Speech by Federal President Dr. h. c. Joachim Gauck at a discussion round with participants of the XV. Potsdam Meetings from Russia and Germany on June 3, 2013, in Berlin:

Germany Joachim Gauck · Former Federal President of Germany

10 July 2013 · XV. Potsdam Meetings · Berlin, Germany

Context
Gauck addressed participants of the XV. Potsdam Meetings of Russian and German representatives in Berlin on June 3, 2013, discussing how societies confront difficult historical legacies.
Main themes
Coming to terms with the past, German historical memory, Soviet-era crimes and memory, transformation societies, civil society development, collective guilt and responsibility, Nazi legacy, Russian historical memory, denial and delayed reckoning, victims and perpetrators, historical discourse, reconciliation
Duration
~10 min
35th percentile
Words
1,203
35th percentile
Sentences
54
35th percentile
Readability
38
32nd percentile
Grade
13.5
61st percentile
Syntax
3.14
65th percentile
Vocabulary
2.15
37th percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Social 78%78%
  • Geopolitical 11%11%
  • Ceremonial 7%7%
  • Institutional 4%4%
  • Economic 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 0%

54 sentences in 15 paragraphs

Your meeting in Potsdam has presented a difficult topic this year: the future impact of the past.

I call this topic difficult not only because it deals with the legacy of terrible dictatorships, but also because the participants come from very different cultures of reception.

In West Germany, a self-critical historical discourse developed after a phase of denial or delay following the war. No longer was the focus of the historical narrative on one's own suffering and losses, but rather on the guilt of our compatriots, their failure to save democracy, their cruelty towards those deemed "inferior." With deep shock, West Germans became aware—albeit only a generation later—that Germany had not only been an enemy of the democratic form of government but had also betrayed humanity. The knowledge that there have always been good people even in evil times was no longer sufficient. Only the acknowledgment of the truth, along with shame and sorrow, could pave the way to establishing new trust in oneself and among neighboring nations. The interesting aspect of this West German development was the fact that the cruel historical reality of the Nazi era was not hidden even in the post-war period. Sub-discourses constantly existed: the victims, for example, did not remain silent about their truth, about their fate; neither did the opponents of the Nazis, nor the emigrants who returned—less so the jurists, but the others—followed the mandate of enlightenment. However, they spoke to a society that was too preoccupied with need or reconstruction for any inner reflection or something like a "clarification," as Karl Jaspers called it after the war, to take place—at least not among the masses. This process, in which the masses turned to this topic, then began with a delay and continues to this day. Today, the collective identity of Germans includes the awareness of their own guilt. As long as this awareness does not develop into a neurotic claim to sole representation, it is useful and constructive for the nation. And that is exactly what we have experienced: Germans found themselves and others when they no longer ignored or marginalized the historical truth and the acknowledgment of their own guilt.

I would like to emphasize: before this became the guiding discourse of an entire society, there existed sub-discourses from victims and the informed. The processing of the past was not yet common property when the knowledge was already generally accessible. And the stronger society transformed into a civil society, the stronger the desire for genuine processing became.

During my visits to various transformation societies—not only in Europe, by the way—I have been able to discover many similarities. The special case of East German historical processing shows no different finding than that of a layered form of processing. By the way, particularly interesting in East Germany, as there was massive state and civil society activity towards openness and self-criticism. Nevertheless, a large portion of the population in the former GDR was unable to make this discourse of the initiated their own.

Now let us look at today's Russia: today's Russia bears many characteristics of a transformation society. And here, too, there have long been impressive discourses: scientific, artistic, or civil society activities that address the criminal Soviet system. But in this process, it still needs to be shown how our German experiences in processing the Nazi past can be utilized for addressing the long history of alienation, lawlessness, and murder in the Soviet state. For, no matter how different the ideologies of the dictators may be, there is a universal rule: the past is not past; at some point, the repressed will resurface. The post-communist society must come to terms with itself, whether it wants to analyze guilt, repent, or even possibly make amends. There are many possibilities for this. And governments can either promote or hinder these processes.

I see a danger in Russia in that the time when the Soviet Union was a victim overshadows the experiences of terror and loss of humanity throughout the entire era of communism. The immense suffering and the unparalleled sacrifices of the population during the "Great Patriotic War" will occupy generations to come. However, whether the memory of this is sufficient to reconcile the nation with itself and to promote the development of civil society is questionable. And this is not for political reasons, but for psychological ones. It is not only the great victories that shape collective memory, and it is not only the great traumas, but it is also always guilt, and it is the perpetuated powerlessness that imprints itself on the soul of a people.

This knowledge of the victims, the scientists, or the artists will eventually become common property for a civil society. And it must become common property.

Only those who do not engage in selective historical politics, who do not subordinate research funds to a political purpose, who do not restore or maintain myths, can create a historical narrative in which the entire society can recognize itself. Perhaps they also talk about how sometimes the rulers and large parts of the ruled have common interests in distorting historical truth. At least, that is what I experienced in Germany for a long time. Those who want a strong state and national greatness, who even mourn a past imperial gesture, will not necessarily promote enlightening sub-discourses.

In this context, many in Germany are asking what future the commendable work of our friends from "Memorial" has. We are concerned to see that some civil society activities are currently under pressure, that critical media are being hindered, and that human rights defenders are being denounced or even criminalized. Together with significant deficits in the rule of law, this creates a societal climate that could also hinder an enlightening historical discourse.

I see your forum as a good way to discuss such concerns. These are truly not only my concerns, and they are truly not only German, but they are European.

I initially spoke of a double difficulty and hope to have addressed this—despite all the brevity—at its core.

And I want to add one more thing: My contribution is not to be understood as "instruction" in the classical sense, and certainly not as a relativization of the injustices and murders that Germans committed against the Soviet Union during the Nazi era. Germans know very well who the perpetrators were. But this deep knowledge only reached broad segments of the population once the described form of self-critical processing of history became common property. Only then did this deepened knowledge emerge. This has also benefited democracy, as historical knowledge was no longer limited or selective. We know more about human dignity and more about human rights than ever before!

From this knowledge about the human condition, we feel commissioned to also engage in discussions about history, human dignity, and human rights in other countries. Just as true science does not allow its discourses to end at borders, so the discourse on human and civil rights, on the central rights of the individual in society, can never be an interference in "internal affairs."

In this sense, I wish the forum courage and a sense of reality for events, strategies, data, and names—whether they are past or present.