Speech by the President of the Government at the events marking the 75th anniversary of the Thomson-Aranzadi publishing house.

Spain José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero · Prime Minister of Spain

21 November 2004 · 75th anniversary of the Thomson-Aranzadi publishing house

Context
Zapatero addressed the 75th anniversary celebration of Thomson-Aranzadi legal publishing house in Spain on 21 November 2004, reflecting on law, democracy, and his personal legal background.
Main themes
Rule of law, Spanish Constitution of 1978, legal publishing and jurisprudence, democracy and constitutionalism, Thomson-Aranzadi anniversary, personal biography and legal vocation, constitutional sentiment, European Constitution, law as democratic foundation, legislative process
Duration
~16 min
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1,862
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Sentences
47
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Readability
30
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Grade
18.7
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Syntax
3.65
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Vocabulary
2.27
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Translated from Spanish

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The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

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  • Institutional 60%57%
  • Social 27%26%
  • Ceremonial 13%13%
  • Geopolitical 0%0%
  • Economic 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
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  • Not in focus 4%

47 sentences in 26 paragraphs

Allow me to begin my remarks at this event with a small autobiographical note, which will serve to explain why the usual and somewhat clichéd way of starting interventions like this — "it is a pleasure for me," etc., etc. — takes on greater authenticity here.

My father and my brother are lawyers. They belong, moreover, to that type of selfless provincial lawyers whose profession is not confined within the walls of the office, because they encounter their clients on the street and talk to them about the status of their cases; because they take work home to continue reading jurisprudence and doctrine in search of insights that guide them in articulating their defenses; because they debate among themselves time and again about these matters.

I now see myself, at a few years of age, following my father to the office that at that time occupied a wing of our family home and which always impressed me, perhaps because there was no more suitable place than that, with its solemn and mysterious character, in the eyes of a child to symbolically house paternal authority.

I remember the clattering of my father's typewriter in the early hours of the morning, spurred on by the deadlines that always loom over lawyers. Today, in the computer age, lawyers make much less noise when they work; but back then it was different. In my home, I learned the value of legal reasoning and of words as instruments of persuasion. I discovered the dialectical utility of disagreement and the intellectual modesty with which one must accept the vulnerability of one's own positions. I was fortunate to breathe in the Law, the profound sense of the Law, which is in itself a school of democracy.

I too followed in my studies the family footsteps, later having the opportunity to know and learn the Law as a science, working at the University of León as a Professor of Constitutional Law, a discipline in which my two great vocations — legal and political — intersected. A few years later, fortune smiled upon me again, taking me as a representative of the citizens of my city to the Congress of Deputies, where this time I approached the Law from the perspective of its creation, its elaboration, through the legislative process.

For all these reasons, you will believe me when I confess that I have never ceased to consider myself — I say this with all modesty, but also with a certain pride — as a jurist or simply, a man of the Law. Not only because of the familial air I have breathed, or because of my training, and the professional activity I have been engaged in, but precisely, and as I will attempt to explain in this event, I cannot conceive of politics without it.

The professional office where I grew up was, like so many others, tiled to the ceiling with wooden shelves that housed thick books, which then seemed enormous to me, made of fine paper and small print. With those same books, with those same volumes, I found myself again, now in the role of a reader, in the Faculty of Law, first as a student and later as a professor, and later still in the Congress of Deputies to prepare some of my interventions as a parliamentarian. Today is the day when they continue to have my back, from the walls of some offices of the Presidency of the Government. Those books were, and are, of course, the volumes of legislation and jurisprudence from Aranzadi, the Aranzadi.

For all these reasons, I say it now, it truly is a pleasure for me to be here today, speaking at this commemoration of the 75th anniversary of this distinguished legal publishing house.

On more than one occasion, I have publicly recalled that the electoral baptism of the generation to which I belong took place with the referendum on the Spanish Constitution of 1978. Around this foundational element of democracy, many of us indeed built our civic commitment. At that time, we understood from the outset the value of the Constitution as a political document, forged through the consensus with which Spain aspired to reconcile, this time definitively, with European history, with the best of our own history.

We were, indeed, fully aware of this, and this sentiment that has come to be called constitutional sentiment, this bond, not only rational but also affective, to the Constitution, will never leave us. And now, I will add, it extends that affective field, in addition to the rational, to another Constitution and another referendum: that of the European Constitution on February 20.

But what was perceived more weakly in those inaugural moments, even for those of us who were already in the Law Faculties, was that the Spanish Constitution of 1978 was not only the political foundation of the new democratic State we wanted to build, but also a true legal norm: the superior norm of the legal order. A few months after its approval, the first academic reflections were published by professors such as Rubio Llorente or García de Enterría, and then we could begin to understand the meaning of the normative supremacy of the Constitution, although its consequences did not become clearly perceptible until the creation in 1981 of the Constitutional Court, the guardian of the Constitution.

Finally, then, in Spain we had democracy, but also, alongside it — it is an inseparable symbiosis — we also had the Rule of Law; a Rule of Law that, being enshrined in and from the Constitution itself, imposed and imposes limits on all public powers, including those that base their legitimacy on the will of the people, and even the sovereign people who, when they want to reappear as a constituent power to reform the supreme law, must abide by the rules it establishes. I learned this as a student, had the opportunity to explain it as a professor, and after experiencing it in practice as a representative of the citizens and currently as President of the Government: in our constitutional State, there is no, there cannot be, space for the immunity of power, of any power. This is a strong personal conviction for me.

With the Constitutional Rule of Law, we seek to honor the republican postulate enunciated by James Harrington in England in the mid-17th century, of "government of laws, not of men," that it is the laws born of common consent and not men who govern, that it is objective reason in the norms that should guide the exercise of power and not the arbitrariness in which its occasional holders may fall.

All under the Law; under a law understood, in the words of Aristotle, as intellect without passions, because — and now it is Norberto Bobbio who comes to my aid — the current democratic State must not renounce in any way the classical ideal of Government of laws, since even in it the perverse manifestations of personal government can appear.

The Government of laws is an old and beautiful metaphor that serves to articulate an old aspiration of lovers of freedom, and perhaps, if Habermas was right when he wrote that Humanity never stops learning, today in the united Europe that we aspire to constitutionalize, the grossest violations of the Rule of Law are hardly conceivable.

But this impression should not contribute to relaxing our commitment to it because, beyond the fact that we must never let our guard down and that controls must always be well-oiled to prevent abuses, we can do more for the functioning of our Rule of Law; we can, or rather must, take the Law more seriously, to paraphrase the title of a well-known monograph on legal philosophy.

To tackle this fine-tuning of the Rule of Law, in which the attitude of this is at stake to order the coexistence of our increasingly complex democratic societies, we should, above all, not lose sight of the importance of respecting the procedures for adopting legally formalized political decisions.

Democracy is poorly served when we yield to the temptation to use it as an excuse, as a pretext, to legitimize positions that are adopted by circumventing procedures, because it is difficult for there not to be something behind them that deserves protection, whether it concerns fundamental rights of citizens, or the legitimate interests of political minorities, or both at once. Those who in democracy stray from the procedure stray from reason. For that alone, they lose it.

Among the dangers that we should ward off, if we want to strengthen the Rule of Law, we could also mention the phenomenon that has come to be called motorized legislation, that is, the frantic normative production with which it is intended to respond to the dynamics and complexities of current societies, and which is devaluing the technical quality of the Law by disaggregating the legal orders, decoding them. I hope that my Government does not fall into that temptation, despite the passion that many Ministers have for presenting legislative projects.

Likewise, the recognition of territorial pluralism, which entails in Spain and in the vast majority of the States in our political orbit the existence of three normative levels (the European, the state, and the autonomous) and the various jurisdictions that affect the determination of the rights and duties of citizens, poses a challenge for legislators, judges, and jurists in general when it comes to making the interpretation and application of the Law intelligible.

But, alongside problems like those described, with which we must inevitably grapple, there are those created for questionable reasons of political opportunity, and the Law is not an entirely fungible instrument with which anything can be done.

Regarding the other concerns I have mentioned, in addition to sharing them with you, they could perhaps be alleviated with the following purposes: to improve legislative technique, Juan Fernando, both in the preliminary phase, which corresponds to the Executive, and, of course, where it is most decisive to do so; in parliamentary proceedings and in the European entities that have competence for normative production; to take into very serious consideration the work of advisory bodies — the Government believes it is proceeding with the Council of State — and, finally, how could it be otherwise, to enhance the Administration of Justice, increasing the number of judicial bodies and improving the training of their holders.

Authorities, ladies and gentlemen, friends,

I believe in the Law; I believe both in its conservative function of pacifying and nationalizing conflicts, as well as in its reformist function, as a lever for change for social transformations. I believe in the Law, which I consider, borrowing some simple but eloquent words from Federico de Castro, as the art of dictating legal rules so that they are socially effective. And I thought it might be appropriate for the President of the Government to proclaim this here, at this event, which commemorates the 75th anniversary of the Thomson-Aranzadi publishing house.

I believe I can speak on behalf of many women and men of the Law to say to the Thomson-Aranzadi publishing house: congratulations, thank you for 75 years of work.

Thank you very much.