- Context
- Mao addressed Chinese Communist Party comrades on August 13, 1945, after Japan's surrender became certain, setting out the Party's policy of tit-for-tat resistance to Chiang Kai-shek's civil war plans and calling for full preparedness.
- Main themes
- Fruits of victory in the War of Resistance, danger of civil war with Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet entry into the war and Japan's surrender, tit-for-tat policy, Liberated Areas and contested cities, critique of Chen Duxiu and 1927, self-reliance, U.S. imperialism's backing of the Kuomintang, atom bomb and the role of the people, political consciousness of the masses, preparedness for civil war
- Duration
- ~41 min
- Words
- 4,936
- Sentences
- 280
- Readability
- 65
- Grade
- 8.5
- Syntax
- 2.80
- Vocabulary
- 2.10
Translated from Chinese Source: GitHub qinglee/maoxuan (毛泽东选集) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other280 sentences in 18 paragraphs
These last few days have been a time of tremendous change in the situation in the Far East. The surrender of Japanese imperialism is now a foregone conclusion. The decisive factor in Japan's surrender is the Soviet Union's entry into the war. A million Red Army troops have entered China's Northeast, and this force is irresistible. Japanese imperialism can no longer keep fighting. The hard-fought War of Resistance of the Chinese people has already won victory. As a historical stage, the War of Resistance Against Japan is over.
In this situation, what are class relations in China now, and what are relations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party now, and what might they become in the future? What is our Party's policy? These are questions of great concern to the people of the whole country and to all the comrades of our Party.
What about the Kuomintang? Look at its past and you can know its present; look at its past and present and you can know its future. This party fought a counter-revolutionary civil war for ten full years. During the War of Resistance, in 1940, 1941 and 1943, it launched three large-scale anti-Communist onslaughts, each of which it intended to develop into a nationwide civil war. It was only because of our Party's correct policy and the opposition of the people of the whole country that this did not come about. Chiang Kai-shek, the political representative of China's big landlords and big bourgeoisie, is, as everyone knows, an extremely cruel and extremely treacherous character. His policy has been to sit by with folded arms, wait for victory, conserve his strength and prepare for civil war. And sure enough, the victory he waited for has come, and now this "Generalissimo" wants to "come down from the mountain." For eight years we and Chiang Kai-shek have swapped places: before, we were on the mountains and he was by the water; during the War of Resistance, we were behind enemy lines and he went up the mountain. Now he wants to come down from the mountain, to come down and seize the fruits of victory in the War of Resistance.
For eight years the people and the army of our Liberated Areas, with no outside help whatsoever and relying entirely on their own efforts, have liberated vast territories and resisted the bulk of the Japanese forces invading China and almost all of the puppet troops. It is because of our resolute resistance and heroic struggle that the 200 million people of the Great Rear Area were spared devastation by the Japanese invaders, and the places where those 200 million people live were not occupied by them. Chiang Kai-shek hid up on Mount Emei, and in front of him there were people standing guard for him: the Liberated Areas, the people and the army of the Liberated Areas. In protecting the 200 million people of the Great Rear Area, we also protected this "Generalissimo" and gave him the time and the place to sit by with folded arms and wait for victory. The time: eight years and one month. The place: the area where 200 million people live. These conditions were given to him by us. Without us, he could not have stood by and watched. Well then, is the "Generalissimo" grateful to us? Not he! This man has never known gratitude. How did Chiang Kai-shek come to power? By relying on the Northern Expedition, on the first period of Kuomintang-Communist cooperation, and on the fact that the people at that time had not yet seen through him and still supported him. Once in power, far from being grateful to the people, he struck them down with one blow and plunged them into the sea of blood of ten years of civil war. You comrades all know this period of history. In this War of Resistance Against Japan the Chinese people protected him once again. Now that the War of Resistance has been won and Japan is about to surrender, he is not in the least grateful to the people. On the contrary, he is digging out the old accounts of 1927 and wants to do the same thing all over again. Chiang Kai-shek says there has never been "civil war" in China, only "bandit suppression." Whatever he calls it, the point is that he intends to launch a civil war against the people and to slaughter the people.
So long as a nationwide civil war has not yet broken out, not everyone among the people, nor many comrades in our Party, sees this question clearly. Because large-scale civil war has not yet come, because civil war is not yet widespread, open or on a large scale, many people think, "Not necessarily!" And many others are afraid of civil war. The fear is understandable: we fought for ten years before, then fought the War of Resistance for eight years, and if we fight again, how can we bear it? It is very natural for such fear to arise. Toward Chiang Kai-shek's scheme to launch civil war, the policy our Party has adopted is clear and consistent: resolutely oppose civil war, disapprove of civil war, and prevent civil war. From now on we will continue, with the greatest effort and patience, to lead the people in stopping civil war. But we must see soberly that the danger of civil war is extremely serious, because Chiang Kai-shek's policy has already been decided. According to Chiang Kai-shek's policy, there is to be civil war. According to our policy, the people's policy, there is not to be civil war. Those who do not want civil war are only the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people; unfortunately this does not include Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang. One side does not want to fight, the other does. If neither side wanted to fight, no fighting could start. Now only one side does not want to fight, and that side's strength is not yet sufficient to restrain the other, and so the danger of civil war is extremely serious.
Chiang Kai-shek is bent on keeping to his reactionary policy of dictatorship and civil war, and our Party pointed this out in good time. Before the Party's Seventh Congress, during the Seventh Congress and after the Seventh Congress, we did quite thorough work to rouse the people's attention to the danger of civil war, so that the people of the whole country, our Party members and our army would be mentally prepared in advance. This is very important; having it and not having it makes a great difference. In 1927 our Party was still an infant party and was completely unprepared mentally for Chiang Kai-shek's sudden counter-revolutionary attack, so that the fruits of victory the people had already won were lost right away, the people suffered long years of calamity, and a bright China was turned into a dark China. This time it is different. Our Party now has the rich experience of three revolutions, and its political maturity has risen greatly. The Central Committee of the Party has repeatedly and again and again explained the danger of civil war, so that the people of the whole country, the comrades of the whole Party and the army led by the Party are all in a state of preparedness.
Chiang Kai-shek always tries to wrest every inch of power and every ounce of gain from the people. And we? Our policy is to give tit for tat and to fight for every inch of land. We do things Chiang Kai-shek's way. Chiang Kai-shek always tries to force war on the people; he holds a knife in his left hand and a knife in his right hand. So we do it his way and take up knives too. This method was found only after investigation and study. This investigation and study is very important. When we see that someone is holding something in his hand, we should investigate. What is he holding? A knife. What is a knife for? It can be used to kill people. Whom does he want to kill with the knife? He wants to kill the people. Having investigated these points, we investigate further: the Chinese people also have hands, they too can take up knives, and if they have no knives they can forge them. The Chinese people discovered this truth through long investigation and study. The warlords, the landlords, the local bullies and evil gentry and the imperialists all hold knives in their hands and want to kill. The people have come to understand this, and so they do likewise. Some of us often pay no attention to this investigation and study. Chen Duxiu, for example, did not know that a knife in a man's hand can kill people. Some say this is a universal, everyday truth; how could a leader of the Communist Party not know it? That is hard to say. Without investigation and study he did not understand this, so we gave him a name and called him an opportunist. No investigation, no right to speak; we took away his right to speak. We adopted a method different from Chen Duxiu's: we enabled the oppressed and slaughtered people to take up knives, and if anyone wants to kill us again, we do likewise. Not long ago the Kuomintang sent six divisions to attack our Guanzhong sub-region; three of them pushed in and occupied an area a hundred li wide and twenty li long. We did it their way too, and wiped out the Kuomintang troops on that area of a hundred li by twenty li cleanly, thoroughly and completely. We give tit for tat and fight for every inch of land; we will never let the Kuomintang easily seize our land and kill our people. Of course, fighting for every inch of land does not mean, as with the "Left" line of the past, "not giving up a single inch of the base areas." This time we gave up an area a hundred li wide and twenty li long. We gave it up at the end of July and took it back at the beginning of August. Once after the Southern Anhui Incident, the Kuomintang liaison staff officer asked what our intentions were. I said, you are in Yan'an every day, don't you know? "If He attacks, we attack; if He stops, we stop." At that time we did not yet name Chiang Kai-shek; we only mentioned He Yingqin. Now it is: "If Chiang attacks, we attack; if Chiang stops, we stop." We act according to his method. Now Chiang Kai-shek is already sharpening his knife, so we must sharpen ours too.
The rights the people have won must never be lightly lost; they must be defended by fighting. We do not want civil war. If Chiang Kai-shek insists on forcing civil war on the Chinese people, then, in self-defence, to defend the lives, property, rights and well-being of the people of the Liberated Areas, we will have no choice but to take up arms and fight him. This civil war will be one he forces us to fight. If we cannot win, we will blame neither heaven nor earth, only ourselves for not winning. But anyone who thinks he can easily grab or swindle away the rights the people have already won will find it impossible. Last year an American correspondent asked me, "Who gave you the authority to do what you do?" I said, "The people." If not the people, who else? The Kuomintang in power did not give it. The Kuomintang does not recognize us. We take part in the People's Political Council, and according to the Council's regulations we do so as a "cultural group." We say we are not a "cultural group"; we have an army, we are a "military group." On March 1 this year Chiang Kai-shek said: Only when the Communist Party hands over its army will it have legal status. Those words of Chiang Kai-shek still apply now. We have not handed over our army, so we have no legal status; we are "lawless and godless." Our responsibility is to be responsible to the people. Every word, every act, every policy must accord with the people's interests, and if there are mistakes they must be corrected; this is what being responsible to the people means. Comrades, the people want liberation, and so they entrust power to those who can represent them and faithfully work for them, and that is us Communists. Having become the people's representatives, we must represent them well and not be like Chen Duxiu. Faced with the counter-revolutionary attack on the people, Chen Duxiu did not adopt the policy of tit for tat and fighting for every inch of land, and as a result, within a few months in 1927, all the rights the people had won were lost completely. This time we must be careful. Our policy is completely different from Chen Duxiu's, and no deception can fool us. We must have clear heads and a correct policy, and we must not make mistakes.
To whom should the fruits of victory in the War of Resistance belong? This is very clear. Take a peach tree. The peaches that grow on the tree are the fruits of victory. Who is entitled to pick them? Ask who planted the tree and who carried the water to water it. Chiang Kai-shek squatted on the mountain and did not carry a single bucket of water, and yet now he is stretching out his arm, long, long, to pick the peaches. He says, these peaches belong to me, Chiang Kai-shek; I am the landlord and you are serfs, and I will not allow you to pick them. We refuted him in the press. We said, you never carried any water, so you have no right to pick the peaches. We, the people of the Liberated Areas, watered the tree every day, and we have the most right to pick them. Comrades, victory in the War of Resistance was won by the people's blood and sacrifice; the victory of the War of Resistance should be the people's victory, and its fruits should go to the people. As for Chiang Kai-shek, he was passive in resisting Japan and active in opposing the Communists; he was a stumbling block in the people's War of Resistance. Now this stumbling block wants to come forward and monopolize the fruits of victory, and to make China after the victory revert to what it was before the war, with not the slightest change allowed. This is how the struggle arises. Comrades, this is a very serious struggle.
That the fruits of victory in the War of Resistance should belong to the people is one question; but into whose hands the fruits of victory will actually fall, and whether they can go to the people, is another question. Do not think that all the fruits of victory are sure to fall into the people's hands. A number of big peaches, such as the big cities of Shanghai, Nanjing and Hangzhou, will be grabbed by Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang Kai-shek is in collusion with U.S. imperialism, and in those places their forces have the upper hand, while the revolutionary people can for the most part occupy only the countryside. Another batch of peaches will be contested by both sides. The Datong-Puzhou line north of Taiyuan, the middle section of the Beiping-Suiyuan line, the Beiping-Liaoning line, the Beiping-Hankou line north of Zhengzhou, the Zhengding-Taiyuan line, the Baigui-Jincheng line, the Dezhou-Shijiazhuang line, the Tianjin-Pukou line, the Qingdao-Jinan line, the Lianyungang-Tianshui line east of Zhengzhou: the small and medium cities in these places must be fought for, and these small and medium peaches were all watered with the blood and sweat of the people of the Liberated Areas. Whether these places can fall into the people's hands cannot yet be said. All that can be said now is two words: fight hard. Are there any that are sure to fall into the people's hands? Yes: in Hebei, Chahar, Jehol, most of Shanxi, Shandong and northern Jiangsu, large stretches of countryside and large numbers of cities, with countryside joined to countryside, one block of a hundred-odd cities, one of seventy or eighty, one of forty or fifty, three, four, five or six blocks of various sizes. What cities? Medium and small cities. These are sure, and our strength is able to win this batch of fruits of victory. Winning this batch of fruits will be a first in the history of the Chinese revolution. Historically, only after we smashed the enemy's third "encirclement and suppression" campaign in the second half of 1931 did the Central Area in Jiangxi have twenty-one county towns joined together, but still no medium-sized cities. With twenty-one small towns linked together, at the most we had a population of 2.5 million. Relying on these, the Chinese people were able to fight for so long, win such great victories and smash such great "encirclement and suppression" campaigns. Later we lost, and we cannot blame Chiang Kai-shek for that; we must blame ourselves for not fighting well. If this time we have dozens of large and small cities linked together in three, four, five or six blocks, then the Chinese people will have three, four, five or six revolutionary base areas each larger than the Central Area in Jiangxi, and the situation of the Chinese revolution will be very promising indeed.
Viewing the situation as a whole, the stage of the War of Resistance Against Japan is over, and the new situation and task is the domestic struggle. Chiang Kai-shek talks of "building the country"; from now on the struggle will be over what kind of country to build. Will it be a new-democratic country of the masses of the people under the leadership of the proletariat, or a semi-colonial, semi-feudal country under the dictatorship of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie? This will be a very complicated struggle. At present this struggle takes the form of Chiang Kai-shek trying to usurp the fruits of victory in the War of Resistance and our struggle against his usurpation. If there is opportunism in this period, it will consist in not fighting hard and willingly handing over to Chiang Kai-shek the fruits that rightly belong to the people.
Will open, all-out civil war break out? That depends on internal and international factors. The internal factors are mainly our strength and our level of political consciousness. Could it be that, owing to the general trend at home and abroad and the sentiments of the people, and through our efforts, the civil war will be confined to a limited area, or the outbreak of an all-out civil war will be delayed? That possibility exists.
Chiang Kai-shek also faces many difficulties in launching civil war with a free hand. First, the Liberated Areas have a hundred million people, an army of a million and over two million militia. Second, the politically conscious people in the Kuomintang areas oppose civil war, which acts as a check on Chiang Kai-shek. Third, there are also some within the Kuomintang who disapprove of civil war. The present situation is very different from that of 1927. In particular, our Party's present condition is very different from what it was in 1927. At that time the Party was an infant party; it did not have a clear head, it had no experience of armed struggle, and it had no policy of tit for tat. Now the Party's level of consciousness has risen enormously.
Besides our own consciousness, the question of the consciousness of the vanguard of the proletariat, there is also the question of the consciousness of the masses of the people. When the people are not yet politically conscious, it is entirely possible for the fruits of revolution to be handed over to others. Such things have happened in history. Today the level of consciousness of the Chinese people has also risen enormously. Our Party's prestige among the people has never been as high as it is now. But among the people, chiefly among the people in the Japanese-occupied areas and the Kuomintang areas, there are still quite a few who believe in Chiang Kai-shek and harbour illusions about the Kuomintang and the United States, and Chiang Kai-shek is working hard to spread these illusions. That a section of the Chinese people is not yet awakened shows that our propaganda and organizational work is still far from adequate. It is not easy for the people to become conscious; to rid their minds of wrong ideas requires a great deal of solid, down-to-earth work on our part. We must sweep away the backward things in the minds of the Chinese people, just as we sweep a room with a broom. Dust never vanishes of its own accord without sweeping. We must carry out propaganda and education widely among the masses, so that the people understand the real situation in China and the direction things are taking, and have confidence in their own strength.
The people depend on us to organize them. As for China's reactionaries, it is up to us to organize the people to overthrow them. Everything reactionary is the same: if you don't hit it, it won't fall. This is like sweeping the floor: where the broom does not reach, the dust as a rule will not go away by itself. On the southern edge of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region there is a river called the Jiezi. South of the river is Luochuan, north of it is Fuxian. South and north of the river are two different worlds. The south belongs to the Kuomintang; because we have not gone there and the people have not been organized, there is a great deal of filth. Some of our comrades put their faith in political influence alone, thinking that problems can be solved by influence. That is superstition. In 1936 we were living in Bao'an. Forty or fifty li from Bao'an there was a fortified village held by a landlord despot. At that time the Party Central Committee was located in Bao'an, so political influence could be said to be great indeed, yet the counter-revolutionaries in that fortified village stubbornly refused to surrender. We swept from the south and swept from the north, and it was no use; later we got the broom inside and swept there, and only then did he say, "Aiyo! I give up." Everything in the world is like this. A bell does not ring unless you strike it. A table does not move unless you lift it. Had the Soviet Red Army not entered the Northeast, Japan would not have surrendered. If our troops don't go and fight, the enemy and puppet troops won't hand over their guns. Only when the broom arrives can political influence take full effect. Our broom is the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army. With the broom in hand, we must study how to sweep, and not lie in bed thinking that some great wind will come along and blow all the dust away. We Marxists are revolutionary realists and never indulge in idle dreams. There is an old Chinese saying: "Rise at dawn and sweep the courtyard." Dawn means when the day is just breaking. The ancients tell us to get up and sweep as soon as day breaks. This gives us a task. Only by thinking this way and acting this way will there be any benefit, and only then will there be work for us to do. China's territory is vast, and it is up to us to sweep it inch by inch.
On what basis should our policy rest? It should rest on the basis of our own strength, and that is called regeneration through one's own efforts. We are not isolated; all the countries and peoples in the world opposed to imperialism are our friends. Nevertheless we stress regeneration through our own efforts. Relying on the forces we ourselves organize, we can defeat all reactionaries, Chinese and foreign. Chiang Kai-shek is the opposite of us; he relies entirely on the help of U.S. imperialism and takes U.S. imperialism as his backer. Dictatorship, civil war and selling out the country, the three in one, have always been the basic points of Chiang Kai-shek's policy. U.S. imperialism wants to help Chiang Kai-shek wage civil war and to turn China into a U.S. dependency, and this policy of its was set long ago. But U.S. imperialism is outwardly strong but inwardly weak. We must keep clear heads, and this includes not believing the "nice words" of the imperialists and not being afraid of their intimidation. An American once said to me, "You should listen to Hurley and send a few people to be officials in the Kuomintang government." I said, "It is no good being an official with hands and feet tied; we won't do it. If we are to be officials, our hands and feet must be free, so that we can act freely; that means forming a coalition government on a democratic basis." He said, "It will be bad if you don't." I asked, "Why bad?" He said, "First, the Americans will curse you; second, the Americans will back up Chiang Kai-shek." I said, "If you, having eaten your fill of bread and slept your fill, want to curse people and back up Chiang Kai-shek, that is your American business, and I won't interfere. Now what we have is millet plus rifles; what you have is bread plus cannon. If you like backing Chiang Kai-shek, back him, and back him as long as you like. But remember one thing: whose China is China? China does not belong to Chiang Kai-shek at all; China belongs to the Chinese people. The day will come when you can't keep backing him!" Comrades, this American was trying to scare people. Scaring people is the imperialists' stock-in-trade, and many people in the colonies are indeed easily scared. They think that all people in the colonies are afraid of being scared, but they do not know that in China there are some people who are not afraid of that sort of thing. In the past we openly criticized and exposed the U.S. policy of supporting Chiang and opposing the Communists; this was necessary, and we shall continue to expose it from now on.
The Soviet Union has sent its troops; the Red Army has come to help the Chinese people drive out the aggressors. This has never happened before in Chinese history. The influence of this event is incalculable. The propaganda machines of the United States and Chiang Kai-shek are trying to use two atom bombs to sweep away the political influence of the Red Army. But it cannot be swept away; it is not that easy. Can the atom bomb decide a war? No. The atom bomb could not make Japan surrender. Without the struggle of the people, the atom bomb by itself is futile. If the atom bomb could decide the war, why was it necessary to ask the Soviet Union to send troops? Why did Japan not surrender after two atom bombs were dropped, yet surrendered as soon as the Soviet Union sent troops? Some of our comrades also believe that the atom bomb is something tremendous; this is quite wrong. These comrades see things even less clearly than a British aristocrat. There is a British lord called Mountbatten. He said that to think the atom bomb can decide the war is the greatest mistake. These comrades of ours are even more backward than Mountbatten. What influence makes these comrades regard the atom bomb as something miraculous? Bourgeois influence. Where does this influence come from? From bourgeois school education, from the bourgeois press and news agencies. There are two world outlooks and methodologies: the proletarian world outlook and methodology, and the bourgeois world outlook and methodology. These comrades constantly keep the bourgeois world outlook and methodology in hand, while they constantly forget the proletarian world outlook and methodology. The theory that weapons decide everything, the purely military viewpoint, bureaucracy and the style of work divorced from the masses, individualist ideology and so on in our ranks are all bourgeois influences. These bourgeois things in our ranks must also be swept away constantly, just as we sweep away dust.
The Soviet Union's entry into the war has decided Japan's surrender, and the situation in China has entered a new period. Between the new period and the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan there is a transitional stage. The struggle in the transitional stage is the struggle against Chiang Kai-shek's usurpation of the fruits of victory in the War of Resistance. Chiang Kai-shek wants to launch a nationwide civil war; his policy is already set, and we must be prepared for this. No matter what day the nationwide civil war breaks out, we must be well prepared. If it comes early, say tomorrow morning, we are prepared for that too. That is the first point. In the present international and domestic situation, it is possible for the civil war to be confined for a time to limited areas, and the civil war may for a time take the form of a number of local wars. That is the second point. We are preparing for the first point; the second point has long been the case. In short, we must be prepared. Being prepared, we shall be able to deal properly with all kinds of complicated situations.
The original Chinese. The tags above are read on the English translation's sentences.
最近几天是远东时局发生极大变动的时候。日本帝国主义投降的大势已经定了。日本投降的决定因素是苏联参战。百万红军进入中国的东北,这个力量是不可抗拒的。日本帝国主义已经不能继续打下去了。中国人民的艰苦抗战,已经取得了胜利。抗日战争当作一个历史阶段来说,已经过去了。
在这种形势下面,中国国内的阶级关系,国共两党的关系,现在怎么样,将来可能怎么样?我党的方针怎么样?这是全国人民很关心的问题,是全党同志很关心的问题。
国民党怎么样?看它的过去,就可以知道它的现在;看它的过去和现在,就可以知道它的将来。这个党过去打过整整十年的反革命内战。在抗日战争中间,在一九四〇年、一九四一年和一九四三年,它发动过三次大规模的反共高潮,每一次都准备发展成为全国范围的内战,仅仅由于我党的正确政策和全国人民的反对,才没有实现。中国大地主大资产阶级的政治代表蒋介石,大家知道,是一个极端残忍和极端阴险的家伙。他的政策是袖手旁观,等待胜利,保存实力,准备内战。果然胜利被等来了,这位“委员长”现在要“下山”了。八年来我们和蒋介石调了一个位置:以前我们在山上,他在水边;抗日时期,我们在敌后,他上了山。现在他要下山了,要下山来抢夺抗战胜利的果实了。
我们解放区的人民和军队,八年来在毫无外援的情况之下,完全靠着自己的努力,解放了广大的国土,抗击了大部的侵华日军和几乎全部的伪军。由于我们的坚决抗战,英勇奋斗,大后方的二万万人民才没有受到日本侵略者摧残,二万万人民所在的地方才没有被日本侵略者占领。蒋介石躲在峨眉山上,前面有给他守卫的,这就是解放区,就是解放区的人民和军队。我们保卫了大后方的二万万人民,同时也就保卫了这位“委员长”,给了他袖手旁观、坐待胜利的时间和地方。时间——八年零一个月,地方——二万万人民所在的地方,这些条件是我们给他的。没有我们,他是旁观不成的。那末,“委员长”是不是感谢我们呢?他不!此人历来是不知感恩的。蒋介石是怎样上台的?是靠北伐战争,靠第一次国共合作,靠那时候人民还没有摸清他的底细,还拥护他。他上了台,非但不感谢人民,还把人民一个巴掌打了下去,把人民推入了十年内战的血海。这段历史同志们都是知道的。这一次抗日战争,中国人民又保卫了他。现在抗日战争胜利了,日本要投降了,他绝不感谢人民,相反地,翻一翻一九二七年的老账,还想照样来干。蒋介石说中国过去没有过“内战”,只有过“剿匪”;不管叫做什么吧,总之是要发动反人民的内战,要屠杀人民。
当全国规模的内战还没有爆发的时候,人民中间和我们党内的许多同志中间,对于这个问题还不是都认识得清楚的。因为大规模的内战还没有到来,内战还不普遍、不公开、不大量,就有许多人认为:“不一定吧!”还有许多人怕打内战。怕,是有理由的,因为过去打了十年,抗战又打八年,再打,怎么得了。产生怕的情绪是很自然的。对于蒋介石发动内战的阴谋,我党所采取的方针是明确的和一贯的,这就是坚决反对内战,不赞成内战,要阻止内战。今后我们还要以极大的努力和耐心领导着人民来制止内战。但是,必须清醒地看到,内战危险是十分严重的,因为蒋介石的方针已经定了。按照蒋介石的方针,是要打内战的。按照我们的方针,人民的方针,是不要打内战的。不要打内战的只是中国共产党和中国人民,可惜不包括蒋介石和国民党。一个不要打,一个要打。如果两方面都不要打,就打不起来。现在不要打的只是一个方面,并且这一方面的力量又还不足以制止那一方面,所以内战危险就十分严重。
蒋介石要坚持独裁和内战的反动方针,我党曾经及时地指明了这一点。在党的七次代表大会以前、七次代表大会中间和七次代表大会以后,我们曾经进行了相当充分的工作,唤起人民对于内战危险的注意,使全国人民、我们的党员和军队,早有精神准备。这一点很重要,有这一点和没有这一点是大不相同的。一九二七年的时候,我党还是幼年的党,对于蒋介石的反革命的突然袭击毫无精神准备,以致人民已经取得的胜利果实跟着就失掉了,人民遭受了长期的灾难,光明的中国变成了黑暗的中国。这一次不同了,我党已经有了三次革命的丰富经验,党的政治成熟程度已经大大提高了。党中央再三再四地讲明内战危险,使全国人民、全党同志和党所领导的军队,都处于有准备的状态中。
蒋介石对于人民是寸权必夺,寸利必得。我们呢?我们的方针是针锋相对,寸土必争。我们是按照蒋介石的办法办事。蒋介石总是要强迫人民接受战争,他左手拿着刀,右手也拿着刀。我们就按照他的办法,也拿起刀来。这是经过调查研究以后才找到的办法。这个调查研究很重要。看到人家手里拿着东西了,我们就要调查一下。他手里拿的是什么?是刀。刀有什么用处?可以杀人。他要拿刀杀谁?要杀人民。调查了这几件事,再调查一下:中国人民也有手,也可以拿刀,没有刀可以打一把。中国人民经过长期的调查研究,发现了这个真理。军阀、地主、土豪劣绅、帝国主义,手里都拿着刀,要杀人。人民懂得了,就照样办理。我们有些人,对于这个调查研究常不注意。例如陈独秀,他就不知道拿着刀可以杀人。有人说,这是普遍的日常真理,共产党的领导人还会不知道?这很难说。他没有调查研究就不懂得这件事,所以我们给他起个名字,叫做机会主义者。没有调查研究就没有发言权,我们取消了他的发言权。我们采取了和陈独秀不同的办法,使被压迫、被屠杀的人民拿起刀来,谁如果再要杀我们,我们就照样办理。不久以前,国民党调了六个师来打我们关中分区,有三个师打进来了,占领了宽一百里、长二十里的地方。我们也照他的办法,把在这宽一百里、长二十里地面上的国民党军队,干净、彻底、全部消灭之。我们是针锋相对,寸土必争,绝不让国民党轻轻易易地占我们的地方,杀我们的人。当然,寸土必争,并不是说要像过去“左”倾路线那样“不放弃根据地的一寸土地”。这一回我们就放弃了宽一百里、长二十里的地方。七月底放弃,八月初收回。在皖南事变以后,有一次,国民党的联络参谋问我们的动向如何。我说,你天天在延安还不清楚?“何反我亦反,何停我亦停”。那时候还没有提出蒋介石的名字,只提何应钦。现在是:“蒋反我亦反,蒋停我亦停。”照他的办法办理。现在蒋介石已经在磨刀了,因此,我们也要磨刀。
人民得到的权利,绝不允许轻易丧失,必须用战斗来保卫。我们是不要内战的。如果蒋介石一定要强迫中国人民接受内战,为了自卫,为了保卫解放区人民的生命、财产、权利和幸福,我们就只好拿起武器和他作战。这个内战是他强迫我们打的。如果我们打不赢,不怪天也不怪地,只怪自己没有打赢。但是谁要想轻轻易易地把人民已经得到的权利抢去或者骗去,那是办不到的。去年有个美国记者问我:“你们办事,是谁给的权力?”我说:“人民给的。”如果不是人民给的,还有谁给呢?当权的国民党没有给。国民党是不承认我们的。我们参加国民参政会,按照参政会条例的规定,是以“文化团体”的资格。我们说,我们不是“文化团体”,我们有军队,是“武化团体”。今年三月一日蒋介石说过:共产党交出军队,才有合法地位。蒋介石的这句话,现在还适用。我们没有交出军队,所以没有合法地位,我们是“无法无天”。我们的责任,是向人民负责。每句话,每个行动,每项政策,都要适合人民的利益,如果有了错误,定要改正,这就叫向人民负责。同志们,人民要解放,就把权力委托给能够代表他们的、能够忠实为他们办事的人,这就是我们共产党人。我们当了人民的代表,必须代表得好,不要像陈独秀。陈独秀对于反革命向人民的进攻,不是采取针锋相对、寸土必争的方针,结果在一九二七年的几个月内,把人民已经取得的权利统统丧失干净。这一次我们就要注意。我们和陈独秀的方针绝不相同,任何骗人的东西都骗不了我们。我们要有清醒的头脑和正确的方针,要不犯错误。
抗战胜利的果实应该属谁?这是很明白的。比如一棵桃树,树上结了桃子,这桃子就是胜利果实。桃子该由谁摘?这要问桃树是谁栽的,谁挑水浇的。蒋介石蹲在山上一担水也不挑,现在他却把手伸得老长老长地要摘桃子。他说,此桃子的所有权属于我蒋介石,我是地主,你们是农奴,我不准你们摘。我们在报上驳了他。我们说,你没有挑过水,所以没有摘桃子的权利。我们解放区的人民天天浇水,最有权利摘的应该是我们。同志们,抗战胜利是人民流血牺牲得来的,抗战的胜利应当是人民的胜利,抗战的果实应当归给人民。至于蒋介石呢,他消极抗战,积极反共,是人民抗战的绊脚石。现在这块绊脚石却要出来垄断胜利果实,要使抗战胜利后的中国仍然回到抗战前的老样子,不许有丝毫的改变。这样就发生了斗争。同志们,这是一场很严重的斗争。
抗战胜利的果实应该属于人民,这是一个问题;但是,胜利果实究竟落到谁手,能不能归于人民,这是另一个问题。不要以为胜利的果实都靠得住落在人民的手里。一批大桃子,例如上海、南京、杭州等大城市,那是要被蒋介石抢去的。蒋介石勾结着美国帝国主义,在那些地方他们的力量占优势,革命的人民还基本上只能占领乡村。另一批桃子是双方要争夺的。太原以北的同蒲,平绥中段,北宁,郑州以北的平汉,正太,白晋,德石,津浦,胶济,郑州以东的陇海,这些地方的中小城市是必争的,这一批中小桃子都是解放区人民流血流汗灌溉起来的。究竟这些地方能不能落到人民的手里,现在还不能说。现在只能讲两个字:力争。靠得住落在人民手里的有没有呢?有的,河北、察哈尔、热河、山西的大部、山东、江苏的北部,这些地方的大块乡村和大批城市,乡村和乡村打成一片,上百的城市一块,七八十个城市一块,四五十个城市一块,大小三、四、五、六块。什么城市?中等城市和小城市。这是靠得住的,我们的力量能够取得这批胜利果实。得到了这批果实,在中国革命的历史上还是头一次。历史上,我们只在一九三一年下半年打破了敌人的第三次“围剿”以后,江西中央区联合起来有过二十一个县城,但是还没有中等城市。二十一个小城市联在一起,最多的时候有过二百五十万人口。依靠着这些,中国人民就能奋斗那样久的时间,取得那样大的胜利,粉碎那样大的“围剿”。后来我们打输了,这不能怪蒋介石,要怪我们自己没有打好。如果这一次,大小城市几十个联成一块,有了三四五六块的话,中国人民就有了三四五六个大于江西中央区的革命根据地,中国革命的形势就很可观了。
从整个形势看来,抗日战争的阶段过去了,新的情况和任务是国内斗争。蒋介石说要“建国”,今后就是建什么国的斗争。是建立一个无产阶级领导的人民大众的新民主主义的国家呢,还是建立一个大地主大资产阶级专政的半殖民地半封建的国家?这将是一场很复杂的斗争。目前这个斗争表现为蒋介石要篡夺抗战胜利果实和我们反对他的篡夺的斗争。这个时期如果有机会主义的话,那就是不力争,自愿地把人民应得的果实送给蒋介石。
公开的全面的内战会不会爆发?这决定于国内的因素和国际的因素。国内的因素主要是我们的力量和觉悟程度。会不会因为国际国内的大势所趋和人心所向,经过我们的奋斗,使内战限制在局部的范围,或者使全面内战拖延时间爆发呢?这种可能性是有的。
蒋介石要放手发动内战也有许多困难。第一,解放区有一万万人民、一百万军队、二百多万民兵。第二,国民党统治地区的觉悟的人民是反对内战的,这对蒋介石是一种牵制。第三,国民党内部也有一部分人不赞成内战。目前的形势和一九二七年的时候是大不相同了。特别是我党目前的情况和一九二七年时候的情况大不相同。那时候的党是幼年的党,没有清醒的头脑,没有武装斗争的经验,没有针锋相对的方针。现在党的觉悟程度已经大大地提高了。
除了我们的觉悟,无产阶级先锋队的觉悟问题以外,还有一个人民群众的觉悟问题。当着人民还不觉悟的时候,把革命果实送给人家是完全可能的。这种事在历史上曾经有过。今天中国人民的觉悟程度也已经是大大地提高了。我党在人民中的威信从来没有过现在这样高。但是,在人民中间,主要是在日本占领区和国民党统治区的人民中间,还有相当多的人相信蒋介石,存在着对于国民党和美国的幻想,蒋介石也在努力散布这种幻想。中国人民中有这样一部分人还不觉悟,就是说明我们的宣传工作和组织工作还做得很不够。人民的觉悟不是容易的,要去掉人民脑子中的错误思想,需要我们做很多切切实实的工作。对于中国人民脑子中的落后的东西,我们要去扫除,就像用扫帚打扫房子一样。从来没有不经过打扫而自动去掉的灰尘。我们要在人民群众中间,广泛地进行宣传教育工作,使人民认识到中国的真实情况和动向,对于自己的力量具备信心。
人民靠我们去组织。中国的反动分子,靠我们组织起人民去把他打倒。凡是反动的东西,你不打,他就不倒。这也和扫地一样,扫帚不到,灰尘照例不会自己跑掉。陕甘宁边区南面有条介子河。介子河南是洛川,河北是富县。河南河北两个世界。河南是国民党的,因为我们没有去,人民没有组织起来,龌龊的东西多得很。我们有些同志就是相信政治影响,以为靠着影响就可以解决问题。那是迷信。一九三六年,我们住在保安。离保安四五十里的地方有个地主豪绅的土围子。那时候党中央的所在地就在保安,政治影响可谓大矣,可是那个土围子里的反革命就是死不投降。我们在南面扫、北面扫,都不行,后来把扫帚搞到里面去扫,他才说:“啊哟!我不干了。”世界上的事情,都是这样。钟不敲是不响的。桌子不搬是不走的。苏联红军不进入东北,日本就不投降。我们的军队不去打,敌伪就不缴枪。扫帚到了,政治影响才能充分发生效力。我们的扫帚就是共产党、八路军和新四军。手里拿着扫帚就要研究扫的办法,不要躺在床上,以为会来一阵什么大风,把灰尘统统刮掉。我们马克思主义者是革命的现实主义者,绝不作空想。中国有句古话说:“黎明即起,洒扫庭除。”黎明者,天刚亮也。古人告诉我们,在天刚亮的时候,就要起来打扫。这是告诉了我们一项任务。只有这样想,这样做,才有益处,也才有工作做。中国的地面很大,要靠我们一寸一寸地去扫。
我们的方针要放在什么基点上?放在自己力量的基点上,叫做自力更生。我们并不孤立,全世界一切反对帝国主义的国家和人民都是我们的朋友。但是我们强调自力更生,我们能够依靠自己组织的力量,打败一切中外反动派。蒋介石同我们相反,他完全是依靠美国帝国主义的帮助,把美国帝国主义作为靠山。独裁、内战和卖国三位一体,这一贯是蒋介石方针的基本点。美国帝国主义要帮助蒋介石打内战,要把中国变成美国的附庸,它的这个方针也是老早定了的。但是,美国帝国主义是外强中干的。我们要有清醒的头脑,这里包括不相信帝国主义的“好话”和不害怕帝国主义的恐吓。曾经有个美国人向我说:“你们要听一听赫尔利的话,派几个人到国民党政府里去做官。”我说:“捆住手脚的官不好做,我们不做。要做,就得放开手放开脚,自由自在地做,这就是在民主的基础上成立联合政府。”他说:“不做不好。”我问:“为什么不好?”他说:“第一,美国人会骂你们;第二,美国人要给蒋介石撑腰。”我说:“你们吃饱了面包,睡足了觉,要骂人,要撑蒋介石的腰,这是你们美国人的事,我不干涉。现在我们有的是小米加步枪,你们有的是面包加大炮。你们爱撑蒋介石的腰就撑,愿撑多久就撑多久。不过要记住一条,中国是什么人的中国?中国绝不是蒋介石的,中国是中国人民的。总有一天你们会撑不下去!”同志们,这个美国人的话是吓人的。帝国主义者就会吓人的那一套,殖民地有许多人也就是怕吓。他们以为所有殖民地的人都怕吓,但是不知道中国有这么一些人是不怕那一套的。我们过去对于美国的扶蒋反共政策作了公开的批评和揭露,这是必要的,今后还要继续揭穿它。
苏联出兵了,红军来援助中国人民驱逐侵略者,这是中国历史上从来没有过的事。这件事情所发生的影响,是不可估计的。美国和蒋介石的宣传机关,想拿两颗原子弹把红军的政治影响扫掉。但是扫不掉,没有那样容易。原子弹能不能解决战争?不能。原子弹不能使日本投降。只有原子弹而没有人民的斗争,原子弹是空的。假如原子弹能够解决战争,为什么还要请苏联出兵?为什么投了两颗原子弹日本还不投降,而苏联一出兵日本就投降了呢?我们有些同志也相信原子弹了不起,这是很错误的。这些同志看问题,还不如一个英国贵族。英国有个勋爵,叫蒙巴顿。他说,认为原子弹能解决战争是最大的错误。我们这些同志比蒙巴顿还落后。这些同志把原子弹看得神乎其神,是受了什么影响呢?是资产阶级的影响。这种影响是从哪里来的呢?是从资产阶级的学校教育中来的,是从资产阶级的报纸、通讯社来的。有两种世界观、方法论:无产阶级的世界观、方法论和资产阶级的世界观、方法论。这些同志把资产阶级的世界观、方法论,经常拿在手里;无产阶级的世界观、方法论,却经常丢在脑后。我们队伍中的唯武器论,单纯军事观点,官僚主义、脱离群众的作风,个人主义思想,等等,都是资产阶级的影响。对于我们队伍中的这些资产阶级的东西,也要像打扫灰尘一样,常常扫除。
苏联的参战,决定了日本的投降,中国的时局发展到了一个新的时期。新时期和抗日战争时期之间有一个过渡阶段。过渡阶段的斗争,就是反对蒋介石篡夺抗战胜利果实的斗争。蒋介石要发动全国规模的内战,他的方针已经定了,我们对此要有准备。全国性的内战不论哪一天爆发,我们都要准备好。早一点,明天早上就打吧,我们也在准备着。这是第一条。现在的国际国内形势,有可能把内战暂时限制在局部范围,内战可能暂时是若干地方性的战争。这是第二条。第一条我们准备着,第二条是早已如此。总而言之,我们要有准备。有了准备,就能恰当地应付各种复杂的局面。
