We Must Learn to Do Economic Work
Mao Zedong · Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
- Context
- Mao addressed labour heroes and model workers of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region on January 10, 1945, urging them to master economic work and make the Border Region and Liberated Areas self-sufficient within two to three years.
- Main themes
- Learning economic work, self-sufficiency in grain and manufactured goods, army and people's production movement, roles of labour heroes and model workers, warning against arrogance, rural guerrilla environment, rent and interest reduction, mutual aid in labour, three standards of army self-sufficiency, self-reliance versus foreign aid, thrift and long-term planning
- Duration
- ~23 min
- Words
- 2,796
- Sentences
- 105
- Readability
- 51
- Grade
- 12.7
- Syntax
- 3.19
- Vocabulary
- 1.98
Translated from Chinese Source: GitHub qinglee/maoxuan (毛泽东选集) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other105 sentences in 23 paragraphs
Labour heroes and model workers!
You have held your conference and summed up your experience, and everyone welcomes you and respects you. You have three strong points, and you have played three roles. The first is the role of taking the lead. That is, because you have worked especially hard and made many innovations, your work has become a model for people in general, has raised the standards of work and has prompted everyone to learn from you. The second is the role of backbone. Most of you are not yet cadres, but you are already the backbone of the masses, the core of the masses, and with you it is easier to push the work forward. In the future you may become cadres; you are now the reserve force of cadres. The third is the role of bridge. You are the bridge between the leadership above and the broad masses below; the opinions of the masses are passed up through you, and the opinions from above are passed down through you.
You have many strong points and great merit, but you must on no account become arrogant. It is right that you are respected by everyone, but this can also easily give rise to arrogance. If you become arrogant, are not modest, cease to make efforts, do not respect others, do not respect the cadres, do not respect the masses, then you will cease to be heroes and models. There have been some such people in the past, and I hope you will not follow their example.
Your experience has been summed up by this conference. The summary document is very good; it applies not only here but can be applied in other places as well, so I shall not talk about these matters. I would like to say something about our economic work.
In the past few years we have begun to learn economic work, and we have achieved great successes in economic work, but this is still only the beginning. Within two or three years we must make the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and the Liberated Areas behind the enemy lines wholly or largely self-sufficient in grain and manufactured goods, and even have a surplus. We must achieve still greater successes in agriculture, industry and trade than we have now. Only then can we say we have learned more and learned better. If in any place the life of the army and the people has not improved, the material basis being prepared for the counter-offensive is still not secure, and agriculture, industry and trade are not rising year by year but are at a standstill or even declining, that proves that the Party, government and army personnel in that place have still not learned economic work, and that place will run into enormous difficulties.
There is one question to which everyone's attention must once again be drawn, and that is that our thinking must suit the environment in which we now find ourselves. The environment in which we now find ourselves is the countryside. This seems to raise no question at all; who does not know that we are in the countryside? In fact, it is not so. Many of our comrades, although they live in the countryside day after day and even think they understand the countryside, do not really understand it, or at least do not understand it deeply. They do not start from the fact that this is a rural environment based on an individual economy, cut up by the enemy and therefore also one of guerrilla warfare, and so in political questions, military questions, economic questions, cultural questions, Party affairs, and questions of the workers' movement, the peasant movement, the youth movement, the women's movement and so on, they often handle matters inappropriately, or not quite appropriately. They deal with the countryside from an urban point of view, subjectively draw up many inappropriate plans, enforce them by compulsion, and often run up against a wall. In recent years, thanks to the rectification movement and to having run into snags in their work, our comrades have made much progress. But we must still take care to make our thinking fully suit the environment in which we find ourselves; only then can we make every piece of our work effective, and quickly effective. If we truly understand that the environment in which we find ourselves is that of rural base areas based on an individual economy, cut up by the enemy and therefore also engaged in guerrilla warfare, and if everything we do starts from this point, then the results may seem very slow and not spectacular at all; but in reality, compared with starting not from this point but from some other point, for example from an urban point of view, how would the results of our work turn out? They would by no means be very slow; on the contrary, they would be very fast. For if we started from the latter point, divorced from today's actual conditions, then in practice it would not be a question of whether results came fast or slow, but a question of constantly running into snags and getting no results at all.
For example, the great results achieved by the production movement of the army and the people that we have promoted in its present form are clear proof of this.
We want to strike at the Japanese aggressors, and we also want to prepare to attack and enter the cities and recover lost territory. But we are in a rural environment of individual economy, cut up, engaged in guerrilla warfare; how can we achieve this aim? We cannot follow the example of the Kuomintang, which does nothing itself and relies entirely on foreigners, depending on foreign countries even for daily necessities such as cotton cloth. We stand for self-reliance. We hope for foreign aid, but we cannot depend on it; we rely on our own efforts, on the creative power of the whole army and the whole people. Then what methods are there? We use the method of launching a large-scale production movement among both the army and the people at the same time.
Because this is the countryside, manpower and material resources are scattered, and so in production and supply we adopt the policy of "unified leadership and decentralized management".
Because this is the countryside, the peasants are scattered individual producers using backward tools of production, most of the land is still owned by landlords, and the peasants suffer feudal exploitation through land rent; in order to raise the peasants' interest in production and the productivity of agricultural labour, we adopt the two policies of reducing rent and interest and organizing mutual aid in labour. Rent reduction has raised the peasants' interest in production, and mutual aid in labour has raised the productivity of agricultural labour. I have received material from various places in north and central China, and all of it says that after rent reduction the peasants' interest in production has greatly increased, they are willing to organize mutual-aid groups like our labour-exchange teams here, and three people can do the work of four. If so, ninety million people can do the work of one hundred and twenty million. There are also cases where two people can do the work of three. If, instead of the policy of coercion and commandism, of haste that makes waste, we adopt the policy of patient persuasion and demonstration by example, then within a few years it may be possible to organize the majority of the peasants into mutual-aid groups for agricultural and handicraft production. Once such production groups become a habit, not only will output greatly increase and all kinds of innovations emerge, but politics will also progress, culture will rise, attention will be paid to hygiene, loafers will be reformed and customs will change; and before long the tools of production will be improved too. By that time our rural society will, step by step, be built on new foundations.
If our working personnel study this work with care and help the rural people develop the production movement with the greatest energy, within a few years the countryside will have abundant grain and daily necessities, and we shall be able not only to keep up the fight and cope with famine years, but also to store large quantities of grain and daily necessities for future use.
We must organize not only the peasants for production but also the troops and the government and other organizations to produce together.
Because this is the countryside, the countryside constantly ravaged by the enemy, the countryside in a protracted war, the troops and organizations must produce. Because this is scattered guerrilla warfare, it is also possible for the troops and organizations to produce. In our Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region there is the further reason that the number of people in the troops and organizations is too large in proportion to the population of the Border Region; if they did not produce for themselves, they would be bound to go hungry, and if too much were taken from the people, the people could not bear the burden and they too would be bound to go hungry. Therefore we decided to launch a large-scale production movement. Take the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region: the troops and organizations need 260,000 tan of husked grain (millet) a year (each tan being 300 catties), of which 160,000 tan are taken from the people and 100,000 tan are produced by themselves; if they did not produce for themselves, then either the army or the people would be bound to go hungry. Because we launched the production movement, now not only do we not go hungry, but both the army and the people eat very well.
The organizations of our Border Region, apart from grain and clothing and bedding, are largely self-sufficient in their other expenses, and some units are entirely self-sufficient. Many other units are, moreover, self-sufficient in part of their grain and part of their clothing and bedding.
The achievement of the troops in the Border Region is even greater. Many units are entirely self-sufficient in grain, clothing and bedding and everything else, that is, one hundred per cent self-sufficient, and do not draw a single thing from the government. This is the highest standard, the first standard, and it was reached gradually over several years.
At the front, where there is fighting to be done, this standard cannot be adopted. The front can set a second and a third standard. The second standard is that, apart from grain and clothing and bedding, which are supplied by the government, everything else, such as cooking oil (half an ounce per person per day), salt (half an ounce per person per day), vegetables (one to one and a half catties per person per day), meat (one to two catties per person per month), fuel, office expenses, miscellaneous expenses, education expenses, health expenses, rifle-cleaning expenses, tobacco, shoes, socks, gloves, towels, toothbrushes and so on, is produced by the units themselves; this amounts to about fifty per cent of total expenses and can be achieved gradually within two to three years. Some units have already achieved it. This standard can be applied in the consolidated areas.
The third standard is to be applied in the border areas and the guerrilla zones; they cannot be fifty per cent self-sufficient, but they can be fifteen to twenty-five per cent self-sufficient. If they can do this, that is very good.
In short, except where there are special circumstances, all troops and organizations must, without exception, take part in production in the intervals between fighting, training and work. Besides making use of the intervals between fighting, training and work to take part in production collectively, the troops and organizations should assign personnel to engage specially in production and set up farms, vegetable gardens, pastures, workshops, small factories, transport teams and cooperatives, or grow grain and vegetables in partnership with the peasants. Under present conditions, in order to overcome difficulties, every organization and every army unit should build up its own household economy. The loafer's habit of being unwilling to build up a household economy is shameful. A system of individual bonuses graded according to quality should also be established, so that those directly engaged in production can share in the dividends, as a stimulus to the development of production. Moreover, leaders must take responsibility and work with their own hands, and apply the method of combining the leading core with the broad masses and combining general calls with specific guidance; only then can production work be pushed forward effectively.
Some people say that if the troops engage in production they will be unable to fight and train, and if organizations engage in production they will be unable to do their work. This view is wrong. In recent years our troops in the Border Region have done a great deal of production and have had ample food and clothing, and at the same time they have carried on military training and political and cultural study, all with greater success than before, and unity within the army and unity between the army and the people have also become better than before. At the front, a large-scale production movement was carried out last year, yet last year great successes were achieved in fighting, and a training movement was begun everywhere. Because of production, the life of the personnel in the organizations has improved, and they work with greater peace of mind and greater efficiency; this is so both in the Border Region and at the front.
It is thus clear that when organizations and army units in the environment of rural guerrilla warfare have a production movement for self-sufficiency, they become all the more vigorous and active in their fighting, training and work, and their discipline and their internal and external unity also become better. This is a product of China's protracted guerrilla warfare; this is our glory. Having learned this, we are not afraid of any material difficulties. We shall become more vigorous and more energetic year by year, growing stronger the more we fight; it is we who will crush the enemy, and we have no fear that the enemy will crush us.
Here there is one point to which our comrades at the front must pay attention. Some of our areas, opened up not long ago, are still fairly well-off, but the personnel there, relying on this abundance, are unwilling to economize and unwilling to produce. This is very bad; they are sure to suffer for it in the future. Everywhere we must cherish manpower and material resources most carefully and must never think only of the moment and squander them wastefully. Everywhere, from the very first year of work, we must plan for many years ahead, plan for keeping up a protracted war, plan for the counter-offensive, and plan for construction after the enemy has been driven out. On the one hand, never squander wastefully; on the other, strive to develop production. In the past some places, lacking long-term planning, paid no attention to economizing manpower and material resources, nor to developing production, and suffered heavily for it. Having learned this lesson, we must now pay attention.
As for manufactured goods, the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region has decided to become completely self-sufficient within two years in cotton, yarn, cloth, iron, paper and many other articles. Whatever was formerly not produced at all or produced only in small quantities must all be grown, made and supplied by ourselves, without relying on outside sources at all. All this is to be accomplished by three sectors: public enterprises, private enterprises and cooperatives. For all products, we seek not only large quantity but also good quality, so that they are hard-wearing and durable. The Border Region Government, the Joint Defence Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army and the Northwest Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party have kept a firm grip on these matters, and this is entirely correct. I hope that all places at the front will do the same. Many places are already doing so, and I hope they will succeed.
Our Border Region and the Liberated Areas as a whole will need another two to three years to learn the whole of economic work. The day when we are wholly or largely self-sufficient in grain and manufactured goods, growing and making them ourselves and even having a surplus, will be the day when we have completely learned how to do economic work in the countryside. In the future, when we drive the enemy out of the cities, we shall also be able to do new kinds of economic work. China depends on us to build her up, and we must study hard.
The original Chinese. The tags above are read on the English translation's sentences.
各位劳动英雄,各位模范工作者!
你们开了会,总结了经验,大家欢迎你们,尊敬你们。你们有三种长处,起了三个作用。第一个,带头作用。这就是因为你们特别努力,有许多创造,你们的工作成了一般人的模范,提高了工作标准,引起了大家向你们学习。第二个,骨干作用。你们的大多数现在还不是干部,但是你们已经是群众中的骨干,群众中的核心,有了你们,工作就好推动了。到了将来,你们可能成为干部,你们现在是干部的后备军。第三个,桥梁作用。你们是上面的领导人员和下面的广大群众之间的桥梁,群众的意见经过你们传上来,上面的意见经过你们传下去。
你们有许多的长处,有很大的功劳,但是你们切记不可以骄傲。你们被大家尊敬,是应当的,但是也容易因此引起骄傲。如果你们骄傲起来,不虚心,不再努力,不尊重人家,不尊重干部,不尊重群众,你们就会当不成英雄和模范了。过去已有一些这样的人,希望你们不要学他们。
你们的经验,这次会议做了总结。这个总结文件说得很好,不但这里适用,各地也可以适用,我就不讲这些了。我想讲一点我们的经济工作。
近几年中,我们开始学会了经济工作,我们在经济工作中有了很大的成绩,但这还只是开始。我们必须在两三年内,使陕甘宁边区和敌后各解放区,做到粮食和工业品的全部或大部的自给,并有盈余。我们必须使农业、工业、贸易三方面都比现在有更大的成绩。到了那时,才算学得更多,学得更好。如果哪一个地方的军民生活没有改善,为着反攻而准备的物质基础还不稳固,农业、工业、贸易不是一年一年地上涨,而是停止不进,甚至下降,便证明哪个地方的党政军工作人员还是没有学会经济工作,哪个地方就会遇到绝大的困难。
有一个问题必须再一次引起大家注意的,就是我们的思想要适合于目前我们所处的环境。我们目前所处的环境是农村,这一点好像并没有什么问题,谁不知道我们是处在农村中呢?其实不然。我们有很多同志,虽然天天处在农村中,甚至自以为了解农村,但是他们并没有了解农村,至少是了解得不深刻。他们不从建立在个体经济基础上的、被敌人分割的、因而又是游击战争的农村环境这一点出发,他们就在政治问题上,军事问题上,经济问题上,文化问题上,党务问题上,工人运动、农民运动、青年运动、妇女运动等项的问题上,常常处理得不适当,或不大适当。他们带着城市观点去处理农村,主观地作出许多不适当的计划,强制施行,常常碰了壁。近几年来,由于整风,由于在工作中碰了钉子,我们的同志有了很多的进步。但是还须注意使我们的思想完全适合于我们所处的环境,然后才能使我们的工作样样见效,并迅速见效。如果我们真正了解了我们所处的环境是一个建立在个体经济基础上的、被敌人分割的、因而又是游击战争的农村根据地,如果我们所做的一切都是从这一点出发,看起来收效很慢,并不轰轰烈烈,但是在实际上,比较那种不从这一点出发而从别一点出发,例如说,从城市观点出发,其工作效果会怎么样呢?那就决不是很慢,反而是很快的。因为,如果我们从后一点出发,脱离今天的实际情况,做起来不是效率快慢的问题,而是老碰钉子,根本没有效果的问题。
比如我们提倡采取现有样式的军民生产运动,发生了很大的效果,就是一个明显的证据。
我们要打击日本侵略者,并且还要准备攻入城市,收复失地。然而我们是处在个体经济的被分割的游击战争的农村环境中,怎样能够达到这个目的呢?我们不能学国民党那样,自己不动手专靠外国人,连棉布这样的日用品也要依赖外国。我们是主张自力更生的。我们希望有外援,但是我们不能依赖它,我们依靠自己的努力,依靠全体军民的创造力。那末,有些什么办法呢?我们就用军民两方同时发动大规模生产运动这一种办法。
由于是农村,人力物力都是分散的,我们的生产和供给就采取“统一领导,分散经营”的方针。
由于是农村,农民都是分散的个体生产者,使用着落后的生产工具,而大部分土地又还为地主所有,农民受着封建的地租剥削,为了提高农民的生产兴趣和农业劳动的生产率,我们就采取减租减息和组织劳动互助这样两个方针。减租提高了农民的生产兴趣,劳动互助提高了农业劳动的生产率。我已得了华北华中各地的材料,这些材料都说:减租之后,农民生产兴趣大增,愿意组织如同我们这里的变工队一样的互助团体,三个人的劳动效率抵过四个人。如果是这样,九千万人就可以抵过一亿二千万人。还有两个人抵过三个人的。如果不是采取强迫命令、欲速不达的方针,而是采取耐心说服、典型示范的方针,那末,几年之内,就可能使大多数农民都组织在农业生产的和手工业生产的互助团体里面。这种生产团体,一经成为习惯,不但生产量大增,各种创造都出来了,政治也会进步,文化也会提高,卫生也会讲究,流氓也会改造,风俗也会改变;不要很久,生产工具也会有所改良。到了那时,我们的农村社会,就会一步一步地建立在新的基础的上面了。
如果我们的工作人员用心地研究这项工作,用极大的精力帮助农村人民展开生产运动,几年之内,农村就会有丰富的粮食和日用品,不但可以坚持战斗,不但可以对付荒年,而且可以贮藏大批粮食和日用品,以为将来之用。
不但要组织农民生产,而且要组织部队和机关一齐生产。
由于是农村,由于是经常被敌人摧残的农村,由于是长期战争的农村,部队和机关就必须生产。由于是分散的游击战争,部队和机关也可能生产。在我们陕甘宁边区,则更由于部队和机关的人数和边区人口比较,所占比例数太大,如果不自己生产,则势将饿饭;如果取之于民太多,则人民负担不起,人民也势将饿饭。因此,我们决定开展大规模的生产运动。拿陕甘宁边区说,部队和机关每年需细粮(小米)二十六万担(每担三百斤),取之于民的占十六万担,自己生产的占十万担,如果不自己生产,则军民两方势必有一方要饿饭。由于展开了生产运动,现在我们不但不饿饭,而且军民两方面都吃得很好。
我们边区的机关,除粮食被服两项之外,其它用费,大部自给,有些单位则全部自给。另有许多单位,并且自给一部分粮食,一部分被服。
边区部队的功劳更大。许多部队,粮食被服和其它一切,全部自给,即自给百分之一百,不领政府一点东西。这是最高的标准,这是第一个标准,是在几年之内逐渐达到的。
前方要作战,不能采取这个标准。前方可以设立第二、第三两个标准。第二个标准是除粮食被服两项由政府供给之外,其它如油(每人每日五钱)、盐(每人每日五钱)、菜(每人每日一斤至一斤半)、肉(每人每月一斤至二斤)、柴炭费、办公费、杂支费、教育费、保健费、擦枪费、旱烟、鞋子、袜子、手套、毛巾、牙刷等,一概生产自给,约占全部用费的百分之五十,可以在两年至三年内逐渐地做到。现在已有做到了的。这个标准,在巩固区内可以实行。
第三个标准,是在边沿区和游击区内实行的,他们不可能自给百分之五十,但是可能自给百分之十五到二十五。能够这样,也就很好。
总之,除有特殊情形者外,一切部队、机关,在战斗、训练和工作的间隙里,一律参加生产。部队和机关,除利用战斗、训练和工作的间隙,集体参加生产之外,应组织专门从事生产的人员,创办农场、菜园、牧场、作坊、小工厂、运输队、合作社,或者和农民伙种粮、菜。在目前条件下,为着渡过困难,任何机关、部队,都应建立起自己的家务。不愿建立家务的二流子习气,是可耻的。还应规定按质分等的个人分红制度,使直接从事生产的人员能够分得红利,借以刺激生产的发展。又须首长负责,自己动手,实行领导骨干和广大群众相结合、一般号召和具体指导相结合的办法,才能有效地推进生产工作。
有人说:部队生产,就不能作战和训练了;机关生产,就不能工作了。这种说法是不对的。最近几年,我们边区部队从事大量的生产,衣食丰足,同时又进行练兵,又有政治和文化学习,这些都比从前有更大的成绩,军队内部的团结和军民之间的团结,也比从前更好了。在前方,去年一年进行了大规模的生产运动,可是去年一年作战方面有很大的成绩,并且普遍地开始了练兵运动。机关因为生产,工作人员生活改善了,工作更安心、更有效率,边区和前方都是这样。
由此可见,处在农村游击战争环境中的机关和部队,如果有了生产自给运动,他们的战斗、训练和工作,就更加有劲,更加活跃了;他们的纪律,他们的内部的团结和外部的团结,也就更好了。这是我们中国长期游击战争的产物,这是我们的光荣。我们学会了这一条,我们就对一切物质困难都不怕了。我们将一年一年地更有生气,更有精力,愈战愈强,只有我们去压倒敌人,决不怕敌人来压倒我们。
在这里,有一点还须引起我们前方同志的注意。我们有些地区开辟不久,还颇富足,但是那里的工作人员自恃富足,不肯节省,也不肯生产。这样就很不好,他们在将来一定会要吃亏的。任何地方必须十分爱惜人力物力,决不可只顾一时,滥用浪费。任何地方必须从开始工作的那一年起,就计算到将来的很多年,计算到长期坚持战争,计算到反攻,计算到赶走敌人之后的建设。一面决不滥用浪费,一面努力发展生产。过去有些地方缺少长期打算,既未注意节省人力物力,又未注意发展生产,吃了大亏。得了这个教训,现在必须引起注意。
关于工业品,陕甘宁边区决定在两年内,做到花、纱、布、铁、纸及其它很多用品的完全自给。原来根本没有或者出产很少的,要一概自种自造自给,完全不靠外面。所有这些,由公营、私营和合作社经营三方面完成任务。一切产品,不但求数量多,而且求质量好,耐穿耐用。边区政府、八路军联防司令部、党中央西北局,对于这些抓得很紧,这是非常之对的。希望前方各地也是这样做。有许多地方已是这样做了,希望他们得到成功。
我们边区和整个解放区,还要有两年至三年工夫,才能学会全部的经济工作。我们到了粮食和工业品全部或大部自种自造自给并有盈余的日子,就是我们全部学会在农村中如何做经济工作的日子。将来从城市赶跑敌人,我们也会做新的经济工作了。中国靠我们来建设,我们必须努力学习。