add things later, it is because you start to show quotas of dirigisme; quotas of policy. That is a different way of seeing the process and, moreover, I think it is also worth analyzing because - unlike other interesting cases of this stabilization - there was no prior hyperinflation, because when you have a prior hyperinflation, what it does is dilute financial assets. Therefore, the stabilization - afterwards - is very easy because they start from very low levels of money demand; thus the very recomposition of money demand makes it much easier to stabilize. Now - of course - going through that experience and seeing the number of poor people, at 95%, would not be a pleasant exercise, to put it mildly.

Another very important characteristic, and that - in fact - during the campaign, I had to deal a lot with this accusation is that we did not make a Bonex Plan; that is to say, there was no expropriation. In fact, although no one spoke about how to solve the problem of remunerated liabilities, we were the only ones who spoke about remunerated liabilities, basically, what we did not provide were dates, and - again - because we are a libertarian liberal government and - consequently - the process had to be market-driven and that depends on the decisions of individuals. Now, something that seemed impossible, we solved in 6 months, that is to say we ended the quasi-fiscal deficit of 10 points of GDP and that seems to go unnoticed, but it is indeed a truly significant issue in terms of expected inflation and looking forward.

Another additional characteristic of this program is that it has no price controls. Furthermore, we have not fixed the exchange rate. That is to say, there is no fixed exchange rate, there is a crawling peg system. And that is also interesting, for the purpose of looking at inflationary results. That is to say - by having a crawling peg system - the program, today, as it is designed has an induced inflation, which is the crawling peg. Plus international inflation. That - more or less - yields a monthly inflation rate of 2.5%. So when one looks at retail inflation, which - the last record - was 3.5%, it means that true macro inflation has been traveling at 1. That is to say, that is the difference between observed inflation and the crawling peg, plus international inflation. That means that then the inflation of the program is around 1%. This means that - today - true inflation in Argentina was traveling at 13% annually and that indeed seems like a dream, throughout what we have been suffering for the last 20 years, or since the creation of the damned Central Bank of the Argentine Republic in 1935; except for the period that was the most successful stabilization program in Argentine history, which was born here, which was the Convertibility Plan, of Minister Domingo Felipe Cavallo.

On the other hand, this - in addition - was done by recomposing relative prices and - with all this - we are bringing inflation to levels that could then be oscillating - between 10 and 25% -, which, if you do not want to consider a miracle or do not like the economic theory that we are using, we can attribute it to the forces of heaven.

And finally, what I am going to do is explain how monetary policy will look going forward, because that - too - will help us communicate and try to explain what we are thinking, looking towards the future. I will explain the concept of endogenous dollarization and - then - show how we are seeing growth and how this links with the monetary part. That is to say, today, I will not be discussing different monetary regimes and so on, because - it seems to me - that is a discussion that seems little relevant and it is time for us to focus on the future.

In that sense - when we took office - it was a situation of enormous disarray. We were facing what could have been the most important crisis in Argentine history, as it combined the elements of the three great Argentine crises. We had a money overhang, which was double that of what was present before the Rodrigazo, back in 1975, during the government of María Estela Martínez de Perón, a dreadful government that involved not only the Triple A and the annihilation decree and some additional aberrations, but in the meantime sextupled the inflation rate and multiplied the number of poor by 5. So, if we had double the monetary imbalance, we would have at least multiplied the inflation rate by 12; that is to say, we would have brought it to levels of 2400. And, on the other hand, we could not have multiplied by 5 the number of poor because it cannot exceed 100%.

That is to say, just that with one part of the imbalance. The other imbalance was the imbalance in the Central Bank's balance sheet, as we had a ratio of remunerated liabilities - in relation to the base - of four times; they left us a situation where - in one day - we could quintuple the amount of money and that situation was much worse than what we had in the Central Bank in 1989, before the hyperinflation exploded, under Alfonsín, which - later - ended with Alfonsín's flight from power, six months earlier. And, in addition, we also had social indicators that were worse than those in December 2001, prior to the fall of Convertibility and the coup d'état, driven by Duhalde and Alfonsín, who - paradoxically - is portrayed as the father of democracy, being that he was in favor of a coup d'état, but that, evidently, pesifying the debt to “Clarín”, made him look like a hero.

In that sense, we found ourselves that, during the first week of December, inflation was traveling at 1% daily, something that implies an annual inflation of 3700%. When one looks - the second week - and computes the relevant 15 days, that is, inflation had accelerated at a rate of 7500% annually. If you take the CPI, at 25.5%, we would be talking about an annualized inflation close to 1500%, and if we take the IPM, the wholesale, annualized, that 54 implied 17,000%. That was the context in which we found ourselves.

And, in addition to the imbalances that I mentioned, we also had flow imbalances; we had twin deficits equivalent to 17 points of GDP. Think that when… in the literature of early crisis indicators, a twin deficit of 4% is a yellow alert; 8 is a red alert, well, 17 was purple, violet, and that is why we won, what did you expect?

Although we usually describe the inheritance, we do not complain about the inheritance. We came and solved the problem because in reality, I am the first liberal-libertarian president in the history of humanity, and that does not happen under normal conditions of pressure and temperature. Now, of those 15 points, 17 points of deficit, 15 were in the national state; 5 was the Treasury deficit and 10 was from the Central Bank. At the same time, we had a gap of 200%, that is to say, the relationship between the parallel exchange rate and the official one was 3 to 1. That makes me laugh, because - when the exchange rate jumps and the inflation rate accelerates - some economists blame me for having devalued, and I think that if someone does that, who is not trained in economics, I can understand. That is to say, people are not obliged to know about economics. But it seems strange to me that professional economists say it, because if I have a gap of 200% and I have negative net international reserves of 12 billion dollars; I did not devalue, I only did what I did was to clarify, to show things as they really are. Moreover, not only did we have that problem, but we also had between the debt of the SIRA - which is truly a scandal - and trapped dividends, that debt, in the Central Bank, was for 60 billion dollars. We also had debt - in pesos - maturing for the equivalent of 90 billion dollars; we had external debt maturing for 25 billion dollars, where - mostly - it was with multilateral organizations, but since the previous government was living in default, the program was down.

That was also very interesting because everyone talked about how the program was not consistent, and to think that one - after such a history of default - goes and sits with the Fund. That discussion is not a quick discussion, and - in general - that discussion takes 3 months. We closed the program over a weekend; it means that we had it quite orderly. So, in that sense, the situation was quite complex and we also had a hidden liability, inside the Central Bank, which was the issue of the Puts; and that was the whole picture we had encountered. So what we needed was to stop the possibility of a hyper because if we had gone to hyperinflation the situation would have been truly disastrous. If you - again - look at the jumps in poverty, from what is the crisis of the “Rodrigazo”; the hyperinflation of Alfonsín or the coup d'état against De la Rúa, you will realize that any of those situations - by itself - would have doubled the number of poor.

So, the situation was quite complicated. Moreover, I am even surprised by the intellectual dishonesty of economists and politicians, or worse still, of politicians who are economists. So, for example, one of them said: “No, no, you have the responsibility of having increased the number of poor by 5 million.” This is also very interesting and raises how difficult it can be to design economic policy, but - above all - the communication of it.

As you all know, in Argentina, poverty - within the methodologies that exist - Argentina uses the income method. So, the basic food basket is looked at, from there the total basic basket is derived. This has a consequence, in terms of income, the conversion between these two lines is called Engel curves or Engel coefficients, and it is compared with income and the number of poor is looked at. Basically, I am explaining very succinctly how the methodology works.

So, the question is: how if I do a clarification, then the numbers fly, and then what sense does it make to clarify? And this is also worth debating and discussing and analyzing. Argentina, in fact, was coming with price controls. That is to say, the previous government controlled prices, suppressed tariffs. The truth is that if you look at any report you will see all that was the imbalance in relative prices. So, when you have price control, that is, you still have fiscal deficits, you finance them with monetary issuance; which by the way the previous government issued 13 points of GDP - during the last year - where the inflation generated by issuance, in Argentina, has a lag of between 18 and 24 months. That is to say, there will still be purging the aberrations of the previous government.

And it is not that I say this now, I said it during the campaign and you can look for videos of mine, from almost 10 years ago and I say exactly the same thing. So, what happens? You have price control and two effects appear: one, is that they go towards other goods and start to make the goods that are under control scarce, which - in general - are the ones that are in the price index. So when you look at the price index, the price index does not reflect the effects of control, the effects of scarcity, to the point that you can take and reach a moment, which was what happened towards the end of the previous government, that the shelves were empty.

So, this reminds me a lot of an example given by Juan Carlos de Pablo, in one of his brilliant books on economic policy, where he says: “a man enters a bazaar and says, ‘I want that vase, how much does it cost?’ 5 million. ‘What do you mean 5 million, if across the street it’s one million?’ Well, go buy it across the street. No, well, there’s nothing across the street. Well, here when there’s nothing left, it will also cost one million.” In other words, the price is what it is. So, this means that the problem of shortages is not reflected in the index; therefore, the measurement of what that basket costs is misleading. Because, moreover, what is the purchasing power of 100 pesos, a thousand pesos, 10 thousand pesos, 20 thousand, whatever you want, if the shelf across is empty?

What is that price? That price is infinite because it doesn’t matter how many pesos you throw because the product doesn’t exist. So, in the face of that situation, where the product doesn’t exist and you don’t acknowledge it, the products don’t appear. So, if you don’t acknowledge it, what happens? You’re going to starve because the products don’t appear. The only way for the products to reappear is for you to acknowledge the prices. The moment you acknowledge the prices, of course, that is statistically recorded, the basic food basket jumps according to Engel’s curve; the total basic basket jumps and you register more poor people.

There is a wonderful piece of work that has recently been done by a professor from Di Tella, who is González Rosada, and he shows that this acknowledgment brought poverty to 57%. But, again, that was there, that was there… But it was easier to hide it, then. No, it wasn’t easier to hide it. I mean, you don’t eat statistics, you eat real products. What we have to try to do is to make the statistics say and be as close to the truth as possible. And the good news is that today - after five months - real wages are rising non-stop, where the ones that rise the most are from the private sector; where the informal private sector is recovering very strongly, and the one that is not recovering and is lagging behind is the public sector, because there is a chainsaw.

The data for the last quarter - according to González Rosada’s estimates - is 49%. That is to say, we have just reduced poverty by 8 percentage points. Yes, we are taking care of the most vulnerable.

So, the point is okay; we are reducing inflation. There is no social plan more powerful than reducing inflation because it is clear that the inflation tax is a super regressive tax. So how did they do it? I think that’s why the diagnosis is important. Now, I remember that prior to the campaign… now it’s not discussed so much, but - prior to the campaign - the issue of the nature of inflation was more debated. So, there is a group of economists who believe it is multi-causal, well, I - since I matured and grew - never believed that, I believed it when I was very young, but one realizes later that the Three Wise Men are the parents, I don’t know.

So, I have always adhered to the monetary hypothesis of inflation. This is so important that even the definition used by an economist of inflation will mark the difference. For example - in my case - inflation is the loss of purchasing power of money. That is to say, it is generated by an excess of money supply, either because supply rises, demand falls, or both things happen at the same time, and all prices expressed in monetary units rise. That is to say, if I have that definition, I have to go and fight with Reconquista 266. I mean, I have to go and confront the Central Bank.

Now, the other definition of inflation, which is the one politicians like, is the generalized rise in prices. So, there you take it out on the union leaders - who are not saints, obviously -, with the businessmen, with the workers, I mean, with anyone but the politicians. Obviously, politicians love that. So, it seems that this debate is quite on track. I’m not hearing much from the heterodox and those nonsense about multi-causal inflation.

Now, the way in which we arrived at this is not the same, it depends on which school you are standing; the monetarist hypothesis is not the same as Friedman’s; the hypothesis is not the same as Robert Lucas Junior’s and it is also not the same as the Austrian format hypothesis.

So, it is well known that I adhere to the Austrian School hypothesis, so something that seems quite obvious is not so obvious. That is to say, for example, in the monetarist hypothesis, money is not neutral in the short term, but it is in the long term; in the rational expectations hypothesis, it is even neutral in the short term, unless there is a surprise, but the effects of the surprise over time, if you abuse that mechanism, it disappears. In the Austrian hypothesis, money is never neutral. Moreover, it is a pernicious element that does harm and that - the truth is - they will come out, I won’t spoil the ending, but you can imagine it. That’s why it’s so important to return to the basics; it seems like something rudimentary, it seems like a comment for beginners, but it happens that it seems that economists have forgotten such basic things that we are delirious about anything and we forget what the problem is about.

The first point is, why does money exist? That is to say, why does money exist, because if we don’t know why money exists, how are we going to understand the monetary hypothesis of inflation, if we don’t understand what we are talking about? So money exists - basically - because if you didn’t have money you would have a barter economy; now in a barter economy, the functioning of a barter economy is quite complex, because you have two major problems: the first is double coincidence. That is to say, you have to find someone who wants to buy what you want to sell. But, moreover, you need the reciprocal, which is quite a complex problem. Now, for example, I can find the baker who wants bread and I want bread. Now there is also a problem of indivisibility. Because I may want a kilo of bread, I don’t know, two, three and I want to share. But I’m not willing to give a complete talk for 3 kg of bread.

And the baker is not interested in listening to me, 3 minutes of my presentation. So that indivisibility, plus the double coincidence problem makes many transactions get lost, and that generates a huge loss of welfare. So money comes to try to solve this problem.

And that’s how other types of money appeared, I mean, man didn’t just sit there crying, oh what a problem, what do I do, I don’t consume. No, no, he found a way, what he did was find a way. And that way was that there were some goods that were exchanged more than others. So, you went and bought that good not because you were interested in consuming that good, but you went and bought that good to buy the other good, that is to say, it was an indirect exchange good. This is an extremely important issue. This is fundamental because if we don’t understand this, we don’t understand the nature of money. Money is an indirect exchange good. This is the key because now I’m going to explain why it’s so important to understand this. Now if it is an indirect exchange good, that also implies understanding the different currencies that humanity has had. For example: when man was nomadic, the first currency he had was livestock. And why was it livestock? Because they walked with food next to them; something that today would be quite complicated psychologically to resolve, that they walk with the animal that they will later kill to eat.

Again: these are things we shouldn’t normalize, but that was how the world worked. And, of course, later man became sedentary, and what did he eat more? He ate bread, so what he ate the most if it was bread, what he used the most then was wheat; so one of the first currencies that appeared was wheat because precisely, not because he wanted to eat wheat or wanted bread, but because it served him as an indirect exchange good. And thus other types of money have appeared, such as salt, linen, tobacco. Moreover, look… I am an older gentleman and - at some point - there were prison movies, and what did they use as money in prisons? Cigarettes.

Then there are very funny things, like, for example, in hyperinflation, in Germany, they used cognac; then Milton Friedman, at one point, makes a joke that says: “yes, they used cognac, the most liquid definition of money I have ever known in my life.” And what does all this come to, that if we understand that money is an indirect exchange good that we only use to make transactions, that implies that then the demand for money is a derived demand.

It is a mirror demand, whose counterpart is the set of excess demand functions of the entire economy. That is to say, everything that is the goods market. That is to say, if you start to go back to the classics and you can read it, in Hume: you can read it in Adam Smith, who probably describes it best is John Stuart Mill. They spoke of a real side and a monetary side; they spoke of the monetary veil and said well, as long as we don’t do nonsense everything works great, the problem is when we start to meddle and that’s where the system breaks down.

And why is this important? Because if the demand for money, the indirect exchange good, is a mirror demand, a derived demand, the fundamentals of the demand for money, the true component within the demand for money, is neither that nonsense of putting income, nor that nonsense of putting the interest rate.

And that also needs to be clear: when you build a general equilibrium system, in the excess demand function, income does not appear, because income is derived from the sale of leisure, plus the share you have of the profits in the companies, which depend on prices. That’s why there are only prices and income does not appear anywhere.

And the excess demand functions are homogeneous, of degree zero, in prices and only relative prices appear and nothing more. And if you use a numeraire, you will be scaled in that numeraire. In a monetary economy, that numeraire is money. But not only that. The interest rate does not appear either. The interest rate does not exist because money exists. The interest rate exists because time exists.

That is to say, if there were no time, the interest rate would not exist, it would make no sense, it is a theoretical contradiction. So what you are going to find - in the excess demand functions - are price vectors. And you will enter present prices and future prices, and the relationship between present prices and future prices will determine the interest rate. And when everyone is managed, the emerging interest rate is the same for each relationship between periods.

In short, the demand for money is a function that depends on the consumption vector. The consumption vector is all the consumptions, of all products not only today, but from here to eternity. And if it depends on consumption, what will consumption depend on? That consumption path, or that path for the consumption vector. It will depend on what Robert Lucas Junior called the deep parameters. What are the deep parameters? Preferences, that is to say utility functions, including the intertemporal preference rate because now we are talking about an economy, which is not of one period, but of the amount of time you want.

Not only that, but - moreover - it will depend on technology. That is to say, on the production function; it will depend on the endowments of factors and it will depend on the property system. I mean, all deep parameters. I mean, if I put it in a picture today, those are all data.

Therefore, the demand for money - under normal conditions of pressure and temperature - what should it be? Directly a granite function. That’s why the classics weren’t so foolish when they put the quantitative theory Cambridge version, if you will, as a fraction of income. I mean, they weren’t foolish.

Then there is the problem of degree inconsistency, that it is a homogeneous function, degree 1, and that you cannot stick the system, but it is a problem of a mathematical nature, which Mises solved, among other problems that Mises solved.

But, beyond that, if now the demand function for money is a granite function; that real demand function for money means that this - in equilibrium in the monetary market - has to equal the real balances; that is to say, the amount of money, divided by the price level. Therefore, the price level will be determined by what? By the amount of money. That is to say, when you set the amount of money, given the demand for money, you are determining the price level.

In essence, it is nothing more or less than, put another way, the problem of the nominal anchor. That is to say, when the Central Bank determines the amount of money, it determines the nominal scale of the economy. Hence, when the Central Bank increases the amount of money, prices rise. So the monetary nature of inflation says that inflation is - always and everywhere - a monetary phenomenon generated by an excess of money supply or a fall in the demand for money that causes the purchasing power of money to fall and, therefore, all prices expressed in a monetary unit to rise.

And that process is not neutral, because the way in which you derive utility, that is, if you have individuals who are different, that will basically generate that money is not neutral, because the marginal utility of 20,000 pesos for me is not the same as you have for each one, therefore, that will modify my consumption pattern, hence, it is not neutral. Or I have a single individual, but now I have several goods, it will not derive the same utility from the different goods, so, therefore, if I have an economy where individuals are not all the same and, moreover, there is not a single good, money is not neutral. If you want to go to the world of Friedman or Robert Lucas Jr., where it is neutral, you have to go to what, to a situation where you have a representative agent and a single good. And there you derive the result of the neutrality of money. But in real life, those assumptions do not hold. Therefore, money is not neutral. And I tell you more, money can only cause harm. Because if the Central Bank issues, it generates harm. Because if the Central Bank contracts, it generates harm. If it does nothing, why am I paying it, why do I have it; why am I paying you. And if I think that, let’s say, fatally arrogant, I have such brilliant types that can do what people would determine, why am I going to give it to them if people can do it alone. My argument against the Central Bank has already begun.

But here the important thing is the monetary nature of inflation. And, obviously, when - the Central Bank - starts to mess around with the amount of money, the nominal scale starts to move and, obviously, relative prices start to distort and inflation begins to generate enormous harm. That is to say, one of the benefits of having stable inflation, which does not spill over, is that the only stable inflation number that does not spill over is zero.

So, basically, if I generate inflation, I start to generate distortions of relative prices; I start to affect the paths of consumption, saving, investment; I affect the capital structure and end up generating cycles of "boom and bust," generally, on top of that, linked to economic policy, and economic policy tends to make those blunders during election times. So can you believe that there is a guy who is so crazy that he wants to go to zero deficit, which is to remove fiscal policy in an election year and zero issuance, which is to remove monetary policy, in an election year? I mean, me.

Look, if this ends well, not only will it be a political success that is going around the planet, but it will also be a revolution for the economists themselves, I mean, the policy maker, who relegates to do expansive monetary and fiscal policy, in the election year. This was not in any textbook.

Therefore, having proven my hypothesis that money, the issuance of money is the cause of inflation, then – now - what we have to see is why we issued money, that is, how did the previous Government come to issue 13 points of GDP? So, basically what we had to do was cut off the elements that made the amount of money grow.

So, the first, most obvious and evident to everyone was the fiscal deficit. Now, I want to say this: the fiscal deficit was one third of the total deficit that we had, in the Treasury, in the Nation I mean. It was 5, the Treasury and 10 the quasi-fiscal. I mean, the mess we had, in the Central Bank, was double that which we had, in the Treasury. And of those 10, no one talked about it, on top of that, this was the most serious thing about all this.

So, for that, we had to cut the fiscal deficit. We campaigned during the campaign and you cannot say that I did not announce it, we campaigned with a chainsaw. Look, the campaign - symbolically - had three things: one was the chainsaw, which was the fiscal adjustment; another was a dollar bill, which was basically the competition of currencies and the elimination of the Central Bank that they called dollarization and you know what it is to have to try to explain “it’s not competition, it’s…”, it’s a huge hassle… And then, also, in our events, flags of Israel appeared - recurrently - so that, look, in fiscal matters we are complying; in international politics we are complying, and I will show you how we are complying in monetary matters as well. No one was deceived in the electoral campaign. It is the first time in the history of humanity that a candidate campaigns saying that he is going to cut public spending. And, in fact, we did it. When we said that we were going to go to zero deficit, they said we were crazy, that it was impossible, that with luck we could cut 1 point of GDP per year. And we proposed that - in the first year - we were going to go to zero deficit. And the most incredible thing is that we achieved it, in the first month of management. If you look at the numbers - from Argentina - in the last 123 years Argentina had a deficit for 113 years and in the only 10 years that it did not have a deficit it was in default, therefore, it was a lie. That is to say, it is the first time - in 124 years - that Argentina is going to end with fiscal balance in the financial line, let’s say that the forces of heaven push.

That was a very important element because it cut off the issuance of money through what is called the fiscal route, that is, one of the sources of monetary issuance was cut off and then the quality of the adjustment began to be discussed… Look, Argentina, the fiscal adjustment - in real terms - is 36.6%, that has never happened in the history of humanity, except in cases where there has been war. And even so, it is among the largest adjustments in history. But that was not only the adjustment that was made, it also went for the adjustment, in the Central Bank. And there this is also important because no one said how it was going to be fixed, others irresponsibly said: “it would fix itself,” which were the same ones who said nothing, but when asked how, they did not know what to do, they said it would fix itself.

There was another who said that what had to be done was to raise the interest rate, which only made the problem bigger. But we knew that we should not touch the interest rate, because - our conception of the monetary nature and inflation - explained by the amount of money, definitely shows that touching prices is wrong. To give you an idea of the madness of doing monetary policy by touching the interest rate. Let’s see, how can we do it? Suppose, do you remember that we had, at one time, a Secretary of Commerce, named Guillermo Moreno? That is to say, the question is: that controlling prices that Moreno did, and I ask you to be emphatic, can you shout if it is right or wrong? I don’t see you very convinced. Are you having throat problems or did Moreno seem nice to you? You can be more specific, let him know that you don’t like price controls! Well, wanting to control the interest rate is wanting to control present and future prices. It’s like a sort of “Moreno Reloaded” and it’s the incredible Hulk version of Moreno. In fact, if we had listened to those who said that we should go to positive real interest rates; today, the ratio of remunerated liabilities to the base would be above 10 times. We would have spent our time talking about carry trade; we would have spent our time talking about the ball of LELIQs or whatever you want. We would have talked about all that kind of stuff, and if we didn’t expropriate everything, then we would have exploded. That would be the discussion today, in Argentina, if we had listened to what they said that we should go to positive real interest rates.

Since we do not believe that the interest rate is a mechanism of intertemporal coordination and inflation a monetary problem, we never thought of doing that nonsense, and thank goodness we didn’t. So imagine all the books we are throwing in the trash of the guys who talk about: “no, that the rate…”; throw all that out because it’s useless. That said, then, the point was: we make a devaluation jump and what we arbitrated were the rates in dollars, that is, the substitution of currencies. That implied that the real interest rates - in pesos - were negative, but even so they were very high in dollars. So, how were they going to lower the rates, in dollars, and how was the Central Bank’s balance going to be cleaned? Well, part of the Central Bank’s balance was liquefied, that is, part of the adjustment was paid by the banks, that is, they had to stop working as bike messengers and had to start working as banks.

But not only that, but as time went on and the fiscal numbers were solid, we were able to start recreating, with a huge task from Pablo Quirno, we started to rebuild the peso market, and in conjunction with another huge colossus, which is Santiago Bausili, they started to remove the remunerated liabilities and we began to truly clarify where the problem was, which was that this debt should have always been state debt because it was fiscal deficit financed with monetary issuance and that this monetary issuance, so that it would not impact prices, was taken out of the market and paid interest. That should always have been debt, of the Treasury.

So - between the masterful, monstrous, cyclopean task of “Toto” Caputo, who was chosen the best Minister of Economy in the world for a reason, which I publicly congratulate him for -, combined with the enormous work of Pablo Quirno rebuilding the peso debt market, and the fabulous task of Santiago Bausili, in the Central Bank, we began to dismantle the problem of the remunerated liabilities, which were for one day and we would have quintupled the amount of money, in one day, if instead of being liberal-libertarians we had acted like liberal libertarians.

So, in that context, something incredible happened, something that no one could find the solution to, that everyone looked sideways; in six months, we cleaned the balance - of the Central Bank - of the remunerated liabilities, making an adjustment equivalent to 10 points of GDP. And that means that, along with the adjustment we made in the Treasury, we made the largest adjustment in the history of humanity, and here we are.

Therefore, we ended the problem of the remunerated liabilities, then we resolved the issue of the Puts, and the only thing left was the issuance by the external sector. And, obviously, look, I’m going to tell you a fabulous anecdote: Boca plays an intercontinental final, if I’m not mistaken it was against Milan; Boca defines by penalties… this is from my time when I was a Boca fan, I warn you that I stopped being a Boca fan when a certain character returned and when a five appeared, who had less marking than La Salada, that made me stop being a Boca fan. But it doesn’t matter, that’s a detail of twenty-fifth order; if it continues like this - at some point - I will be able to return to the stadium, but that’s another topic. That said, they go to a penalty shootout and Battaglia misses the penalty and, fortunately, thanks to Abbondanzieri, who is also a great guy, just like Palermo, you can imagine that I’m really Palermo. So, Boca wins that final, and a journalist has no better idea than to go interview him when he wants to go celebrate with Battaglia. And so he goes and instead of asking him, I don’t know, about how he felt about…, they had won everything, what does it feel like to have missed the penalty?

So Battaglia, with great wisdom, fabulously, says to him: “Have you ever taken a penalty in an Intercontinental final?” No. “Well, look, penalties are missed by those who take them, those who don’t take them don’t miss,” he said.

Sometimes some say that we make mistakes; and yes, of course, we make mistakes; the one who does, makes mistakes, and especially, people who do a lot.

If I had told you that, with 15% of the Chamber of Deputies and with 10% of the Senate, we were going to make a structural reform, which is the largest in the history of Argentina, because it is 8 times larger than Menem’s, you would have told me it is impossible and - yet - we did it. Or when they said that, for example, it was impossible to end the blockades, and thanks to the management of that enormous minister, who is Dr. Bullrich, today in Argentina there are no blockades. Or those who said it was impossible to end the intermediaries of poverty until I put a minister, who has the guts, like “Mario Alberto Kempes,” and ended the managers of poverty.

So imagine all the things we do every day, look at all the things that the minister Sturzenegger deregulates - every day. So, something that was impossible, we make possible every day. Obviously, if you are constantly doing things, and some you are going to throw to the stands, yes, life, but I think that in the net - without a doubt - we are doing the best Government in history.

In this sense, when we moved to the program, to the monetary part of zero excess supply, basically what we were saying was we are only going to issue to buy dollars. Believing that the demand for money when it grows is with a fixed exchange rate, brings as a result dollar sales and the increase of reserves.

And the problem is that, of course, this was not in the textbooks, because one day I was self-flagellating, and a friend told me: “Hey, but was that in the textbooks?” “No.” “And then, what do you want?” Well, that's fine, but I shouldn't have… Well, it doesn't matter, we missed that and didn't realize that - when you have an open economy model, without capital controls, - what the sale of dollars to the Central Bank is, is money demand, but that is true when there are no capital controls. That is to say, now when I have capital controls and I am forcing the liquidation of foreign currency, that sale of dollars, that purchase of pesos is not money demand; part of it may be money demand, but the other part is not money demand, and that was what was going to the exchange rate and that was what was causing pressure on prices or that inflation was not decreasing as quickly as we wanted.

So when we were facing a run and the dollar was at 1500 and everyone was predicting it would jump to 2000 and then - the following week - to 2500, and so on. We decided to change the monetary program again and went to what is zero issuance. Today it is below 1200; something happened that had never happened in Argentina, and that is that the dollar went down.

And that is how we reached zero issuance. And so today we discuss what is the exit from the capital controls, that is, today we are much closer to the exit from the capital controls than we were in December. Because, in addition, in the meantime we recognized a capital loss at the Central Bank, resulting from the previous management, amounting to 45 billion dollars. And, in addition - in the meantime - we bought nearly 20 billion dollars. That is to say, if you want to move towards a system, whether it be currency competition or a free system, or if you want to finish closing the Central Bank, the first thing you have to do is to clean it up and restore its equity. Because, in that way, when you restore the equity, it means that the monetary liabilities will be rescued and, therefore, the price level remains anchored. On the other hand, if you want to do it… the other day I heard a stupid person, because he is directly a stupid person, saying that we could do that on the first day by closing the Central Bank. Well, look, if you do not rescue the pesos and do it with negative net equity, how do you eliminate the pesos? The only way to eliminate them is with hyperinflation, and generating 95% poverty, and yes, on January 1, you would already have the Kirchnerists back in power, a genius. Whether to stabilize, dollarize, or eliminate the Central Bank, the first thing that had to be done is to clean up the Central Bank. And we have done that, we have done it like never before in history, because we not only cleaned up the capital loss of 45 billion dollars, but at the same time we bought 20 billion dollars. We certainly improved the balance sheet of the Central Bank; that is why prices are going down.

As for the exit from the capital controls, basically, three conditions must be met: the first is that the money overhang disappears. The money overhang occurs when I have price controls or when I have capital controls. Basically, we generated a fiscal deficit, issued money, that money went to the foreign exchange market, putting pressure on the exchange rate, while the purchasing power of the peso fell. So trying to anchor prices with the exchange rate, the exchange rate was fixed and reserves began to be lost; when reserves were lost, excess demand was eliminated with a club, which is capital controls. In that way, they are forced to demand more pesos than they want, increasing the taxable base of the inflation tax, and that is how they corrected.

But there you have a lot of excess pesos because they are pesos that wanted to buy dollars and could not and got trapped. So, the first thing you have to do is eliminate the money overhang. So, the question is how do you know what the money demand is to determine how much the money overhang is? And that, while one can do it, has its issues, that is, believing that money demand function.

So, there is another mechanism: we decided to keep the amount of money constant. If I keep the amount of money constant, I know that the money overhang disappears when there is no more inflation. So, I fixed the amount of money; when there is no more inflation, there is no more money overhang. If the inflation of the program today is 2.5 (induced) and I look at the observed at 3.5, today the program generates one point of inflation; that is to say, there is still money overhang to clean. So, the first thing we have to find is that the observed inflation maps with the induced inflation, because the day that happens it means that the money overhang has been cleaned, that is, there are no excess pesos left. That is a very important element: the day the money overhang disappears, that occurs when the observed inflation coincides with the induced. And it is not something of a single month; it has to be something that is verified robustly. First condition: that the money overhang disappears. Is that enough? No, because I still have stock problems. So, I also have to solve the problem, for example, of the dividends abroad that I have not yet paid and that I have trapped. That is to say, I also need to fix the stock problem in foreign currency.

Naturally, is that enough? No, one more condition is missing, and that is that the monetary base in its traditional definition coincides with the broad monetary base. What is the difference? The difference is the LEFIs and the LECAPs. So, as the economy begins to recover, there begins to be money demand. If that is the case, what we have to see is that the LEFIs have to shrink, and that is something that is happening. Why? Because you are a company that has money in the money market, there begins to be a recovery in economic activity, and indeed there is, either because real wages are rising —which they have been for five months—, because pensions are improving in real terms, because the stock cycle has run out and they have to be rebuilt, so economic activity begins to move. In fact, the recession ended between April and May, and we are in recovery.

Do you know that today, the seasonally adjusted EMAE - for August - is at the same level as December? That is to say, we made the largest adjustment in the history of humanity and we have already recovered the level of economic activity with which we arrived, see if that does not resemble a miracle.

So, what is that company going to do to produce? Is it going to go into debt? No. It is going to dismantle its money market. When it dismantles its money market and asks the bank for the money, what does the bank do? It dismantles the position of the LEFIs. So, the Treasury pays the LEFIs, pays the LECAPs. And what that does is that the monetary base, in the traditional definition, begins to resemble and starts to attend to the broad monetary base. All driven by money demand, not by the supply side. So that does not generate pressure on the price index, because it is demand… let’s say, it occurs from the demand for money.

When the gap between the traditional monetary base and the broad one coincides, at the same time that the problem of foreign currency debt stocks is cleaned up and the program inflation is zero, that is, equal to the induced. At that moment, there are no stock problems, there are no flow problems, and there are no excess pesos, therefore, that is the day we will open the capital controls.

And that day we will open it without any kind of shock, because there is no way to go against the peso. That is to say, the solution to exit the capital controls is also planned, but it depends on the decisions of individuals. As these elements converge faster, the closer the exit from the capital controls is. Obviously, if you give me a pile of money and I solve the stock problem, I will open and we will exit the capital controls; do not have any doubt about that. Now, the point is how we think from here forward, without the capital controls. How will monetary policy work? Look, here the issue is that we have decided on zero issuance. So, what happens if I have zero issuance and the economy starts to recover and, obviously, as a consequence of that, the demand for money rises? So, if the demand for money rises and the amount of money is given, what is going to happen to me? Several things will happen, but the most obvious is that I will have deflation.

Moreover, another thing that will happen to me is that I will bring dollars to monetize, and when I bring the dollars, what happens to me? I take them to the exchange market to get pesos. So, that generates a sharp drop in the nominal exchange rate, and the problem that can generate is that the speed of adjustment is so fast in the financial market compared to the goods market, that it can generate bankruptcies. So, I either have deflation or I have bankruptcies. So, how do we solve that? We have already provided the solution; some are implementing it, which is currency competition. That is to say, you, the individuals themselves, are the ones who monetize the economy. So, you take your dollars, and today you can make transactions in dollars or in any currency. That is to say, today there is currency competition; in fact, you can use the currency you want. Why do we do this? So that, in that way, you do not have to go to the peso and then a very abrupt appreciation of the peso occurs that generates a problem on the real side. And that is happening today: a supermarket has done it, and based on what it did, I say already, since they did it… Thank you, Diarco, because you showed others that it can be done! Do it all!

So you start now to circulate dollars in the economy to make transactions. So, as if you previously had a fixed exchange rate model, what happens? No, well, you needed to go, sell the dollars, the Central Bank bought them and the amount of money was stretched; notice that what stretches the amount of money is the demand for money, but if I do not increase the supply, then how do I solve that? either with deflation or let people create a currency competition system, bring in the dollars and use them as they see fit.

If you think that the structural reforms we made are a leap in economic freedom of 90 places and that today we have institutions, formally, that resemble those of Germany, France, Italy… Argentina has a lot of room to grow in the coming years. There is a study by Juan Pablo Nicolini, which says that, by achieving fiscal balance - in 10 years - we will double GDP per capita, we will grow at 7% annually. Not only that, but also, if you look, the fact of having made a fiscal adjustment of 15 points of GDP meant returning 15 points of savings to the private sector, and that will finance investment; that will make the economy grow. In addition, you have the advantages of the RIGI, you have the drop in country risk. Or would anyone have imagined that, receiving the country with 3000 country risk, today we have broken the barrier of 900 points and that, when we free the capital controls, we will start the path so that, sooner or later, we reach investment grade? What was impossible, we are making possible.

And notice that, as the economy grows, because interest rates fall, inflation disappears, we deregulate, and these are all elements that make the economy grow more, I suggest watching my talk at IDEA where I present the case of Argentina as a business case. So, in that context, with more money demand, given the currency competition, the economy will begin to be monetized with people putting their own dollars into the economy. And that will mean that if I have a given amount of pesos, what will I have? More dollars relatively. And there will come a time when the relationship between dollars and pesos in the economy will be so large that dollarization will be de facto and that doing it in practice, having cleaned up the Central Bank's balance sheet, will be easier than a snap of the fingers. Therefore, in the end, we will be able to dollarize and eliminate the Central Bank and end that filthy cancer that has been in Argentine history called the Central Bank of the Argentine Republic, which made us take 13 zeros off the currencies, which destroyed 5 monetary signs, which had two hyperinflations without war and that had been a mechanism that fed the politicians' scam. Therefore, the scam of the politicians in the electoral sense has ended, which by the way we are the only party that passed the electoral reform and put in the single ballot.

We are the only government that ensures fiscal balance because today we go to the budget with a zero deficit law and if you want to spend a little more, spend, but you will have to cut it from somewhere else and you will have to put the fish on the table and tell the people where you are getting it from.

Finally, with everything we are doing, at the Central Bank, and in monetary matters, at some point, the relationship between dollars within the economy and pesos will be so great that we will be able to dollarize, we will be able to close the Central Bank and we will have put an end to that cancer that we inherited from 1935, when that filthy institution that was the Central Bank of the Argentine Republic was created; which served only to enrich politicians and impoverish Argentines. The Argentina of the caste is over, the Argentina of free men who will be prosperous is coming.

Thank you very much, may the strength of heaven be with you, and long live freedom, damn it! Long live freedom, damn it! Long live freedom, damn it! Thank you very much.