The Situation and Our Policy After the Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan

China Mao Zedong

13 August 1945

Context
Mao addressed Chinese Communist Party comrades on August 13, 1945, after Japan's surrender became certain, setting out the Party's policy of tit-for-tat resistance to Chiang Kai-shek's civil war plans and calling for full preparedness.
Main themes
Fruits of victory in the War of Resistance, danger of civil war with Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet entry into the war and Japan's surrender, tit-for-tat policy, Liberated Areas and contested cities, critique of Chen Duxiu and 1927, self-reliance, U.S. imperialism's backing of the Kuomintang, atom bomb and the role of the people, political consciousness of the masses, preparedness for civil war
Duration
~41 min
91st percentile
Words
4,936
91st percentile
Sentences
280
94th percentile
Readability
65
95th percentile
Grade
8.5
7th percentile
Syntax
2.80
22nd percentile
Vocabulary
2.10
28th percentile

Translated from Chinese Source: GitHub qinglee/maoxuan (毛泽东选集) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 76%72%
  • Institutional 9%9%
  • Social 6%6%
  • Ceremonial 5%5%
  • Economic 4%4%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 5%

280 sentences in 18 paragraphs

These last few days have been a time of tremendous change in the situation in the Far East. The surrender of Japanese imperialism is now a foregone conclusion. The decisive factor in Japan's surrender is the Soviet Union's entry into the war. A million Red Army troops have entered China's Northeast, and this force is irresistible. Japanese imperialism can no longer keep fighting. The hard-fought War of Resistance of the Chinese people has already won victory. As a historical stage, the War of Resistance Against Japan is over.

In this situation, what are class relations in China now, and what are relations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party now, and what might they become in the future? What is our Party's policy? These are questions of great concern to the people of the whole country and to all the comrades of our Party.

What about the Kuomintang? Look at its past and you can know its present; look at its past and present and you can know its future. This party fought a counter-revolutionary civil war for ten full years. During the War of Resistance, in 1940, 1941 and 1943, it launched three large-scale anti-Communist onslaughts, each of which it intended to develop into a nationwide civil war. It was only because of our Party's correct policy and the opposition of the people of the whole country that this did not come about. Chiang Kai-shek, the political representative of China's big landlords and big bourgeoisie, is, as everyone knows, an extremely cruel and extremely treacherous character. His policy has been to sit by with folded arms, wait for victory, conserve his strength and prepare for civil war. And sure enough, the victory he waited for has come, and now this "Generalissimo" wants to "come down from the mountain." For eight years we and Chiang Kai-shek have swapped places: before, we were on the mountains and he was by the water; during the War of Resistance, we were behind enemy lines and he went up the mountain. Now he wants to come down from the mountain, to come down and seize the fruits of victory in the War of Resistance.

For eight years the people and the army of our Liberated Areas, with no outside help whatsoever and relying entirely on their own efforts, have liberated vast territories and resisted the bulk of the Japanese forces invading China and almost all of the puppet troops. It is because of our resolute resistance and heroic struggle that the 200 million people of the Great Rear Area were spared devastation by the Japanese invaders, and the places where those 200 million people live were not occupied by them. Chiang Kai-shek hid up on Mount Emei, and in front of him there were people standing guard for him: the Liberated Areas, the people and the army of the Liberated Areas. In protecting the 200 million people of the Great Rear Area, we also protected this "Generalissimo" and gave him the time and the place to sit by with folded arms and wait for victory. The time: eight years and one month. The place: the area where 200 million people live. These conditions were given to him by us. Without us, he could not have stood by and watched. Well then, is the "Generalissimo" grateful to us? Not he! This man has never known gratitude. How did Chiang Kai-shek come to power? By relying on the Northern Expedition, on the first period of Kuomintang-Communist cooperation, and on the fact that the people at that time had not yet seen through him and still supported him. Once in power, far from being grateful to the people, he struck them down with one blow and plunged them into the sea of blood of ten years of civil war. You comrades all know this period of history. In this War of Resistance Against Japan the Chinese people protected him once again. Now that the War of Resistance has been won and Japan is about to surrender, he is not in the least grateful to the people. On the contrary, he is digging out the old accounts of 1927 and wants to do the same thing all over again. Chiang Kai-shek says there has never been "civil war" in China, only "bandit suppression." Whatever he calls it, the point is that he intends to launch a civil war against the people and to slaughter the people.

So long as a nationwide civil war has not yet broken out, not everyone among the people, nor many comrades in our Party, sees this question clearly. Because large-scale civil war has not yet come, because civil war is not yet widespread, open or on a large scale, many people think, "Not necessarily!" And many others are afraid of civil war. The fear is understandable: we fought for ten years before, then fought the War of Resistance for eight years, and if we fight again, how can we bear it? It is very natural for such fear to arise. Toward Chiang Kai-shek's scheme to launch civil war, the policy our Party has adopted is clear and consistent: resolutely oppose civil war, disapprove of civil war, and prevent civil war. From now on we will continue, with the greatest effort and patience, to lead the people in stopping civil war. But we must see soberly that the danger of civil war is extremely serious, because Chiang Kai-shek's policy has already been decided. According to Chiang Kai-shek's policy, there is to be civil war. According to our policy, the people's policy, there is not to be civil war. Those who do not want civil war are only the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people; unfortunately this does not include Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang. One side does not want to fight, the other does. If neither side wanted to fight, no fighting could start. Now only one side does not want to fight, and that side's strength is not yet sufficient to restrain the other, and so the danger of civil war is extremely serious.

Chiang Kai-shek is bent on keeping to his reactionary policy of dictatorship and civil war, and our Party pointed this out in good time. Before the Party's Seventh Congress, during the Seventh Congress and after the Seventh Congress, we did quite thorough work to rouse the people's attention to the danger of civil war, so that the people of the whole country, our Party members and our army would be mentally prepared in advance. This is very important; having it and not having it makes a great difference. In 1927 our Party was still an infant party and was completely unprepared mentally for Chiang Kai-shek's sudden counter-revolutionary attack, so that the fruits of victory the people had already won were lost right away, the people suffered long years of calamity, and a bright China was turned into a dark China. This time it is different. Our Party now has the rich experience of three revolutions, and its political maturity has risen greatly. The Central Committee of the Party has repeatedly and again and again explained the danger of civil war, so that the people of the whole country, the comrades of the whole Party and the army led by the Party are all in a state of preparedness.

Chiang Kai-shek always tries to wrest every inch of power and every ounce of gain from the people. And we? Our policy is to give tit for tat and to fight for every inch of land. We do things Chiang Kai-shek's way. Chiang Kai-shek always tries to force war on the people; he holds a knife in his left hand and a knife in his right hand. So we do it his way and take up knives too. This method was found only after investigation and study. This investigation and study is very important. When we see that someone is holding something in his hand, we should investigate. What is he holding? A knife. What is a knife for? It can be used to kill people. Whom does he want to kill with the knife? He wants to kill the people. Having investigated these points, we investigate further: the Chinese people also have hands, they too can take up knives, and if they have no knives they can forge them. The Chinese people discovered this truth through long investigation and study. The warlords, the landlords, the local bullies and evil gentry and the imperialists all hold knives in their hands and want to kill. The people have come to understand this, and so they do likewise. Some of us often pay no attention to this investigation and study. Chen Duxiu, for example, did not know that a knife in a man's hand can kill people. Some say this is a universal, everyday truth; how could a leader of the Communist Party not know it? That is hard to say. Without investigation and study he did not understand this, so we gave him a name and called him an opportunist. No investigation, no right to speak; we took away his right to speak. We adopted a method different from Chen Duxiu's: we enabled the oppressed and slaughtered people to take up knives, and if anyone wants to kill us again, we do likewise. Not long ago the Kuomintang sent six divisions to attack our Guanzhong sub-region; three of them pushed in and occupied an area a hundred li wide and twenty li long. We did it their way too, and wiped out the Kuomintang troops on that area of a hundred li by twenty li cleanly, thoroughly and completely. We give tit for tat and fight for every inch of land; we will never let the Kuomintang easily seize our land and kill our people. Of course, fighting for every inch of land does not mean, as with the "Left" line of the past, "not giving up a single inch of the base areas." This time we gave up an area a hundred li wide and twenty li long. We gave it up at the end of July and took it back at the beginning of August. Once after the Southern Anhui Incident, the Kuomintang liaison staff officer asked what our intentions were. I said, you are in Yan'an every day, don't you know? "If He attacks, we attack; if He stops, we stop." At that time we did not yet name Chiang Kai-shek; we only mentioned He Yingqin. Now it is: "If Chiang attacks, we attack; if Chiang stops, we stop." We act according to his method. Now Chiang Kai-shek is already sharpening his knife, so we must sharpen ours too.

The rights the people have won must never be lightly lost; they must be defended by fighting. We do not want civil war. If Chiang Kai-shek insists on forcing civil war on the Chinese people, then, in self-defence, to defend the lives, property, rights and well-being of the people of the Liberated Areas, we will have no choice but to take up arms and fight him. This civil war will be one he forces us to fight. If we cannot win, we will blame neither heaven nor earth, only ourselves for not winning. But anyone who thinks he can easily grab or swindle away the rights the people have already won will find it impossible. Last year an American correspondent asked me, "Who gave you the authority to do what you do?" I said, "The people." If not the people, who else? The Kuomintang in power did not give it. The Kuomintang does not recognize us. We take part in the People's Political Council, and according to the Council's regulations we do so as a "cultural group." We say we are not a "cultural group"; we have an army, we are a "military group." On March 1 this year Chiang Kai-shek said: Only when the Communist Party hands over its army will it have legal status. Those words of Chiang Kai-shek still apply now. We have not handed over our army, so we have no legal status; we are "lawless and godless." Our responsibility is to be responsible to the people. Every word, every act, every policy must accord with the people's interests, and if there are mistakes they must be corrected; this is what being responsible to the people means. Comrades, the people want liberation, and so they entrust power to those who can represent them and faithfully work for them, and that is us Communists. Having become the people's representatives, we must represent them well and not be like Chen Duxiu. Faced with the counter-revolutionary attack on the people, Chen Duxiu did not adopt the policy of tit for tat and fighting for every inch of land, and as a result, within a few months in 1927, all the rights the people had won were lost completely. This time we must be careful. Our policy is completely different from Chen Duxiu's, and no deception can fool us. We must have clear heads and a correct policy, and we must not make mistakes.

To whom should the fruits of victory in the War of Resistance belong? This is very clear. Take a peach tree. The peaches that grow on the tree are the fruits of victory. Who is entitled to pick them? Ask who planted the tree and who carried the water to water it. Chiang Kai-shek squatted on the mountain and did not carry a single bucket of water, and yet now he is stretching out his arm, long, long, to pick the peaches. He says, these peaches belong to me, Chiang Kai-shek; I am the landlord and you are serfs, and I will not allow you to pick them. We refuted him in the press. We said, you never carried any water, so you have no right to pick the peaches. We, the people of the Liberated Areas, watered the tree every day, and we have the most right to pick them. Comrades, victory in the War of Resistance was won by the people's blood and sacrifice; the victory of the War of Resistance should be the people's victory, and its fruits should go to the people. As for Chiang Kai-shek, he was passive in resisting Japan and active in opposing the Communists; he was a stumbling block in the people's War of Resistance. Now this stumbling block wants to come forward and monopolize the fruits of victory, and to make China after the victory revert to what it was before the war, with not the slightest change allowed. This is how the struggle arises. Comrades, this is a very serious struggle.

That the fruits of victory in the War of Resistance should belong to the people is one question; but into whose hands the fruits of victory will actually fall, and whether they can go to the people, is another question. Do not think that all the fruits of victory are sure to fall into the people's hands. A number of big peaches, such as the big cities of Shanghai, Nanjing and Hangzhou, will be grabbed by Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang Kai-shek is in collusion with U.S. imperialism, and in those places their forces have the upper hand, while the revolutionary people can for the most part occupy only the countryside. Another batch of peaches will be contested by both sides. The Datong-Puzhou line north of Taiyuan, the middle section of the Beiping-Suiyuan line, the Beiping-Liaoning line, the Beiping-Hankou line north of Zhengzhou, the Zhengding-Taiyuan line, the Baigui-Jincheng line, the Dezhou-Shijiazhuang line, the Tianjin-Pukou line, the Qingdao-Jinan line, the Lianyungang-Tianshui line east of Zhengzhou: the small and medium cities in these places must be fought for, and these small and medium peaches were all watered with the blood and sweat of the people of the Liberated Areas. Whether these places can fall into the people's hands cannot yet be said. All that can be said now is two words: fight hard. Are there any that are sure to fall into the people's hands? Yes: in Hebei, Chahar, Jehol, most of Shanxi, Shandong and northern Jiangsu, large stretches of countryside and large numbers of cities, with countryside joined to countryside, one block of a hundred-odd cities, one of seventy or eighty, one of forty or fifty, three, four, five or six blocks of various sizes. What cities? Medium and small cities. These are sure, and our strength is able to win this batch of fruits of victory. Winning this batch of fruits will be a first in the history of the Chinese revolution. Historically, only after we smashed the enemy's third "encirclement and suppression" campaign in the second half of 1931 did the Central Area in Jiangxi have twenty-one county towns joined together, but still no medium-sized cities. With twenty-one small towns linked together, at the most we had a population of 2.5 million. Relying on these, the Chinese people were able to fight for so long, win such great victories and smash such great "encirclement and suppression" campaigns. Later we lost, and we cannot blame Chiang Kai-shek for that; we must blame ourselves for not fighting well. If this time we have dozens of large and small cities linked together in three, four, five or six blocks, then the Chinese people will have three, four, five or six revolutionary base areas each larger than the Central Area in Jiangxi, and the situation of the Chinese revolution will be very promising indeed.

Viewing the situation as a whole, the stage of the War of Resistance Against Japan is over, and the new situation and task is the domestic struggle. Chiang Kai-shek talks of "building the country"; from now on the struggle will be over what kind of country to build. Will it be a new-democratic country of the masses of the people under the leadership of the proletariat, or a semi-colonial, semi-feudal country under the dictatorship of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie? This will be a very complicated struggle. At present this struggle takes the form of Chiang Kai-shek trying to usurp the fruits of victory in the War of Resistance and our struggle against his usurpation. If there is opportunism in this period, it will consist in not fighting hard and willingly handing over to Chiang Kai-shek the fruits that rightly belong to the people.

Will open, all-out civil war break out? That depends on internal and international factors. The internal factors are mainly our strength and our level of political consciousness. Could it be that, owing to the general trend at home and abroad and the sentiments of the people, and through our efforts, the civil war will be confined to a limited area, or the outbreak of an all-out civil war will be delayed? That possibility exists.

Chiang Kai-shek also faces many difficulties in launching civil war with a free hand. First, the Liberated Areas have a hundred million people, an army of a million and over two million militia. Second, the politically conscious people in the Kuomintang areas oppose civil war, which acts as a check on Chiang Kai-shek. Third, there are also some within the Kuomintang who disapprove of civil war. The present situation is very different from that of 1927. In particular, our Party's present condition is very different from what it was in 1927. At that time the Party was an infant party; it did not have a clear head, it had no experience of armed struggle, and it had no policy of tit for tat. Now the Party's level of consciousness has risen enormously.

Besides our own consciousness, the question of the consciousness of the vanguard of the proletariat, there is also the question of the consciousness of the masses of the people. When the people are not yet politically conscious, it is entirely possible for the fruits of revolution to be handed over to others. Such things have happened in history. Today the level of consciousness of the Chinese people has also risen enormously. Our Party's prestige among the people has never been as high as it is now. But among the people, chiefly among the people in the Japanese-occupied areas and the Kuomintang areas, there are still quite a few who believe in Chiang Kai-shek and harbour illusions about the Kuomintang and the United States, and Chiang Kai-shek is working hard to spread these illusions. That a section of the Chinese people is not yet awakened shows that our propaganda and organizational work is still far from adequate. It is not easy for the people to become conscious; to rid their minds of wrong ideas requires a great deal of solid, down-to-earth work on our part. We must sweep away the backward things in the minds of the Chinese people, just as we sweep a room with a broom. Dust never vanishes of its own accord without sweeping. We must carry out propaganda and education widely among the masses, so that the people understand the real situation in China and the direction things are taking, and have confidence in their own strength.

The people depend on us to organize them. As for China's reactionaries, it is up to us to organize the people to overthrow them. Everything reactionary is the same: if you don't hit it, it won't fall. This is like sweeping the floor: where the broom does not reach, the dust as a rule will not go away by itself. On the southern edge of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region there is a river called the Jiezi. South of the river is Luochuan, north of it is Fuxian. South and north of the river are two different worlds. The south belongs to the Kuomintang; because we have not gone there and the people have not been organized, there is a great deal of filth. Some of our comrades put their faith in political influence alone, thinking that problems can be solved by influence. That is superstition. In 1936 we were living in Bao'an. Forty or fifty li from Bao'an there was a fortified village held by a landlord despot. At that time the Party Central Committee was located in Bao'an, so political influence could be said to be great indeed, yet the counter-revolutionaries in that fortified village stubbornly refused to surrender. We swept from the south and swept from the north, and it was no use; later we got the broom inside and swept there, and only then did he say, "Aiyo! I give up." Everything in the world is like this. A bell does not ring unless you strike it. A table does not move unless you lift it. Had the Soviet Red Army not entered the Northeast, Japan would not have surrendered. If our troops don't go and fight, the enemy and puppet troops won't hand over their guns. Only when the broom arrives can political influence take full effect. Our broom is the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army. With the broom in hand, we must study how to sweep, and not lie in bed thinking that some great wind will come along and blow all the dust away. We Marxists are revolutionary realists and never indulge in idle dreams. There is an old Chinese saying: "Rise at dawn and sweep the courtyard." Dawn means when the day is just breaking. The ancients tell us to get up and sweep as soon as day breaks. This gives us a task. Only by thinking this way and acting this way will there be any benefit, and only then will there be work for us to do. China's territory is vast, and it is up to us to sweep it inch by inch.

On what basis should our policy rest? It should rest on the basis of our own strength, and that is called regeneration through one's own efforts. We are not isolated; all the countries and peoples in the world opposed to imperialism are our friends. Nevertheless we stress regeneration through our own efforts. Relying on the forces we ourselves organize, we can defeat all reactionaries, Chinese and foreign. Chiang Kai-shek is the opposite of us; he relies entirely on the help of U.S. imperialism and takes U.S. imperialism as his backer. Dictatorship, civil war and selling out the country, the three in one, have always been the basic points of Chiang Kai-shek's policy. U.S. imperialism wants to help Chiang Kai-shek wage civil war and to turn China into a U.S. dependency, and this policy of its was set long ago. But U.S. imperialism is outwardly strong but inwardly weak. We must keep clear heads, and this includes not believing the "nice words" of the imperialists and not being afraid of their intimidation. An American once said to me, "You should listen to Hurley and send a few people to be officials in the Kuomintang government." I said, "It is no good being an official with hands and feet tied; we won't do it. If we are to be officials, our hands and feet must be free, so that we can act freely; that means forming a coalition government on a democratic basis." He said, "It will be bad if you don't." I asked, "Why bad?" He said, "First, the Americans will curse you; second, the Americans will back up Chiang Kai-shek." I said, "If you, having eaten your fill of bread and slept your fill, want to curse people and back up Chiang Kai-shek, that is your American business, and I won't interfere. Now what we have is millet plus rifles; what you have is bread plus cannon. If you like backing Chiang Kai-shek, back him, and back him as long as you like. But remember one thing: whose China is China? China does not belong to Chiang Kai-shek at all; China belongs to the Chinese people. The day will come when you can't keep backing him!" Comrades, this American was trying to scare people. Scaring people is the imperialists' stock-in-trade, and many people in the colonies are indeed easily scared. They think that all people in the colonies are afraid of being scared, but they do not know that in China there are some people who are not afraid of that sort of thing. In the past we openly criticized and exposed the U.S. policy of supporting Chiang and opposing the Communists; this was necessary, and we shall continue to expose it from now on.

The Soviet Union has sent its troops; the Red Army has come to help the Chinese people drive out the aggressors. This has never happened before in Chinese history. The influence of this event is incalculable. The propaganda machines of the United States and Chiang Kai-shek are trying to use two atom bombs to sweep away the political influence of the Red Army. But it cannot be swept away; it is not that easy. Can the atom bomb decide a war? No. The atom bomb could not make Japan surrender. Without the struggle of the people, the atom bomb by itself is futile. If the atom bomb could decide the war, why was it necessary to ask the Soviet Union to send troops? Why did Japan not surrender after two atom bombs were dropped, yet surrendered as soon as the Soviet Union sent troops? Some of our comrades also believe that the atom bomb is something tremendous; this is quite wrong. These comrades see things even less clearly than a British aristocrat. There is a British lord called Mountbatten. He said that to think the atom bomb can decide the war is the greatest mistake. These comrades of ours are even more backward than Mountbatten. What influence makes these comrades regard the atom bomb as something miraculous? Bourgeois influence. Where does this influence come from? From bourgeois school education, from the bourgeois press and news agencies. There are two world outlooks and methodologies: the proletarian world outlook and methodology, and the bourgeois world outlook and methodology. These comrades constantly keep the bourgeois world outlook and methodology in hand, while they constantly forget the proletarian world outlook and methodology. The theory that weapons decide everything, the purely military viewpoint, bureaucracy and the style of work divorced from the masses, individualist ideology and so on in our ranks are all bourgeois influences. These bourgeois things in our ranks must also be swept away constantly, just as we sweep away dust.

The Soviet Union's entry into the war has decided Japan's surrender, and the situation in China has entered a new period. Between the new period and the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan there is a transitional stage. The struggle in the transitional stage is the struggle against Chiang Kai-shek's usurpation of the fruits of victory in the War of Resistance. Chiang Kai-shek wants to launch a nationwide civil war; his policy is already set, and we must be prepared for this. No matter what day the nationwide civil war breaks out, we must be well prepared. If it comes early, say tomorrow morning, we are prepared for that too. That is the first point. In the present international and domestic situation, it is possible for the civil war to be confined for a time to limited areas, and the civil war may for a time take the form of a number of local wars. That is the second point. We are preparing for the first point; the second point has long been the case. In short, we must be prepared. Being prepared, we shall be able to deal properly with all kinds of complicated situations.