Speech at the Wuchang Conference

China Mao Zedong · Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

21 November 1958 · Wuchang Conference · Wuhan, China

Context
Mao addressed Party leaders at the Wuchang Conference on November 21 and 23, 1958, urging caution on the transition to communism, a lower 1959 steel target of 18 million tons, and consolidation of the people's communes.
Main themes
Timing of the transition to communism, Soviet Union entering communism before China, 1959 steel target of 18 million tons, planned and proportionate development, fake reporting of output, people's communes consolidation, elimination of classes, commodity production under socialism, water conservancy workload and deaths, breaking down superstition without breaking science
Duration
~78 min
97th percentile
Words
9,374
97th percentile
Sentences
643
99th percentile
Readability
68
96th percentile
Grade
7.4
2nd percentile
Syntax
2.67
11th percentile
Vocabulary
2.04
17th percentile

Translated from Chinese Source: GitHub qinglee/maoxuan (毛泽东选集) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 41%40%
  • Institutional 33%32%
  • Social 13%13%
  • Geopolitical 9%9%
  • Ceremonial 3%2%
  • Environmental 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Not in focus 2%

643 sentences in 40 paragraphs

21 November 1958

If People Die, You Can't Cut Off My Head

I can't sleep; something is on my mind. Doubling output, as the first set of accounts. I will raise a few topics and ask everyone to study them. You are writing articles; I have some ideas of my own.

(1) The transition to communism: how do you see it? There are two methods. We may be able to go somewhat faster; it looks as though our mass line is a good method. With so many people, anything can be done. Khrushchev's report outline was printed in the People's Daily on 15 November; I hope you will read it. Read it carefully and discuss it. The article isn't long, and it reads well. They have already had forty-one years, and now he wants another seven years plus five, twelve years in all. Judging by his meaning, he is preparing for the transition, but he speaks only of preparation, not of the transition itself. He is very cautious. We Chinese, myself included, are probably rash fellows. Khrushchev is very cautious. He already has 55 million tons of steel and over 100 million tons of oil, and even so he is that cautious and still wants twelve years to prepare for the transition. They have their difficulties, and we have our strengths. Their bourgeois hierarchy is deeply rooted; the living standards of superiors and subordinates are worlds apart, like cat and mouse. We send cadres down; cadres from the Centre downward all take part in labour, and generals serve as ordinary soldiers. They lack this one thing, the mass line, that is, they lack politics. So they go relatively slowly. And there are several differences, between workers and peasants, between town and country, between mental and manual labour, which they have not set about eliminating. But they are cautious. Before the people of the whole world, and speaking of the socialist camp as a whole, my idea is that the Soviet Union must make the transition first (this is not an order), and that we must in any case make the transition after them, no matter how much steel we produce. Do you all think this is right? Perhaps we will have a bit more steel, because we have more people and we also have the mass line; in ten years we could produce several hundred million tons of steel. He doubles in seven years: 55 million tons doubled is 110 million tons, yet he speaks only of 91 million tons, leaving some leeway. Think it over: is this right?

As for revolution, in Marx's day it did not succeed; Lenin succeeded and accomplished the October Revolution. The Soviet Union has been at it for forty-one years already, and only after another twelve years will it make the transition. If it falls behind us, and they are already getting flustered now. They have no people's communes; they can't get going, and if we rush ahead of them, the Soviet Union loses face, and the proletariat of the whole world loses face too. What is to be done? I think we have to push them across; the situation is pressing, push them to make the transition faster; without this kind of situation it won't work. You go across in the first half of the year, I go across in the second half; you go across and I go across too, at most three years later than them, but we must definitely let them go first. Otherwise it is bad for the world proletariat, bad for the Soviet Union, and bad for us too. In the present domestic situation, we have at least several hundred thousand, up to a million, cadres who want to get there first; they all want to go as fast as possible, and they pay too little attention to the overall picture. They see only several hundred million people and fail to see 2.7 billion. We are only a part (600 million people); the whole world is the whole. Is there such a problem or not? Should it be considered or not? This question involves a whole series of issues: our way of thinking, drawing up plans, learning from and respecting the Soviet Union, removing estrangement. Their economic foundation is better than ours; our political foundation, in turn, is better than theirs. They have 200 million people, 55 million tons of copper, 100 million tons of oil, technology that advanced, millions of technical personnel, the whole population educated to middle-school level. Their capital is large; America can't compare with them.

We are now a family come down in the world, "poor and blank", and also poor and weak. As for our poverty, the average income per head nationwide is under 80 yuan, probably between 60 and 80 yuan; workers nationwide average 60 yuan a month (including dependants). How much do peasants actually have? Henan says 74 yuan; is it that much? Workers are paid by the month, peasants by the year. Over 500 million people with an average annual income of under 80 yuan: desperately poor. When we say we are strong and great, there is still no basis for it. We are bragging far too much now; it doesn't accord with the facts. I think it doesn't reflect objective reality. The Soviet Union has had forty-one years; we have had only nine. We have no experience in building socialism. I think that in making the transition to communism we must let the Soviet Union go first and go after them. Is this opportunism? They will have only 100 million tons of steel in twelve years, and we can't go first either, there are reasons for that too. In ten years we will have 400 million tons of steel, 1.6 million machine tools, 2.5 billion tons of coal, 300 million tons of oil. Our country has the "number one field under heaven"; by that time, there will be the number one country under heaven on this earth. Whether we can achieve it is another question. About the material from the Zhengzhou Conference, I am both pleased and doubtful. Is producing 400 million tons of steel a good thing? Producing 4 billion tons would be even better. The question is: is there a need? Is it possible? As of the statistics up to 17 November this year, we have produced only 8.9 million tons of steel, and 60 million people have already been mobilised. How many people would you need, do you suppose, to produce 400 million tons? Of course conditions differ: Anshan Steel now has 100,000 people and produced 4 million tons. It is better to let the Soviet Union go first, so as to avoid putting ourselves in the limelight. I am worried that our construction has a bit of the white poplar about it; there is a kind of tower poplar that grows very fast but isn't sturdy. Shooting up too fast, out of balance, could throw everything under heaven into great chaos. I keep worrying: whatever about the line being correct or not, if everything under heaven is in great chaos, are you still going to say you're correct?

(2) Planned and proportionate development: if iron and steel go up, does everything go up? The sixty-four rare metals all need to be in proportion. What is meant by proportion? Right now none of us knows what proportion means. I certainly don't; you may be a bit cleverer. What planned and proportionate development is, we have to grope our way towards slowly. Engels said we must understand objective laws, master them, and apply them skilfully. I think Stalin's understanding was incomplete, his application was inflexible, and as for skilful application, that was even worse. He wasn't quite correct about industry and agriculture, or light and heavy industry. Heavy industry was too heavy, the long leg; agriculture was the short leg, an Iron-Crutch Li. Now Khrushchev shows signs of walking on two legs. We have now groped our way to a bit of proportion: walking on two legs, the three simultaneous developments, heavy industry, light industry and agriculture. Following the three simultaneous developments is walking on two legs; there are several proportions. Large, medium and small is also a proportion; things in the world always come in large, medium and small. I have read the twelve reports now; most are well written, and some are especially good. Combining colloquial language with scientific terminology is also a combination of the native and the foreign. In the past I often said that articles on economic science were badly written: you yourself could understand them, others couldn't. I hope everyone will read them all once. We have so many days; if each person reads one at a time, they're easy to get through. It seems we have a bit of proportion. The three simultaneous developments have a key point, with heavy industry as the key link, but truly mastering objective laws and applying them skilfully still poses problems.

We have shortcomings too. The Beidaihe Conference spoke of three or four years, or five or six years, or a little longer, to achieve ownership by the whole people. Fortunately, the transition to communism still has five conditions: 1. an extreme abundance of products; 2. a rise in communist ideological consciousness and morality; 3. the spread and raising of culture and education; 4. the elimination of the three differences and of the remnants of bourgeois rights; 5. the gradual withering away of the state's functions other than its external functions. As for the three differences and the elimination of bourgeois rights, it can't be done without ten or twenty years. I'm not in a hurry; it's the young people who are in a hurry. If the three conditions are not complete, it's merely socialism, nothing more. Please everyone think about this question. This doesn't mean we should dawdle. "More, faster, better, more economically" is something objective; go fast where you can go fast, but don't force it. The Tu-104 aircraft flies at over ten thousand metres; our planes fly at only a few thousand metres. Old Ke travels by train, even slower, and walking is slower still. Speed is an objective law. This year's grain at 900 billion jin, I don't believe it. 740 billion jin, a doubling, is possible, and I would be very satisfied with that. I don't believe in 800 billion jin, 900 billion jin, a trillion jin.

As for this question of the forty articles, if it gets out it will be very bad. You're going for so much, and how much is the Soviet Union going for? This is called chasing an empty reputation and suffering real calamity. You won't even get the empty reputation; nobody will believe it; they'll say the Chinese are bragging. As for suffering real calamity, the Americans might drop atomic bombs and throw you into chaos. Of course, not necessarily. In future, one, it won't be possible; two, it won't be needed. Wouldn't that be the same as bringing ourselves down? I think we'd better be a bit cautious. Some people collude with foreign countries; if they go and report to an embassy, the Soviet Union will be the first to get a fright. What then? A bit more grain doesn't matter, but ten thousand jin per person isn't good either. It would become a disaster; it would just mean not farming for three years. Eat it all up and then plant again. I've heard that some girls say they won't marry unless yields reach 80,000 jin per mu. I think they want to stay single and are using this as a shield. According to Boda's investigation, they still want to get married. 80,000 jin is impossible. That is the second question. What exactly is best? Let it sit for two or three years before deciding; either way, it does no harm. We said before that we wouldn't do long-range plans, since we're not sure of them, only annual plans; but it is still necessary for a few people to have a figure in their heads. For the forty-article programme there are two approaches. One is to deliberate on it seriously and discuss and adopt it as a draft at the plenum. The other is not to discuss it at all, not to adopt it, just to give an explanation, stating that the figures from the Zhengzhou Conference are not certain but have a positive significance.

(3) The tasks of this meeting. One is the people's communes. One is the arrangement of next year's plan (especially the arrangement for the first quarter). Of course we can also do some other things, such as the "two decentralisations, three unifications, one contract" in finance and trade work, and so on.

(4) The question of drawing the line. Should a line be drawn? How should it be drawn? The Zhengzhou Conference had five criteria. Shanxi has objections. The completion of socialism finds its concentrated expression in ownership by the whole people; this is inconsistent with what Stalin announced in 1936. What does completing ownership by the whole people mean? What does completing the building of socialism mean? In his two reports of 1936 and 1938 (the former the report on the Constitution, the latter the report to the Eighteenth Congress), Stalin put forward two markers: one, the elimination of classes; the other, industry already accounting for 70 per cent. But the Soviet Union went on for twenty years, and now Khrushchev adds another twelve years, which means thirty-two years before the transition can be made, and only then can collective ownership and ownership by the whole people be merged into one. On this question we won't do as they did. We speak of five criteria. We don't say that industry accounting for 70 per cent counts as completion. By this year we've had nine years; another ten years makes nineteen years in all. Counting from 1921, by 1938 the Soviet Union had had eighteen years in all and had only 18 million tons of steel. By 1968 we too will have had eighteen years; the time is about the same, and we will certainly have more. Next year we'll exceed 18 million tons of steel. For us, completing the building of socialism takes the merging of ownership into one as the criterion: everything under ownership by the whole people. Having completed ownership by the whole people is our first criterion. By this criterion, the Soviet Union hasn't completed the building of socialism. It still has two forms of ownership. That creates a problem. People all over the world will ask: has the Soviet Union still not completed the building of socialism? (Zeng Xisheng interjected: This point won't be made public.) Even if it isn't made public, it will get out. Another way is not to say it like this. As at the Beidaihe Conference, speak only of a few conditions and don't say when it will be completed; that may give us more initiative. The Beidaihe document had one shortcoming: the time frame was a bit too fast. It was influenced by Henan. I thought three or four years at least in the north and five or six years at most in the south, but it can't be done, it has to be changed. The Soviet standard of living is still higher than ours, and they haven't made the transition yet. A professor from Peking University went to have a look at Xushui and said, "A one-yuan communism? I'm damned if I'll go along with it." In Xushui wages are no more than two or three yuan. Ten years of the one-third system: allocating one third each year means one third is ownership by the whole people. Of course there is another third for accumulation, and there is still what the peasants consume themselves, so it's nearly ownership by the whole people. Right now we're eating the rice of poverty, all these public canteens. Right now it's just too fast: three or four years at least, five or six at most. I'm a bit alarmed; I'm afraid of making the mistake of adventurism.

(Liu Shaoqi: Once a consumption level of 150 to 200 yuan is reached, one batch can make the switch; later, switch in batches. That's advantageous. Otherwise, if we wait until it's even higher, there will be more difficulties in switching, which would actually be disadvantageous.)

(Peng Zhen: We carried out land reform, then big cooperatives, then communes. As soon as we reach 150 to 200 yuan per person, the transition can be made. If it's too much, as in Romania, where the peasants earn more than the workers, it becomes hard to switch. Keep the "three -izations" down, strike while the iron is hot; switching early is better than switching late. The transition can be made in three or four years.)

According to the views of Shaoqi and Peng Zhen, the transition is to be made by taking advantage of poverty. Making the transition while poor may be somewhat advantageous; otherwise, it will be hard to make the transition. In short, the line must be drawn; as to how to draw it, please discuss it among yourselves and work out several criteria, which must be higher than the Soviet Union's.

(5) The question of eliminating classes. The question of eliminating classes merits consideration. In the Soviet version, it was announced in 1936 that classes had been eliminated in sixteen years. We may manage it in sixteen years; this year is nine, leaving seven, but don't commit to it. Eliminating classes is of two kinds. One is classes as economic exploiters, which are easy to eliminate; now we can say they have already been eliminated. The other is classes in a political and ideological sense (landlords, rich peasants, the bourgeoisie, including their intellectuals), which are not easy to eliminate and have not yet been eliminated; we only discovered this in last year's rectification. In a comment I wrote in 1956, there was one sentence saying, "The socialist revolution is basically complete; the question of ownership has basically been resolved." Looking at it now, that was inappropriate. Afterwards the Zhang-Luo alliance popped up. Landlords in the countryside liked reading Wenhui Bao; as soon as Wenhui Bao arrived, they spread rumours. "Landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries and bad elements" seized the opportunity to rise up. That's why the Qingdao meeting began arresting and began killing. Hunan struggled against 100,000, arrested 10,000 and killed 1,000; the other provinces were the same, and the problem was solved. Those landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries and bad elements do not exploit economically, but as a class in the political and ideological sense, landlords and bourgeoisie of the Zhang Bojun crowd still exist. When the people's communes were set up, intellectuals and professors were the most concerned of all, living in a constant state of anxiety. In Beijing there was a woman professor who, in the middle of the night, had a dream: the people's commune was established and her child went into a nursery. She cried her heart out, and only when she woke up did she realise it was a dream. That's no simple matter.

Stalin announced the elimination of classes in 1936; why then were so many people killed in 1937, with spies everywhere? I think it's best to leave this question of eliminating classes hanging and not rush to announce it. When exactly would it be advantageous to announce the elimination of classes? If we announce they've been eliminated, so that landlords are all peasants and capitalists are all workers, is that advantageous or not? The bourgeoisie are allowed to join the people's communes, but they must still wear the bourgeois label, and fixed interest won't be abolished. In view of Stalin announcing too early, we shouldn't rush to announce the elimination of classes; we can only announce it once there's basically no harm left, I'm afraid. Among Soviet intellectuals, have classes been eliminated so cleanly? Not necessarily, I think. Recently a Soviet writer wrote a novel that caused a small anti-Soviet movement around the world; the Hong Kong papers trumpeted it, and Eisenhower said, "If this writer comes, I'll receive him." There are still bourgeois among their writers, and so many university graduates still believe in religion and become priests. I'm afraid they had no experience before; we have experience, and should be a bit more cautious.

(6) Questions of economic theory. Should we have commodities or not? What does the scope of commodities include? At Zhengzhou it was limited to means of subsistence, plus some of the communes' means of production. This is Stalin's view; Stalin advocated not selling means of production to the collective farms. Our country has also declared the land state-owned. The machinery for mechanisation they make themselves; what the peasants can't make, we supply. There's news now that the third edition of the Soviet political economy textbook has expanded the scope of commodities: not only means of subsistence but also means of production. This question can be studied. There's one point in Stalin that doesn't make sense: agricultural products are commodities, industrial products are non-commodities; one a commodity, one a non-commodity (the products of state industry), and the two are exchanged (cloth exchanged for collective-farm grain). How can that make sense? I think the present formulation is better: means of production. In the final analysis, means of production are for making means of subsistence (including clothing, food, housing and transport, culture and entertainment, the erhu and flutes for opera singers, the "four treasures of the study", and so on). For a time, people seemed to think the fewer commodities the better, and the shorter the period the better, even doing away with them in two or three years. That is problematic. I think it's better to keep commodities for longer; if not a hundred years, then thirty years, or fifteen years at the very least. What harm does this do? The question is what harm it does, whether it obstructs economic development. Of course, there will be a period when it does obstruct the development of production. Therefore, what's written about commodities in the forty articles is inappropriate; it still follows what Stalin wrote, and Stalin didn't get clear the relationship between means of subsistence produced by state enterprises and means of subsistence produced by collective farms. Please discuss this, it's the third edition of the political economy; nothing else has been greatly changed. So Stalin's things can only be partly overturned, not entirely thrown out, because he is science; overturning him entirely is no good. Who was the first to write a socialist political economy? It was still Stalin. Of course that book has some shortcomings and errors in it, for example the third letter: in order to keep the peasants on a leash, machines weren't sold to the collective farms. It was written down that they have the right of use but no right of ownership. This is distrust of the peasants. We give them to the cooperatives.

I asked Comrade Yudin: the collective farms have trucks, small factories, work implements; why not give them tractors? People like us, myself included, in the past paid no attention to any socialist political economy and didn't read the books. Now hundreds of thousands of people across the country are arguing back and forth: ten people, ten views; a hundred people, a hundred views. We still have to read books. Those who haven't read them should read them, and those who have should read them again. We should also read the political economy textbook. Have you read it? Everyone will be issued a set of the textbook. Read the socialist part first. Didn't we want to discuss principles?

(7) Will this pour cold water? We want people to eat their fill and sleep well, especially when they are going all out, fighting hard for several days and nights, and getting the job done. Except in special cases, they must still get some sleep. Now we need to lighten the tasks. For water conservancy, last winter and this spring the whole country moved 50 billion cubic metres of earth and stone, and this winter and next spring the whole country is to move 190 billion cubic metres, more than three times as much. On top of that there are all sorts of tasks: iron and steel, copper, aluminium, coal, transport, processing industries, chemical industry, all needing a great many people. Going about it this way, I think, China will inevitably have half its people die; if not half, then a third or a tenth, 50 million dead. People died in Guangxi; wasn't Chen Manyuan dismissed? If 50 million die, even if you aren't dismissed, at the very least I should be dismissed, and my head would be in question too. Anhui wants to do that much. You can do more, but on the principle of not letting people die. More than 190 billion cubic metres of earth and stone is too much after all. Discuss it among yourselves. If you insist on doing it, there's nothing I can do, but if people die, you can't cut off my head. Add a bit more than last year, do 60 or 70 billion, not too much. There's an item on this in the document; I hope you'll discuss it. Besides that, if there are other tasks that are really crushing people so they can't breathe, you can also consider lightening them. Tasks must be increased, but not by too much. We must consider things from the opposite side too. Doubling is fine; increasing dozens of times over requires consideration. 30 million tons of steel: do we really need that much? Can we achieve it? How many people need to be mobilised? Will people die? Even though you say you'll build up key points (steel, coal), how many months will it take to get them done? Hebei says half a year, and that has to include ironmaking, coal, transport, steel rolling and so on. This needs discussing. This year has had two sides. China has had several lots of 60 million people, and several million tons of native iron and native steel, of which only 40 per cent is good. Should we honestly just double next year? This year 10.7 million tons, next year 21.4 million tons. Do 10,000 tons more: next year produce 21.41 million tons. I still think we should be a bit steadier. Water conservancy stays at 50 billion cubic metres of earth and stone, not doubled at all. Do that for ten years and won't it be 500 billion? I say leave a bit for our sons to do; how could we finish everything ourselves?

In addition, there is the arrangement of all the various kinds of work: coal, electricity, chemicals, forestry, building materials, textiles, papermaking. At this meeting we should sing in a low key and compress the atmosphere a bit. Do the first half of next year; if we have strength to spare and things go smoothly, then we can get a bit ambitious again and add a bit more on 1 July. Don't be like playing the huqin at an opera, with the string drawn so tight it's in danger of snapping. This may have a bit of a cold-water flavour. Cadres down below running communes won't want to hear some of it; at most they'll curse us as right-deviationist. Don't be afraid; brace yourselves and let those below curse. Doubling: since Pangu split heaven and earth, the whole world has never seen it. What right deviation is there in that?!

How high should the agricultural targets be? The Beidaihe Conference material still needs discussing. You call it right opportunism? I'm doubling, aren't I! Machine tools: 80,000 units, next year increased sixteenfold to 320,000 units. Are we really that formidable? At the time of the Beidaihe Conference we still had no experience in running industry. After two months, steel and transport are jammed solid everywhere; now we have a fair amount of experience. It's always best to have a real possibility. There are two kinds of real possibility: one is realistic possibility, the other is unrealistic possibility. For example, making satellites now is unrealistic, but in future it may become realistic. There are two kinds of possibility, aren't there? (Turning to Comrade Chen Boda.) Comrade Boda! A possibility that can be transformed into reality is a realistic possibility; the other kind is a possibility that can't be transformed into reality, like the dogmatism of the past that claimed to be one hundred per cent correct. Didn't we lose all our territory? I think "not marrying unless yields reach 80,000 jin per mu" is also an unrealistic possibility.

(8) The people's communes must be consolidated for four months: December, January, February, March. We should set up an inspection team of ten thousand people, mainly to see whether people sleep eight hours a day; if they sleep only seven hours, they've failed to fulfil the task. I have never fulfilled the task; you can inspect me too and put up big-character posters. How are the canteens? There should be a set of regulations. The people's communes need discussing; we should draw up a directive. Can they be consolidated in four months? Is that too little? Six months are needed. According to Hubei now, 7 or 8 per cent of the communes are doing relatively well. I'm a sceptic. I think if one commune in ten is truly done well, that counts as success. Provincial (municipal) and prefectural committees should concentrate their efforts on helping one commune get it right, over four months; by then we must set up the ten-thousand-strong inspection team, otherwise there's a danger of the country perishing. Dulles and Chiang Kai-shek both curse us for setting up the people's communes. They both say: if you don't set up communes, you won't perish; if you do, you'll perish. I don't think you can say there's not a grain of truth in that. There are always two possibilities: one, perishing; the other, not perishing. Of course, if we perish, we'll rise again; it would be a temporary perishing. The canteens could perish, the nurseries could perish too. There's a canteen in Gucheng County, Hubei Province, that's exactly like that. A batch of nurseries will certainly perish; as soon as a few children die, the parents will definitely take theirs back home. In Henan there was a Home of Happiness where 30 per cent died and the rest all ran away. I'd run away too. How could it not collapse? Since nurseries and Homes of Happiness can collapse, can't the people's communes collapse? I think everything has two possibilities: collapse and not collapse. Cooperatives collapsed before, in Henan and in Zhejiang. I just don't believe that in a province as big as your Sichuan not a single cooperative collapsed. It's simply that it wasn't reported.

I'm raising questions. Putting the topics forward for discussion is the better way. Every comrade can raise questions. These days, these questions are in my head, always like fifteen buckets drawing water, seven up and eight down: which method is actually better? For instance, for steel, is it better to have 30 million tons or 21.4 million tons?

This meeting is a meeting to sum up this year. It's already December, after all. Arrange next year, mainly the first quarter.

23 November 1958

Spanking My Backside Has Nothing to Do With You

(1) Starting with writing articles. Comrades from twelve central ministries have written twelve reports; these need to be discussed and somewhat revised. The articles are well written; I was very pleased reading them. The line is still the same line, the spirit is still the same spirit; it's just that the targets proposed and their grounds need to be studied in earnest. Some of the targets put forward in the reports have insufficient grounds; they speak only of possibility and not of grounds. Each ministry needs to supply the grounds. For instance, they say reaching 400 million tons of steel in ten years is possible, but why it is possible isn't adequately explained. It needs to be made more solid. All members of the Central Committee should read them, and they can also be sent to the Party secretaries and directors of the eighteen key enterprises, so they all read them and gain an overall perspective. Some articles, once revised, could even be published in the newspapers so the people know; there's nothing secret about this. When I say compress the air, I don't mean reduce the air. Matter is indestructible; there's still as much air as before, it's just compressed a bit, into a liquid or solid state.

Reports must have adequate grounds. They should be made clearer, explaining when the hurdles can be cleared. For instance, the equipment at both ends of iron and steel, mining and rolling, hasn't cleared the hurdle. When exactly can it clear it? Next March, April, May? Why can it clear it then? Give reasons and grounds. Or again, why can't machinery sets be completed, when exactly can they be completed, and on what grounds? Discuss it with the second-in-command. Or again, on what grounds can the modern furnaces take native iron, and when and by what means will this be resolved? And what is to be done about the shortage of electricity? We've now found a way out: building our own self-supplied power plants. Factories, mines, government offices, schools and army units all build their own power stations, making use of water, fire, wind and methane, which has solved quite a few problems. This is something the Northeast came up with. Are other places adopting the same method? How much can it solve?

Should we discuss the twelve reports for another two or three days before setting about revising them? Supplying the grounds mainly requires that they be truly reliable. Revise the targets again.

(2) On the question of comrades from the provincial, municipal and autonomous-region Party committees writing reports. Comrades from the central ministries have written twelve reports. You comrades from the provincial and municipal committees, it won't do for you not to write a single one; we need to put on some pressure. Would one each be all right? Nobody says a word. Pushing this time might push people to death. How about each person writing one for next time, five or six thousand characters, or seven or eight thousand, one-sided or comprehensive, either is fine, but the first secretary must do it personally; even if he doesn't write it himself, he must use his brain and his mouth, revising and patching. Were the central ministries' reports written personally by the ministers? The next meeting will be held on 1 February next year. Send these articles in before 25 January so they can be reviewed and printed and distributed at the meeting, where they can be discussed and revised. Each province should hold a Party congress to sum things up. Too many questions won't do; with a hundred questions nobody will read it. Get rid of ninety-nine and write about a few questions or one question, ten at the very most. There must be points that stand out. People have their various systems, and local work also has many systems; so some things can be left out, some should be touched on in a few strokes, and some should be emphasised.

(3) Let's talk about tomorrow evening's question. Taking steel as the key link to drive everything else, what's the best figure for the steel target (1959)? The Beidaihe Conference set it at 27 to 30 million tons, which was for discussion; this time we must decide. 27 million tons of steel, I'm in favour; 30 million tons, I'm in favour too; even more would be good too. The question is whether it can be done and whether there are grounds. The Beidaihe Conference didn't settle this question because it wasn't ripe. Last year 5.35 million tons, all good steel. This year doubled to 10.7 million tons, an adventurous plan, with the result that 60 million people were mobilised and everything else had to give way; things got very tense. In a county in Hubei, a batch of pigs was transported to the Xiangyang prefecture; they couldn't be moved on, so they were left and the people went away. Xiangyang has a lot of local produce and iron that can't be shipped out, and the industrial goods the peasants need can't be shipped in. The steel marshal itself can't walk. The experience of the two or three months since the Beidaihe Conference has been very useful to us. Setting next year at 27 to 30 million tons will be hard to achieve. Could we use another method and lower the target? I propose that next year we don't double twice but only double once. Are we sure of producing 22 million tons? The night before last, Fuchun, Yibo, Wang Heshou and Zhao Erlu had already gone to sleep; I dragged these comrades out from under their quilts to say that the question isn't whether we're sure of 30 million tons but whether we're sure of 18 million tons. Last night I chatted about it with several comrades from the large regions and the Centre: are we really sure of 18 million tons? The grounds we've got are insufficient.

The grounds given now still don't convince me. I've already taken the opportunist position and am struggling for it. Spanking my backside has nothing to do with you. At worst, in future we'll have another saddle shape. In the past everyone opposed my rash advance; today I'm here opposing other people's rash advance. From last night's talk, it seems we're sure of 18 million tons; this can be reached by effort, and it isn't called rash advance. Next year we want 18 million tons of good steel. This year, of 11 million tons of steel, only 8.5 million are good. Doubling 8.5 million tons is 17 million tons. 18 million tons is more than double. Is saying this opportunism? If you say I'm an opportunist, Marx will defend me and say I'm not an opportunist; it only counts when he says so. And I say it's a Great Leap Forward; if it isn't a Great Leap Forward, I won't accept it. 18 million tons: I still feel the grounds are insufficient. Quite a few hurdles haven't been cleared. When you revise your articles, you must show when each hurdle will be cleared: the ore-dressing hurdle, the ore-washing hurdle, the crushing hurdle, the coal-washing hurdle, the smelting hurdle, the transport hurdle, the quality hurdle. Some can only clear the hurdle next January or February, or March, April, May, June. Now some places already have no stocks for the next night (coal, iron, ore). Because of transport difficulties, some factories can't even get meals delivered at present. That's taking steel as an example; it's the same in other sectors too. When exactly can certain hurdles be cleared? If we aren't sure, we'll have to push it down further. 15 million tons would also do. If we're sure, 18 million tons; if we're surer, 22 million tons; surer still, 25 million tons; 30 million tons, I'm in favour of it all. The question is whether we're sure. Yesterday the comrades favoured 18 million tons, which means we're sure of it. Last year the Northeast had about 3.5 million tons; this year's original target was 6 million tons and it achieved 5 million. Next year it plans only 7.15 million tons, and says that with effort it could manage 8 million tons. If we're talking opportunism, I'd say he's the opportunist. But in the Soviet Union he'd be in favour, because this year it's only 5 million tons and next year [eight] million tons, an increase of 60 per cent, more than half again; that's half an opportunist. North China had only 600,000 tons last year, 1.5 million tons this year, and plans 4 million tons next year. This year's increase is 1.7 times; that's Marxism-Leninism. Increasing to 4 million tons next year is several Marxisms. Can you do it? Tell us your grounds: why produce so much next year? East China last year 220,000 tons, this year 1.2 million tons (1.6 million tons including bad steel), next year 4 million tons, an increase of more than double. Shanghai is a true proletarian: first, no coal; second, no iron; only fifty thousand people. Central China last year 170,000 tons, this year 500,000 tons, next year 2 million tons, an increase of three times. This fellow originally had great boldness and planned to produce 3 million tons. As long as everyone makes an effort, (if they can) clear those hurdles, it can succeed; nobody objects, and we'll even hold a celebration meeting. Southwest last year 200,000 tons, this year 700,000 tons, next year 2 million tons, an increase of double. Northwest last year only 14,000 tons, a bit less than Chiang Kai-shek (his iron and steel output); this year 50,000 tons, surpassing Chiang Kai-shek; next year 700,000 tons, an increase of thirteen times. Is there any opportunism in that? South China last year 2,000 tons, this year 60,000 tons, an increase of thirty times. The further south you go, the higher the Marxism. Next year 600,000 tons, a tenfold increase.

These figures still need verifying; each must have grounds. Please, Comrade Fuchun, verify them: how much this year, how much next year, not just blurting something out. Citing these figures just shows that this isn't opportunism, and there's no danger of being expelled from the Party. Adding up all the regions, next year comes to 21.3 million tons. The question is whether it can really be done. We need a lot of safety margins. 18 million tons as the first set of accounts, adopted at the People's Congress, and we'll truly struggle for it, but we must also be mentally prepared: if we can only produce 15 million tons of good steel, plus another 3 million tons of native steel, I'll be satisfied. That way my burden is lifted. If we can't fulfil it, I've got native steel. The Soviet Metallurgy Gazette praised our "small, native, mass" method highly. It said some of the steel may be poor in quality but very useful, it can be made into farm tools. Thinking about it that way, my heart feels lighter.

First set of accounts, 18 million tons; second set of accounts, 22 million tons. Taking this as an example, every sector's targets must be reduced accordingly. For instance, electricity generation: with small, native, mass methods you can generate for your own use, coercion and commandism. For what has already been done, adopt He Yingqin's method of not paying wages. Or railways: the original plan was only 20,000 kilometres in five years, and now 20,000 kilometres are being done in a few years. It's needed, yes, but can that much be done? The Chengdu Conference said 20,000 kilometres in five years; now in 1958 alone 20,000 kilometres have been done. Lü Zhengcao's report was very bold, and I was very pleased; the question is whether it can be done, whether we're sure of it. Find the grounds. What other methods are there? There are contradictions. Lü Zhengcao, you've really got your thinking straightened out. The Centre can boast big, while the burden falls on the localities. For instance, in Hubei in the first quarter the localities want 80,000 tons of rolled steel, Wuhan Steel wants 75,000 tons, 655,000 tons, but the Centre only gives 70,000 tons, so those projects can't be built. If you don't give them rice, even the cleverest housewife can't cook without rice. Disaster victims have all sorts of ways of resisting us. For instance, at district level, to fill in reporting forms, they specially appoint a false reporter whose job is to fill in the forms, because the higher-ups insist on reports, and reporting too little doesn't look good. It gets reported all the way up, the higher-ups take it as true, and in reality there's nothing at all. I see quite a few problems like this now. Do we really have 8.5 million tons of good steel this year? Is it really there or just reported? Isn't any of it false? If it can't be transferred up, there's falsity. I think in reality there isn't that much.

(4) The question of faking. The first draft of the Resolution on Certain Questions Concerning the People's Communes put forward at the Zhengzhou Conference is now to be made into a directive. The question of faking should have a point of its own; don't write it together with working methods, otherwise people won't pay attention. Now everyone is set on launching "satellites" and competing for honours, so they fake. One commune had only 100 pigs of its own; to cope with visitors, it borrowed 200 big pigs and returned them after the visit. If you have 100, you have 100; if you don't have any, you don't. What's the point of faking? In the past, when we fought wars and issued victory bulletins, saying how many prisoners were taken and how much was captured, the same thing happened: exaggerating battle results to boost morale. Ordinary people read it and felt good; the enemy read it and laughed. You can't deceive them. Later we opposed doing this, issued repeated orders and instructions, educated people many times to be honest, and only then did people not dare to fake. Actually, is everyone really that honest? People are not of one mind; I think there's still a bit of falsity. Some people in the world just aren't that honest. I suggest talking in earnest with county Party secretaries and commune Party secretaries: be honest, don't fake. If something doesn't work, let people curse you; losing face doesn't matter. Don't go chasing vanity. For instance, eliminating illiteracy: saying it'll be wiped out in half a year or a year, I don't really believe that. If it's wiped out during the Second Five-Year Plan, that'll be pretty good. Afforestation: afforested every year, never afforested any year; the more we afforest, the fewer trees we see. They say the four pests have been eliminated, it's a "four-withouts" village, when in fact it's a "four-withs" village. Whatever task is set from above, they always say it's been fulfilled; if it hasn't been fulfilled, they fake it. The serious problem now is that not only do those below fake, but we believe it. From the Centre, the province and the prefecture down to the county, all believe it, mainly the first three levels. That's dangerous. If we disbelieved everything, that would become opportunism. The masses really have achieved results; why obliterate the masses' achievements? But believing fakery is also a mistake. For instance, with 11 million tons of steel, if you say there isn't even 10,000 tons, of course that's wrong, but is there really that much? Or grain again: how much is there really? Last year 370 billion jin. This year it was first said to be 900 billion jin, then pressed down to 750 to 800 billion jin. Is this reliable? I think doubling to 750 billion jin would be quite remarkable.

Hold evaluations and comparisons, and the result is faking; don't hold them, and there's no competition. We need to draw up rules for competitions, carry out inspections, set up acceptance committees, as with export goods; if it doesn't meet the specifications, it won't do. Economic undertakings must become ever more precise, ever more practical, ever more scientific. This is different from writing poetry; we must understand the difference between writing poetry and running the economy. "Lift up Chaohu Lake to use as a water ladle": that's poetry. I've never lifted one; probably you Anhui people have. How could Chaohu Lake be lifted up? Even after inspection, you still have to reckon there's falsity in it. Some fakes you can't find even if you check; people have held meetings and arranged everything in advance. I hope the three levels of the Centre, the province and the prefecture all understand this problem, keep a clear head, and apply a discount. Thirty-seventy: out of ten, take three as false; is that acceptable? Does this underestimate achievements and distrust cadres and masses? There should be some distrust. We should reckon on at least no less than one-tenth being false; some are one hundred per cent false. That's bad faking. Another kind is faking we can be glad of. For instance, concealing output: cadres want to report more, ordinary people want to conceal output; that's a contradiction. Concealing output has its benefits. In some places where too much was reported, the higher-ups requisitioned more and there wasn't much left for them; they got the short end. There's yet another kind of falsity that's well done, the kind that copes with subjectivism and coercion and commandism. A sent-down cadre from Zhongnanhai wrote a letter back saying that the commune he was in had ordered 300 mu of maize uprooted and replaced with sweet potatoes, with 1.5 million sweet potato plants per mu, when the maize had already grown as tall as a man. The masses thought it was a pity and only uprooted 30 mu, but reported that 300 mu had been uprooted. This kind of faking is good. Wang Renzhong said that in a place in Hebei, his home area, at Spring Festival everyone was made to water the wheat and not allowed to rest. What could the ordinary people do? They had no choice but to fake. At night they lit lanterns in the fields while actually resting at home; the cadres saw lanterns everywhere and thought nobody was resting. In a county in Hubei, the masses were made to fight hard day and night and not sleep at night. But the masses wanted to sleep, so they sent children to keep watch; when they saw cadres coming, everyone got up and put on a show, and when the cadres left, they went back to sleep. That's also good faking. In short, first, cadres must keep a clear head; second, they must be educated not to be deceived and not to resort to coercion and commandism. Otherwise, what will you do when people set up sentries? Now there's an atmosphere of talking only about achievements and not about shortcomings. Having shortcomings means losing face; telling the truth, nobody listens; faking, talking big, brings glory. Say the ox's tail grows behind its backside and nobody listens; say it grows on its head and that's news. We must carry out education, explain clearly, be honest; if this can be achieved within a few years, that's good. I think after some years, once things are on track, we can be more down-to-earth.

(5) Break down superstition, but don't break down science as if it were superstition. For instance, people have to eat; that's science and can't be broken down. Zhang Liang abstained from grain, but he ate meat. Now people aren't being allowed to eat freely; probably output has been over-reported. People have to sleep; that's science too. Animals always need rest; bacteria need rest too. The human heart beats seventy-two times a minute, over a hundred thousand times a day. First, eating; second, sleeping. Break down these two and things won't work; people will die. Besides that, quite a few other things are being broken down as superstition. When people press upon nature, applying the tools of production to the objects of production, nature, as the object, puts up resistance and reacts. That's a scientific truth. When a person walks on the ground, the ground pushes back; without that resistance, you can't walk. Grassland doesn't resist much, so it's hard to walk on. Mud paddy doesn't resist; you sink in and can't pull yourself out, so such fields need sand mixed in. Nature has resistance; that's a scientific truth. If you don't acknowledge it, it will do you to death. Since we began breaking down superstition, the effect has been tremendous: daring to think, dare to speak, dare to act. But a small part has gone too far in breaking things down and has broken scientific truth too, for instance doing away with sleep altogether and saying one hour of sleep is enough. The policy is to break down superstition, but science can't be broken down.

All superstition must be broken down; all truth must be protected. Bourgeois rights can only be partly broken down. For example, the three styles and five airs, excessively wide gaps in rank, the attitude of overlords, cat-and-mouse relationships: these must be broken down, and the more thoroughly the better. Another part, for example wage grades, relations between superiors and subordinates, a certain amount of state coercion, can't be broken down yet. Part of bourgeois rights is useful in the socialist era and must be protected and made to serve socialism. If we beat it until there isn't a whole patch of skin left on it, one day we'll find ourselves in a passive position, having to admit our mistake and apologise to the useful bourgeois rights. So there must be analysis, distinguishing which parts are useful and which must be broken down. Given that the Soviet Union didn't break down those bourgeois rights that should have been broken down, and its order has become quite rigid, we should break down what should be broken down and protect the useful part.

(6) As for the forty articles, it's better not to do them this time. There are no grounds for them now; they can't be properly discussed.

(7) Who enters communism first? Does the Soviet Union enter first or does our country? With us this has become a question. Khrushchev proposed that the twelve years are for preparing the conditions for entering communism. They are very cautious; on this question we should also be a bit more cautious. Some people say we'll enter communism in two or three years, three or four years, five or seven years. Is that possible? If anyone is to enter, Anshan Steel would enter first, Liaoning next (of their 24 million people, 8 million are in the cities), and not other provinces; after that, Old Ke and Shanghai. If even they have to wait for others and can't enter alone, then Xushui, Shouzhang and Fan County want to enter; wouldn't that be too fast? We sent Comrade Chen Boda to investigate, and he said it would be hard to enter. Now no prefecture or province says it will enter first; they want to be cautious. It's just some counties that are acting as vanguards. How much time will it take for the whole of China to enter communism? Right now nobody knows; it's hard to imagine. Ten years? Fifteen years? Twenty years? Thirty years? The Soviet Union has had forty-one years, add twelve more, fifty-three years in all, and they still say it's preparing the conditions. Is China that formidable? We've had only a few years and already we're getting ambitious. Is that possible or not? Considering the interests of the world proletariat, it's also better for the Soviet Union to enter first. Perhaps the Soviet Union will enter communism at the centenary of the Paris Commune (1971). What about us in twelve years? Perhaps it's possible; I think it isn't possible. Even if in ten years, by 1968, we're already prepared, we won't enter; at least wait two or three years after the Soviet Union enters before we enter, so that Lenin's party and the country of the October Revolution don't lose face. Being able to enter and not entering is also acceptable. Having all this capability and not announcing it, not putting it in the papers that we've entered communism: isn't that deliberate faking? That doesn't matter. Many people think China may enter first because we've found this road of the people's communes. In this there is an "it isn't possible", and there is also an "it shouldn't be". How do you enter on wages of one yuan? These questions can't be discussed publicly, but these ideological questions must be explained clearly within the Party.