On the International Situation

China Mao Zedong · Chairman of the Communist Party of China

5 September 1958

Context
Mao addressed an audience of Chinese leaders and cadres on the international situation, apparently in early September 1958 during the Taiwan Strait crisis, arguing that American entanglement and tension favoured China, and calling for war preparedness.
Main themes
America's "noose" at Taiwan, Jinmen and Mazu, relative fear of war between East and West, aggressive Western military blocs, benefits of tense situations, withdrawal of US and British troops from the Middle East, de Gaulle's return to power in France, trade embargo and self-reliance, non-recognition of China, preparation for war against aggression, people's militia and communes, disengagement policy
Duration
~35 min
87th percentile
Words
4,187
87th percentile
Sentences
250
93rd percentile
Readability
65
94th percentile
Grade
8.4
7th percentile
Syntax
2.82
24th percentile
Vocabulary
2.07
21st percentile

Translated from Chinese Source: GitHub qinglee/maoxuan (毛泽东选集) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 87%84%
  • Economic 7%6%
  • Social 3%3%
  • Ceremonial 2%2%
  • Institutional 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 3%

250 sentences in 21 paragraphs

I

On the international situation, we have always held one view: we are always optimistic. Later we summed it up as "the East Wind prevails over the West Wind."

America has now introduced a "full contracting" system here with us. It has simply taken on Jinmen, Mazu, and some places called Big Dan Island, Second Dan Island and Dongding Island, the whole lot, and I think that makes it comfortable. It has put itself into our noose; America's neck is hanging in China's iron noose. Taiwan is a noose too, only a bit farther off. If it wants to include the whole Jinmen set-up, then its head comes even closer to us. Any day we choose to give it a kick, it cannot get away, because it is caught by a rope.

I am now putting forward a number of viewpoints, offering some views to all of you. They are not to be taken as some kind of decision, as a law. As a law it would be dead; as a view it is alive. Take these viewpoints and use them to observe the international situation.

Point one: who fears whom more. In my view the Americans are afraid of fighting a war. We are also afraid of fighting a war. The question is which side is more afraid. This too is a viewpoint, a view. I ask all of you to take this viewpoint and look, observe, over the next one year, two years, three years, four years, keep on observing like this: is it the West that fears the East more, or is it we in the East who fear the West more? As I see it, it is Dulles who fears us more; it is Britain, America, Germany, France, those Western countries, that fear us more. Why do they fear more? It is a question of strength, a question of people's hearts. People's hearts are strength; there are more people on our side and fewer on theirs. Of the three isms, communism, nationalism and imperialism, communism and nationalism are relatively close. And nationalism occupies a fairly broad area, three continents: Asia, Africa and Latin America. Even though many of the rulers in these continents are pro-Western, for example those of Thailand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Japan, Turkey, Iran and so on, among the people there are not a few who are pro-Eastern, possibly a great many. It is the monopoly capitalists and those most deeply poisoned by them who advocate war. Apart from the monopoly capitalists, most other people (not all) do not want war. For example, in several Nordic countries, those in power are also the bourgeoisie, and they do not want war. That is the balance of forces. Because truth is held in the hands of the majority, and not in the hands of Dulles, their hearts are emptier than ours, and our hearts are more solid. We rely on the people; they prop up those reactionary rulers. That is exactly what Dulles is doing now; he specializes in propping up people like Generalissimo Chiang, Syngman Rhee and Ngo Dinh Diem. This is how I see it: both sides are afraid, but they are a bit more afraid of us, and therefore war will not break out.

Point two: the American imperialists and the others have formed military blocs, the North Atlantic, Baghdad, Manila, whatever. What is the nature of these blocs, after all? We say they are aggressive. That they are aggressive is absolutely true. But in which direction is their spearhead pointed now? Are they attacking socialism or attacking nationalism? As I see it, they are now attacking nationalism, that is, attacking Egypt, Lebanon and those weak countries of the Middle East. As for the socialist countries, unless, say, Hungary had failed, Poland had also collapsed, Czechoslovakia and East Germany had collapsed too, and even the Soviet Union ran into trouble and we ran into trouble too, tottering on the verge of falling, at that point they would attack. If you are about to fall, why wouldn't they attack? Now we are not falling, we are consolidated, this bone of ours is too hard to gnaw, so they gnaw at the places that are easier to gnaw: going after Indonesia, India, Burma, Ceylon, trying to bring down Nasser, trying to bring down Iraq, trying to subdue Algeria, and so on. Now Latin America has made great progress. Nixon is a vice president, and he was unwelcome in eight countries; he was spat on and pelted with stones. America's political representative was dealt with using spit in front of those people; that is contempt for "dignity," that is having no "courtesy"; in their eyes he counted for nothing. You are our enemy, so we deal with you with spit and stones. So do not regard these three military blocs as all that serious; they must be analysed. They are aggressive, but they are not consolidated.

Point three: on tense situations. Every day we call for easing tension, and easing tension benefits the people of the world. Then does it follow that every tense situation is harmful to us? I don't think that is entirely so. This tense situation is not purely harmful to us with no benefit; it also has a favourable side. Why is that? Because apart from its harmful side, a tense situation can also mobilize forces, mobilize the backward strata, mobilize the middle elements to rise up and struggle. Those who fear atomic war will have to think it over. Look, a few shells fired at Jinmen and Mazu, and I never expected the world to be in such an uproar, with smoke billowing to the sky. That is because people fear war, fear America making trouble everywhere. Of all the many countries in the world, apart from Syngman Rhee alone, there is not yet a second country supporting America. Perhaps add the Philippines, which offers what is called "conditional support." Take the Iraqi revolution, for example: wasn't that brought about by a tense situation? Tense situations do not depend on us; they are created by the imperialists themselves, but in the final analysis they are more unfavourable to the imperialists. Lenin expressed this viewpoint. He was speaking of war; he said that war mobilizes people's spirits and makes them tense. Of course there is no war now, but this kind of tense situation under armed confrontation can also mobilize all positive factors and make the backward strata think things over.

Point four: the question of troop withdrawal from the Middle East. The American and British aggressor troops must withdraw. The imperialists now want to hang on there and not leave. This is unfavourable to the people, but at the same time it also serves to educate the people. If you want to oppose the aggressor but have no object, no target, no opposite, then it is hard to oppose. Now it has come forward itself to serve as the opposite and hangs on without leaving, and that has served to mobilize the people of the whole world to rise against the American aggressors. So its delay in withdrawing, taken as a whole, is not necessarily purely harmful to the people with no benefit, because this way the people can urge it to go every day: why don't you leave?

Point five: is it better for de Gaulle to come to power or not? Right now the French Communist Party and the French people should resolutely oppose de Gaulle coming to power and vote against his constitution, but at the same time they should prepare for the struggle after he takes power, in case they cannot stop him. If de Gaulle comes to power he will oppress the French Communists and the French people, but there are also advantages, both domestically and externally. Externally, this man likes to be at odds with Britain and America; he likes to argue with them. He suffered at their hands in the past; he wrote a memoir in which he does nothing but curse Britain and America and speak well of the Soviet Union. As it looks now, he is still going to be at odds with them. France being at odds with Britain and America is very beneficial. Domestically, he is an indispensable teacher for educating the French proletariat, just like our Generalissimo Chiang in China. Without Generalissimo Chiang, there would have been no way to educate six hundred million people; positive education by the Communist Party alone would not have done it. De Gaulle still has prestige now. If you defeat him at this point, he isn't dead, and people will still long for him. Let him come to power; at most he will last five, six, seven, eight, ten years, and he is bound to collapse. Once he collapses there will be no second de Gaulle; the poison will have been let out. This poison must be let out, just like the poison of our rightists; you have to let them let it out. If you don't let them let it out, they will always be poisonous; once it's let out, the poison dissipates.

Point six: the embargo, the refusal to do business with us. How exactly does this thing affect our interests? As I see it, the embargo is extremely beneficial to us; we do not feel the embargo is any disadvantage. The embargo is of enormous benefit to our food, clothing, housing and transport, and to construction (making steel and iron). Once there's an embargo, we have to find our own way. I have always been grateful to He Yingqin. In 1937 the Red Army was reorganized into the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army and received 400,000 yuan in fabi every month; once he began issuing the fabi, we depended on it. By 1940, during the anti-communist upsurge, it was cut off; it stopped coming. From then on we had to find our own way. What way? We issued an order saying the fabi is gone, you must make your own arrangements with the regiment as the unit. From then on, every base area launched a production movement, and the value produced was not 400,000 yuan, not 4 million yuan, not even 40 million yuan; all the base areas together produced perhaps 100 or 200 million. From then on we relied on our own hands. Who is the "He Yingqin" of today? It is Dulles, under a different name. Now they impose an embargo, so we do it ourselves, we make a Great Leap Forward, we get rid of dependence, we smash superstition, and that is good.

Point seven: the question of non-recognition. Is recognition more advantageous or non-recognition? I say it is the same as the embargo: the imperialist countries not recognizing us is somewhat more advantageous to us than their recognizing us. There are still forty-some countries that do not recognize us, and the main reason lies with America. France, for example, wants to recognize us, but doesn't dare because America opposes it. There are also some countries in Central and South America, Asia, Africa and Europe, as well as Canada, that don't dare to recognize us because of America. The capitalist countries that recognize us now number only nineteen altogether; add the eleven of the socialist camp and that makes thirty; add Yugoslavia and that makes thirty-one. I say let's just get by with this many. Their not recognizing us is, I think, not bad, rather good; it lets us make more steel, make six or seven hundred million tons, and by then they will surely have to recognize us. Even then they can go on not recognizing us; what does it matter if they don't?

The last point is to prepare for a war against aggression. Point one said both sides are afraid of fighting and war will not break out, but in worldly affairs we still need a safety factor. Because there is a monopoly bourgeoisie in the world, and we fear they might act rashly and recklessly, we must prepare for war. This point must be made clear among the cadres. First, we do not want to fight, and we oppose fighting, and so does the Soviet Union. If there is to be fighting, it will be they who strike first, forcing us to fight. Second, but we are not afraid of fighting; if there's to be a fight, then we fight. Right now we have only hand grenades and potatoes. A war with hydrogen bombs and atomic bombs is of course terrifying; people will die, and that is why we oppose war. But the power of decision is not in our hands. If the imperialists insist on fighting, then we must prepare everything; if there's to be a fight, we fight. That is to say, even if half the people die, there is nothing to be afraid of. That is putting it at the extreme. In terms of the whole history of the universe, I just don't believe one need be so pessimistic. I debated this question with Prime Minister Nehru. He said that at that point there would be no governments left; everything would be wiped out, and even if you wanted to make peace you couldn't find a government. I said, how could that be? If your government is wiped out by atomic bombs, the common people will set up another government, and peace can still be negotiated. In worldly affairs, if you don't think things through to the extreme, you can't sleep. It's nothing more than people being killed, nothing more than fear of fighting. But if it insists on fighting, it strikes first, it drops atomic bombs, then at that point, whether you are afraid or not, it will fight anyway. Since it will fight whether we are afraid or not, which of the two do we choose? Is it better to be afraid or better not to be afraid? To be afraid every day, without rousing some spirit among the cadres and the people, is very dangerous. I think we'd better steel our hearts: if there's to be a fight, we fight, and after the fight we rebuild. That is why we are now organizing militia; every people's commune is organizing militia, everyone a soldier. Guns are to be issued, several million at first and tens of millions later, with each province making light weapons: rifles, machine guns, hand grenades, small mortars, light mortars. The people's communes have military departments, and there is drilling everywhere. There are cultural people present here; you too should issue a call. Holding only the pen won't do; hold the pen in one hand and the gun in the other, being both cultured and martial.

There are these eight viewpoints, to be taken as a view, for all of you to use when observing the international situation.

II

Let me again talk about old things. About the noose, didn't we talk about it last time? Now we want to talk about using the noose on Dulles, Eisenhower and those warmongers. There are many places where the noose can be used on America. As I see it, wherever it has set up military bases, it is caught in a noose. For example: in the East, South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan; in the West, West Germany, France, Italy, Britain; in the Middle East, Turkey, Iran; in Africa, Morocco, and so on. In each place America has many military bases; Turkey, for example, has twenty-some bases, and Japan, I hear, has eight hundred. And there are places without bases but with troops in occupation, such as America in Lebanon and Britain in Jordan.

Now let me not speak of anything else, just two nooses: one is Lebanon, the other is Taiwan. Taiwan is an old noose; America has occupied it for several years now. Who has caught it? It has been caught by the People's Republic of China. Six hundred million people hold a rope in their hands, and this rope is a steel cable that has looped around America's neck. Who let it be caught? It made the rope itself, put its own neck in it, and then threw one end of the noose onto the Chinese mainland for us to grab. Lebanon was caught recently; it too is a noose America made itself and put on itself, and one end of the noose was thrown into the hands of the Arab nation. Not only that, it was thrown into the hands of the great majority of the world's people. Everyone curses it, no one sympathizes with it; the people and governments of most countries hold this noose in their hands. On the Middle East question, for example, the United Nations held a meeting. But mainly it is caught in the hands of the Arab people and cannot get free. Now it is in a dilemma: is it better to withdraw early or withdraw late? If it withdraws early, then what did it come for? If it withdraws late, the noose gets tighter and tighter and may become a dead knot; then what will it do? As for Taiwan, it signed a treaty, which is different again from Lebanon. Lebanon is still relatively loose; there is no treaty; one side invited and the other came, and so it got caught. As for Taiwan, a treaty was signed, and that is a dead knot. Here there is no distinction between Democrats and Republicans: it was Eisenhower who signed the treaty, and Truman who sent the Seventh Fleet. In Truman's time it could come or go; no treaty had been signed. Eisenhower signed a treaty. This too was a case of the Kuomintang panicking and making a request, America being willing, and so it got caught.

Are Jinmen and Mazu caught too? As I see it, Jinmen and Mazu are caught as well. Why? Don't they say that nothing has been decided yet, that they'll wait until the Communists attack and then decide according to the situation? The issue is the 110,000 Kuomintang troops, 95,000 on Jinmen and 15,000 on Mazu; so long as these two piles are there, they have to care. This is their class interest, their class feeling. Why are the British and Americans so good to the governments of certain countries? They cannot stand by and watch them die without helping. Yesterday the commander of the Seventh Fleet, Beakley, was personally directing operations, and wasn't that Smoot also sounding off? That gentleman who displeased both the State Department and the Defense Department was there too, directing alongside Beakley.

All in all, you are caught. You can get free if you like, but you must take the initiative and extricate yourself slowly. Isn't there a disengagement policy? There was a disengagement policy in Korea, and now, as I see it, a disengagement policy for Jinmen and Mazu has taken shape. Your crowd really wants to disengage, and public opinion is also demanding disengagement. To disengage means to get out of the noose. How to get out? That is, these 110,000 men leave. Taiwan is ours; on that there can be no concession whatever; it is a domestic question. Negotiations with you are an international question. These are two separate matters. You, America, are bound up with Chiang Kai-shek, but this compound can be broken down. Take electrolytic aluminium and electrolytic copper, for example: run a current through and don't they separate? Chiang Kai-shek's side is a domestic question; your side is a foreign affairs question; they cannot be lumped together.

Now, of the five continents, apart from Australia, America wants to dominate four. First North America, which is mainly its own territory, where it has troops; then Central and South America, where although it has no troops stationed, it wants to "protect" them. Add to that Europe, Africa and Asia, mainly Europe, Asia and Africa, with the main force in Europe and Asia. With so few soldiers spread so thin, I don't know how it is going to fight this war. So I always feel that its main aim is to dominate the intermediate zone. As for our areas, unless the socialist camp falls into great chaos and it is truly certain that once it comes, we, the Soviet Union and China, will collapse completely, otherwise I think it won't dare come. Apart from our camp, it wants to dominate everywhere: Latin America, Europe, Africa, Asia. And there is Australia, which is also tied to it by military treaty and follows its orders. Is it better for it to win these places under the banner of "anti-communism," or to really fight communism? Really fighting communism means bringing troops to attack us, to attack the Soviet Union. I say there is no one that stupid. It has only a few soldiers that it shifts back and forth. When the Lebanon affair happened, it moved them from the Pacific; when they reached the Red Sea area, the situation was not right, so they hurriedly turned back and landed in Malaya, supposedly to rest for a few days, and for seventeen days they didn't make a sound. Afterwards one of its own journalists announced that they were in charge of the Indian Ocean, and with that everyone around the Indian Ocean objected. As soon as we started shelling here, there weren't enough troops here, so it came again. Getting free of Taiwan and these places earlier would be more advantageous for America. If it hangs on and won't leave, then let it stay caught here; it does no harm to the overall situation, and we will go on with the Great Leap Forward.

As for the tense situation, perhaps a few more words can be said. You create a tense situation; do you think it benefits you? Not necessarily. A tense situation mobilizes the hearts of the world, and everyone curses the Americans. In the tense situation in the Middle East, everyone cursed the Americans. In the tense situation over Taiwan, again everyone is cursing the Americans, and relatively few are cursing us. The Americans curse us, Chiang Kai-shek curses us, Syngman Rhee curses us, and perhaps a few others curse us, but mainly it is these three. Britain is a waverer; militarily it is not taking part, and politically, I hear, it is fairly sympathetic. Because it has a Jordan problem, it has to show a bit of sympathy; if the Americans withdraw from Lebanon, what will Britain do in Jordan? Prime Minister Nehru issued a statement that is basically in agreement with us, endorsing Taiwan and these places belonging to us, but hoping for a peaceful settlement. This time the countries of the Middle East are really welcoming it, especially the UAR and Iraq, which sing its praises every day, saying this action of ours is good. Because with what we are doing, American pressure on them is lightened.

I think we can tell the people of the world openly that tense situations are relatively unfavourable to the Western countries, unfavourable to America. Where is the benefit for them? What benefit does the tense situation in the Middle East bring America? What benefit does it bring Britain? It is rather more beneficial to the Arab countries, more beneficial to the peace-loving people of Asia, Africa, Latin America and the other continents. Who, after all, benefits more from the tense situation over Taiwan? Take our country, for example: our whole country is now mobilized. If we say that the Middle East affair had thirty or forty million people marching, demonstrating and holding meetings, this time it is probably three hundred million people, giving them education and tempering. This is also good for the unity of the democratic parties, isn't it? All the parties have a common goal to struggle for, and so those who in the past had some knots in their hearts, some resentment, who were criticized, will find it dissipating somewhat. If we carry on like this, little by little, one way and another, won't we all simply become the working class? So the tense situation created by the imperialists themselves turns out instead to benefit us, the several hundred million people who oppose imperialism, and, as I see it, it benefits the peace-loving people of the whole world, all classes, all strata, and governments. They have to think it over: America is always bad, baring its fangs and brandishing its claws. Of its thirteen aircraft carriers, six have come, including some as big as that, sixty-five thousand tons or something, and they say they will put together a hundred and twenty ships, the first and strongest fleet. Be a bit stronger still, that's fine too; if you concentrate all four of your fleets here, I welcome it. That stuff of yours is useless anyway. Concentrate it all here, and you still can't come ashore. The peculiarity of ships is that they stay in the water and cannot go on land. All you are doing is putting on a display here. The more you fight, the more the whole world will know that you are in the wrong.