Speeches at the Central Work Conference
Mao Zedong · Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
- Context
- Mao addressed senior Party officials at the Central Work Conference on October 24 and 25, 1966, accepting responsibility for the first and second line division and the Cultural Revolution's turmoil while urging cadres to self-criticise and engage the Red Guards.
- Main themes
- Self-criticism of veteran leaders, fear of the Red Guards, division into first and second lines, independent kingdoms in the Party, criticism of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, five months of the Cultural Revolution, big-character posters and great networking, treatment of the democratic parties, Sun Yat-sen centenary commemoration, political and ideological work by local committees, correcting line errors, comparison with the 28-year democratic revolution
- Duration
- ~29 min
- Words
- 3,422
- Sentences
- 233
- Readability
- 70
- Grade
- 7.2
- Syntax
- 2.71
- Vocabulary
- 2.09
Translated from Chinese Source: GitHub qinglee/maoxuan (毛泽东选集) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other233 sentences in 49 paragraphs
24 October 1966
(1)
What do you have to be afraid of? Have you read Li Xuefeng's bulletin? His two children went off to do revolutionary networking, and when they came back they lectured Li Xuefeng, saying: "Why are the veteran leaders here so afraid of the Red Guards? We haven't beaten you." You just won't make self-criticism!
Wu Xiuquan has four children, split into four factions. Lots of students go to his home, sometimes a few, sometimes a dozen or more. Once you have had more contact with them, there is nothing to be afraid of; you find them very lovable. If you want to educate people, the educator must first be educated. You cannot straighten out your thinking, you dare not meet the Red Guards, you do not tell the students the truth, you act like officials and lords. First you dare not meet them, then you dare not speak. After decades of making revolution, you are getting more and more stupid. Shaoqi's letter to Jiang Weiqing criticised Jiang Weiqing, said he was stupid. So is he himself so clever?
(Liu Lantao: The Red Guards are seizing files everywhere, digging into our historical problems. It has gone too far.)
What do you plan to do when you go back?
(Liu Lantao: I'll go back, see how things are, and then decide.)
You always speak so hesitantly.
(To Li Jingquan): How is that Liao Zhigao of yours in Sichuan doing now?
(Li Jingquan: At first he didn't quite understand, but for a while after the plenum he was rather better. Looking at his history, he has always been consistently correct.)
What consistently correct? Once the masses rose up, he slipped away, scared out of his wits, and went to live at the military region. When you go back, pull yourself together and do a proper job. But on no account admit to being anti-Party and anti-socialist. Overthrow the regional bureaus, the provincial and municipal committees, and let the students take over, would that work? Knowing nothing of industry or agriculture, having only read a few books, would that work?
Putting up big-character posters against Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping on the streets is not good. People must be allowed to make mistakes, allowed to make revolution, allowed to correct themselves. Let the Red Guards read *The True Story of Ah Q*.
As I see it, this meeting has gone rather better. At the last meeting things were poured in but did not sink in; there was no experience. This meeting had two months of experience, less than five months of experience in all. The democratic revolution took twenty-eight years, and how many mistakes were made?! How many people died?! The socialist revolution has gone on for seventeen years, the Cultural Revolution only five months; it will take at least five years to gain experience. One big-character poster, the Red Guards, the great networking. Nobody expected it, not even I expected it, and it left the provinces and cities in a state of "alas, all is lost". The students have made some mistakes too, but it is mainly we lords and masters who have made mistakes.
(To Li Xiannian): How did your meeting go today?
(Li Xiannian: The Institute of Finance and Economics says they will hold a denunciation meeting tomorrow. I wanted to make a self-criticism, but they wouldn't let me speak.)
Go and make your self-criticism again tomorrow, otherwise people will say you ran away.
(Li Xiannian: Tomorrow I'm going abroad.)
You should tell them. In the past it was "the third wife teaches her son"; now it is "the son teaches the third wife". I think you are a bit short on spirit. If they won't listen to your self-criticism, make it anyway. If they denounce you, admit your mistakes. The turmoil was started by the Centre; the responsibility lies with the Centre, and the localities bear responsibility too.
My responsibility lies in dividing things into a first line and a second line. Why did I divide them into first and second lines? First, my health was poor; second, there was the lesson of the Soviet Union. Malenkov was not mature; before Stalin died he did not hold power, and at every meeting it was just toasting and flattery. I wanted to build up their prestige before I died. I never imagined it would turn into its opposite.
(Tao Zhu: Power slipped into others' hands.)
I let power slip into others' hands deliberately, but not only were they not conscious of it, they set up independent kingdoms against me. On many matters they did not consult me: the land conference, the Tianjin speech, the Shanxi cooperatives, the rejection of investigation and research, the great promotion of Wang Guangmei. These should have been discussed by the Centre and settled by a resolution, but he (Liu Shaoqi) insisted on going his own way. Deng Xiaoping never came to see me. From 1959 to now, he has never come to see me about anything. I don't even know what the Secretariat and the Planning Commission are doing. In 1962, suddenly four vice-premiers, Li Fuchun, Tan Zhenlin, Li Xiannian and Bo Yibo, came to see me in Nanjing, and later in Tianjin. I agreed at once to what they wanted done, and then the four of them went back, but Deng Xiaoping just would not come. I was not satisfied with the Wuchang conference; the high targets left me helpless. At the meeting in Beijing, you met for six days, and when I wanted one day it was not allowed. It doesn't matter if you fail to fulfil a task; don't act as if you had lost your parents.
After the Zunyi Conference, the Centre was fairly centralised. After the Sixth Plenum in 1938, Xiang Ying and Peng Dehuai set up independent kingdoms; on those matters (the Southern Anhui Incident, the Hundred Regiments Campaign) they gave no notice. After the Seventh Congress, there were not many people at the Centre. When Hu Zongnan attacked Yan'an, the Centre split into two groups: I was in northern Shaanxi with Zhou Enlai and Ren Bishi, Liu Shaoqi and Zhu De were in North China, and it was still fairly centralised. After we entered the cities, things became dispersed, everyone doing things their own way, and after the division into first and second lines it became even more dispersed. After the financial and economic conference of 1953 I gave notice that everyone should keep each other informed, keep the Centre informed, keep the localities informed. Liu and Deng did things openly, not secretly; they are different from Peng Zhen. In the past Chen Duxiu, Zhang Guotao, Wang Ming, Luo Zhanglong and Li Lisan all did things openly; that doesn't matter. Gao Gang, Rao Shushi and Peng Dehuai were all double-dealers; Peng Dehuai got in league with them, and I didn't know. Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, Lu Dingyi and Yang Shangkun operated in secret, and those who operate in secret come to no good end.
Those who made line errors must correct them. Chen Duxiu, Wang Ming and Li Lisan did not correct theirs. Whatever the small clique, whatever the faction, shut the door on it tight; as long as people correct themselves and reach agreement, unity is good.
Liu and Deng must be allowed to make revolution, allowed to correct themselves. You say I am a smoother-over; I am indeed someone who smooths things over. At the Seventh Congress, Chen Qihan said those who had followed the Wang Ming line could not be elected to the Central Committee. Wang Ming and several others were all elected to the Central Committee. Now only Wang Ming has left; the others are still here! Luo Fu was no good. I have a good impression of Wang Jiaxiang; he supported the battle of Donggu. At the Ningdu Conference Luo Fu wanted to expel me, but Zhou, Zhu and the others disagreed. At the Zunyi Conference he played a good role; at that time we could not have done without them. Luo Fu was stubborn. Comrade Shaoqi opposed them, and Nie Rongzhen opposed them too. Liu Shaoqi cannot be written off entirely.
If you have made mistakes, correct them! Once you've corrected them, that's fine. Go back, pull yourselves together, and work boldly and without restraint. This meeting was held on my proposal. The time has been so short that I don't know whether things have got through, but it may be better than last time. I never imagined that one big-character poster, the Red Guards and the great networking would stir up such a huge affair. Some of the students do not have very good class backgrounds, but do all of us have good backgrounds? Don't recruit deserters and traitors. I have many Rightist friends, such as Zhou Gucheng and Zhang Zhizhong. How can a person not associate with a few Rightists? Where is there such purity? Associating with them is investigation and research, finding out what they are up to. That day on Tiananmen I made a point of pulling Li Zongren in beside me. This man is better left without a post than given one; better with no position and no power.
Do we want the democratic parties? Will one party do? The Party organisations in the schools cannot be restored too early. Many Party members were recruited after 1949. Jian Bozan, Wu Han and Li Da were all Party members; are they all so good? Are the democratic parties all so bad? I think the democratic parties are better than Peng, Luo, Lu and Yang. We still want the democratic parties, and we still want the CPPCC. Explain clearly to the Red Guards that China's democratic revolution was started by Sun Yat-sen. At that time there was no Communist Party; it was started under Sun Yat-sen's leadership, against Kang Youwei, against Liang Qichao, against the monarchy. This year is the hundredth anniversary of Sun Yat-sen's birth; how should we commemorate it? Discuss it with the Red Guards; we will still hold a commemorative meeting. My division into first and second lines turned into its opposite.
(Kang Sheng: The political report to the Eighth Congress was the theory of the dying out of class struggle.)
We read that report. It was adopted by the Congress; those two alone cannot be held responsible.
25 October 1966
(2)
Deng Xiaoping is deaf, yet whenever there is a meeting he sits far away from me. Since 1959, for six years he has not reported his work to me. For the work of the Secretariat he relied on Peng Zhen. Deng Xiaoping keeps me at a respectful distance.
As for my view of the situation: small at both ends, large in the middle. Those who put "daring" first are only in Henan; those who put "fear" first are the majority. Those who are really "anti" are still a minority. Genuine fourth-category cadres are only one, two or three per cent.
(Zhou Enlai: Now it has already far exceeded that.)
Don't be afraid if there are more; we will rehabilitate them later! Some who cannot work in their own area can be transferred to work elsewhere.
In Henan, one secretary handles production and the other five handle receptions. In the whole country only Liu Jianxun wrote a big-character poster supporting the minority faction. That is good.
25 October 1966
(3)
I will say a few words, about two things:
In the past seventeen years, there is one thing I think was not done well, and that is setting up the first and second lines. The original idea was out of concern for the security of the state, in view of the lesson of Stalin in the Soviet Union. We set up a first line and a second line; I was in the second line, other comrades in the first. Now it seems that was not so good. The result was great dispersal; once we entered the cities we could not stay centralised, and there were quite a number of independent kingdoms. That is why the Eleventh Plenum made a change. That is one thing. Previously I was in the second line and did not handle day-to-day work. I let others do many things, to build up their prestige, so that when I go to meet God the country would not suffer such a great upheaval. Everyone agreed with this idea. Later, the comrades in the first line handled some matters not so well. There were some matters I should have taken charge of and did not, so I am also responsible; they cannot be blamed entirely.
Why do I say I am also responsible?
First, dividing the Standing Committee into first and second lines and setting up the Secretariat was my proposal, and everyone agreed. Then, I trusted others too much. This matter put me on my guard at the time the Twenty-Three Articles were being drawn up. Nothing could be done in Beijing, and nothing could be done at the Centre either. In September and October last year I raised the question: if revisionism appears at the Centre, what are the localities to do? I felt that my views could not be carried out in Beijing. Why was the criticism of Wu Han launched not in Beijing but in Shanghai? Because there was no one in Beijing to do it. Now the Beijing problem has been solved.
The second thing: in the Cultural Revolution I caused a big disaster, namely approving Nie Yuanzi's big-character poster at Peking University, writing a letter to the Tsinghua University Middle School, and writing a big-character poster of my own, "Bombard the Headquarters". These things happened in a very short time: June, July, August, September, October, less than five months. No wonder comrades still don't understand so well. The time was very short and the momentum very fierce; I didn't anticipate it either. Once the Peking University poster was broadcast, the whole country was in an uproar. Before my letter to the Red Guards had even been sent, Red Guards across the whole country were on the move, and in one rush they knocked you all flat. I am the one who caused this big disaster. So it is no wonder you have complaints.
At the last meeting I had no confidence. I said that the decision once adopted would not necessarily be carried out, and sure enough many comrades still did not understand so well. Now, after two months, there is experience and things are a bit better. This meeting had two stages. In the first stage, people's speeches were not so normal; in the second stage, after the comrades of the Centre spoke and experience was exchanged, things went more smoothly and thinking got straightened out somewhat. The movement has only gone on for five months; it may take two five-month periods, perhaps a bit more.
The democratic revolution took twenty-eight years. When we began the democratic revolution, nobody knew how to make it, how to wage the struggle; only later did we work out some experience. The road too was found step by step through practice, summing up experience; it took twenty-eight years. The socialist revolution has also gone on for seventeen years, and the Cultural Revolution only five months, so we cannot demand that comrades all understand so well. Last year many comrades did not read the articles criticising Wu Han and did not pay much attention. Earlier, the criticism of *The Life of Wu Xun* and the criticism of *Studies of "A Dream of Red Mansions"* were handled case by case, and it never took hold. Without taking hold of the whole picture it won't work, and the responsibility for this lies with me. Handling things case by case, treating the head when the head aches and the foot when the foot aches, cannot solve the problem. In this Cultural Revolution, during the first few months, January, February, March, April, there were so many articles, and the Centre issued the (16 May) "Circular", yet it did not attract much attention. It was only when the big-character posters and the Red Guards burst in that it attracted attention, and you could not ignore it any more. When the revolution comes down on your own head, you hurry to sum up experience and do political and ideological work. Why hold this meeting again after two months? Precisely to sum up experience and do political and ideological work well. When you go back, you have a great deal of political and ideological work to do.
The regional bureaus, provincial, prefectural and county committees should hold meetings of a dozen days or so and explain the problems clearly; but do not think that everything can be explained clearly. Some people say: "We understand the principles, but when we run into concrete problems we can't handle them well." At first I could not understand that: once the questions of principle are sorted out, how can concrete problems still be hard to handle? Now it seems there is some truth in it; I'm afraid it is still because political and ideological work has not been done well. After the last meeting, some places had no time to hold proper meetings when they went back. Seven or eight out of ten secretaries were receiving Red Guards, and in one rush everything was thrown into confusion. The students got angry, and they themselves did not even know it, nor were they prepared to answer questions; they thought it would be enough to speak for a few dozen minutes and express a welcome. The others were full of anger, and when they asked a few questions that could not be answered, you were put in a passive position. This passivity can be changed; passivity can be turned into initiative. So my confidence in this meeting has grown. I don't know how you feel? If you go back and keep to the old rules, maintain the status quo, set one faction of Red Guards in opposition and pull in another faction of Red Guards as bodyguards, things will not go well. I think there will be a change, and the situation will improve. Of course we cannot demand too much, that the broad mass of cadres in the regional bureaus, provinces, prefectures and counties all suddenly see the light. Not necessarily; there will always be some who don't get it, and a minority will be in opposition, but I believe the majority can be won over by reasoning.
I have talked about two things above:
The first was history, the history of seventeen years: the first and second lines were not unified; others are responsible, and I am responsible too.
The second was the five months of the Cultural Revolution. I lit the fire, and the time has been very rushed. Compared with the twenty-eight years of democratic revolution and the seventeen years of socialist revolution, it is a very short time, only five months. Less than half a year; it is understandable that people don't quite understand and have feelings of resistance. Why don't they understand? In the past you only dealt with industry, agriculture and transport; you just never dealt with a cultural revolution. Your Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the same, the Military Commission is the same. Something you never thought of has come; well, it has come. I think a jolt does some good. You hadn't thought for so many years, and with one jolt you started thinking. At worst you have made mistakes, some line error or other; correct it and that's the end of it. Who wants to overthrow you? I don't want to overthrow you either, and I don't think the Red Guards want to overthrow you.
Quite a lot of bulletins were issued at this meeting, and I read almost all of them. If you can't get through this test, I won't have an easy time either; if you are anxious, I am anxious too. The comrades cannot be blamed, because the time has been too short. Some comrades say they did not make mistakes deliberately but made them in confusion; that can be forgiven. Nor can Comrade Shaoqi and Comrade Xiaoping be blamed entirely. They bear responsibility, and the Centre bears responsibility too; the Centre did not manage things well either. The time was too short, there was no mental preparation for new problems, and political and ideological work was not done well. I think things will be somewhat better after this seventeen-day meeting.
The original Chinese. The tags above are read on the English translation's sentences.
一九六六年十月二十四日
(一)
你们有什么可怕的呢?你们看了李雪峰的简报没有?他的两个孩子跑出去搞串连,回来教育李雪峰说:“我们这里的老首长为什么那么害怕红卫兵呢?我们又没打你们。”你们就是不检讨!
伍修权有四个孩子,分为四派。有很多同学到他家里去,有时几个人或十几个人。接触多了,就没有什么可怕的了,觉得他们很可爱。自己要教育人,教育者应先受教育。你们思想搞不通,不敢见红卫兵,不和学生说真话,做官当老爷。先不敢见面,后不敢说话。革了几十年的命,越来越蠢了。少奇给江渭清的信,批评了江渭清,说他蠢,他自己就聪明了?
(刘澜涛:红卫兵到处抢档案,查我们的历史问题,搞得大过火了。)
你回去打算怎么办?
(刘澜涛:回去看看再说。)
你说话总是那么吞吞吐吐。
(问李井泉):你们四川那个廖志高现在怎么样啊?
(李井泉:开始不大通,全会后一段时间比较好了,从历史上看,他还是一贯正确的。)
什么一贯正确?群众起来后你自己就溜了,吓得魂不附体,跑到军区去住。回去要振作精神,好好搞一搞。但万万不能承认反党反社会主义,把中央局、省、市委都打倒,让他们学生来接班,行吗?不知工农业,只读一点书,行吗?
把刘少奇、邓小平的大字报贴到大街上去不好,要允许人家犯错误,要允许人家革命,允许改嘛。让红卫兵看看《阿Q正传》。
依我看,这次会开得比较好些。上次会是灌而不进,没有经验。这次会议有了两个月的经验,一共不到五个月的经验。民主革命搞了二十八年,犯了多少错误?!死了多少人?!社会主义革命搞了十七年,文化革命只搞了五个月,最少得五年才能得出经验。一张大字报,一个红卫兵,一个大串联,谁也没料到,连我也没料到,弄得各省市“呜呼哀哉”。学生也犯了一些错误,主要是我们这些老爷们犯了错误。
(问李先念)你们今天会开得怎样?
(李先念:财经学院说,他们明天要开声讨会。我要检查,他们不让我说话)
你明天还去检查,不然人家说你溜了。
(李先念:明天我要出国。)
你要告诉他们一下。过去是“三娘教子”,现在是“子教三娘”。我看你精神有点不足。他们不听你们检讨,你们就偏检讨。他们声讨,你们就承认错误。乱子是中央闹起来的,责任在中央,地方也有责任。
我的责任是分一、二线。为什么分一、二线呢?一是身体不好,二是苏联的教训。马林科夫不成熟,在斯大林死前没有当权,每次会议都只是敬酒、吹吹捧捧。我想在我没死之前,树立他们的威信,没有想到反面。
(陶铸:大权旁落。)
这是我故意大权旁落,可他们不但不自觉,反而和我闹独立王国,许多事情不与我商量,如土地会议、天津讲话、山西合作社、否定调查研究、大捧王光美。本来应经中央讨论作个决议就好了,可是他(刘少奇)偏要自行其是。邓小平从来不找我,从一九五九年到现在,什么事情都不找我。书记处、计委干什么我也不知道。六二年,忽然四个副总理就是李富春、谭震林、李先念、薄一波到南京来找我,后又到天津,他们要办的事情我马上答应,后来,四个人又回去了,可邓小平就是不来。武昌会议我不满意,高指标弄得我毫无办法。到北京开会,你们开了六天,我要开一天还不行,完不成任务不要紧,不要如丧考妣。
遵义会议以后,中央比较集中。三八年六中全会以后,项英、彭德怀搞独立王国,那些事情(皖南事变、百团大战)都不打招呼。七大后中央没有几个人,胡宗南进攻延安,中央分两路,我同周恩来、任弼时在陕北,刘少奇、朱德在华北,还比较集中。进城以后就分散了,各搞一套,特别分一线、二线后,就更分散了。一九五三年财经会议以后,就打过招呼,要大家互相通气,向中央通气,向地方通气。刘、邓两人是搞公开的,不是秘密的,与彭真不同。过去陈独秀、张国焘、王明、罗章龙、李立三都是搞公开的,这不要紧。高岗、饶漱石、彭德怀都是搞两面手法,彭德怀与他们勾结上了,我不知道。彭真、罗瑞卿、陆定一、杨尚昆是搞秘密的,搞秘密的没有好下场。
犯路线错误的要改,陈独秀、王明、李立三没改。不管什么小集团,什么门头,都要关紧关严,只要改过来,意见一致,团结就好。
要允许刘、邓革命,允许改。你们说我是和稀泥,我就是和稀泥的人。七大时,陈其涵说不能把犯王明路线的选为中央委员。王明和其他几个人都选上中央委员了。现在只走了一个王明,其他人还在嘛!洛甫不好,王稼祥我有好感,东崮一战他是赞成的。宁都会议洛甫要开除我,周、朱他们不同意,遵义会议他起了好作用,那个时候没有他们不行,洛甫是顽固的,少奇同志是反对他们的,聂荣臻也是反对他们的。对刘少奇不能一笔抹煞。
你们有错就改嘛!改了就行,回去振作精神,大胆放手工作。这次会议是我建议开的,时间这样短,不知是否通,可能比上次好。我没想到一张大字报,一个红卫兵,一个大串联就闹起来了这么大的事。学生有些出身不太好的,难道我们出身都好吗?不要招降纳叛,我的右派朋友很多,如周谷城、张治中,一个人不去接近几个右派,那怎么行呢?哪有那么干净?接近他们就是调查研究嘛,了解他们的动态。那天在天安门上我特意把李宗仁拉在一起,这个人不安置比安置好,无职无权好。
民主党派要不要?一个党行不行?学校党组织不能恢复太早。一九四九年以后发展的党员很多,翦伯赞、吴晗、李达都是党员,都那么好吗?民主党派都那么坏?我看民主党派比彭罗陆杨就好。民主党派还要,政协也还要,同红卫兵讲清楚,中国的民主革命是孙中山搞起来的,那时没有共产党,是孙中山领导搞起来的,反康、反梁、反帝制。今年是孙中山诞生一百周年,怎样纪念呢?和红卫兵商量一下,还要开纪念会。我的分一线、二线走向反面。
(康生说:八大政治报告是阶级斗争熄灭论。)
报告我们看了,这是大会通过的,不能单叫他们两个负责。
一九六六年十月二十五日
(二)
邓小平(虽然)耳朵聋,(但)一开会就在我很远的地方坐着。一九五九年以来,六年不向我汇报工作,书记处的工作他就抓彭真。邓小平对我是敬而远之。
对形势的看法,两头小,中间大,“敢”字当头的只有河南,“怕”字当头的占多数。真正“反”字的还是少数。真正四类干部也就是百分之一、二、三。
(周恩来:现在已经大大超过了。)
多了不怕,将来平反嘛!有的不能在本地工作,可以调到别的地方工作。
河南一个书记搞生产,其余五个书记搞接待。全国只有刘建勋写了一张大字报,支持少数派,这是好的。
一九六六年十月二十五日
(三)
讲几句话,两件事:
十七年来,有一件事我看做得不好,就是搞一、二线。原来的意思是考虑到国家的安全,鉴于苏联斯大林的教训,搞了一线二线,我处在二线,别的同志在一线。现在看来不那么好,结果很分散,一进城就不能集中了,相当多的独立王国,所以十一中全会作了改变,这是一件事。以前,我处在二线,不主持日常工作,许多事让别人去搞,培养别人的威信,以便我见上帝的时候,国家不会出现那么大的震动,大家赞成这个意见,后来处在一线的同志,有些事情处理得不那么好。有些应当我抓的事情,我没有抓,所以,我也有责任,不能完全怪他们。
为什么说我也有责任呢?
第一,常委分一、二线,搞书记处,是我提议的,大家同意了。再嘛是过于信任别人了。这件事引起警惕,还是在制定二十三条那个时候。北京就是没有办法,中央也没有办法。去年九、十月提出中央出了修正主义,地方怎么办?我就感到我的意见在北京不能实行。为什么批判吴晗不在北京发起,而在上海发起呢?因为北京没有人办。现在北京问题解决了。
第二件事,文化大革命闯了一个大祸,就是批了北大聂元梓一张大字报,给清华附中写了一封信,还有我自己写了一张《炮打司令部》的大字报。这几件事,时间很短,六、七、八、九、十,五个月不到,难怪同志们还不那么理解。时间很短,来势很猛,我也没有料到。北大大字报一广播,全国都闹起来了,红卫兵信还没有发出,全国红卫兵都动起来了,一冲就把你们冲了个不亦乐乎。我这个人闯了这么个大祸。所以你们有怨言,也是难怪的。
上次开会我是没有信心的,说过决定通过了不一定能执行,果然很多同志还是不那么理解。现在经过两个月了,有了经验,好一点了。这次会议两个阶段,头一个阶段,大家发言都不那么正常,后一个阶段经中央同志讲话,交流经验,就比较顺了,思想就通了一些。运动只搞五个月,可能要搞两个五个月,也许还要多一点。
民主革命搞了二十八年,开始搞民主革命,谁也不知道怎么个革法,斗争怎么斗争法,以后才摸出一些经验。路也是一步一步从实践中走出来的,总结经验,搞了二十八年嘛。社会主义革命也搞了十七年,文化革命只有五个月嘛,所以就不能要求同志们都就那么理解。去年批判吴晗的文章,许多同志不去看,不那么管。以前批判《武训传》,批判《红楼梦研究》,是个别抓,抓不起来,不全盘抓不行,这个责任在我。个别抓,头痛医头,脚痛医脚,是不能解决问题的。这次文化大革命,前几个月,一、二、三、四月用那么多文章,中央又发了(五·一六)“通知”,可是并没有引起多大注意,还是大字报、红卫兵一冲,引起注意,不注意不行了。革命革到自己头上来了,赶快总结经验,做政治思想工作,为什么两个月之后又开这个会?就是总结经验,做好政治思想工作。你们回去以后有大量的政治思想工作要做。
中央局、省委、地委、县委召开十几天会,把问题讲清楚,也不要以为所有都能讲清楚。有人说,“原则通了,碰到具体问题处理不好。”原来我想不通,原则问题搞通了,具体问题还不好处理?现在看来还是有点道理,恐怕还是政治思想工作没有作好。上次开会回去,有些地方没有来得及很好开会,十个书记有七、八个接待红卫兵,一冲就冲乱了,学生们生了气,自己还不知道,也没有准备回答问题,还以为几十分钟讲一讲,表示欢迎就可以了。人家一肚子气,几个问题一问不能回答就被动了。这个被动是可以改变的,可以变被动为主动的。所以我对这次会议信心增强了。不知你们怎么样?如果回去还是老章程,维护现状,让一派红卫兵对立,拉另一派红卫兵保驾,就搞不好。我看会改变,情况会好转。当然不能过多地要求中央局、省、地、县广大干部全部都那么豁然贯通。不一定,总有那么一些人不通,有少数人是要对立的,但是我相信多数讲得通的。
上面讲了两件事情:
第一件事讲历史,讲十七年历史,一线二线不统一,别人有责任,我也有责任。
第二件事,五个月文化大革命,火是我点起来的,时间很仓促。与二十八年民主革命和十七年社会主义革命比起来,时间是很短的,只有五个月。不到半年,不那么通,有抵触情绪,是可以理解的。为什么不通!你们过去只搞工业、农业、交通,就是没有搞文化大革命,你们外交部也一样,军委也一样。你们没有想到的事情来了,来了就来了,我看冲一下有好处,多少年没有想,一冲就想了。无非是犯错误,什么路线错误,改了就算了,谁要打倒你们!我也是不想打倒你们,我看红卫兵也不要打倒你们。
这次会议发的简报不少,我几乎全部看了。你们过不了关,我也不好过,你们着急,我也着急,不能怪同志们,因为时间太短。有的同志说不是有心犯错误,是糊里糊涂犯了错误,可以原谅,也不能完全怪少奇同志和小平同志,他们有责任,中央也有责任,中央也没有管好,时间太短,新的问题没有精神准备,政治思想工作没有做好,我看十七天会议以后会好一些。