- Context
- Mao addressed an audience of Chinese leaders and cadres on the international situation, apparently in early September 1958 during the Taiwan Strait crisis, arguing that American entanglement and tension favoured China, and calling for war preparedness.
- Main themes
- America's "noose" at Taiwan, Jinmen and Mazu, relative fear of war between East and West, aggressive Western military blocs, benefits of tense situations, withdrawal of US and British troops from the Middle East, de Gaulle's return to power in France, trade embargo and self-reliance, non-recognition of China, preparation for war against aggression, people's militia and communes, disengagement policy
- Duration
- ~35 min
- Words
- 4,187
- Sentences
- 250
- Readability
- 65
- Grade
- 8.4
- Syntax
- 2.82
- Vocabulary
- 2.07
Translated from Chinese Source: GitHub qinglee/maoxuan (毛泽东选集) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other250 sentences in 21 paragraphs
I
On the international situation, we have always held one view: we are always optimistic. Later we summed it up as "the East Wind prevails over the West Wind."
America has now introduced a "full contracting" system here with us. It has simply taken on Jinmen, Mazu, and some places called Big Dan Island, Second Dan Island and Dongding Island, the whole lot, and I think that makes it comfortable. It has put itself into our noose; America's neck is hanging in China's iron noose. Taiwan is a noose too, only a bit farther off. If it wants to include the whole Jinmen set-up, then its head comes even closer to us. Any day we choose to give it a kick, it cannot get away, because it is caught by a rope.
I am now putting forward a number of viewpoints, offering some views to all of you. They are not to be taken as some kind of decision, as a law. As a law it would be dead; as a view it is alive. Take these viewpoints and use them to observe the international situation.
Point one: who fears whom more. In my view the Americans are afraid of fighting a war. We are also afraid of fighting a war. The question is which side is more afraid. This too is a viewpoint, a view. I ask all of you to take this viewpoint and look, observe, over the next one year, two years, three years, four years, keep on observing like this: is it the West that fears the East more, or is it we in the East who fear the West more? As I see it, it is Dulles who fears us more; it is Britain, America, Germany, France, those Western countries, that fear us more. Why do they fear more? It is a question of strength, a question of people's hearts. People's hearts are strength; there are more people on our side and fewer on theirs. Of the three isms, communism, nationalism and imperialism, communism and nationalism are relatively close. And nationalism occupies a fairly broad area, three continents: Asia, Africa and Latin America. Even though many of the rulers in these continents are pro-Western, for example those of Thailand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Japan, Turkey, Iran and so on, among the people there are not a few who are pro-Eastern, possibly a great many. It is the monopoly capitalists and those most deeply poisoned by them who advocate war. Apart from the monopoly capitalists, most other people (not all) do not want war. For example, in several Nordic countries, those in power are also the bourgeoisie, and they do not want war. That is the balance of forces. Because truth is held in the hands of the majority, and not in the hands of Dulles, their hearts are emptier than ours, and our hearts are more solid. We rely on the people; they prop up those reactionary rulers. That is exactly what Dulles is doing now; he specializes in propping up people like Generalissimo Chiang, Syngman Rhee and Ngo Dinh Diem. This is how I see it: both sides are afraid, but they are a bit more afraid of us, and therefore war will not break out.
Point two: the American imperialists and the others have formed military blocs, the North Atlantic, Baghdad, Manila, whatever. What is the nature of these blocs, after all? We say they are aggressive. That they are aggressive is absolutely true. But in which direction is their spearhead pointed now? Are they attacking socialism or attacking nationalism? As I see it, they are now attacking nationalism, that is, attacking Egypt, Lebanon and those weak countries of the Middle East. As for the socialist countries, unless, say, Hungary had failed, Poland had also collapsed, Czechoslovakia and East Germany had collapsed too, and even the Soviet Union ran into trouble and we ran into trouble too, tottering on the verge of falling, at that point they would attack. If you are about to fall, why wouldn't they attack? Now we are not falling, we are consolidated, this bone of ours is too hard to gnaw, so they gnaw at the places that are easier to gnaw: going after Indonesia, India, Burma, Ceylon, trying to bring down Nasser, trying to bring down Iraq, trying to subdue Algeria, and so on. Now Latin America has made great progress. Nixon is a vice president, and he was unwelcome in eight countries; he was spat on and pelted with stones. America's political representative was dealt with using spit in front of those people; that is contempt for "dignity," that is having no "courtesy"; in their eyes he counted for nothing. You are our enemy, so we deal with you with spit and stones. So do not regard these three military blocs as all that serious; they must be analysed. They are aggressive, but they are not consolidated.
Point three: on tense situations. Every day we call for easing tension, and easing tension benefits the people of the world. Then does it follow that every tense situation is harmful to us? I don't think that is entirely so. This tense situation is not purely harmful to us with no benefit; it also has a favourable side. Why is that? Because apart from its harmful side, a tense situation can also mobilize forces, mobilize the backward strata, mobilize the middle elements to rise up and struggle. Those who fear atomic war will have to think it over. Look, a few shells fired at Jinmen and Mazu, and I never expected the world to be in such an uproar, with smoke billowing to the sky. That is because people fear war, fear America making trouble everywhere. Of all the many countries in the world, apart from Syngman Rhee alone, there is not yet a second country supporting America. Perhaps add the Philippines, which offers what is called "conditional support." Take the Iraqi revolution, for example: wasn't that brought about by a tense situation? Tense situations do not depend on us; they are created by the imperialists themselves, but in the final analysis they are more unfavourable to the imperialists. Lenin expressed this viewpoint. He was speaking of war; he said that war mobilizes people's spirits and makes them tense. Of course there is no war now, but this kind of tense situation under armed confrontation can also mobilize all positive factors and make the backward strata think things over.
Point four: the question of troop withdrawal from the Middle East. The American and British aggressor troops must withdraw. The imperialists now want to hang on there and not leave. This is unfavourable to the people, but at the same time it also serves to educate the people. If you want to oppose the aggressor but have no object, no target, no opposite, then it is hard to oppose. Now it has come forward itself to serve as the opposite and hangs on without leaving, and that has served to mobilize the people of the whole world to rise against the American aggressors. So its delay in withdrawing, taken as a whole, is not necessarily purely harmful to the people with no benefit, because this way the people can urge it to go every day: why don't you leave?
Point five: is it better for de Gaulle to come to power or not? Right now the French Communist Party and the French people should resolutely oppose de Gaulle coming to power and vote against his constitution, but at the same time they should prepare for the struggle after he takes power, in case they cannot stop him. If de Gaulle comes to power he will oppress the French Communists and the French people, but there are also advantages, both domestically and externally. Externally, this man likes to be at odds with Britain and America; he likes to argue with them. He suffered at their hands in the past; he wrote a memoir in which he does nothing but curse Britain and America and speak well of the Soviet Union. As it looks now, he is still going to be at odds with them. France being at odds with Britain and America is very beneficial. Domestically, he is an indispensable teacher for educating the French proletariat, just like our Generalissimo Chiang in China. Without Generalissimo Chiang, there would have been no way to educate six hundred million people; positive education by the Communist Party alone would not have done it. De Gaulle still has prestige now. If you defeat him at this point, he isn't dead, and people will still long for him. Let him come to power; at most he will last five, six, seven, eight, ten years, and he is bound to collapse. Once he collapses there will be no second de Gaulle; the poison will have been let out. This poison must be let out, just like the poison of our rightists; you have to let them let it out. If you don't let them let it out, they will always be poisonous; once it's let out, the poison dissipates.
Point six: the embargo, the refusal to do business with us. How exactly does this thing affect our interests? As I see it, the embargo is extremely beneficial to us; we do not feel the embargo is any disadvantage. The embargo is of enormous benefit to our food, clothing, housing and transport, and to construction (making steel and iron). Once there's an embargo, we have to find our own way. I have always been grateful to He Yingqin. In 1937 the Red Army was reorganized into the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army and received 400,000 yuan in fabi every month; once he began issuing the fabi, we depended on it. By 1940, during the anti-communist upsurge, it was cut off; it stopped coming. From then on we had to find our own way. What way? We issued an order saying the fabi is gone, you must make your own arrangements with the regiment as the unit. From then on, every base area launched a production movement, and the value produced was not 400,000 yuan, not 4 million yuan, not even 40 million yuan; all the base areas together produced perhaps 100 or 200 million. From then on we relied on our own hands. Who is the "He Yingqin" of today? It is Dulles, under a different name. Now they impose an embargo, so we do it ourselves, we make a Great Leap Forward, we get rid of dependence, we smash superstition, and that is good.
Point seven: the question of non-recognition. Is recognition more advantageous or non-recognition? I say it is the same as the embargo: the imperialist countries not recognizing us is somewhat more advantageous to us than their recognizing us. There are still forty-some countries that do not recognize us, and the main reason lies with America. France, for example, wants to recognize us, but doesn't dare because America opposes it. There are also some countries in Central and South America, Asia, Africa and Europe, as well as Canada, that don't dare to recognize us because of America. The capitalist countries that recognize us now number only nineteen altogether; add the eleven of the socialist camp and that makes thirty; add Yugoslavia and that makes thirty-one. I say let's just get by with this many. Their not recognizing us is, I think, not bad, rather good; it lets us make more steel, make six or seven hundred million tons, and by then they will surely have to recognize us. Even then they can go on not recognizing us; what does it matter if they don't?
The last point is to prepare for a war against aggression. Point one said both sides are afraid of fighting and war will not break out, but in worldly affairs we still need a safety factor. Because there is a monopoly bourgeoisie in the world, and we fear they might act rashly and recklessly, we must prepare for war. This point must be made clear among the cadres. First, we do not want to fight, and we oppose fighting, and so does the Soviet Union. If there is to be fighting, it will be they who strike first, forcing us to fight. Second, but we are not afraid of fighting; if there's to be a fight, then we fight. Right now we have only hand grenades and potatoes. A war with hydrogen bombs and atomic bombs is of course terrifying; people will die, and that is why we oppose war. But the power of decision is not in our hands. If the imperialists insist on fighting, then we must prepare everything; if there's to be a fight, we fight. That is to say, even if half the people die, there is nothing to be afraid of. That is putting it at the extreme. In terms of the whole history of the universe, I just don't believe one need be so pessimistic. I debated this question with Prime Minister Nehru. He said that at that point there would be no governments left; everything would be wiped out, and even if you wanted to make peace you couldn't find a government. I said, how could that be? If your government is wiped out by atomic bombs, the common people will set up another government, and peace can still be negotiated. In worldly affairs, if you don't think things through to the extreme, you can't sleep. It's nothing more than people being killed, nothing more than fear of fighting. But if it insists on fighting, it strikes first, it drops atomic bombs, then at that point, whether you are afraid or not, it will fight anyway. Since it will fight whether we are afraid or not, which of the two do we choose? Is it better to be afraid or better not to be afraid? To be afraid every day, without rousing some spirit among the cadres and the people, is very dangerous. I think we'd better steel our hearts: if there's to be a fight, we fight, and after the fight we rebuild. That is why we are now organizing militia; every people's commune is organizing militia, everyone a soldier. Guns are to be issued, several million at first and tens of millions later, with each province making light weapons: rifles, machine guns, hand grenades, small mortars, light mortars. The people's communes have military departments, and there is drilling everywhere. There are cultural people present here; you too should issue a call. Holding only the pen won't do; hold the pen in one hand and the gun in the other, being both cultured and martial.
There are these eight viewpoints, to be taken as a view, for all of you to use when observing the international situation.
II
Let me again talk about old things. About the noose, didn't we talk about it last time? Now we want to talk about using the noose on Dulles, Eisenhower and those warmongers. There are many places where the noose can be used on America. As I see it, wherever it has set up military bases, it is caught in a noose. For example: in the East, South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan; in the West, West Germany, France, Italy, Britain; in the Middle East, Turkey, Iran; in Africa, Morocco, and so on. In each place America has many military bases; Turkey, for example, has twenty-some bases, and Japan, I hear, has eight hundred. And there are places without bases but with troops in occupation, such as America in Lebanon and Britain in Jordan.
Now let me not speak of anything else, just two nooses: one is Lebanon, the other is Taiwan. Taiwan is an old noose; America has occupied it for several years now. Who has caught it? It has been caught by the People's Republic of China. Six hundred million people hold a rope in their hands, and this rope is a steel cable that has looped around America's neck. Who let it be caught? It made the rope itself, put its own neck in it, and then threw one end of the noose onto the Chinese mainland for us to grab. Lebanon was caught recently; it too is a noose America made itself and put on itself, and one end of the noose was thrown into the hands of the Arab nation. Not only that, it was thrown into the hands of the great majority of the world's people. Everyone curses it, no one sympathizes with it; the people and governments of most countries hold this noose in their hands. On the Middle East question, for example, the United Nations held a meeting. But mainly it is caught in the hands of the Arab people and cannot get free. Now it is in a dilemma: is it better to withdraw early or withdraw late? If it withdraws early, then what did it come for? If it withdraws late, the noose gets tighter and tighter and may become a dead knot; then what will it do? As for Taiwan, it signed a treaty, which is different again from Lebanon. Lebanon is still relatively loose; there is no treaty; one side invited and the other came, and so it got caught. As for Taiwan, a treaty was signed, and that is a dead knot. Here there is no distinction between Democrats and Republicans: it was Eisenhower who signed the treaty, and Truman who sent the Seventh Fleet. In Truman's time it could come or go; no treaty had been signed. Eisenhower signed a treaty. This too was a case of the Kuomintang panicking and making a request, America being willing, and so it got caught.
Are Jinmen and Mazu caught too? As I see it, Jinmen and Mazu are caught as well. Why? Don't they say that nothing has been decided yet, that they'll wait until the Communists attack and then decide according to the situation? The issue is the 110,000 Kuomintang troops, 95,000 on Jinmen and 15,000 on Mazu; so long as these two piles are there, they have to care. This is their class interest, their class feeling. Why are the British and Americans so good to the governments of certain countries? They cannot stand by and watch them die without helping. Yesterday the commander of the Seventh Fleet, Beakley, was personally directing operations, and wasn't that Smoot also sounding off? That gentleman who displeased both the State Department and the Defense Department was there too, directing alongside Beakley.
All in all, you are caught. You can get free if you like, but you must take the initiative and extricate yourself slowly. Isn't there a disengagement policy? There was a disengagement policy in Korea, and now, as I see it, a disengagement policy for Jinmen and Mazu has taken shape. Your crowd really wants to disengage, and public opinion is also demanding disengagement. To disengage means to get out of the noose. How to get out? That is, these 110,000 men leave. Taiwan is ours; on that there can be no concession whatever; it is a domestic question. Negotiations with you are an international question. These are two separate matters. You, America, are bound up with Chiang Kai-shek, but this compound can be broken down. Take electrolytic aluminium and electrolytic copper, for example: run a current through and don't they separate? Chiang Kai-shek's side is a domestic question; your side is a foreign affairs question; they cannot be lumped together.
Now, of the five continents, apart from Australia, America wants to dominate four. First North America, which is mainly its own territory, where it has troops; then Central and South America, where although it has no troops stationed, it wants to "protect" them. Add to that Europe, Africa and Asia, mainly Europe, Asia and Africa, with the main force in Europe and Asia. With so few soldiers spread so thin, I don't know how it is going to fight this war. So I always feel that its main aim is to dominate the intermediate zone. As for our areas, unless the socialist camp falls into great chaos and it is truly certain that once it comes, we, the Soviet Union and China, will collapse completely, otherwise I think it won't dare come. Apart from our camp, it wants to dominate everywhere: Latin America, Europe, Africa, Asia. And there is Australia, which is also tied to it by military treaty and follows its orders. Is it better for it to win these places under the banner of "anti-communism," or to really fight communism? Really fighting communism means bringing troops to attack us, to attack the Soviet Union. I say there is no one that stupid. It has only a few soldiers that it shifts back and forth. When the Lebanon affair happened, it moved them from the Pacific; when they reached the Red Sea area, the situation was not right, so they hurriedly turned back and landed in Malaya, supposedly to rest for a few days, and for seventeen days they didn't make a sound. Afterwards one of its own journalists announced that they were in charge of the Indian Ocean, and with that everyone around the Indian Ocean objected. As soon as we started shelling here, there weren't enough troops here, so it came again. Getting free of Taiwan and these places earlier would be more advantageous for America. If it hangs on and won't leave, then let it stay caught here; it does no harm to the overall situation, and we will go on with the Great Leap Forward.
As for the tense situation, perhaps a few more words can be said. You create a tense situation; do you think it benefits you? Not necessarily. A tense situation mobilizes the hearts of the world, and everyone curses the Americans. In the tense situation in the Middle East, everyone cursed the Americans. In the tense situation over Taiwan, again everyone is cursing the Americans, and relatively few are cursing us. The Americans curse us, Chiang Kai-shek curses us, Syngman Rhee curses us, and perhaps a few others curse us, but mainly it is these three. Britain is a waverer; militarily it is not taking part, and politically, I hear, it is fairly sympathetic. Because it has a Jordan problem, it has to show a bit of sympathy; if the Americans withdraw from Lebanon, what will Britain do in Jordan? Prime Minister Nehru issued a statement that is basically in agreement with us, endorsing Taiwan and these places belonging to us, but hoping for a peaceful settlement. This time the countries of the Middle East are really welcoming it, especially the UAR and Iraq, which sing its praises every day, saying this action of ours is good. Because with what we are doing, American pressure on them is lightened.
I think we can tell the people of the world openly that tense situations are relatively unfavourable to the Western countries, unfavourable to America. Where is the benefit for them? What benefit does the tense situation in the Middle East bring America? What benefit does it bring Britain? It is rather more beneficial to the Arab countries, more beneficial to the peace-loving people of Asia, Africa, Latin America and the other continents. Who, after all, benefits more from the tense situation over Taiwan? Take our country, for example: our whole country is now mobilized. If we say that the Middle East affair had thirty or forty million people marching, demonstrating and holding meetings, this time it is probably three hundred million people, giving them education and tempering. This is also good for the unity of the democratic parties, isn't it? All the parties have a common goal to struggle for, and so those who in the past had some knots in their hearts, some resentment, who were criticized, will find it dissipating somewhat. If we carry on like this, little by little, one way and another, won't we all simply become the working class? So the tense situation created by the imperialists themselves turns out instead to benefit us, the several hundred million people who oppose imperialism, and, as I see it, it benefits the peace-loving people of the whole world, all classes, all strata, and governments. They have to think it over: America is always bad, baring its fangs and brandishing its claws. Of its thirteen aircraft carriers, six have come, including some as big as that, sixty-five thousand tons or something, and they say they will put together a hundred and twenty ships, the first and strongest fleet. Be a bit stronger still, that's fine too; if you concentrate all four of your fleets here, I welcome it. That stuff of yours is useless anyway. Concentrate it all here, and you still can't come ashore. The peculiarity of ships is that they stay in the water and cannot go on land. All you are doing is putting on a display here. The more you fight, the more the whole world will know that you are in the wrong.
The original Chinese. The tags above are read on the English translation's sentences.
一
国际形势,我们历来有个观点,总是乐观的。后来总结为一个“东风压倒西风”。
美国现在在我们这里来了个“大包干”制度,索性把金门、马祖,还有些什么大担岛、二担岛、东碇岛一切包过去,我看它就舒服了。它上了我们的绞索,美国的颈吊在我们中国的铁的绞索上面。台湾也是个绞索,不过要隔得远一点。它要把金门这一套包括进去,那它的头更接近我们。我们哪一天踢它一脚,它走不掉,因为它被一根索子绞住了。
我现在提出若干观点,提出一些看法供给各位,并不要把它作为一个什么决定,作为一个法律。作为一个法律就死了,作为一个看法就是活的。拿这些观点去观察观察国际形势。
第一条,谁怕谁多一点。我看美国人是怕打仗。我们也怕打仗。问题是究竟哪一个怕得多一点。这也是个观点,也是个看法。请各位拿了这个观点去看一看,观察观察,以后一年、二年、三年、四年,就这样观察下去,究竟是西方怕东方多一点,还是我们东方怕西方多一点?据我的看法,是杜勒斯怕我们怕得多一点,是英、美、德、法那些西方国家怕我们怕得多一点。为什么它们怕得多一点呢?就是一个力量的问题,人心的问题。人心就是力量,我们这边的人多一点,它们那边的人少一点。共产主义,民族主义,帝国主义,这三个主义中,共产主义和民族主义比较接近。而民族主义占领的地方相当宽,有三个洲:一个亚洲,一个非洲,一个拉丁美洲。即使这些洲里头有许多统治者是亲西方的,比如泰国、巴基斯坦、菲律宾、日本、土耳其、伊朗等国的,可是人民中间亲东方的不少,可能是相当多。就是垄断资本家以及中了他们的毒最深的人是主张战争的。除了垄断资本家,其他的人,大多数(不是全体)是不愿意战争的。比如北欧几个国家,当权的也是资产阶级,他们是不愿意战争的。力量对比是如此。因为真理是抓在大多数人手里,而不抓在杜勒斯手里,他们的心比我们虚,我们的心比较实。我们依靠人民,他们是维持那些反动统治者。现在杜勒斯就干这一套,他就专扶什么蒋委员长、李承晚、吴庭艳这类人。我看是这样,双方都怕,但是他们怕我们比较多一点,因此战争是打不起来的。
第二条,美帝国主义它们结成军事集团,什么北大西洋,巴格达,马尼拉,这些集团的性质究竟怎么样?我们讲它们是侵略的。它们是侵略的,那是千真万确的。但是它们现在的锋芒向哪一边呢?是向社会主义进攻,还是向民族主义进攻?我看现在是向民族主义进攻,就是向埃及、黎巴嫩和中东那些弱的国家进攻。社会主义国家,除非是比如匈牙利失败了,波兰也崩溃了,捷克、东德也崩溃了,连苏联也发生问题,我们也发生问题,摇摇欲倒,那个时候它们会进攻的。你要倒了,它们为什么不进攻?现在我们不倒,我们巩固,我们这个骨头啃不动,它们就啃那些比较可啃的地方,搞印尼、印度、缅甸、锡兰,想搞垮纳赛尔,想搞垮伊拉克,想征服阿尔及利亚等等。现在拉丁美洲有个很大的进步。尼克松是个副总统,在八个国家不受欢迎,被吐口水,打石头。美国的政治代表在那些人面前被用口水去对付,这就是藐视“尊严”,没有“礼貌”了,在他们心目中间不算数了。你是我们的对头,因此拿口水、石头去对付你。所以,不要把这三个军事集团看得那么严重,要有分析。它们是侵略性的,但是它们并不巩固。
第三条,关于紧张局势。我们每天都是要求缓和紧张局势,紧张局势缓和了对世界人民是有利的。那末,凡是紧张局势就对我们有害,是不是?我看也不尽然。这个紧张局势,对我们并不是纯害无利,也有有利的一面。什么道理呢?因为紧张局势除了有害的一面外,还可以调动人马,调动落后阶层,调动中间派起来奋斗。怕打原子战争的,就要想一想。你看金门、马祖打这样几炮,我就没有料到现在这个世界闹得这样满城风雨,烟雾冲天。这就是因为人们怕战争,怕美国到处闯祸。全世界那么多国家,除了一个李承晚之外,现在还没有第二个国家支持美国。可能还加一个菲律宾,叫做“有条件的支持”。比如伊拉克革命,还不是紧张局势造成的?紧张局势并不取决于我们,是帝国主义自己造成的,但是归根结底对于帝国主义更不利。这个观点列宁说过的,他是讲战争,他说,战争调动人们的精神状态使它紧张起来。现在当然没有战争,但是这种在武装对立的情况下的紧张局势也是能够调动一切积极因素,并且使落后阶层想一想的。
第四条,中东的撤兵问题。美英侵略军必须撤退。帝国主义现在想赖在那里不走,这对人民是不利的,可是同时也有教育人民的作用。你要反对侵略者,如果没有个对象,没有个靶子,没有个对立面,这就不好反。它自己现在跑上来当作对立面,并且赖着不走,就起了动员全世界人民起来反对美国侵略者的作用。所以它迟迟不撤退,总起来看对人民也不见得就那么纯害无利,因为这样人民每天就可以催它走:你为什么不走?
第五条,戴高乐登台好,还是不登台好?现在法国共产党和人民应该坚决反对戴高乐登台,要投票反对他的宪法,但是同时要准备反对不了时,他登台后的斗争。戴高乐登台要压迫法共和法国人民,但对内对外也有好处。对外,这个人喜欢跟英美闹别扭,他喜欢抬杠子。他从前吃过苦头的,他写过一本回忆录,尽骂英美,而说苏联的好话。现在看起来,他还是要闹别扭的。法国跟英美闹别扭很有益处。对内,为教育法国无产阶级不可少之教员,等于我们中国的蒋委员长一样。没有蒋委员长,六亿人民教不过来的,单是共产党正面教育不行的。戴高乐现在还有威信,你这会把他打败了,他没有死,人们还是想他。让他登台,无非是顶多搞个五年,六年,七年,八年,十年,他得垮的。他一垮了,没有第二个戴高乐了,这个毒放出来了。这个毒必须放,等于我们右派的毒,你得让他放。你不让他放,他总是有毒的,放出来毒就消了。
第六条,禁运,不跟我们做生意。这个东西对于我们的利害究竟怎么样?我看,禁运对我们的利益极大,我们不感觉禁运有什么不利。禁运对于我们的衣食住行以及建设(炼钢炼铁)有极大的好处。一禁运,我们得自己想办法。我历来感谢何应钦。一九三七年红军改编成国民革命军第八路军,每月有四十万法币,自从他发了法币,我们就依赖这个法币。到一九四〇年反共高潮时就断了,不来了。从此我们得自己想办法,想什么办法呢?我们就下了个命令,说法币没有了,你们以团为单位自己打主意。从此,各根据地搞生产运动,产生的价值不是四十万元,不是四百万元,甚至于不是四千万元,各根据地合起来,可能一亿两亿。从此就靠我们自己动手。现在的“何应钦”是谁呢?就是杜勒斯,改了个名字。现在它们禁运,我们就自己搞,搞大跃进,搞掉了依赖性,破除了迷信,就好了。
第七条,不承认问题。是承认比较有利,还是不承认比较有利?我说,等于禁运一样,帝国主义国家不承认我们比较承认我们是要有利一些。现在还有四十几个国家不承认我们,主要的原因就在美国。比如法国,想承认,但是因为美国反对就不敢。其他还有一些中南美洲、亚洲、非洲、欧洲的国家,以及加拿大,都是因为美国而不敢承认。资本主义国家现在承认我们的,合起来只有十九个,加上社会主义阵营十一个,有三十个,再加上南斯拉夫,有三十一个。我看就是这么一点过日子吧。不承认我们,我看是不坏,比较好,让我们更多搞一点钢,搞个六七亿吨,那个时候它们总要承认。那个时候也可以不承认,它们不承认有什么要紧?
最后一条,就是准备反侵略的战争。头一条讲了双方怕打,仗打不起来,但世界上的事情还是要搞一个保险系数。因为世界上有个垄断资产阶级,恐怕他们冒里冒失乱搞,所以,要准备作战。这一条要在干部里头讲通。第一,我们不要打,而且反对打,苏联也是。要打就是他们先打,逼着我们不能不打。第二,但是我们不怕打,要打就打。我们现在只有手榴弹跟山药蛋。氢弹、原子弹的战争当然是可怕的,是要死人的,因此我们反对打。但是这个决定权不操在我们手中,帝国主义一定要打,那末我们就得准备一切,要打就打。就是说,死了一半人也没有什么可怕。这是极而言之。在整个宇宙史上来说,我就不相信要那么悲观。我跟尼赫鲁总理辩论过这个问题,他说,那个时候没有政府了,统统打光了,想要讲和也找不到政府了。我说,哪有那个事,你这个政府被原子弹消灭了,老百姓又起一个政府,又可以议和。世界上的事情你不想到那个极点,你就睡不着觉。无非是打死人,无非是一个怕打。但是它一定要打,是它先打,它打原子弹,这个时候,怕,它也打,不怕,它也打。既然是怕也打,不怕也打,二者选哪一个呢?还是怕好,还是不怕好?每天总是怕,在干部和人民里头不鼓起一点劲,这是很危险的。我看,还是横了一条心,要打就打,打了再建设。因此,我们现在搞民兵,人民公社里头都搞民兵,全民皆兵。要发枪,开头发几百万枝,将来要发几千万枝,由各省造轻武器,造步枪、机关枪、手榴弹、小迫击炮、轻迫击炮。人民公社有军事部,到处练习。在座的有文化人,你们也要号召一下,单拿笔杆不行,一手拿笔杆,一手拿枪杆,又是文化,又是武化。
有这么八个观点,当做一种看法,供各位观察国际形势的时候采用。
二
还是谈一谈老话。关于绞索,上一次不是谈过吗?现在我们要讲对杜勒斯、艾森豪威尔,对那些战争贩子使用绞索。对美国使用绞索的地方很多。据我看,凡是搞了军事基地的,就被一条绞索绞住了,例如:东方,南朝鲜、日本、菲律宾、台湾;西方,西德、法国、意大利、英国;中东,土耳其、伊朗;非洲,摩洛哥等等。每一个地方美国有许多军事基地,比如土耳其有二十几个基地,日本听说有八百个基地。还有些地方没有基地,但是有军队占领,比如美国在黎巴嫩,英国在约旦。
现在不讲别的,单讲两条绞索:一个黎巴嫩,一个台湾。台湾是老的绞索,美国已经占领几年了。它被什么人绞住了呢?被中华人民共和国绞住了。六亿人民手里拿着一根索子,这根索子是钢绳,把美国的脖子套住了。谁人让它套住的呢?是它自己造的索子,自己套住的,然后把绞索的一头丢到中国大陆上,让我们抓到。黎巴嫩是最近套住的,也是美国自己造的一条绞索,自己套上去的,绞索的一端就丢到阿拉伯民族手里。不但如此,而且是丢到全世界大多数人民手里,大家都骂它,不同情它,大多数国家的人民、政府手里拿着这个绞索。比如中东问题,联合国开了会。但主要是在阿拉伯人民手里套住了,不得脱身。它现在进退两难,早退好,还是迟退好?早退,那末所为何来呢?迟退,越套越紧,可能成为死结,那怎么得了呀?至于台湾,它是订了条约的,比黎巴嫩还不同。黎巴嫩还比较活,没有什么条约,说是一个请,一个就来了,于是乎套上了。至于台湾,就订了个条约,这是个死结。这里不分民主党、共和党,订条约是艾森豪威尔,派第七舰队是杜鲁门。杜鲁门那个时候可去可来,没有订条约,艾森豪威尔订了个条约。这也是国民党一恐慌、一要求,美国一愿意,就套上了。
金门、马祖套上了没有?金门、马祖据我看也套上了。为什么呢?他们不是讲现在还没有定,要共产党打上去,那个时候看情形再决定吗?问题是十一万国民党军队,金门九万五,马祖一万五,只要有这两堆在这个地方,他们得关心。这是他们的阶级利益,阶级感情。为什么英国人和美国人对一些国家的政府那样好?他们不能见死不救。昨天第七舰队的司令比克利亲自指挥,还有那个斯摩特,不是放大炮吗?引得国务院也不高兴、国防部也不高兴的那位先生,他也在那里跟比克利一道指挥。
总而言之,你是被套住了。要解脱也可以,你得采取主动,慢慢脱身。不是有脱身政策吗?在朝鲜有脱身政策,现在我看形成了金、马的脱身政策。你那一班子实在想脱身,而且舆论上也要求脱身。脱身者,是从绞索里面脱出去。怎么脱法呢?就是这十一万人走路。台湾是我们的,那是无论如何不能让步的,是内政问题;跟你的交涉是国际问题。这是两件事。你美国跟蒋介石搞在一起,这个化合物是可以分解的。比如电解铝、电解铜,用电一解,不就分离了吗?蒋介石这一边是内政问题,你那一边是外交问题,不能混为一谈。
现在五大洲,除了澳洲,四大洲美国都想霸住。首先是北美洲,那主要是它自己的地方,它有军队;然后是中南美洲,虽然没有驻军,但是它要“保护”的。再加上欧洲、非洲、亚洲,主要是欧亚非,主力是在欧亚两洲。这么几个兵,分得这么散,我不晓得它这个仗怎么打法。所以,我总是觉得,它是霸中间地带为主。至于我们这些地方,除非是社会主义阵营出了大乱子,它确有把握,一来,我们苏联、中国就全部崩溃,否则我看它是不敢来的。除了我们这个阵营以外,它都想霸占,一个拉丁美洲,一个欧洲,一个非洲,一个亚洲。还有个澳洲,澳洲也在军事条约上跟它联起来了,听它的命令。它用“反共”的旗帜取得这些地方好些,还是真正反共好些?所谓真正反共,就是拿军队来打我们,打苏联。我说,没有那么蠢的人。它只有几个兵调来调去,黎巴嫩事情发生,从太平洋调去,到了红海地方,形势不对,赶快回头,到马来亚登陆,名为休息几天,十七天不吭声。后头它一个新闻记者自己宣布是管印度洋的,这一来,印度洋大家都反对。我们这里一打炮,这里兵不够,它又来了。台湾这些地方早一点解脱,对美国比较有利,它赖着不走,就让它套到这里,无损于大局,我们还是搞大跃进。
至于紧张局势,也许还可以讲几句。你搞紧张局势,你以为对你有利呀?不一定,紧张局势调动世界人心,都骂美国人。中东紧张局势大家骂美国人。台湾紧张局势又是大家骂美国人,骂我们的比较少。美国人骂我们,蒋介石骂我们,李承晚骂我们,也许还有一点人骂我们,主要就是这三个。英国是动摇派,军事上不参加,政治上听说它相当同情。因为它有个约旦问题,它不同情一下,美国人如果在黎巴嫩撤退,英国在约旦怎么办呀?尼赫鲁总理发表了声明,基本上跟我们一致的,赞成台湾这些东西归我们,不过希望和平解决。这回中东各国可是欢迎啦,特别是一个阿联,一个伊拉克,每天吹,说我们这个事情好。因为我们这一搞,美国人对它们那里的压力就轻了。
我想可以公开告诉世界人民,紧张局势比较对于西方国家不利,对于美国不利。利在什么地方呢?中东紧张局势对于美国有什么利?对于英国有什么利?还是对于阿拉伯国家有利些,对于亚洲、非洲、拉丁美洲以及其他各洲爱好和平的人民有利些。台湾的紧张局势究竟对谁有利些呢?比如对于我们国家,我们国家现在全体动员,如果说中东事件有三四千万人游行示威、开会,这一次大概搞个三亿人口,使他们得到教育,得到锻炼。这个事情对于各民主党派的团结也好吧,各党派有一个共同奋斗目标,这样一来,过去心里有些疙瘩的,有些气的,受了批评的,也就消散一点吧。就这样慢慢搞下去,七搞八搞,我们大家还不就是工人阶级了。所以,帝国主义自己制造出来的紧张局势,结果反而对于反对帝国主义的我们几亿人口有利,对于全世界爱好和平的人民,各阶级,各阶层,政府,我看都有利。他们得想一想,美国总是不好,张牙舞爪。十三艘航空母舰就来了六艘,其中有大到那么大的,有什么六万五千吨的,说是要凑一百二十条船,第一个最强的舰队。你再强一点也好,把你那四个舰队统统集中到这个地方我都欢迎。你那个东西横直没有用的,统统集中来,你也上来不得。船的特点,就在水里头,不能上岸。你不过是在这个地方摆一摆,你越打,越使全世界的人都知道你无理。
