Speeches at the Opening and Closing Sessions of the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China

China Mao Zedong · Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

1 April 1969 · Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China

Context
Mao addressed the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China at its opening session on 1 April 1969 and its closing session on 28 April 1969, calling for unity, continued revolution and preparation for war.
Main themes
Unity and victory at the Ninth Party Congress, history of the Party's congresses since 1921, errors of the Wang Ming line, Liu Shaoqi and the old line, Cultural Revolution as second revolution, continuing socialist revolution, Soviet revisionist attacks, preparation for war, rectifying and rebuilding the Party, leniency toward cadres who made mistakes, factory leadership and the February Seventh Works, contradictions among the people in the provinces
Duration
~28 min
80th percentile
Words
3,336
80th percentile
Sentences
214
90th percentile
Readability
67
96th percentile
Grade
7.8
4th percentile
Syntax
2.74
16th percentile
Vocabulary
1.98
9th percentile

Translated from Chinese Source: GitHub qinglee/maoxuan (毛泽东选集) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 50%48%
  • Social 24%23%
  • Geopolitical 15%14%
  • Economic 7%7%
  • Ceremonial 5%5%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 4%

214 sentences in 30 paragraphs

Speech at the Opening Session on 1 April 1969

(1)

Comrades!

The Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China is now open.

I hope that our congress will go well, that it will be a congress of unity, a congress of victory.

Our Party, from its founding in 1921 to this year, has existed for as long as forty-eight years. The First Congress had only twelve delegates. Of those, two are still here among us: one is Comrade Dong, and the other is me. Several of the delegates gave their lives: the Shandong delegates Wang Jinmei and Deng Enming, the Hubei delegate Chen Tanqiu, the Hunan delegate He Shuheng, the Shanghai delegate Li Hanjun, all of them sacrificed. Those who turned traitor, who became collaborators with the Japanese and counter-revolutionaries, were four: Chen Gongbo, Zhou Fohai, Zhang Guotao and Liu Renjing, and the last two are still alive. There was also one called Li Da, who died a couple of years ago. At that time the Party had only a few dozen members in the whole country, most of them intellectuals. Later it grew. At the First, Second, Third and Fourth Congresses, very few delegates attended each time, a dozen or so, twenty-odd. The Fifth Congress was held in Wuhan, with rather more people, a few hundred. The Sixth Congress was held in Moscow, with several dozen delegates; Comrade Enlai and Comrade Bocheng took part.

The Seventh Congress was held in Yan'an, and it was a congress of unity. At that time there were also divisions within the Party, because of the errors of Qu Qiubai, Li Lisan and Wang Ming, especially the Wang Ming line. At that time some people proposed not electing the comrades of the Wang Ming line to the Central Committee; we did not agree, and we persuaded them to vote for them. And the result? The result was that a few turned out bad: Wang Ming ran off abroad to oppose us, Li Lisan was no good either, Zhang Wentian and Wang Jiaxiang made mistakes, just these few. Some others, such as Liu Shaoqi, and people like Peng Zhen and Bo Yibo, we did not know they were bad, we were not clear about their political histories, and they were elected too. From the Eighth Congress up to now, things have become fairly clear. On the political line, on the organizational line, in ideology, things have become fairly clear. Therefore we hope that this congress can be a congress of unity. On the basis of this unity, can we win victory? As for this congress itself, can it be a congress of victory? After the congress, can we win still greater victories throughout the country? I think we can. It can be a congress of unity, a congress of victory, and after the congress we can win still greater victories throughout the country!

11 April 1969

(2)

When the Republic was founded, socialism began, but we did not announce it; we announced it gradually only after land reform. Was land reform thorough? It was not all that thorough. In some places there was peaceful land reform. Towards the national bourgeoisie, the policy was to use, restrict and transform.

Within a few years, the principal contradiction in the country was the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. This was pointed out, but it was not talked about regularly, so the broad mass of cadres did not know it, and so this time there came a second revolution, called the Cultural Revolution. It started from culture; should it be called a great revolution? Let historians work that out later. Calling it the Cultural Revolution is fine too; any name will do. It is aimed mainly at the superstructure, at offices, schools and factories. This work is not yet finished, and I am afraid it will have to be seriously taken in hand for some time yet.

(3) (28 April 1969) Speech at the Closing Session

What I have to say are old words, things everyone knows; there is nothing new. It is simply about unity, and the purpose of uniting is to win still greater victories. Now the Soviet revisionists are attacking us: broadcasts from TASS, Wang Ming's material, and the long-winded pieces in *Kommunist*, saying we are now not a proletarian party, calling us a "petty-bourgeois party." They say we have practised centralization, gone back to the era of the old base areas, which is to say we have regressed. What do they mean by centralization? They say it is a military-bureaucratic system. In the Japanese wording it's called a "system"; in the Soviet wording it's called a "military-bureaucratic dictatorship." They look at our list of names and see quite a few military men, and that's what they call "military"; and then there's the "bureaucratic" part, which presumably means "bureaucrats" like me, Enlai, Kang Sheng, Chen Boda and that lot. In short, any of you who isn't a military man belongs to the "bureaucratic" system, that's all! That's why they call it a "military-bureaucratic dictatorship." As for these words, I say let them talk! Whatever they want to say, let them say it. But there's one peculiar thing: they don't call us a bourgeois party, they call us a "petty-bourgeois party." Whereas we say that theirs is a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, a restoration of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.

When we talk about victory, we must guarantee that, under the leadership of the proletariat, we unite the broad masses of the people of the whole country to win victory. The socialist revolution must still continue. In this revolution there are still some things that haven't been finished and must still be carried on now, for example struggle-criticism-transformation. After a number of years, perhaps we will have to make revolution again.

Several of us old comrades spent a period looking around in factories. I hope that in future, when you have the chance, you too will go down and look, and study the problems in the various factories. It seems the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution had to be carried out; our foundation is not solid. According to my observation, not in all of them, and not in the overwhelming majority, but I am afraid in a fairly large majority of factories, leadership is not in the hands of genuine Marxists, not in the hands of the masses of workers. Among those who led the factories in the past, it isn't that there were no good people.

There were good people: among Party committee secretaries, deputy secretaries and committee members there were good people, and among branch secretaries there were good people. But they followed the old line of Liu Shaoqi, which was nothing but material incentives, putting profit in command, not promoting proletarian politics, handing out bonuses and so on. Now in some factories these people have already been liberated and have taken part in three-in-one combination leadership; in some factories not yet. But there really are bad people in the factories. Take the February Seventh Works, that is, the Changxindian railway locomotive and rolling stock repair works. It's a big factory, eight thousand workers, tens of thousands with their families. In the past the Kuomintang had nine district sub-branches there, the Three People's Principles Youth League had three organizations, and there were another eight special-agent organizations of some kind. Of course this has to be analysed, because in those days you couldn't get by without joining that Kuomintang thing! Some are old workers; are we going to throw out all the old workers? That won't do either. We should distinguish degrees of seriousness. Some were nominal members of the Kuomintang who had no choice but to join; a talk with them is enough. Some bore a bit more responsibility. A small number burrowed in deep and did bad things. Several kinds of situations must be distinguished. Those who did bad things must be distinguished too: leniency for those who confess, severity for those who resist. If they now examine themselves well, they should still be allowed to work, though of course not in leadership work. If these people aren't allowed to work, what are they to do at home? What about their children? Moreover, old workers generally have skills, even if some of their skills aren't all that brilliant.

I give this example to show that the revolution is not finished. So all comrades of the Central Committee, including alternate members, please pay attention and do your work meticulously. In matters like this you must be meticulous; being sloppy won't do, sloppiness often leads to mistakes. In some places too many people have been arrested; this is not good. If you arrest too many people, what are you arresting them for? They haven't killed anyone, haven't committed arson, haven't poisoned anyone. I say as long as none of these things apply, don't arrest them. As for committing capitalist-roader errors, all the more reason not to arrest them. In the factories, let them work, have them take part in the mass movement. People who made mistakes made them in the past, either joining the Kuomintang, or doing some bad things, or making mistakes in the recent period, the so-called capitalist roaders. They should be with the masses; if they aren't allowed to be with the masses, that is bad. Some people have been locked up for two years, locked in "cowsheds," and know nothing of what's happening in the world. When they come out and listen, what they say is out of step; they're still talking the way people talked two years ago. They've been cut off from two years of life. These people must be helped. Study classes must be run for them, and they must be told the history, the history of the two years of the Cultural Revolution, so that they gradually come to their senses.

Unite for one goal, that is, to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat, and this must be carried down to every factory, village, office and school. At the start, don't spread it across the board; you can spread it out, but don't spread it out and then stop paying attention. Don't let it go for half a year or longer with nobody seeing to it. Experience must be summed up factory by factory, school by school, office by office. That's why Comrade Lin Biao's report says it must be done factory by factory, school by school, commune by commune, Party branch by Party branch, unit by unit. And also Youth League branch by Youth League branch; the question of rectifying the League has been raised too.

Apart from this, as has been said before, we must prepare for war. Whatever the year, we must prepare for war. People ask: what if they don't come? Whether they come or not, we should prepare. Don't make it so that even manufacturing hand grenades requires the Centre to allocate materials. Hand grenades can be made anywhere; every province can make them. Rifles, light weapons, every province can make those. This is speaking of material preparation. But the main thing is spiritual preparation. Spiritual preparation means having the spirit of being ready to fight. Not only our Central Committee, but the majority of the whole people must be spiritually prepared. What I'm saying here doesn't include the objects of dictatorship, that lot of landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries and bad elements. Because that lot would be delighted to see the imperialists and revisionists attack; they think if there's an attack, the world will be turned over and they can turn things over in their favour. We must be prepared for that too.

In the course of the socialist revolution, this revolution must still be made.

If others attack us, we will not go out to fight. We will not go out to fight. I say don't be provoked; even if you invite me, I won't go. But if you attack, then I'll have to deal with you. It depends whether you fight a small war or a big war. A small war, we fight at the border. A big war, I am for yielding some ground. China is not a small place. If he doesn't get some advantage, I don't think he'll come in. We must let the whole world see that our fighting is justified and advantageous. If he comes in, I think that's rather advantageous: not only justified, but advantageous, easy to fight, getting him bogged down in the encirclement of the people. As for aircraft, tanks, armoured cars and the like, experience everywhere now proves they can be dealt with.

To win victory, we need more people, isn't that so? People from all sides, no matter which mountain stronghold or which province you're from, whether north or south, is it better to unite more people or fewer? It's always better to unite more people. Some people's views may not be the same as ours, but that is not a relationship between ourselves and the enemy. I just don't believe, to take a concrete case, that Yang Dezhi and Wang Xiaoyu are in an enemy relationship. Is the relationship between you two an enemy relationship or one among the people? As I see it, it's squabbling among the people. The Centre has had a bit of bureaucratism too, hasn't paid much attention to you, and you haven't brought it to the Centre for discussion either. A province as big as Shandong, it's a contradiction among the people. Take this opportunity and talk it over, all right? I think East China also has this problem among the people. And Shanxi, also among the people: you back one faction, I back another, why keep quarrelling like that! Then there's the problem of Yunnan, Guizhou and Sichuan. Every place has some problems, more or less, that's all; but it's much better compared with last year and the year before. You there, comrade, aren't you called Xu Shiyou? The year before last, when we were in Shanghai, things were terrible, those three months, July, August, September. Now life is a bit easier, isn't it! I'm speaking of the overall situation. That Nanjing of yours, out popped some "Red General" outfit, and as a result of the work done, they ended up cooperating, didn't they: one "August 27," one "Red General," and didn't they end up cooperating?

I say the main problem is still our work. Didn't we once say two sentences? The problem in the localities lies in the army; the problem in the army lies in work. It's not a mortal feud, so why bother? If we're going to talk about personal grudges, there are too many accounts to settle. All in all, I think there was no enmity in your previous lives and no feud in this one; you ran into each other and some of your opinions didn't match. Someone criticized you, or opposed you, and you hit back, and the result was a contradiction. People who oppose you are not necessarily bad people.

One of the figures in Beijing that people were always wanting to overthrow was called Xie Fuzhi. Later the policy he adopted was this: whenever he saw groups that wanted to overthrow him, he told them, you're all right.

And those who support you are not necessarily all good.

So what I'm saying is still those few old words, simply: unite and win still greater victories. There is concrete content in this: what work to do, what concrete victories, how to unite.

I have confidence in some of the old comrades who made mistakes in the past. Originally there was a big list of thirty-odd names, and we thought it would be good to elect them all to the Political Bureau. Later someone put forward a small list, a dozen or so, and that was felt to be too small. Most people were in the middle; they opposed the big list and also opposed the small list, and favoured a medium list of twenty-odd people, so we had no choice but to elect representatives. It's not that alternate members of the Central Committee are inferior to full members in political level, in working ability, in virtue, talent and seniority, that's not the issue. There is some unfairness in this. If you say it's all that fair, I don't think it's all that fair, not all that just.

Everyone must be cautious and careful, whether alternate members of the Central Committee, members of the Central Committee or members of the Political Bureau, all must be cautious and careful. Don't let yourselves get carried away in a moment of excitement and forget who you are. Ever since Marx, there has never been any haggling over the size of one's merits. You are Communist Party members, the more conscious section of the whole mass of the people, the more conscious section of the proletariat. So I am in favour of the slogan "first, fear no hardship; second, fear no death," and not in favour of the slogan "if not merit, then at least toil; if not toil, then at least fatigue." That slogan is opposed to "first, fear no hardship; second, fear no death." Look how many of us died in the past. We old comrades who are still here are survivors, alive by chance. Comrade Pi Dingjun, how many people did you have back in that Hubei-Henan-Anhui period? How many were left afterwards? There were a great many people then; not so many are still alive now. Back then, the Jiangxi soviet area, the Jinggangshan soviet area, northeastern Jiangxi, western Fujian, western Hunan-Hubei, northern Shaanxi, through the fighting there were great sacrifices, and not many of the old people survived. That is what is called "first, fear no hardship; second, fear no death." For many years we had no salary to speak of, no eight-grade wage system. There was just a fixed ration for food: three qian of oil, five qian of salt and a jin and a half of rice, and that was considered a lot. As for vegetables? Where a great army is passing through, how could you get vegetables to eat everywhere?

Now we have entered the cities. Entering the cities was a good thing; if we hadn't, Chiang Kai-shek would have held on to these places. But entering the cities was also a bad thing, because it made our Party not so good. So some foreigners and journalists say that our Party is being rebuilt. Now we ourselves have also put forward this slogan, rectifying and building the Party. In fact it does need rebuilding. Every branch must be rectified anew among the masses. It must go through the masses, not just a few Party members; masses from outside the Party must take part in the meetings and take part in the appraisal. Individuals who really won't do should be persuaded to leave. A very small number may have to be given disciplinary sanctions, as laid down in the Party Constitution, isn't that so? And this must go through a general meeting of the branch and be approved by the higher level. In short, cautious methods must be adopted. It must be done, it absolutely must be done, but cautious methods must be adopted.

This National Congress seems to have gone well. As I see it, it has been a congress of unity, a congress of victory. We adopted the method of issuing communiqués. Now foreigners can't get any news about us and say we're holding secret meetings. We are both open and secret. These journalists in Beijing, I don't think they're up to much either; we've probably pretty much rooted out the traitors and spies they had mixed in among us. In the past, every time a meeting was held, it leaked out right away, and the Red Guard tabloids were all over it. Ever since Wang, Guan and Qi, and Yang, Yu and Fu fell from power, they don't know the news from the Centre anymore.