Speeches at the Central Work Conference

China Mao Zedong · Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

24 October 1966 · Central Work Conference

Context
Mao addressed senior Party officials at the Central Work Conference on October 24 and 25, 1966, accepting responsibility for the first and second line division and the Cultural Revolution's turmoil while urging cadres to self-criticise and engage the Red Guards.
Main themes
Self-criticism of veteran leaders, fear of the Red Guards, division into first and second lines, independent kingdoms in the Party, criticism of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, five months of the Cultural Revolution, big-character posters and great networking, treatment of the democratic parties, Sun Yat-sen centenary commemoration, political and ideological work by local committees, correcting line errors, comparison with the 28-year democratic revolution
Duration
~29 min
81st percentile
Words
3,422
81st percentile
Sentences
233
92nd percentile
Readability
70
97th percentile
Grade
7.2
2nd percentile
Syntax
2.71
13th percentile
Vocabulary
2.09
24th percentile

Translated from Chinese Source: GitHub qinglee/maoxuan (毛泽东选集) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 79%78%
  • Social 14%14%
  • Ceremonial 5%5%
  • Geopolitical 2%2%
  • Economic 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 1%

233 sentences in 49 paragraphs

24 October 1966

(1)

What do you have to be afraid of? Have you read Li Xuefeng's bulletin? His two children went off to do revolutionary networking, and when they came back they lectured Li Xuefeng, saying: "Why are the veteran leaders here so afraid of the Red Guards? We haven't beaten you." You just won't make self-criticism!

Wu Xiuquan has four children, split into four factions. Lots of students go to his home, sometimes a few, sometimes a dozen or more. Once you have had more contact with them, there is nothing to be afraid of; you find them very lovable. If you want to educate people, the educator must first be educated. You cannot straighten out your thinking, you dare not meet the Red Guards, you do not tell the students the truth, you act like officials and lords. First you dare not meet them, then you dare not speak. After decades of making revolution, you are getting more and more stupid. Shaoqi's letter to Jiang Weiqing criticised Jiang Weiqing, said he was stupid. So is he himself so clever?

(Liu Lantao: The Red Guards are seizing files everywhere, digging into our historical problems. It has gone too far.)

What do you plan to do when you go back?

(Liu Lantao: I'll go back, see how things are, and then decide.)

You always speak so hesitantly.

(To Li Jingquan): How is that Liao Zhigao of yours in Sichuan doing now?

(Li Jingquan: At first he didn't quite understand, but for a while after the plenum he was rather better. Looking at his history, he has always been consistently correct.)

What consistently correct? Once the masses rose up, he slipped away, scared out of his wits, and went to live at the military region. When you go back, pull yourself together and do a proper job. But on no account admit to being anti-Party and anti-socialist. Overthrow the regional bureaus, the provincial and municipal committees, and let the students take over, would that work? Knowing nothing of industry or agriculture, having only read a few books, would that work?

Putting up big-character posters against Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping on the streets is not good. People must be allowed to make mistakes, allowed to make revolution, allowed to correct themselves. Let the Red Guards read *The True Story of Ah Q*.

As I see it, this meeting has gone rather better. At the last meeting things were poured in but did not sink in; there was no experience. This meeting had two months of experience, less than five months of experience in all. The democratic revolution took twenty-eight years, and how many mistakes were made?! How many people died?! The socialist revolution has gone on for seventeen years, the Cultural Revolution only five months; it will take at least five years to gain experience. One big-character poster, the Red Guards, the great networking. Nobody expected it, not even I expected it, and it left the provinces and cities in a state of "alas, all is lost". The students have made some mistakes too, but it is mainly we lords and masters who have made mistakes.

(To Li Xiannian): How did your meeting go today?

(Li Xiannian: The Institute of Finance and Economics says they will hold a denunciation meeting tomorrow. I wanted to make a self-criticism, but they wouldn't let me speak.)

Go and make your self-criticism again tomorrow, otherwise people will say you ran away.

(Li Xiannian: Tomorrow I'm going abroad.)

You should tell them. In the past it was "the third wife teaches her son"; now it is "the son teaches the third wife". I think you are a bit short on spirit. If they won't listen to your self-criticism, make it anyway. If they denounce you, admit your mistakes. The turmoil was started by the Centre; the responsibility lies with the Centre, and the localities bear responsibility too.

My responsibility lies in dividing things into a first line and a second line. Why did I divide them into first and second lines? First, my health was poor; second, there was the lesson of the Soviet Union. Malenkov was not mature; before Stalin died he did not hold power, and at every meeting it was just toasting and flattery. I wanted to build up their prestige before I died. I never imagined it would turn into its opposite.

(Tao Zhu: Power slipped into others' hands.)

I let power slip into others' hands deliberately, but not only were they not conscious of it, they set up independent kingdoms against me. On many matters they did not consult me: the land conference, the Tianjin speech, the Shanxi cooperatives, the rejection of investigation and research, the great promotion of Wang Guangmei. These should have been discussed by the Centre and settled by a resolution, but he (Liu Shaoqi) insisted on going his own way. Deng Xiaoping never came to see me. From 1959 to now, he has never come to see me about anything. I don't even know what the Secretariat and the Planning Commission are doing. In 1962, suddenly four vice-premiers, Li Fuchun, Tan Zhenlin, Li Xiannian and Bo Yibo, came to see me in Nanjing, and later in Tianjin. I agreed at once to what they wanted done, and then the four of them went back, but Deng Xiaoping just would not come. I was not satisfied with the Wuchang conference; the high targets left me helpless. At the meeting in Beijing, you met for six days, and when I wanted one day it was not allowed. It doesn't matter if you fail to fulfil a task; don't act as if you had lost your parents.

After the Zunyi Conference, the Centre was fairly centralised. After the Sixth Plenum in 1938, Xiang Ying and Peng Dehuai set up independent kingdoms; on those matters (the Southern Anhui Incident, the Hundred Regiments Campaign) they gave no notice. After the Seventh Congress, there were not many people at the Centre. When Hu Zongnan attacked Yan'an, the Centre split into two groups: I was in northern Shaanxi with Zhou Enlai and Ren Bishi, Liu Shaoqi and Zhu De were in North China, and it was still fairly centralised. After we entered the cities, things became dispersed, everyone doing things their own way, and after the division into first and second lines it became even more dispersed. After the financial and economic conference of 1953 I gave notice that everyone should keep each other informed, keep the Centre informed, keep the localities informed. Liu and Deng did things openly, not secretly; they are different from Peng Zhen. In the past Chen Duxiu, Zhang Guotao, Wang Ming, Luo Zhanglong and Li Lisan all did things openly; that doesn't matter. Gao Gang, Rao Shushi and Peng Dehuai were all double-dealers; Peng Dehuai got in league with them, and I didn't know. Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, Lu Dingyi and Yang Shangkun operated in secret, and those who operate in secret come to no good end.

Those who made line errors must correct them. Chen Duxiu, Wang Ming and Li Lisan did not correct theirs. Whatever the small clique, whatever the faction, shut the door on it tight; as long as people correct themselves and reach agreement, unity is good.

Liu and Deng must be allowed to make revolution, allowed to correct themselves. You say I am a smoother-over; I am indeed someone who smooths things over. At the Seventh Congress, Chen Qihan said those who had followed the Wang Ming line could not be elected to the Central Committee. Wang Ming and several others were all elected to the Central Committee. Now only Wang Ming has left; the others are still here! Luo Fu was no good. I have a good impression of Wang Jiaxiang; he supported the battle of Donggu. At the Ningdu Conference Luo Fu wanted to expel me, but Zhou, Zhu and the others disagreed. At the Zunyi Conference he played a good role; at that time we could not have done without them. Luo Fu was stubborn. Comrade Shaoqi opposed them, and Nie Rongzhen opposed them too. Liu Shaoqi cannot be written off entirely.

If you have made mistakes, correct them! Once you've corrected them, that's fine. Go back, pull yourselves together, and work boldly and without restraint. This meeting was held on my proposal. The time has been so short that I don't know whether things have got through, but it may be better than last time. I never imagined that one big-character poster, the Red Guards and the great networking would stir up such a huge affair. Some of the students do not have very good class backgrounds, but do all of us have good backgrounds? Don't recruit deserters and traitors. I have many Rightist friends, such as Zhou Gucheng and Zhang Zhizhong. How can a person not associate with a few Rightists? Where is there such purity? Associating with them is investigation and research, finding out what they are up to. That day on Tiananmen I made a point of pulling Li Zongren in beside me. This man is better left without a post than given one; better with no position and no power.

Do we want the democratic parties? Will one party do? The Party organisations in the schools cannot be restored too early. Many Party members were recruited after 1949. Jian Bozan, Wu Han and Li Da were all Party members; are they all so good? Are the democratic parties all so bad? I think the democratic parties are better than Peng, Luo, Lu and Yang. We still want the democratic parties, and we still want the CPPCC. Explain clearly to the Red Guards that China's democratic revolution was started by Sun Yat-sen. At that time there was no Communist Party; it was started under Sun Yat-sen's leadership, against Kang Youwei, against Liang Qichao, against the monarchy. This year is the hundredth anniversary of Sun Yat-sen's birth; how should we commemorate it? Discuss it with the Red Guards; we will still hold a commemorative meeting. My division into first and second lines turned into its opposite.

(Kang Sheng: The political report to the Eighth Congress was the theory of the dying out of class struggle.)

We read that report. It was adopted by the Congress; those two alone cannot be held responsible.

25 October 1966

(2)

Deng Xiaoping is deaf, yet whenever there is a meeting he sits far away from me. Since 1959, for six years he has not reported his work to me. For the work of the Secretariat he relied on Peng Zhen. Deng Xiaoping keeps me at a respectful distance.

As for my view of the situation: small at both ends, large in the middle. Those who put "daring" first are only in Henan; those who put "fear" first are the majority. Those who are really "anti" are still a minority. Genuine fourth-category cadres are only one, two or three per cent.

(Zhou Enlai: Now it has already far exceeded that.)

Don't be afraid if there are more; we will rehabilitate them later! Some who cannot work in their own area can be transferred to work elsewhere.

In Henan, one secretary handles production and the other five handle receptions. In the whole country only Liu Jianxun wrote a big-character poster supporting the minority faction. That is good.

25 October 1966

(3)

I will say a few words, about two things:

In the past seventeen years, there is one thing I think was not done well, and that is setting up the first and second lines. The original idea was out of concern for the security of the state, in view of the lesson of Stalin in the Soviet Union. We set up a first line and a second line; I was in the second line, other comrades in the first. Now it seems that was not so good. The result was great dispersal; once we entered the cities we could not stay centralised, and there were quite a number of independent kingdoms. That is why the Eleventh Plenum made a change. That is one thing. Previously I was in the second line and did not handle day-to-day work. I let others do many things, to build up their prestige, so that when I go to meet God the country would not suffer such a great upheaval. Everyone agreed with this idea. Later, the comrades in the first line handled some matters not so well. There were some matters I should have taken charge of and did not, so I am also responsible; they cannot be blamed entirely.

Why do I say I am also responsible?

First, dividing the Standing Committee into first and second lines and setting up the Secretariat was my proposal, and everyone agreed. Then, I trusted others too much. This matter put me on my guard at the time the Twenty-Three Articles were being drawn up. Nothing could be done in Beijing, and nothing could be done at the Centre either. In September and October last year I raised the question: if revisionism appears at the Centre, what are the localities to do? I felt that my views could not be carried out in Beijing. Why was the criticism of Wu Han launched not in Beijing but in Shanghai? Because there was no one in Beijing to do it. Now the Beijing problem has been solved.

The second thing: in the Cultural Revolution I caused a big disaster, namely approving Nie Yuanzi's big-character poster at Peking University, writing a letter to the Tsinghua University Middle School, and writing a big-character poster of my own, "Bombard the Headquarters". These things happened in a very short time: June, July, August, September, October, less than five months. No wonder comrades still don't understand so well. The time was very short and the momentum very fierce; I didn't anticipate it either. Once the Peking University poster was broadcast, the whole country was in an uproar. Before my letter to the Red Guards had even been sent, Red Guards across the whole country were on the move, and in one rush they knocked you all flat. I am the one who caused this big disaster. So it is no wonder you have complaints.

At the last meeting I had no confidence. I said that the decision once adopted would not necessarily be carried out, and sure enough many comrades still did not understand so well. Now, after two months, there is experience and things are a bit better. This meeting had two stages. In the first stage, people's speeches were not so normal; in the second stage, after the comrades of the Centre spoke and experience was exchanged, things went more smoothly and thinking got straightened out somewhat. The movement has only gone on for five months; it may take two five-month periods, perhaps a bit more.

The democratic revolution took twenty-eight years. When we began the democratic revolution, nobody knew how to make it, how to wage the struggle; only later did we work out some experience. The road too was found step by step through practice, summing up experience; it took twenty-eight years. The socialist revolution has also gone on for seventeen years, and the Cultural Revolution only five months, so we cannot demand that comrades all understand so well. Last year many comrades did not read the articles criticising Wu Han and did not pay much attention. Earlier, the criticism of *The Life of Wu Xun* and the criticism of *Studies of "A Dream of Red Mansions"* were handled case by case, and it never took hold. Without taking hold of the whole picture it won't work, and the responsibility for this lies with me. Handling things case by case, treating the head when the head aches and the foot when the foot aches, cannot solve the problem. In this Cultural Revolution, during the first few months, January, February, March, April, there were so many articles, and the Centre issued the (16 May) "Circular", yet it did not attract much attention. It was only when the big-character posters and the Red Guards burst in that it attracted attention, and you could not ignore it any more. When the revolution comes down on your own head, you hurry to sum up experience and do political and ideological work. Why hold this meeting again after two months? Precisely to sum up experience and do political and ideological work well. When you go back, you have a great deal of political and ideological work to do.

The regional bureaus, provincial, prefectural and county committees should hold meetings of a dozen days or so and explain the problems clearly; but do not think that everything can be explained clearly. Some people say: "We understand the principles, but when we run into concrete problems we can't handle them well." At first I could not understand that: once the questions of principle are sorted out, how can concrete problems still be hard to handle? Now it seems there is some truth in it; I'm afraid it is still because political and ideological work has not been done well. After the last meeting, some places had no time to hold proper meetings when they went back. Seven or eight out of ten secretaries were receiving Red Guards, and in one rush everything was thrown into confusion. The students got angry, and they themselves did not even know it, nor were they prepared to answer questions; they thought it would be enough to speak for a few dozen minutes and express a welcome. The others were full of anger, and when they asked a few questions that could not be answered, you were put in a passive position. This passivity can be changed; passivity can be turned into initiative. So my confidence in this meeting has grown. I don't know how you feel? If you go back and keep to the old rules, maintain the status quo, set one faction of Red Guards in opposition and pull in another faction of Red Guards as bodyguards, things will not go well. I think there will be a change, and the situation will improve. Of course we cannot demand too much, that the broad mass of cadres in the regional bureaus, provinces, prefectures and counties all suddenly see the light. Not necessarily; there will always be some who don't get it, and a minority will be in opposition, but I believe the majority can be won over by reasoning.

I have talked about two things above:

The first was history, the history of seventeen years: the first and second lines were not unified; others are responsible, and I am responsible too.

The second was the five months of the Cultural Revolution. I lit the fire, and the time has been very rushed. Compared with the twenty-eight years of democratic revolution and the seventeen years of socialist revolution, it is a very short time, only five months. Less than half a year; it is understandable that people don't quite understand and have feelings of resistance. Why don't they understand? In the past you only dealt with industry, agriculture and transport; you just never dealt with a cultural revolution. Your Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the same, the Military Commission is the same. Something you never thought of has come; well, it has come. I think a jolt does some good. You hadn't thought for so many years, and with one jolt you started thinking. At worst you have made mistakes, some line error or other; correct it and that's the end of it. Who wants to overthrow you? I don't want to overthrow you either, and I don't think the Red Guards want to overthrow you.

Quite a lot of bulletins were issued at this meeting, and I read almost all of them. If you can't get through this test, I won't have an easy time either; if you are anxious, I am anxious too. The comrades cannot be blamed, because the time has been too short. Some comrades say they did not make mistakes deliberately but made them in confusion; that can be forgiven. Nor can Comrade Shaoqi and Comrade Xiaoping be blamed entirely. They bear responsibility, and the Centre bears responsibility too; the Centre did not manage things well either. The time was too short, there was no mental preparation for new problems, and political and ideological work was not done well. I think things will be somewhat better after this seventeen-day meeting.