Speech by Federal President Dr. h. c. Joachim Gauck at a ceremony celebrating the anniversary "25 Years – 16 States in the Bundesrat" on November 27, 2015, in Berlin:

Germany Joachim Gauck · Former Federal President of Germany

28 November 2015 · Ceremony celebrating the anniversary "25 Years – 16 States in the Bundesrat" · Berlin, Germany

Context
Gauck addressed a ceremony in Berlin on November 27, 2015, marking 25 years since the five eastern German states joined the Bundesrat following reunification.
Main themes
German federalism, 25th anniversary of reunification and Bundesrat expansion, subsidiarity principle, German constitutional history, East-West integration, critique and defense of federalism, Erich Kästner's poetry, federalism vs. centralism, historical continuity of federal structures
Duration
~25 min
76th percentile
Words
3,024
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Sentences
147
80th percentile
Readability
45
49th percentile
Grade
11.9
44th percentile
Syntax
2.94
40th percentile
Vocabulary
2.16
41st percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 66%62%
  • Social 18%16%
  • Ceremonial 11%10%
  • Geopolitical 3%3%
  • Economic 2%2%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 7%

147 sentences in 49 paragraphs

Mr. President, I am grateful that you reminded me that I have also taken other steps in my political life. I particularly fondly remember the year 1990.

On the one hand, I am here – you can feel it – of course as the Federal President. I am happy that I was able to make a start, and I assume that at some point there will be a Federal President or a Federal President who will continue this contact between these two constitutional bodies, which has begun today.

On the other hand, I congratulate you as a citizen of this united country and also specifically as a Mecklenburger, that is, someone from the East who had to relearn federalism.

I have also brought you a birthday poem. It comes from a famous compatriot of the President of the Federal Council, namely Erich Kästner. Although he became known in Berlin and throughout Germany, he actually comes from Saxony. It is well known that he did not only express friendly sentiments. Therefore, I will certainly subject you to what he produced in 1932 as a rather biting reflection on German federalism. The poem is called "Inscription on a Saxon-Prussian Boundary Stone" and goes like this:

"Whoever passes by here, linger!

Here runs an invisible wall.

Germany falls apart into many parts.

The noun is: disintegration.

What we have left standing here,

is a gravestone, so you know!

Here lies a part of the dog buried,

on which a people has come."

These are admittedly harsh words. You will – so much is already clear – not let this go unchallenged in this speech, despite all other sympathies for the brilliant diagnostician of the times, Erich Kästner.

I quoted them nonetheless. On the one hand, because one rarely finds a literary witness of this rank in the sober world of constitutional law. On the other hand, I also quote them because in these mocking verses some accusations emerge that still characterize the criticism of federalism today: It offers a stage for "small-state-ism" and regional egotisms, one sometimes hears. It is slow and inefficient. In short: it is inferior to a centralist state order.

The strongest argument that can be made against Kästner and his successors at this point is the simple fact that the states and the federal order still exist today, more than 80 years after this poem, to be more precise: that they exist again. Federalism has – despite some criticisms in individual issues – clearly proven itself in sum and still represents an attractive fundamental principle of state order today, so attractive that the people in the soon-to-end GDR chose exactly this model with their accession to the Federal Republic:

On October 3, 1990, simultaneously with German reunification, five states were founded between the Baltic Sea and the Ore Mountains, which were referred to as "new states" for reasons that were still obvious at the time. The first state elections followed, and a few weeks later, on November 9, 1990, the Federal Council convened for the first time with representatives from all 16 German states.

The names Mecklenburg, Vorpommern, Brandenburg, Saxony, Anhalt, and Thuringia can be found on centuries-old maps, admittedly: linguistically and geographically somewhat differently cut – and of course without hyphens. Even the oldest predecessor of the Federal Council can be located very early, in the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation: The Permanent Diet in Regensburg from 1663 to 1803 was structurally and personally different, but in the overall structure of the Old Empire, it played a similar role. It formed a counterweight to the central power of the emperor. It was supposed to organize participation and involvement. It embodied the idea that the empire is constituted by its member states and the insight that each of the two levels is dependent on the other.

Later, the term "principle of subsidiarity" became established to describe this relationship, which essentially states that problems should be solved where they arise, and that the next higher level may only become active when the lower level cannot achieve a proper solution on its own.

Anyone who looks at some stages of our national constitution in fast motion – the German Confederation in 1815, the Paulskirchen Constitution of 1849, the North German Confederation in 1867, the German Empire in 1871, the Weimar Republic in 1919, and the Federal Republic in 1949 – will find: Federalism, that is, the balance aimed at joint action between the various states and a central power, is a fixed element of German constitutional history. Jurists even speak of a "constitutional heritage."

This federal element has been differently pronounced throughout German history, and there have been – as we have already heard – two political systems in the recent past that have overridden this heritage because the rulers did not tolerate any other centers of power alongside them, namely the Nazi state and later the GDR. The rulers in both dictatorships knew very well what federalism also stands for: for the separation of powers, for mutual control, for balance, and for peaceful competition for the best idea. However, this is not compatible with a totalitarian claim to power. Therefore, both in Nazi Germany and in the later GDR, the states were early eliminated.

After the end of World War II, the Allies had a comprehensible interest in promoting the decentralization of Germany. They relied on the historically grown states and provinces. The eleven western states, all of which are older than the Federal Republic, will soon celebrate the 70th anniversary of their founding. Those who can do everything except High German may even celebrate multiple times.

In East Germany, things were known to be different. Although the states had even been re-established here in 1945 – the philatelists among you know that – and the first constitution of the GDR in 1949 at least on paper assigned them a task and even a chamber of their own, they were abolished again in 1952. In their place came 14 districts, somehow arbitrarily designed on the drawing board. These districts differed from the states not only by their borders but above all by their function. They were not independent units that together constituted a whole, but intermediate instances of a centralist state power.

But now something very special comes, and that is the feelings and hearts of the people. In the hearts of the East Germans, the identity of the states somehow continued to live. The terminology of our states, the names of our states were not liked by the state, but in the population, it was clear that there is indeed Saxony. Not everyone liked that, Mr. President, as we have often discussed together, but we were indeed aware of our different identities as Berliners, Brandenburgers, Saxons, Thuringians, and Anhalters. Therefore, when the phase of the disintegration of communist rule began in 1989, it immediately became about: Now something new is starting. "A dream comes true, Land Saxony," one read as early as December 1989 on the rear windows of many Trabants that drove around the streets of Saxony. And in Cottbus, the Red Eagle was sung with Brandenburg fervor.

Behind this joyful rediscovery of the regional were very different motives at the time. On the one hand, many East Germans seemed fundamentally suspicious after 40 years of "democratic centralism" when a state was centrally directed from above. On the other hand, after the dissolution of the GDR and its purpose and coercive communities, there was also a great longing for identity, for belonging, for historical rootedness in a manageable local area. And then there was also the old Federal Republic, which one wanted to join and which had overall had such good experiences with its federal model over four decades.

Thus, the new states became the first anchor points of the new East German identity – or should I say better: "the new East German identities"? The second term is the better one. Because one was not just "Ossi," but first and foremost a Mecklenburger or Saxon, Thuringian or Berliner. This anchoring was important because the people were asked to give up an infinite amount at that time: transformation at high speed became everyday life for millions. Even a word like "Landesvater" soon found its way back into the East German vocabulary – well, how about that! – even if some "fathers" initially came from the West. In some nicknames, a monarchical trait was even reflected.

But the new states were far more than just emotional points of identification. They quickly developed into capable political units with their parliaments, governments, and a functioning administration. That this succeeded so smoothly at the time is, in retrospect, anything but self-evident. Of course, there were buried structures to which one could reconnect, such as the mentality of the people, but above all, there were the western states as a blueprint. By the way, there were also countless energetic helpers from the West who were infinitely helpful in the construction of this structure.

But that does not diminish the enormous political construction achievement that had to be accomplished in a very short time, and that was done by people, most of whom had lived under the rule of a socialist dictatorship just one or two years earlier. I can only bow to this achievement today with respect and gratitude.

I consciously include in this gratitude the officials, the administrative specialists, and jurists from the West who, after the Peaceful Revolution and reunification, helped build justice – where it was particularly important – and administration in the new states within the framework of the state partnerships, often under difficult conditions. Everything was missing, from copiers to laws and regulations. Thus, we can today say with full gratitude: This pioneering work, which was not appreciated by everyone at the time, was extraordinarily successful. Thank you very much for that. Here, a principle has proven itself that belongs to federalism just as much as competition and the idea of subsidiarity: solidarity – solidarity between East and West, between old and new states, between those who had already grown up with freedom and democracy and those who were only striving for both.

That the transformation in East Germany succeeded better and faster than in many other states in Eastern and Central Europe that embarked on the same path in 1989/90 was certainly also due to the fact that in Germany, there were the experiences and resources of the old Federal Republic and that the burden of upheaval was distributed across many shoulders and different levels.

In parallel with the grassroots integration, political integration at the federal level had to be managed. The Federal Council naturally played a significant role in this. The list of tasks that the state chamber had to tackle during reunification is long. Just a few randomly selected keywords from the agendas of the sessions during those tumultuous months: "Financial aid for investors, provisional accommodation of asylum seekers and resettlers, conversion of military facilities, traffic route planning acceleration law, open property issues, SED injustices, rents, housing benefits, labor market, LPG areas, Treuhandanstalt, old debt regulation, childcare facilities, national cancer registry, and much more."

There is no doubt: The Federal Council as a community of 16 has achieved enormous things since 1990 – for the new states and with them. The governments of all states have impressively fulfilled their overall state responsibility in the Federal Council before and after October 3, 1990. For this, all those involved – you, ladies and gentlemen, and your predecessors – deserve a great, a highly official thank you!

The Federal Council has also debunked a number of persistent prejudices that have been circulating against German federalism since at least Erich Kästner in its practical work. For example, when it came to deploying rescue umbrellas during the financial market crisis to support European partners and strengthen the cohesion of Europe, the states demonstrated decisiveness and capability to act under high time pressure and in a politically tense situation. There was no sign of lethargy or even a blockade mentality.

The latter is also hardly felt otherwise. One might think that in a body consisting of representatives from 16 states governed by different party constellations, there must be a permanent election campaign atmosphere – with all the known side effects: party-political maneuvering, window speeches, showcasing the opponent, and so on. But although statistically, there is almost always an election somewhere in Germany, a constructive and issue-oriented atmosphere usually prevails here in the Federal Council. For this, ladies and gentlemen, I want to express my gratitude to you today for good reason.

I encounter this constructive focus on substance, by the way, when I have discussions with representatives of the various specialized ministerial conferences. In general, I experience a great deal of thoughtfulness and consensus there. And when there are differences of opinion, it is not due to the different party affiliations of my conversation partners, but rather to the differing situations in the individual countries. My guests usually confirm this to each other as well. And in this assessment, they also include their partners in the federation.

Especially in times like the ones we are currently experiencing, I find it extremely reassuring that there are such forums where people who bear special responsibility for the well-being of the country can work together in a focused manner, without too much regard for the press coverage of the coming days.

No, the countries are very much aware of their strengths; they know their responsibilities. They also bring this knowledge to the European level. The fact that the principle of subsidiarity is generally recognized as a structural principle of European unification outside of Germany is largely due to the efforts of the German states since the 1990s. Without this commitment, Europe would be more centralized and more distant from its citizens today.

Is German federalism therefore a success story? Yes. In sum, I would answer this question in the affirmative. It is so primarily because it has always proven to be capable of learning and reform throughout its history. I wish us, and I wish you, this capacity for learning and reform in the future as well.

There are indeed plenty of tasks and challenges that we still need to work on. I think, for example, of the area that is symptomatic of federalism for many citizens, namely school and education. There is still a great deal of dissatisfaction in many areas that cannot leave us indifferent. One often hears complaints about the differences between the school systems of the individual states, which can make moving with school-age children within Germany a bit of a gamble. Yes, I know that some unification has already taken place recently. I welcome that. Nevertheless, the debate will continue on how we can provide our children with the best possible education.

Or – you have experienced this, you have also helped shape it – take the broad field of science, which in Germany largely falls under the responsibility of your states. There has also been some progress recently towards closer cooperation in this area. What once seemed impossible has become a reality. I can only be pleased about that.

But these opportunities must now also be utilized so that our universities and research institutions can compete in the global race for talent and ideas. Because one thing is clear: In this competition, one no longer competes as before between the individual states of the federation – that is, Bavaria with Saxony-Anhalt – but today Germany competes with other major scientific nations around the globe.

Finally, I think of the current challenges posed by the influx of refugees. In a conversation I had recently with members of the National Regulatory Control Council, I was informed about the difficulties that exist between the administrations of the federal government, states, and municipalities regarding data exchange about refugees. I could hardly believe that in a high-tech country it is not possible for the individual institutions involved to communicate with each other in a straightforward manner. So, there is still something to be done.

In addressing the challenges of refugee influx, it becomes particularly clear how urgently we depend on good, efficient, and solidary cooperation at all levels. I greatly appreciate that all parties involved are working towards a common solution here.

The fact that federalism is a learning system is closely related to the fact that it has its sensors close to the people and thus serves as a large laboratory. To be more precise – I must unfortunately temper my enthusiasm a bit: that it can be such a laboratory. Because sometimes, even in a federal order, the desire for a comfortable journey in a convoy is greater than the willingness to struggle for the best, for a new solution. You should resist this temptation – just as you have generally resisted the temptation to place competitive rivalry over federal cooperation.

The fundamental problem of federalism can be summarized in a few questions – even after two reform commissions.

First: How do we define the "common good" in a system with multiple levels and actors?

Second: How do we ensure a wise balance between the common good and the self-interests of the individual actors?

Third: How do we achieve a fair distribution of burdens among them?

Unfortunately, there are no simple answers to these three questions. Nevertheless, it is worth asking them and working hard on them. Because here, beyond the German federal-state relations, there is much to learn for cooperation in a united Europe or for shaping globalization.

Federalism is more than a technical organizational form of political power. It also represents a political culture in our country that it has shaped and from which it is in turn shaped. This culture aims at weighing options, finding compromises, and achieving balance. This sometimes makes decisions a bit more laborious and dampens the swings of the political pendulum. Some call this "sluggishness." But one can also say something else about it, namely "measure and moderation." And these are values that benefit our country, especially in turbulent times like those we live in today.