On the Chongqing Negotiations

China Mao Zedong · Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

17 October 1945

Context
Mao addressed Communist Party comrades, apparently in Yan'an, on October 17, 1945, reporting on the 43-day Chongqing negotiations with the Kuomintang, defending the Double Tenth Agreement and the concessions made, and urging cadres to prepare for the struggle ahead.
Main themes
Chongqing negotiations with the Kuomintang, Double Tenth Agreement, agreements on paper versus reality, Kuomintang attacks on the Liberated Areas, Shangdang campaign, 'tit for tat' policy, concessions on eight Liberated Areas, reduction of army divisions, cadres going to the front, bright future but tortuous road
Duration
~28 min
80th percentile
Words
3,352
80th percentile
Sentences
206
90th percentile
Readability
65
95th percentile
Grade
8.2
6th percentile
Syntax
2.71
13th percentile
Vocabulary
2.00
11th percentile

Translated from Chinese Source: GitHub qinglee/maoxuan (毛泽东选集) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 69%64%
  • Social 12%11%
  • Institutional 12%11%
  • Ceremonial 6%6%
  • Economic 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 8%

206 sentences in 8 paragraphs

I want to talk about the current situation. This is a question that concerns you, comrades. This time, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party negotiated in Chongqing, and the talks went on for forty-three days. The results of the negotiations have already been published in the newspapers. The representatives of the two parties are still continuing to negotiate. These negotiations have yielded gains. The Kuomintang has accepted the policy of peace and unity and recognized certain democratic rights of the people, and it has agreed that civil war must be avoided and that the two parties should cooperate peacefully to build a new China. On these points agreement was reached. There are also points on which no agreement was reached. The question of the Liberated Areas has not been resolved, and the question of the armies has in fact not been resolved either. The agreements already reached are still only things on paper. Things on paper are not the same as things in reality. Facts show that a great deal of effort will still be needed to turn them into reality.

On the one hand the Kuomintang is negotiating with us, and on the other it is actively attacking the Liberated Areas. Not counting the troops encircling the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, the Kuomintang troops directly attacking the Liberated Areas already number 800,000. At present, fighting is going on, or preparations for fighting are being made, wherever there are Liberated Areas. The very first article of the Double Tenth Agreement is "peaceful national reconstruction". Don't the words written on paper contradict the facts? Yes, they do. That is why we say that turning what is on paper into reality still depends on our efforts. Why is the Kuomintang mobilizing so many troops to attack us? Because its mind was made up long ago: it wants to wipe out the people's forces, to wipe us out. Best of all, wipe us out quickly; even if it cannot wipe us out quickly, it wants to make our situation more unfavourable and its own more favourable. Peace is written into the agreement, but in fact it has not been achieved. In some places the fighting is now fairly large-scale, for example in the Shangdang region of Shansi. Between the Taihang, Taiyue and Zhongtiao Mountains there is a basin, and that is the Shangdang region. In that basin there is fish and there is meat, and Yan Xishan sent thirteen divisions to grab it. Our policy was also decided long ago: tit for tat, and fight for every inch of land. This time we gave tit for tat and we fought, and we gave tit for tat very well and fought very well. That is to say, we wiped out all thirteen of their divisions. Their attacking forces totalled 38,000 men, and we sent 31,000. Of their 38,000, 35,000 were wiped out, 2,000 escaped and 1,000 scattered. Battles like this will go on being fought. They will fight desperately for the territory of our Liberated Areas. This question seems hard to explain. Why do they fight for it like this? Isn't it very good for it to be in our hands, in the hands of the people? That is how we think, how the people think. If they thought that way too, there would be unity and we would all be "comrades". But they will not think that way; they are determined to oppose us. If they did not oppose us, they could not get over it. That they attack is perfectly natural. If they grabbed the territory of our Liberated Areas, we could not get over it either. That we hit back is also perfectly natural. Put two parties who cannot get over it together, and there will be fighting. Since neither side can get over it, why negotiate at all, and why conclude the Double Tenth Agreement? Things in the world are complicated and are determined by factors on all sides. We must look at a problem from all sides, not from one side only. In Chongqing, some people held that Chiang Kai-shek is unreliable, a deceiver, and that it is impossible to get any result out of negotiating with him. Many people I met told me this, some of them Kuomintang members. I said to them: what you say is reasonable and well founded; from eighteen years of experience we know very well that this is how things are. The two parties are bound to fail in their negotiations, bound to fight, bound to break off—but that is only one side of the matter. There is another side, there are many other factors, which force Chiang Kai-shek to have many misgivings. There are three main factors here: the strength of the Liberated Areas, the opposition of the people in the Great Rear Area to civil war, and the international situation. In our Liberated Areas there are a hundred million people, a million troops and two million militiamen, and no one dares underestimate this strength. The position our Party holds in the country's political life is no longer what it was in 1927, nor what it was in 1937. The Kuomintang has never been willing to recognize the equal status of the Communist Party, but now it has had to recognize it. The work of our Liberated Areas has already had an influence on the whole of China and the whole world. The people of the Great Rear Area all hope for peace and need democracy. During this stay in Chongqing I felt deeply that the broad masses of the people warmly support us; they are dissatisfied with the Kuomintang government and are placing their hopes in us. I also met many foreigners, including Americans, who are very sympathetic towards us. The broad masses of people abroad are dissatisfied with China's reactionary forces and sympathize with the forces of the Chinese people. They do not approve of Chiang Kai-shek's policy either. We have a great many friends throughout the country and the whole world; we are not isolated. Those who oppose civil war in China and stand for peace and democracy are not only the people of our Liberated Areas, but also the broad masses of people in the Great Rear Area and the broad masses of people throughout the world. Chiang Kai-shek's subjective wish is to uphold his dictatorship and wipe out the Communist Party, but objectively there are many difficulties in the way of realizing that wish. This forces him to be somewhat realistic. If others are being realistic, we will be realistic too. They were realistic in inviting us, and we were realistic in going to negotiate. We arrived in Chongqing on August 28, and on the evening of the 29th I said to the Kuomintang representatives: ever since the September 18th Incident there has been a need for peace and unity. We demanded it, but it was not achieved. Only after the Xi'an Incident, before the July 7th outbreak of the War of Resistance, was it achieved. For eight years of the War of Resistance everyone fought Japan together. But the civil war never stopped; there was unceasing friction, large and small. To say there was no civil war is a deception and does not accord with the facts. During those eight years we repeatedly expressed our willingness to negotiate. At the Party's Seventh National Congress we also declared that as soon as the Kuomintang authorities "are willing to give up their present erroneous policies and agree to democratic reforms, we are willing to resume negotiations with them." In the negotiations we put forward, first, that China must have peace and, second, that China must have democracy. Chiang Kai-shek had no grounds to oppose this and could only agree. The policy of peace and the various democratic agreements published in the Summary of Conversations are, on the one hand, written on paper and not yet things of reality; on the other hand, they were also determined by the forces on all sides. The strength of the people of the Liberated Areas, the strength of the people of the Great Rear Area, the international situation and the general trend of events forced the Kuomintang to accept these things.

"Tit for tat" depends on the situation. Sometimes not going to negotiate is tit for tat; sometimes going to negotiate is also tit for tat. It was right not to go before, and it was also right to go this time; both were tit for tat. We did well to go this time; it smashed the Kuomintang rumour that the Communist Party does not want peace or unity. They sent three telegrams in a row inviting us, and we went, but they had made no preparations whatsoever, and all the proposals had to be put forward by us. As a result of the negotiations, the Kuomintang has accepted the policy of peace and unity. That is very good. If the Kuomintang launches civil war again, it will have put itself in the wrong in the eyes of the whole nation and the whole world, and we will have all the more reason to wage a war of self-defence and smash its attacks. Now that the Double Tenth Agreement has been concluded, our task is to uphold this agreement, to make the Kuomintang honour it, and to continue to strive for peace. If they want to fight, we will wipe them out thoroughly. That is how matters stand: if he attacks and we wipe him out, he will feel comfortable. Wipe out a little, and he will feel a little comfortable; wipe out more, and he will feel more comfortable; wipe him out thoroughly, and he will feel thoroughly comfortable. China's problems are complicated, and our brains must be a little more complicated too. If others attack us, we fight, and we fight in order to win peace. Unless heavy blows are dealt to the reactionaries who dare to attack the Liberated Areas, peace will not come.

Some comrades ask why we should give up eight Liberated Areas. It is a great pity to give up these eight areas, but it is better to give them up. Why is it a pity? Because these are Liberated Areas that the people created with their blood and sweat and built up through arduous effort. So in the areas we give up, we must explain things clearly to the local people and make proper arrangements. Why give them up? Because the Kuomintang is uneasy. They want to go back to Nanjing, and some of the Liberated Areas in the south are right beside their bed or in their corridor. As long as we are there, they simply cannot sleep in peace, so they will fight for those places at all costs. By making concessions on this point, we help to smash the Kuomintang's civil war plot and win the sympathy of the broad intermediate elements at home and abroad. At present all the propaganda organs in the country, except the Xinhua News Agency, are controlled by the Kuomintang. They are all rumour factories. During these negotiations they spread the rumour that the Communist Party wants nothing but territory and refuses to make concessions. Our policy is to protect the basic interests of the people. On the principle of not harming the basic interests of the people, it is permissible to make some concessions and use these concessions to obtain the peace and democracy the people of the whole country need. In our past dealings with Chiang Kai-shek we also made concessions, and even bigger ones than now. In 1937, in order to bring about nationwide resistance, we voluntarily dropped the name of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Government, renamed the Red Army the National Revolutionary Army, and changed the policy of confiscating the landlords' land to one of reducing rent and interest. This time, by giving up a number of areas in the south, we have completely exposed the Kuomintang's rumours before the people of the whole country and of the whole world. The same goes for the question of the armies. The Kuomintang's propaganda says that the Communist Party is just fighting for guns. We said that we were prepared to make concessions. First we proposed reducing our army from its present size to forty-eight divisions. The Kuomintang army has 263 divisions, so we would have one-sixth. Later we proposed reducing to forty-three divisions, one-seventh. The Kuomintang said they would reduce their army to 120 divisions. We said that, reducing proportionately, our army could be cut to twenty-four divisions, or even as few as twenty, still one-seventh. The Kuomintang army has many officers and few soldiers; a division has fewer than 6,000 men. By their way of organizing, our army of 1,200,000 men could be organized into 200 divisions. But we will not do that. In this way they have nothing to say, and all the rumours have collapsed. Does this mean handing our guns over to them? No, it does not. If we handed them over, wouldn't they just have more! Every gun and every bullet of the people's armed forces must be kept; none may be handed over.

That is what I have to tell you, comrades, about the current situation. The present development of the situation shows many contradictory phenomena. Why could agreement be reached on some questions in the negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, but not on others? Why does the Summary of Conversations speak of peace and unity, while in reality there is fighting? Some comrades cannot make sense of these contradictory phenomena. My talk is an answer to these questions. Some comrades cannot understand why, when Chiang Kai-shek has always been anti-Communist and anti-people, we are nevertheless willing to negotiate with him. The Seventh National Congress of our Party decided that as long as the Kuomintang's policy changes, we are willing to negotiate with them. Is that right or not? It is entirely right. The Chinese revolution is a protracted one, and victory is won step by step. What China's future will be depends on how all of us exert ourselves. For about half a year or so, the situation will remain unsettled. We must redouble our efforts and strive to make the situation develop in favour of the people of the whole country.

I also want to say something about our work. Some of the comrades here are going to the front. Many comrades are full of enthusiasm and are vying with each other to go out and work; this initiative and enthusiasm are very precious. But there are also a few comrades with wrong ideas, who do not think of the many difficulties there that need solving, but believe that everything there is going very smoothly and that it is more comfortable than Yan'an. Are there people who think this way? I think there are. I advise these comrades to correct their thinking. They are going in order to work. What is work? Work is struggle. There are difficulties and problems in those places that need us to solve them. We go there to work and to struggle in order to overcome difficulties. A good comrade is one who is all the more eager to go where the difficulties are greater. The work in those places is very hard. Hard work is like a load placed before us, challenging us to shoulder it. Some loads are light, some heavy. Some people prefer the light to the heavy; they shove the heavy loads onto others and pick the light ones for themselves. That is not a good attitude. Some comrades are different: they leave the comforts to others and choose the heavy loads for themselves; they are the first to bear hardships and the last to enjoy comforts. Such comrades are good comrades. We should all learn from this communist spirit.

Many local cadres are now going to leave their native places and go to the front. There are also many cadres born in the south who came from the south to Yan'an in the past and are now also going to the front. All comrades going to the front should be mentally prepared, ready to take root, blossom and bear fruit once they get there. We Communists are like seeds and the people are like the soil. Wherever we go, we must unite with the people there, take root and blossom among the people. Wherever our comrades go, they must build good relations with the masses, show concern for the masses and help them solve their difficulties. Unite with the broad masses of the people; the more we unite, the better. Boldly arouse the masses, expand the people's forces and, under the leadership of our Party, defeat the aggressors and build a new China. This is the policy of the Party's Seventh National Congress, and we must fight for it. China's affairs must be handled by relying on the Communist Party and on the people. We have the determination and the means to achieve peace and achieve democracy. As long as we unite better with the whole people, China's affairs will be easy to manage.

The world after the Second World War has a bright future. This is the general trend. The London Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Five Powers has failed; does this mean a third world war is about to be fought? No, it does not. Just think: the Second World War has only just ended, so how could a third world war possibly be fought? The capitalist countries and the socialist country will still reach compromises on many international matters, because compromise is advantageous. A war against the Soviet Union and against communism is firmly opposed by the proletariat and the people of the whole world. Within the last thirty years two world wars have been fought. Between the First and the Second World War there was an interval of some twenty years. In the five hundred thousand years of human history, world wars have been fought only within these thirty years. After the First World War the world made great progress. After this war the world is sure to progress even faster. After the First World War the Soviet Union came into being, and dozens of Communist Parties emerged throughout the world; this had never happened before. After the Second World War the Soviet Union has become even stronger, the face of Europe has changed, the political consciousness of the proletariat and the people of the whole world has risen further, and the progressive forces of the whole world have become more united. Our China too is in the midst of rapid change. The general trend of China's development must also be for the better, not for the worse. The world is progressing and the future is bright; no one can change this general trend of history. We should constantly tell the people about the world's progress and its bright future, so that the people build up confidence in victory. At the same time, we must tell the people and tell our comrades that the road is tortuous. There are still many obstacles and many difficulties on the road of revolution. Our Party's Seventh National Congress envisaged many difficulties, and we would rather imagine more difficulties than fewer. Some comrades do not like to think much about difficulties. But difficulties are facts; we must acknowledge as many as there are and must not adopt a "policy of non-recognition". We must acknowledge difficulties, analyse them and combat them. There are no straight roads in the world; we must be prepared to follow a tortuous road and not try to get things on the cheap. It must not be imagined that one fine morning all the reactionaries will go down on their knees of their own accord. In a word, the future is bright, but the road is tortuous. There are still many difficulties ahead of us, and they must not be overlooked. By uniting with the whole people and making common efforts, we can certainly overcome all difficulties and win victory.