Speech at the Enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party

China Mao Zedong · Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party

13 October 1968 · Enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party

Context
Mao addressed the enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, speaking at the opening on October 13, 1968 and the closing on October 31, 1968, on the Cultural Revolution and the treatment of purged cadres.
Main themes
Assessment of two years of the Cultural Revolution, fate of purged senior cadres, Deng Xiaoping's errors and possible indoor work, February Adverse Current, mass criticism and cleansing the class ranks, policy of steady, accurate and ruthless, ban on beating people and the jet plane, role and re-education of intellectuals, closure of universities for two years, military academies and sending the army and workers in, cutting provincial staff and sending cadres to the countryside, Ninth Congress delegates
Duration
~25 min
75th percentile
Words
2,999
75th percentile
Sentences
221
91st percentile
Readability
69
97th percentile
Grade
6.9
1st percentile
Syntax
2.68
12th percentile
Vocabulary
2.11
29th percentile

Translated from Chinese Source: GitHub qinglee/maoxuan (毛泽东选集) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 58%56%
  • Social 27%26%
  • Ceremonial 9%9%
  • Geopolitical 3%3%
  • Economic 3%3%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 4%

221 sentences in 35 paragraphs

Speech at the Opening Session, 13 October 1968

(I)

The meeting will probably run seven to ten days. Let's think about what questions need to be raised. The question of the situation: one domestic, one international. Domestically, we need to sum up the work of the two-plus years since the last plenary session. On two years of the Cultural Revolution there are, after all, only two views: one, that it has been good, basically correct; two, that some people say, not necessarily. At the Eleventh Plenum I already said, and at the October work conference I also gave notice: don't assume that everything the meeting passes can be carried out; raising your hand at a meeting is one thing, really having disagreements is another. Later it turned out that people still did not understand, and some people ran into trouble.

There is a comrade called Zhang Dingcheng; no problem of being a traitor, a spy or a counter-revolutionary has been found with him either. Why didn't he come to the meeting? What is the reason? Old Deng, you know him very well. (Zhou Enlai: He took part in the Dalian meeting. Gao Gang, Rao Shushi, Xu Haidong, the four of them. Xu Haidong and Gao Gang wept in each other's arms, saying the Centre had treated him unfairly, that without his victories in northern Shaanxi the Centre would not have been able to keep its footing. This was exactly when Gao Gang's appointment as vice-chairman was announced. He formed an alliance and had dealings with Gao Gang; it deserves investigation.)

Tan Qilong of Shandong joined the Red Army as a boy. He has no other problem, only errors in his work. Shandong does not forgive him, and the problem still cannot be resolved now. Shandong wants to drag him back to struggle against him; we won't allow it. (Zhou Enlai: He has been dragged back; he is in Jinan now.) The comrades from Shandong should do persuasion work.

Zhang Tixue of Hubei is a good comrade who made mistakes. He went back to Hubei and made a good self-criticism, and the masses forgave him. The masses all welcome him. He still wanted to make more self-criticism, and the masses said there's no need for any more. Wang Renzhong is a hidden traitor, a Kuomintang man. Tao Zhu also has problems in his history.

Wang Yanchun of Hunan, this man is finished. Deng Xiaoping—no problem has yet been found in his history, only that business of him deserting from the Seventh Army. (Zhang Yunyi: When he was political commissar of the Red Seventh Army, when the situation became tense, he used the pretext of going to the Centre to report on work and deserted at Chongyi. Comrade Ye Jizhuang also exposed this before he died.)

The main problem is still that after coming to Beijing he set up an independent kingdom. He wasn't convinced; he says he didn't grab power, but in fact he was the one fanning the goose-feather fan, the strategist, in Liu Shaoqi's headquarters. But sometimes I still sought him out for a few words. In the War of Resistance against Japan and the War of Liberation, he fought the enemy. And no problems of the kind of going over to the enemy, betrayal or surrender have been found in his history. With this man, for one thing, his errors are not small; for another, he has written an autobiography with a self-criticism, which can be shown to everyone. He asks not to be expelled from the Party, and would preferably like to be given some work. As soon as work is mentioned, many comrades shake their heads. A very big job would be hard for him now. I'd say giving him some indoor work like sorting materials should be all right!

The comrades have a great deal of experience. We can consider: should the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution be carried out after all, or not? Are the achievements primary, or are the shortcomings primary? Can the Cultural Revolution really be carried through to the end? Let everyone discuss it. Take for example the Zhejiang question: the "Red Storm" has still not been properly resolved to this day; that too is a question of work.

The Fujian problem is very big. Han Xianchu, isn't there great disorder under heaven where you are? (Han Xianchu: The situation now is very good.) I've seen it. Your report is very good. Once the work is done, isn't it resolved? Problems can be resolved; how could they not be resolved?

We must sum up experience. In the past we fought north and south; the War of Liberation was easy to fight. Like the autumn wind sweeping away fallen leaves, one sweep and in three and a half years it was all swept away. At that time the enemy was relatively clear. Now, in carrying out the Cultural Revolution, there are many difficulties; this war is not easy to fight. Still, the Cultural Revolution is somewhat faster than before. In the past we fought for twenty-two years, from 1927 to 1949; the Cultural Revolution has been fought for only two and a half years.

The problem is that ideological errors are mixed up with contradictions between ourselves and the enemy, and they can't be sorted out at one go. We can only resolve things one province at a time. Liaoning Province, for example, had three big factions; they fought for eight months, great disorder under heaven. Wasn't it resolved? It can still be made clear.

We ourselves should take on more responsibility, so that it is lighter for those below. It is mainly a matter of ideological problems, contradictions among the people. Within there are also some enemies mixed in, a minority; it is a question of doing the work well.

Xiao Ke did fight in wars. On National Day he went up on Tiananmen, this time he didn't come. What is his problem? I'm not clear either. (Zhou Enlai: There is a period of his history that is not clear. He fought a battle in a village in Chao'an County, handed over his rifles to the enemy, and even set up a party. This time the rebels dug it up.)

Which one is Li Desheng? You handled the Anhui incidents quite well. You straightened out Wuhu quite well!

(Li Desheng: It was the "July 3rd" notice approved by the Chairman that did the job; public opinion was created well.)

That's exactly it, you have to create public opinion. As if it were some invention—we've been at this for decades and didn't understand creating public opinion. We've been at this for decades, and that's just creating public opinion. Otherwise how could we have built the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army? Without the masses, how could there be a dictatorship of the proletariat? Without the masses, without the army, who would accept this party of yours?

At the Eleventh Plenum we said we want struggle by reasoning, not struggle by force, and as a result they wanted struggle by force, not struggle by reasoning. In a school, two factions fight, each with weapons; in a factory, two factions fight, two centres; in a ministry too, two factions fight.

The basic masses are still the workers, peasants and soldiers, and the soldiers are workers and peasants too. Only after them come the intellectuals. The majority of intellectuals should be won over, united with and educated. The shortcoming of intellectuals is that they waver easily, mainly because they have not integrated with the workers, peasants and soldiers.

We can't call them stinking intellectuals at every turn, but a little stinking is all right too. We can't do without intellectuals, nor can we let them stick their tails up to the sky.

The universities will not run for two years. Let them all graduate and go down to mix with the workers, peasants and soldiers. If they don't run for two years, the sky won't fall. Afterwards we'll start again, selecting middle-school students who have worked well in the countryside and factories to go to university.

Military academies—who knew a hundred and ten of them had been set up, "yao-yao-yao", one-one-zero. Among them there really are "yao", demons. We can only blame ourselves; what was the point of setting up so many? And nobody was in charge. Ye Jianying, weren't you in charge? Carrying out the Four Cleanups won't work; better to send workers into all of them, send the Liberation Army into them.

Can this Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution really be carried through to the end? We say we will carry it through to the end, but to what end? That is a question. I estimate three years or so; by next summer it should be about done. Carrying it to the end includes mass criticism, cleansing the class ranks, Party rectification, streamlining the administration and cutting staff, and reforming unreasonable rules and regulations.

If the factories aren't rectified—look, without carrying out the Cultural Revolution, what would become of things? For example, there is a timber mill in Beijing with a thousand or so people, formed by two capitalists merging. Some factories have veterans of three regimes, some of four. And there's the Xinhua Printing Works: in the Beiyang warlord period it printed banknotes for them; when Japan came it printed newspapers and leaflets for the Japanese. The Kuomintang took it over, and when the Communist Party came it did well too; it does well under everyone. There are some cadres who do well under three or four regimes, and among them some are hidden counter-revolutionaries. Our own people are not effective either; their ideological state and morale are not good. If the hidden counter-revolutionaries aren't cleared out, whose factories are they, after all?

By rights the countryside should be better, but it has problems too. Communes and brigades that haven't been done well should be properly taken in hand. Rely on the People's Liberation Army and on the provincial, prefectural and county revolutionary committees. One province organised propaganda teams of a million people, with only a few tens of thousands from the Liberation Army and ninety per cent poor and lower-middle peasants; that's Guangdong. Jiangxi is not bad either. Jiangxi is a medium-sized province, twenty-two million people. In some places there are too many people: the provincial organs alone have seven thousand people; at least six thousand must be cut. Where will they be cut to? Still within China's borders, aren't they? A factory, a village—mainly sending them down to the countryside; the factories can't take in that many people.

Speech at the Closing Session, 31 October 1968

(II)

I think this meeting has gone all right, it has gone very well. Perhaps some comrades did not understand the matter of the "February Adverse Current"; after eighteen days they understand it better than before. In the past senior cadres weren't clear about it either; we didn't let anything leak. In the past, when the provinces came to resolve their problems, there was no time to talk about these things either. At this meeting the comrades who made mistakes explained matters, the comrades questioned them and they answered. Question, then answer again, and it became fairly clear. If you say this matter is small, it isn't really small; if you say it's big, in my view it isn't anything tremendous either; it's a natural phenomenon. They had opinions, so they were bound to voice them. A few people together, all Politburo members, vice-premiers, vice-chairmen of the Military Commission—it's permissible for them to talk things over. It is also permissible as part of Party life, and they spoke openly. The two big rows were spoken out openly. Some of the details I wasn't very clear about before either. Details such as how many times people met, what dealings they had—don't pay too much attention to these; don't steer inner-Party life into trivial minutiae. Not paying attention to the big questions would be bad. This isn't a small matter, but would you say the sky will fall?! The earth will stop turning?! It turns as usual; how could it not turn?! I really admire Old Deng; he held out all along. If it were me, I'd have ignored it, but in the end you still produced a self-criticism. He made self-criticism long ago; for example, at the time of the Beidaihe meeting he already made a self-criticism. As for some of the old comrades, could they be given work in the future? Tan Qilong and Jiang Weiqing, who were overthrown—after a few years, once everyone's anger has subsided, they can also do some work. Not principal work, but there are also some others who are strong and healthy; in future they must be given something to do! Has Deng Hua come? (Deng stands up.) Long time no see. In Sichuan for several years nobody said he was bad; who knows how the Red Guards locked him up again. You made mistakes along with Peng Dehuai; once you correct your mistakes, that's fine. In Beijing there are Huang Kecheng and Tan Zheng. People who have made mistakes should be allowed to correct them; they must be given time, even many years. Because the masses still want to see how they behave.

Right now mass criticism and cleansing the class ranks are underway. In this matter, first, we must grasp it tightly; second, we must pay attention to policy. Don't we say "steady, accurate, ruthless"? With "steady", there are rightist tendencies, and then steadiness isn't steady. "Ruthless" can easily become very "left", and go too far. The key is the word "accurate". Otherwise, if it isn't accurate, you can't be steady and you can't be ruthless either. We must investigate and study, pay attention to evidence. Don't hang black placards, don't do the "jet plane", don't beat people. In 1927 I wrote an article on Hunan, about the local tyrants and evil gentry: making them wear dunce caps and parading them through the villages. In fact that hasn't been done for decades. The Red Guards followed that method and escalated it step by step: hanging black placards, doing the "jet plane", and all sorts of other things. With spies, traitors and unrepentant capitalist-roaders, we must investigate and study, pay attention to evidence, not rely heavily on confessions, and not go in for that business of beating people, dunce caps and the "jet plane". The results of that are not good. In Beijing we have Du Yuming and Wang Yaowu. In the past we didn't do this kind of thing even to enemy prisoners.

There are some people who refuse to repent no matter what; you can work them over and they still won't repent. Feng Youlan—if you tell him not to do his idealism, I think that's hard too. Then there's Jian Bozan, a professor at Peking University, a historian, a bourgeois historical authority. Telling him not to do emperors, kings, generals and ministers is hard too. With these people, don't use methods that disrespect their human dignity. For example, giving them a salary of only twenty-four yuan a month, at most forty yuan—don't deduct so much that they have it too hard. These people aren't of much use any more. Then there's Wu Han, who may still be of some use. If you want to ask about idealism, about emperors, kings, generals and ministers, you still have to ask them. Old Fan, sitting here, also does emperors, kings, generals and ministers, and Old Guo counts as one too. In those days there were no other books to read; it was all the Twenty-Four Histories and the like. To oppose emperors, kings, generals and ministers, you still need to know what emperors, kings, generals and ministers are. Otherwise when people ask you, you won't be able to answer. Mind you, I'm not urging those of you sitting here to go and do emperors, kings, generals and ministers. You should do as the Premier said, follow those few documents. Nor do I approve of young students going in for it. A small number of people should do it. For example, Old Fan, if you don't do it, won't emperors, kings, generals and ministers die out? It's not that we want emperors, kings, generals and ministers to appear again, but history needs people to study it.

In cleansing the class ranks, you must pay attention with these people; there are three kinds: good, middle, and extreme right. What I'm talking about is the right: how they should be treated. In the world there is always left, centre and right. Without a right, where would your left come from? It's not that absolute. Everyone being leftists—I don't agree with that. How could that be? Being that pure isn't necessarily good either. Our Party, through this Cultural Revolution, I think, has become fairly pure. It has never been done like this before. But being too pure isn't so good either. Take the Ninth Congress delegates, for example: if the comrades of the February Adverse Current don't take part, that's a shortcoming. So we still recommend that the various localities elect them as delegates. Comrade Chen Yi says he isn't qualified. I think you are qualified, to represent the right of left, centre and right. You don't quite meet the second of the three conditions for Ninth Congress delegates, but that can be worked out through consultation. Having a few such people take part is beneficial.

The situation now is different from two years ago at the Eleventh Plenum, very greatly different. The movement isn't over yet; even after the Ninth Congress has been held, the movement won't necessarily end right away. Because it involves every factory, every school, every institution.

Quoted from the Communiqué of the Enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee

(III)

This Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is absolutely necessary and most timely for consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat, preventing capitalist restoration, and building socialism.