We Must Learn to Do Economic Work

China Mao Zedong · Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

10 January 1945 · Conference of Labour Heroes and Model Workers of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region

Context
Mao addressed labour heroes and model workers of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region on January 10, 1945, urging them to master economic work and make the Border Region and Liberated Areas self-sufficient within two to three years.
Main themes
Learning economic work, self-sufficiency in grain and manufactured goods, army and people's production movement, roles of labour heroes and model workers, warning against arrogance, rural guerrilla environment, rent and interest reduction, mutual aid in labour, three standards of army self-sufficiency, self-reliance versus foreign aid, thrift and long-term planning
Duration
~23 min
73rd percentile
Words
2,796
73rd percentile
Sentences
105
65th percentile
Readability
51
66th percentile
Grade
12.7
54th percentile
Syntax
3.19
71st percentile
Vocabulary
1.98
8th percentile

Translated from Chinese Source: GitHub qinglee/maoxuan (毛泽东选集) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 64%63%
  • Institutional 13%12%
  • Geopolitical 11%10%
  • Social 8%8%
  • Ceremonial 5%5%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 2%

105 sentences in 23 paragraphs

Labour heroes and model workers!

You have held your conference and summed up your experience, and everyone welcomes you and respects you. You have three strong points, and you have played three roles. The first is the role of taking the lead. That is, because you have worked especially hard and made many innovations, your work has become a model for people in general, has raised the standards of work and has prompted everyone to learn from you. The second is the role of backbone. Most of you are not yet cadres, but you are already the backbone of the masses, the core of the masses, and with you it is easier to push the work forward. In the future you may become cadres; you are now the reserve force of cadres. The third is the role of bridge. You are the bridge between the leadership above and the broad masses below; the opinions of the masses are passed up through you, and the opinions from above are passed down through you.

You have many strong points and great merit, but you must on no account become arrogant. It is right that you are respected by everyone, but this can also easily give rise to arrogance. If you become arrogant, are not modest, cease to make efforts, do not respect others, do not respect the cadres, do not respect the masses, then you will cease to be heroes and models. There have been some such people in the past, and I hope you will not follow their example.

Your experience has been summed up by this conference. The summary document is very good; it applies not only here but can be applied in other places as well, so I shall not talk about these matters. I would like to say something about our economic work.

In the past few years we have begun to learn economic work, and we have achieved great successes in economic work, but this is still only the beginning. Within two or three years we must make the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and the Liberated Areas behind the enemy lines wholly or largely self-sufficient in grain and manufactured goods, and even have a surplus. We must achieve still greater successes in agriculture, industry and trade than we have now. Only then can we say we have learned more and learned better. If in any place the life of the army and the people has not improved, the material basis being prepared for the counter-offensive is still not secure, and agriculture, industry and trade are not rising year by year but are at a standstill or even declining, that proves that the Party, government and army personnel in that place have still not learned economic work, and that place will run into enormous difficulties.

There is one question to which everyone's attention must once again be drawn, and that is that our thinking must suit the environment in which we now find ourselves. The environment in which we now find ourselves is the countryside. This seems to raise no question at all; who does not know that we are in the countryside? In fact, it is not so. Many of our comrades, although they live in the countryside day after day and even think they understand the countryside, do not really understand it, or at least do not understand it deeply. They do not start from the fact that this is a rural environment based on an individual economy, cut up by the enemy and therefore also one of guerrilla warfare, and so in political questions, military questions, economic questions, cultural questions, Party affairs, and questions of the workers' movement, the peasant movement, the youth movement, the women's movement and so on, they often handle matters inappropriately, or not quite appropriately. They deal with the countryside from an urban point of view, subjectively draw up many inappropriate plans, enforce them by compulsion, and often run up against a wall. In recent years, thanks to the rectification movement and to having run into snags in their work, our comrades have made much progress. But we must still take care to make our thinking fully suit the environment in which we find ourselves; only then can we make every piece of our work effective, and quickly effective. If we truly understand that the environment in which we find ourselves is that of rural base areas based on an individual economy, cut up by the enemy and therefore also engaged in guerrilla warfare, and if everything we do starts from this point, then the results may seem very slow and not spectacular at all; but in reality, compared with starting not from this point but from some other point, for example from an urban point of view, how would the results of our work turn out? They would by no means be very slow; on the contrary, they would be very fast. For if we started from the latter point, divorced from today's actual conditions, then in practice it would not be a question of whether results came fast or slow, but a question of constantly running into snags and getting no results at all.

For example, the great results achieved by the production movement of the army and the people that we have promoted in its present form are clear proof of this.

We want to strike at the Japanese aggressors, and we also want to prepare to attack and enter the cities and recover lost territory. But we are in a rural environment of individual economy, cut up, engaged in guerrilla warfare; how can we achieve this aim? We cannot follow the example of the Kuomintang, which does nothing itself and relies entirely on foreigners, depending on foreign countries even for daily necessities such as cotton cloth. We stand for self-reliance. We hope for foreign aid, but we cannot depend on it; we rely on our own efforts, on the creative power of the whole army and the whole people. Then what methods are there? We use the method of launching a large-scale production movement among both the army and the people at the same time.

Because this is the countryside, manpower and material resources are scattered, and so in production and supply we adopt the policy of "unified leadership and decentralized management".

Because this is the countryside, the peasants are scattered individual producers using backward tools of production, most of the land is still owned by landlords, and the peasants suffer feudal exploitation through land rent; in order to raise the peasants' interest in production and the productivity of agricultural labour, we adopt the two policies of reducing rent and interest and organizing mutual aid in labour. Rent reduction has raised the peasants' interest in production, and mutual aid in labour has raised the productivity of agricultural labour. I have received material from various places in north and central China, and all of it says that after rent reduction the peasants' interest in production has greatly increased, they are willing to organize mutual-aid groups like our labour-exchange teams here, and three people can do the work of four. If so, ninety million people can do the work of one hundred and twenty million. There are also cases where two people can do the work of three. If, instead of the policy of coercion and commandism, of haste that makes waste, we adopt the policy of patient persuasion and demonstration by example, then within a few years it may be possible to organize the majority of the peasants into mutual-aid groups for agricultural and handicraft production. Once such production groups become a habit, not only will output greatly increase and all kinds of innovations emerge, but politics will also progress, culture will rise, attention will be paid to hygiene, loafers will be reformed and customs will change; and before long the tools of production will be improved too. By that time our rural society will, step by step, be built on new foundations.

If our working personnel study this work with care and help the rural people develop the production movement with the greatest energy, within a few years the countryside will have abundant grain and daily necessities, and we shall be able not only to keep up the fight and cope with famine years, but also to store large quantities of grain and daily necessities for future use.

We must organize not only the peasants for production but also the troops and the government and other organizations to produce together.

Because this is the countryside, the countryside constantly ravaged by the enemy, the countryside in a protracted war, the troops and organizations must produce. Because this is scattered guerrilla warfare, it is also possible for the troops and organizations to produce. In our Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region there is the further reason that the number of people in the troops and organizations is too large in proportion to the population of the Border Region; if they did not produce for themselves, they would be bound to go hungry, and if too much were taken from the people, the people could not bear the burden and they too would be bound to go hungry. Therefore we decided to launch a large-scale production movement. Take the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region: the troops and organizations need 260,000 tan of husked grain (millet) a year (each tan being 300 catties), of which 160,000 tan are taken from the people and 100,000 tan are produced by themselves; if they did not produce for themselves, then either the army or the people would be bound to go hungry. Because we launched the production movement, now not only do we not go hungry, but both the army and the people eat very well.

The organizations of our Border Region, apart from grain and clothing and bedding, are largely self-sufficient in their other expenses, and some units are entirely self-sufficient. Many other units are, moreover, self-sufficient in part of their grain and part of their clothing and bedding.

The achievement of the troops in the Border Region is even greater. Many units are entirely self-sufficient in grain, clothing and bedding and everything else, that is, one hundred per cent self-sufficient, and do not draw a single thing from the government. This is the highest standard, the first standard, and it was reached gradually over several years.

At the front, where there is fighting to be done, this standard cannot be adopted. The front can set a second and a third standard. The second standard is that, apart from grain and clothing and bedding, which are supplied by the government, everything else, such as cooking oil (half an ounce per person per day), salt (half an ounce per person per day), vegetables (one to one and a half catties per person per day), meat (one to two catties per person per month), fuel, office expenses, miscellaneous expenses, education expenses, health expenses, rifle-cleaning expenses, tobacco, shoes, socks, gloves, towels, toothbrushes and so on, is produced by the units themselves; this amounts to about fifty per cent of total expenses and can be achieved gradually within two to three years. Some units have already achieved it. This standard can be applied in the consolidated areas.

The third standard is to be applied in the border areas and the guerrilla zones; they cannot be fifty per cent self-sufficient, but they can be fifteen to twenty-five per cent self-sufficient. If they can do this, that is very good.

In short, except where there are special circumstances, all troops and organizations must, without exception, take part in production in the intervals between fighting, training and work. Besides making use of the intervals between fighting, training and work to take part in production collectively, the troops and organizations should assign personnel to engage specially in production and set up farms, vegetable gardens, pastures, workshops, small factories, transport teams and cooperatives, or grow grain and vegetables in partnership with the peasants. Under present conditions, in order to overcome difficulties, every organization and every army unit should build up its own household economy. The loafer's habit of being unwilling to build up a household economy is shameful. A system of individual bonuses graded according to quality should also be established, so that those directly engaged in production can share in the dividends, as a stimulus to the development of production. Moreover, leaders must take responsibility and work with their own hands, and apply the method of combining the leading core with the broad masses and combining general calls with specific guidance; only then can production work be pushed forward effectively.

Some people say that if the troops engage in production they will be unable to fight and train, and if organizations engage in production they will be unable to do their work. This view is wrong. In recent years our troops in the Border Region have done a great deal of production and have had ample food and clothing, and at the same time they have carried on military training and political and cultural study, all with greater success than before, and unity within the army and unity between the army and the people have also become better than before. At the front, a large-scale production movement was carried out last year, yet last year great successes were achieved in fighting, and a training movement was begun everywhere. Because of production, the life of the personnel in the organizations has improved, and they work with greater peace of mind and greater efficiency; this is so both in the Border Region and at the front.

It is thus clear that when organizations and army units in the environment of rural guerrilla warfare have a production movement for self-sufficiency, they become all the more vigorous and active in their fighting, training and work, and their discipline and their internal and external unity also become better. This is a product of China's protracted guerrilla warfare; this is our glory. Having learned this, we are not afraid of any material difficulties. We shall become more vigorous and more energetic year by year, growing stronger the more we fight; it is we who will crush the enemy, and we have no fear that the enemy will crush us.

Here there is one point to which our comrades at the front must pay attention. Some of our areas, opened up not long ago, are still fairly well-off, but the personnel there, relying on this abundance, are unwilling to economize and unwilling to produce. This is very bad; they are sure to suffer for it in the future. Everywhere we must cherish manpower and material resources most carefully and must never think only of the moment and squander them wastefully. Everywhere, from the very first year of work, we must plan for many years ahead, plan for keeping up a protracted war, plan for the counter-offensive, and plan for construction after the enemy has been driven out. On the one hand, never squander wastefully; on the other, strive to develop production. In the past some places, lacking long-term planning, paid no attention to economizing manpower and material resources, nor to developing production, and suffered heavily for it. Having learned this lesson, we must now pay attention.

As for manufactured goods, the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region has decided to become completely self-sufficient within two years in cotton, yarn, cloth, iron, paper and many other articles. Whatever was formerly not produced at all or produced only in small quantities must all be grown, made and supplied by ourselves, without relying on outside sources at all. All this is to be accomplished by three sectors: public enterprises, private enterprises and cooperatives. For all products, we seek not only large quantity but also good quality, so that they are hard-wearing and durable. The Border Region Government, the Joint Defence Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army and the Northwest Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party have kept a firm grip on these matters, and this is entirely correct. I hope that all places at the front will do the same. Many places are already doing so, and I hope they will succeed.

Our Border Region and the Liberated Areas as a whole will need another two to three years to learn the whole of economic work. The day when we are wholly or largely self-sufficient in grain and manufactured goods, growing and making them ourselves and even having a surplus, will be the day when we have completely learned how to do economic work in the countryside. In the future, when we drive the enemy out of the cities, we shall also be able to do new kinds of economic work. China depends on us to build her up, and we must study hard.