Speech by Federal President Dr. h. c. Joachim Gauck at the memorial event "1914 – 2014. One Hundred European Years" on June 27, 2014, in Berlin:

Germany Joachim Gauck · Former Federal President of Germany

5 July 2014 · Memorial event "1914 – 2014. One Hundred European Years" · Berlin, Germany

Context
Gauck addressed a Berlin memorial event on June 27, 2014, marking the centenary of World War I's outbreak and reflecting on its lessons for contemporary Europe.
Main themes
Lessons of World War I, European unity and integration, nationalism and ethnic conflict, democracy versus totalitarianism, communism and völkisch nationalism, Franz Marc and Expressionism, post-war territorial reorganization, the Weimar Republic, reconciliation and peace, minority rights and ethnic cleansing, the idea of European civil war
Duration
~18 min
62nd percentile
Words
2,215
62nd percentile
Sentences
114
69th percentile
Readability
42
40th percentile
Grade
12.3
48th percentile
Syntax
3.03
52nd percentile
Vocabulary
2.27
67th percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 74%68%
  • Social 12%11%
  • Institutional 8%7%
  • Ceremonial 5%4%
  • Economic 2%2%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 9%

114 sentences in 31 paragraphs

Once again, welcome, now to the second part of our event.

Let me begin with the Blue Rider, more specifically: with Franz Marc, whose wonderfully enigmatic horse paintings gave this artist group its name. Marc was a Munich Expressionist, shaped by the great French painters of the turn of the century, closely befriended with the Russian Wassily Kandinsky. A creative cosmopolitan in a world that many contemporaries believed to be culturally advanced, internationally connected, shaped by scientific progress, rationality, and enlightenment – until this self-image of an era collapsed almost overnight, 100 years ago.

I do not want to repeat what we heard this morning about the reasons for the outbreak of the First World War and what we have been able to read in insightful new publications over the past months. Rather, I would like to ask what lessons have been drawn from the "original catastrophe" and its "subsequent catastrophes," and whether these lessons also apply to the challenges of our present time.

Franz Marc was among those who volunteered for the front at the outbreak of war, like so many fellow artists in a militarized society. And as with so many, Marc's national enthusiasm gave way in the face of mechanized mass killing. Franz Marc was the first to refer to the First World War as a "European civil war." That was prophetic. And it was equally prophetic that he drew a conclusion from this in 1914, a little more than a year before he fell at Verdun, which we can still quote as a central lesson from this war 100 years later: "The love for good Germanness must today be intertwined with the love for good European-ness. Only with it and through it will Germany have the century it longs for. The borders should not be redrawn, but broken." This hope was not to be fulfilled for the time being, for in 1918, after 17 million dead and immeasurable suffering, the borders were not "broken," but "redrawn." The victors demanded territorial concessions from the vanquished. And from the bankruptcy of the old multi-ethnic states, from Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and the Tsarist Empire, a multitude of new and revived nation-states emerged. The peoples realized their dream of self-determination.

The political guiding principle of this territorial reorganization of Europe was the nation-state, whose republican roots reach back to the French Revolution. The citizens of the new nation-states preferred the "citizen society" of equals over the feudal estate society of the fallen empires. This was more modern and democratic at the time than belonging to a multi-ethnic state under a ruler by the grace of God.

The flip side of this concept was the close connection between statehood and ethnic belonging: the overvaluation of blood and descent, language and culture, the inability to integrate minorities – while tolerating their peculiarities. This provided the basis for immediate conflicts, border disputes, and desires for revenge, for conflicts with minorities, for forced assimilation and expulsion – for what would be euphemistically called "ethnic cleansing" 80 years later. Where enough ruthlessness and will to power prevailed, such a conflict could even end in annexation – as in Hitler's expansionist ambitions in 1938 in the Sudetenland.

However, the First World War not only changed the borders of Europe and the ethnic composition of individual countries. The spiritual map of the continent also received new coordinates.

I see here three major currents that were in conflict with each other. They determined the history – including the path to the downfall – of the first German Republic.

The first current is the turn towards Western democracy, towards an open society based on the dignity and freedom of the individual, and towards a state in which the law stands above power. Added to this was the desire for peace and reconciliation among many. They did not want to see themselves only as Germans, French, or Poles, but as Europeans. As early as the early 1920s, the Austrian politician Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi advocated for a European unification movement. On the other hand, soldiers and free corps fighters were still fighting with weapons in hand for the borders of the new nation-states when he was already promoting the United States of Europe, a political and economic community that was to prevent a new war. At the same time, the League of Nations was founded, with the aim of international understanding and peaceful conflict resolution.

On the other side stood two political currents that could rather be described as salvation ideologies, namely communism and völkisch nationalism. Both had a promise of salvation: the dissolution of social and political contradictions in a mythically elevated community ideal, which in one case was called "class" and in the other case "race." Both also pursued expansionist goals.

And both, as different as they were otherwise, stood in sharp contrast to freedom and democracy. Communism and völkisch nationalism experienced enormous support through the First World War and the social tensions of the post-war period. It was the war that had significantly prepared the victory of Leninist communism and the emergence of the Soviet Union. And it was the struggle of many Germans with the defeat and the Treaty of Versailles, as well as the hardship of the interwar period, that fostered the rise of the National Socialists. With their seizure of power, the path to a brutal dictatorship began, which engulfed the world in a new war of annihilation and perpetrated an unprecedented genocide.

And only after this war and another defeat did democracy in Germany receive a new chance. And only now could the idea of international understanding and European unification prevail on our continent, which, as we have heard, was conceived much earlier. Both – democratization and Europeanization – initially applied only to the respective western part, for the West of Germany as well as for the West of Europe, in the shadow of the Cold War. The Federal Republic became a stable parliamentary democracy. And the Europe of the Six, then the Nine, the Ten, and the Twelve actually developed into a community of peace, freedom, and prosperity.

However, European unification only approached completion when brave citizens in 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe, and thus also in the GDR, freed themselves from communist rule. And the will to cooperate also included states like Russia, with which special agreements were made.

Hope seemed justified that dialogue and cooperation would long-term replace rivalry and mistrust. Not a few believed and hoped that the Western understanding of democracy, human rights, and international cooperation would now be the guiding principle for global development. I believed and hoped that too. But today, a quarter of a century later, we see: history does not proceed in a continuous upward movement. Neither nationalism nor salvation ideologies have simply disappeared.

In the 1990s, the wars in the Balkans caused shock and horror. And Islamist terror confronts us with a worldview that deeply contradicts our notions of humanity and non-violence. And in countries like China, we are witnessing new, authoritarian forms of capitalism that call into question our European conception of a triad of peace, democracy, and human rights.

Many of us may have initially thought in the face of these challenges: These are special developments. This does not really concern us. This is far away. But then, recently, we were taught otherwise.

Russia's resistance to Ukraine's rapprochement with the European Union has confronted us with ways of thinking and behaving that we thought had long been overcome on our continent. What we are experiencing today is old thinking in terms of spheres of power and influence – up to the destabilization of foreign states and the annexation of foreign territories. Are we falling back into a politics of confrontation and violence?

The Charter of the United Nations of 1945 commits to the peaceful resolution of international disputes. It prohibits any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state. A secession accompanied by a violation of the prohibition of force cannot be lawful. How can we Europeans ensure the validity of international law and maintain peace on the continent if this fundamental conviction is no longer shared by all partners?

The Federal Government has engaged early and consistently in this conflict, principled and at the same time de-escalating, and it does not relent in this. Here it becomes clear what we are currently debating, namely that Germany takes on a responsibility that is due to it as an important member of the European Union and as a supporter of a norms-based world order.

Germany and the European Union face a serious, great, and unexpected challenge. We do not want to return to a politics of confrontation, but we cannot simply accept the violation of the law and a questioning of our common European foundation either. Otherwise, we would abandon ourselves and our values.

This new external challenge hits the European Union at a time when it is itself in a crisis. For within, voices are growing that want more nation-state at the expense of European integration. It seems paradoxical: While the European promise of peace, freedom, and prosperity is particularly attractive to those who are not yet members of the European Union, populist and even anti-European forces are gaining strength within the Union.

There may be reasons for the criticism of Europe. Reasons that can also be easily instrumentalized: There is disappointment over what some call a democratic deficit and regulatory obsession in Brussels. There is the accusation that the global financial sector emerges from the crisis largely unscathed while millions of citizens slip into poverty. There is also the unwillingness regarding the acceptance of immigrants and refugees, a migration that some perceive as uncontrolled. And beneath it all simmers the fear of globalization, which is felt as increasing unboundedness and obscurity, as the feeling of losing home, security, belonging, and identity.

But the retreat space of the nation-state, which some dream of, no longer exists.

It is true: The nation-state was and is the basic unit of democracy in Europe. That was also the case 25 years ago when the Soviet Empire collapsed and the desire for national self-determination developed immense appeal. For it was connected with the feeling of historical legitimacy, with cultural identity, and with the longing for freedom. And yet, the citizens east of Europe's old dividing line preferred at that time to cede parts of the newly acquired national sovereignty back to European institutions, to Europe. They did so knowing that Europe offers them protection and grants them new, global agency. They knew that every European country alone would be far too small to truly play a role on the world stage of the future. Yes, too small even to remain capable of action in the future and to live in safety. The nation-state can no longer fulfill important state functions alone – without friends and allies.

The return to the classical nation-state cannot therefore be the answer for Europe to the new unboundedness and the new obscurity. We cannot solve our current problems through withdrawal or exclusion.

So, we stand, 100 years after the beginning of the First World War, in a completely different situation than the people of another era. Do the lessons of then fit the challenges of today?

Like the peace-loving citizens of our country, it seems unimaginable to me today that intellectuals expected salvation or purification from war. That a friendly country like Belgium was ruthlessly made a victim. And that the barbarization of warfare – for example, in gas warfare and in submarine warfare against civilians – could be regarded as a patriotic act. For me, it is clear: The lesson from the "original catastrophe" and the "subsequent catastrophes" is a commitment to the values of enlightenment and the cohesion of Western democracies. For us, all of this is more necessary today than ever. Or let us put it better, as ever. It is necessary to defend the achievements against the challengers from the outside, and we must win over the doubters from within.

Our Europe has its common foundation in the respect for human rights and in the unconditional respect for the rule of law. It is fundamentally based on the dignity of the human being and the respect for others. It is built on understanding and communication, on dialogue and de-escalation – within individual countries and also in relation to neighbors. Our Europe fosters cooperation. Our Europe offers a home to all its residents – regardless of which people, religion, gender, or nation they belong to. And no one has to alienate themselves from their nation if they feel committed to these universal values, which are broader than any allegiance to a nation could ever be.

So let us continue to embrace this Europe as our common home in the future. Let us examine with objectivity and sympathy where its construction can be improved. Let us confidently advocate for what unites us.

One hundred years ago, Franz Marc saw in an exaggerated nationalism an "invisible enemy of the European spirit." To this inner enemy, he opposed the love for Europeanness. Every challenge that the European idea has faced in the past 100 years reaffirms its necessity anew.

Franz Marc knew the alternatives. We know them too.