Interview with Mr. Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the Republic, in "Politique internationale" on February 5, 2012, on major foreign policy issues including the situation in Arab countries, G20 countries facing the economic crisis, Afghanistan, and European construction.

France Nicolas Sarkozy · President of France

5 February 2012

Context
Sarkozy gave an interview to Politique Internationale on February 5, 2012, reviewing his major foreign policy initiatives as his presidential term neared its end.
Main themes
French foreign policy achievements, European economic governance, G20 and global financial crisis, Arab Spring and Libya intervention, European Union reform, Russia-Georgia conflict, climate change and energy policy, international monetary system reform, food security, diplomatic reflection and self-assessment
Duration
~72 min
97th percentile
Words
8,638
97th percentile
Sentences
411
97th percentile
Readability
46
50th percentile
Grade
12.1
46th percentile
Syntax
2.96
41st percentile
Vocabulary
2.21
52nd percentile

Translated from French

This is an interview, press conference or exchange with other speakers. It is split into sentences and counted in the corpus, but its sentences are not tagged on the twelve indices.

411 sentences in 150 paragraphs

International Politics

Mr. President, which of your diplomatic initiatives gives you the most satisfaction, even pride?

Nicolas Sarkozy It is not in those terms that the question is posed. The feeling of personal pride should never be the driving force behind action, let alone its criterion for evaluation. One does not act to feel proud. One acts to be useful to the interests of one's country, to promote its values, and to provide answers to the problems and challenges of the world. From this perspective, I believe that the international action I have taken on behalf of France, and that we continue to take with François Fillon and Alain Juppé, has been useful.

It was useful when we brought Europe out of the deadlock of the European Constitution through the simplified treaty, which allowed for the reform of the institutions of the European Union after ten years of fruitless debates.

It was useful in bringing together, in October 2008, the first Eurozone summit in history to adopt a common European response to the crisis that threatened to engulf the entire global banking system. Then when we convinced our European partners to finally establish the true economic governance that Europe and the Eurozone so desperately needed; when we also convinced them to strengthen the integration of the member countries of the Eurozone.

It was useful in proposing to the world the G20, which allowed for a concerted and coordinated response to the most serious crisis since the Great Depression of 1929. This action was also useful in making France, within the G20, the country most committed to the moralization of capitalism, which led to unprecedented advances in regulation, whether in the fight against tax havens, the regulation of bonuses, or the oversight of entities that had previously escaped all control, such as hedge funds.

It was also useful when, presiding over the G20 in 2011, our country put essential topics on the table that no one had wanted to address until then: the reform of the international monetary system; food security and the fight against excessive volatility in agricultural commodity prices; or when we placed for the first time the social dimension of globalization at the heart of the G20's work.

It was useful when, exercising the presidency of the European Union, France intervened in the summer of 2008 to put an end to the war between Russia and Georgia. This helped preserve the independence of this young democracy.

Useful, too, when we helped our Lebanese friends out of the political deadlock; when we helped to end the Gaza crisis in early 2009; or when we defended Ivorian democracy and protected the Ivorian people after Laurent Gbagbo's refusal to acknowledge his electoral defeat.

Useful again, when we saved the population of Benghazi at the last minute from the bloodbath that Gaddafi had promised them and took the lead in the international operation that helped the Libyan people break the chains of 42 years of dictatorship; or when we mobilized the international community in support of the "Arab Springs" by launching the Deauville Partnership during our G8 presidency.

I could also speak to you about France's leading role in the fight against climate change, with the adoption by the 27 countries of the European Union of the "energy-climate" package, which is today the only comprehensive and coherent plan that is legally binding.

P. I. If you could turn back time, is there any action you would have conducted differently?

N. S. In politics, while it is essential to learn lessons, one must be wary of hindsight bias—of those truths that are so blinding in retrospect that no one thought to predict them.

Understand me well: I am not saying that no mistakes were made—who hasn't made mistakes? I am not saying that there are not things we could have, or should have, done differently. When one holds these positions for the five years of a presidential term, faced with crises and trials, one inevitably changes, learns, and evolves in one's approach to problems.

But when looking back, one must always remember the circumstances and objectives under which a particular decision was made.

Take the example of Gaddafi's visit to Paris. This visit was criticized. I was reproached for it. Yet, at the time, there was an international consensus that it was necessary to engage in dialogue with Libya. A Libya that had abandoned its weapons of mass destruction programs, renounced terrorism, and agreed to compensate the victims. It was also this dialogue that allowed for the release of the five Bulgarian nurses and the Palestinian doctor who had been sentenced to death for crimes they did not commit.

And that did not prevent France from being the first to send its planes to stop Gaddafi's tanks that threatened the population of Benghazi with "rivers of blood."

P. I. Similarly, you were criticized for reaching out to Bashar al-Assad in 2008. In hindsight, do you regret that gesture?

N. S. The dialogue we resumed with Syria was again a demanding dialogue, conditioned by the achievement of concrete progress, particularly on the Lebanese file. It is precisely because I saw no significant progress that I decided, in December 2007, to end this rapprochement with Damascus. And it was only when things actually advanced on the Lebanese file and the attacks in Lebanon ceased that we resumed it. Could we have ended the Lebanese political crisis without that dialogue? I am convinced we could not. But, in this case as well, that does not prevent us today from acting resolutely to end the cruel and futile repression that the Syrian regime inflicts on its own people.

We were also criticized regarding the "Arab Springs." Did we take too long to grasp what was happening, particularly in Tunisia? Certainly. Did we underestimate the exasperation of these peoples against these authoritarian regimes and, above all, their deep desire for freedom and democracy? Yes, I believe so. Finally, in the name of stability, did we show too much complacency towards these oppressive and corrupt regimes? Undoubtedly.

But we must have the honesty to say that these Arab Springs surprised everyone, starting with those who made them happen. I add that, in the case of Tunisia, the former colonial power that is France found itself in a particular position, which exposed it more than others to accusations of interference. But, once again, France was able to grasp the magnitude of this great movement for freedom that swept through the Arab world, by proposing to accompany the development of democracy and the economy of these countries within the framework of the Deauville Partnership adopted at the G8 summit under French presidency.

That there were mistakes is certain. When one acts, one always takes risks, one exposes oneself—but that is the only way to provide answers to challenges and problems. We have not lacked those.

P. I. What was, during this first term, the most moving moment on the international stage?

N. S. I could mention the welcome I received in Tbilisi on October 7 last, more than three years after the conflict between Georgia and Russia, where more than 100,000 Georgians gathered to thank France for intervening to stop the fighting and for Georgia to remain a free country.

But it was undoubtedly my trip to Libya in September, just a few days after the liberation of Tripoli, that was the most moving moment. I will never forget that joy palpable everywhere, that atmosphere of liberation, those radiant faces, and the gratitude towards France from this courageous people who had risen for their freedom.

P. I. Some observers have seen France's intervention in Côte d'Ivoire as interference in the internal affairs of its former colony, a return to old reflexes. A return to that time when our country intervened to make and unmake presidents in its African backyard.

N. S. It is not France that chose Alassane Ouattara; it is the Ivorians, in the context of free, democratic elections recognized as such by the entire international community, notably by regional African organizations.

French forces intervened in Côte d'Ivoire only because the United Nations expressly requested us to do so. We did this in support of ONUCI, the United Nations force on the ground. We did this in strict application of UN resolutions, particularly Resolution 1975, which demanded the cessation of the use of heavy weapons against civilians. And our action had the sole objective of protecting the Ivorian civilian population against the use of these heavy weapons—let it be emphasized—by the Gbagbo camp.

You see that all this has nothing to do with the interventions of another nature and another age to which you refer!

In Côte d'Ivoire, as in Libya, the principle that the United Nations adopted as early as 2005 at France's request was implemented, but to which they had never given concrete content: the responsibility to protect. That is to say, the idea that when a civilian population is targeted, when the authorities of the country are unable to protect it or worse, commit these abuses themselves, the international community must come to the aid of that population. That is what we did in Libya as we did in Côte d'Ivoire, within the framework of a UN mandate. And France can be proud of that.

P. I. You have sometimes been reproached for not having put an end to "Françafrique," as you announced before your election.

N. S. Talking about "Françafrique" today simply makes no sense. With our African partners, we have chosen to profoundly modernize our relationship. What we want, and what they expect from us, is a balanced, uncomplexed, and transparent relationship, as shown by the renegotiation of all our defense agreements and their full publication. It is a relationship based on respect and frankness, which places the demand for democracy and good governance at the heart of our partnership. It is an open relationship. Our cultural and political ties with Francophone Africa are strong, and our solidarity efforts in its favor remain whole. But France has no pretension to exclusivity in its ties with Francophone African countries. These countries are opening up to new partners, and they are right to do so. France, too, is diversifying its partnerships in Africa: we are working more closely with South Africa, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Kenya.

The demand for modernization and partnership is also at the heart of the management of our public development aid. Beyond our public aid effort, which we have maintained despite the crisis, we have invented new forms of support that involve the development of the private sector, as it is the key to Africa's economic takeoff. And we propose that innovative financing be added to this.

Such is the reality of our relations with Africa today. The rest is pure fantasy. Or malice. France has only one voice; it expresses itself through our diplomacy. The shadowy networks, dubious intermediaries, all that no longer exists. Those who claim to represent them have no other legitimacy than that which is sometimes complacently granted to them by commentators.

P. I. Do you not fear the emergence of Islamism in some of the countries affected by the Arab Springs?

N. S. These Arab Springs are primarily a historic opportunity: for these countries, of course, but also for the region and for the world. Let us not forget that these movements were created in the name of the universal values that are dearest to us: freedom, democracy, justice. We should not be afraid of them, but rather accompany them and help these countries succeed in their democratic transitions.

Naturally, the risk of drift exists; it should not be underestimated, let alone denied. That is why, without interference, we are entitled to state on what basis we envision cooperating by recalling the principles to which we are attached and which are, I repeat, the ones for which these revolutions were made: respect for democracy, human rights, equality between men and women, respect for minorities, freedom of conscience, cultural and religious diversity.

But let us not make the mistake of falling back into this false dilemma in which we have been too long trapped: between dictatorship and religious extremism or between freedom and stability. With Alain Juppé, we are convinced that freedom is always preferable to the absence of freedom. We also believe that there is no lasting stability without justice.

Many, including in the countries concerned, are worried about the success of religiously inspired parties in recent elections. But the issue of the ongoing democratic transitions is not so much the place of political forces that claim a strong link with Islam. The issue is that these parties respect, as they have committed to do, the rules and requirements of democracy, which are above all respect for the minority and acceptance of alternation.

The new leaders will face considerable economic and social challenges. The expectations in these areas are also significant. Ultimately, the peoples will judge. For our part, there is no need to make assumptions about their intentions. Our duty is to continue to help and support these peoples. First, because they had the courage to rise up to choose their destiny; and, secondly, because the development of these countries is in our interest: failure and despair would be powerful factors of destabilization and migration.

Let us not judge too quickly or too harshly what is happening and let the new leaders have time to prove themselves. Building democracy is never an easy task. The previous regimes had virtually eliminated all political life. How can we be surprised that, in the face of this political void left by decades of authoritarianism, religious parties are the first to benefit from regained freedom? They are practically the only ones who, in secrecy, represented the opposition during this long period. But time will do its work. Other parties will find their place, and the peoples will form a judgment on the merits of each and on their ability to solve concrete problems.

Let us not forget that in France, starting from the Revolution, it took more than a century to consolidate democracy. In the Arab world, there will be disappointments, there will be trials, but we will not go back on the choice we made to support democracy. I add that the best way to ward off the danger of extremism or dictatorship is to help these countries turn these democratic springs into an opportunity for economic development and social progress.

This is what we did by launching, at the G8 summit under the French presidency, the Deauville Partnership, which mobilized the international community in favor of Tunisia and Egypt; and in which we have since welcomed Libya, but also Morocco and Jordan. Since I mention Morocco, I want to pay tribute to the courageous and visionary choice of King Mohammed VI, who led a peaceful democratic transition through profound institutional reform.

To all these countries, we continue, with our European partners, to provide financial, technical, and human assistance to help them succeed in their transitions.

P. I. Do you see the Arab springs as an opportunity or a risk for Israeli-Palestinian relations?

N. S. The Arab springs have shown that the aspiration for freedom and democracy is no less strong in the Arab world than elsewhere. This appetite for freedom makes a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict more necessary than ever: at a time when Arab peoples are taking back control of their destiny, who would understand that the Palestinians continue to wait indefinitely for a state? The two-state solution living side by side in peace and security is the only one that matters, and it is clearly the best guarantee for Israel of real and lasting security.

And let us not underestimate the growing sensitivity of the Arab world on this issue, to which democratically elected governments will naturally give an even greater echo.

The economic, social, administrative, and security reforms implemented by President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad to build the foundations of a future Palestinian state show that the Palestinians are legitimate, serious, and reliable interlocutors; that they are partners for peace. But these efforts remain fragile; they will only endure if their goal, the emergence of a Palestinian state, is quickly achieved. We must relaunch peace negotiations and do so quickly.

P. I. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, what do you see as the minimal concessions that each party must make to give peace a chance?

N. S. Everyone knows the parameters of peace, which were defined by the Roadmap: two states, with Jerusalem as the capital of both states; the Palestinian state within its 1967 borders with agreed land swaps; a resolution of the fate of refugees, which the Arab League has said should also be achieved through "a just and agreed solution," meaning one also agreed upon by the Israelis. And a state of Israel that is legitimately attached to its security and must be fully accepted in the region. I say this to all my interlocutors, wherever they come from: Israel's right to live in peace and security in the Middle East is non-negotiable.

Then, it is up to the Israelis and the Palestinians, and no one else, to define together the necessary compromises to move forward. But for that, discussions must resume. The current deadlock plays into the hands of extremists on both sides. Mahmoud Abbas is a man of peace; it is with him that Benjamin Netanyahu should do everything possible to reach an agreement quickly, because no one knows what will still be possible in the future.

P. I. Why did France ultimately vote in favor of Palestine's entry into UNESCO?

N. S. In September, before the United Nations, I proposed that we work towards a resolution of the UN General Assembly that would grant Palestine observer state status.

We continue to believe that this status would constitute a major and legitimate step towards the recognition of the Palestinian state, without creating the conditions for a sterile diplomatic confrontation in the Security Council.

France would have preferred that the question of Palestine's membership in UNESCO be raised after the UN General Assembly had been able to express itself. But since that was not the case, and since the question was on the table, we had to respond substantively to the question posed to us.

The question was simple: Does Palestine have the right to become a member of UNESCO? Does Palestine have a vocation to join this organization whose goal is to promote a culture of peace? For us, the answer was clearly yes. It is as simple as that.

For us, it was a question of coherence: coherence with the position we expressed in September at the UN; coherence with the conviction we hold that the status quo is untenable; coherence with our ongoing efforts to ensure that the Palestinians finally obtain the state they aspire to and to which they are entitled.

P. I. Do you not think that if Palestinian organizations recognized the "legitimacy of the existence of a Jewish state in Palestine," it would be easier to ask for real concessions from the Israelis?

N. S. Even though the diversity of Israel and its population is a richness, France understands and defends the idea of a solution based on two "nation-states": the state of Israel for the Jewish people, which has the right to a state, while respecting the rights of non-Jewish Israelis; and a state of Palestine for the Palestinian people.

P. I. In the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation, what role do you attribute to the United States, the Quartet, the European Union, and France? Would you say that the current negotiation method is flawed? In what way? What is, in this regard, the ideal framework?

N. S. Today, the process is at a standstill. I blame no one. Barack Obama tried, sincerely, resolutely. He brought the parties together in Washington in September 2010, he delivered an important speech on the 1967 borders last May. The United States has a crucial role to play. It is evident.

But we must be pragmatic and realistic: neither the United States, acting alone, nor the Quartet can get the peace process out of the rut. Too many major actors have been left out until now, Europe and its major states in particular.

Changing the method also means recognizing that by setting preconditions for negotiation, one condemns oneself to failure. It is clear that there can be no lasting peace without the cessation of Israeli colonization, and from this perspective, France has always unambiguously condemned colonization, as it is illegal and distances the chances of peace. But making the cessation of colonization a condition for negotiations was to make a prerequisite of what should have been a subject of discussion. There must be no prerequisites. What is necessary is an agreement on the terms of reference for negotiation. Those in the Roadmap are still valid, and they have the advantage of having been unanimously validated by the Security Council.

P. I. In the long run, do you believe that the fate of Bashar al-Assad's regime is sealed? Do you think international sanctions are sufficient to bring it down?

N. S. By persisting in disregarding the aspirations of his people and locking himself into a path of brutal repression, the Syrian regime has lost all legitimacy. It is doomed to disappear, sooner or later. That is my conviction, and it is also the experience of recent months, from Tunisia to Yemen, from Libya to Egypt. That is why, with our American, British, German partners, and many others, we have deemed that Bashar al-Assad must leave power.

Today, it is essential that the entire international community sends a unified message of firmness. Europe, the United States, and others have already adopted very severe sanctions against the Syrian regime. The Arab League condemned its bloody drift by suspending Syria, taking unprecedented sanctions against the regime, and sending observers on the ground. The few supports it still has within the international community are dwindling, now opening the prospect of a strong expression from the Security Council, which France has been actively working on for several months. Because I want to say it without ambiguity: the Security Council has a particular responsibility, a political but also a moral responsibility. That of not accepting the unacceptable, of not tolerating the intolerable, of refusing horror. In the face of the martyrdom of the Syrian people, silence is complicit, silence is culpable.

P. I. What factors, in your opinion, Mr. President, distinguish the Syrian and Libyan crises regarding the opportunity for international military intervention?

N. S. Military intervention cannot be the answer to all crises, no matter how serious they are. It can only be a last resort, conceivable when all other avenues have been exhausted and proven ineffective, and only if certain conditions are met. The fundamental difference between the two crises? The Security Council, in the case of Libya, agreed to mandate the international community to do everything possible, including military means, to protect the Libyan people. That was resolution 1973. However, among the values to which France is unwaveringly attached, and which condition its engagement, particularly military, is respect for international legality.

This does not condemn us to inaction. As I have already told you, with our European partners but not only with them, France has adopted several packages of economic sanctions against the regime in recent months. Sanctions whose consequences are already very real. Others, like the Arab League, have followed our lead. This is the strategy that must be pursued. France is ready to go further, with the European Union, if that is the price for the regime to come to its senses and accept the expectations of its people. This strategy of sanctions goes hand in hand with the determined political support we provide, with our partners, to the Syrian opposition. It is gradually structuring and unifying: it wants to be representative of all sensitivities and all Syrian communities.

P. I. Should we rule out a priori the hypothesis of a military intervention against Iranian nuclear facilities?

N. S. If Iran continues on its reckless path towards the bomb and persists in threatening its neighbors, we indeed run the risk of military intervention. We know that some in Israel are seriously considering it, because it is the very existence of the country that is at stake.

Let us ask the question: would a military intervention solve the Iranian nuclear problem? No! It would be the opposite—and it would be worse: war, chaos in the Middle East, unleashing of hatred. France will never encourage such a scenario.

Everything must be done to avoid confrontation and to convince Iran to abandon its illegal nuclear activities. After the latest IAEA report, no one can ignore the extent of Iran's engagement in military nuclear activities.

Early on, with our European partners and with the United States, we chose a strategy based on both dialogue and firmness. Dialogue, with ambitious cooperation offers, including on civilian nuclear, if Iran agrees to comply with its international obligations. Firmness, with increasingly tough sanctions, as long as the regime continues its efforts to acquire the atomic bomb.

Iran having rejected all offers and multiplied provocations, only extreme firmness can pay off. I believe in the effectiveness of sanctions to convince the Iranian authorities that they have everything to lose by persisting on this dead-end path.

I proposed in November maximum sanctions: a total embargo on oil exports and the freezing of the Iranian central bank's assets. I am hopeful of rallying our European partners around this line.

One thing is certain: we must not allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. My determination in this regard is unwavering.

Q. I. As a regime, does the Islamic Republic of Iran seem to you to be enduring?

N. S. The Iranian people deserve better than the isolation to which this regime condemns them and the repression that still strikes daily against the opposition. I remember the tragic images and accounts of the repression in the summer of 2009, a year before the start of the Arab Spring. The Iranian people are a great people; their desire for freedom, justice, and dignity is legitimate. The Iranian authorities must hear this.

But let me be clear: the goal of France and the international community is not regime change in Tehran; it is for the regime to change and finally fulfill its international obligations, to abandon its illegal proliferation activities, and to choose cooperation with the international community.

Q. I. What is the true purpose of our new military base in the United Arab Emirates: to counter an Iranian threat? To ensure our crude oil supply?

N. S. With the joint military base in Abu Dhabi—the first created outside national territory in fifty years—our strategic commitment in the Gulf has taken on a new dimension.

Of course, we were already engaged in this area: in the aftermath of the Gulf War, France signed defense agreements with the main countries in the region. But, I repeat, with this base we have truly opened a new era in our relations with all our allies in the Gulf. France is thus showing that it is ready to fully engage alongside its allies and intends to participate fully in the stability of this strategic area for the balance of the world.

Strategic because of its geographical location in the Middle East, between the Arab world and Iran, in a region marked by opposition and rivalries between Sunnis and Shiites; strategic also because it concentrates a large part of the world's energy reserves; strategic finally because it is a troubled area, where threats are multiplying: you mentioned the challenge of combating proliferation; you could also add the challenge of fighting terrorism.

In the face of these threats and challenges, France is more than ever, thanks to the base in Abu Dhabi, alongside its Gulf partners. Just as our Gulf partners, the Emirates and Qatar in particular, stood by us to protect the Libyan people.

Q. I. Do the Arab Springs justify a revival of the Union for the Mediterranean?

N. S. The Arab Springs have shown that the vision underlying the Union for the Mediterranean project at its launch was correct. They make it possible today.

From the moment of my election, I decided that building a space for cooperation and dialogue in the Mediterranean would be a priority. Launched in 2008 at France's initiative, the UfM has enabled the implementation of concrete cooperation projects such as the Mediterranean Solar Plan, the decontamination of the Mediterranean, the motorways of the sea, and other initiatives in the academic field.

With the Arab Springs, for the first time in history, freedom, human rights, democracy—values that were at the heart of the Arab revolutions—can finally triumph on both sides of the Mediterranean. This is an extraordinary opportunity to seize in order to refound the UfM with even greater ambition, going much further on the political side. This is how the peoples of the Mediterranean, together, can finally build a common destiny.

Q. I. How do you analyze the recent shift in Turkish diplomacy: a near-break with Israel, a rather anti-Western evolution? Were you surprised by the Turkish reaction to the proposed law aimed at penalizing the denial of the Armenian genocide?

N. S. Turkey is a great country with a great civilization; it has a diplomacy that matters and, due to its unique position as a bridge between East and West, can play an irreplaceable role in the service of dialogue and peace in the region and beyond. It is through its ability to engage in dialogue with everyone, including Israel, that Turkey can most influence the course of events and contribute to the stability of the region.

Regarding the Armenian genocide, which resulted in 1,500,000 victims in 1915, we were faced with a question of principle: should the duty of memory yield to state reason? My conviction is that yielding on one's convictions is a cowardice that always ends up costing. I am aware of the highly sensitive nature of this issue. I also know that France has no lessons to give; that said, it certainly has no lessons to receive! It is the honor of all countries to face their history. France has done much in this regard. In short, I respect Turkey, but Turkey must also respect its partners.

Q. I. Does the "Turkish model" seem suitable to you, as is often said, for the new regimes arising from the Arab Spring?

N. S. Let us be logical: at a time when democracy is spreading in the Arab world, it is not for a foreign leader to say whether a particular model is suitable for one or another. Your question actually concerns the compatibility between Islam and democracy, between Islam and modernity. This is, for me, self-evident. From this perspective, the Turkish experience since Atatürk is remarkable.

But I believe that each country is different and must define its own model, which will allow it to reconcile fidelity to its culture with the demands of democracy and the rule of law. This is the whole challenge of the ongoing democratic transitions in the countries of the Arab Spring, and we are by their side to help them.

Q. I. More than ten years after the September 11 attacks, why is France still engaged in Afghanistan? Does it still make sense?

N. S. I hear the calls for withdrawal, and my answer is simple: we have a clear policy with our allies and our Afghan friends—we are following it; we have clear responsibilities—we are assuming them.

Our allies are the NATO countries and the United States in particular. No one in France has forgotten, at least I hope, the barbaric attack of September 11 and the aid that the Taliban provided to that madman Bin Laden. We will not leave Afghanistan militarily until we are assured 1) that Al-Qaeda can no longer nest there to launch terrorist attacks against the West and 2) that the Afghans are capable of ensuring the security of their territory by themselves. With the death of Bin Laden and the weakening of Al-Qaeda, this objective has become quite realistic and achievable.

France has longstanding ties with Afghanistan; we will celebrate this year the 90th anniversary of our diplomatic relations. These ties of friendship, rooted in history, we will perpetuate through the treaty I just signed with President Karzai. It will allow for the continuation of our civilian aid to the Afghans and will serve as a kind of signal in the region. This: France, even when it has withdrawn its troops, will remain supportive of its Afghan friends. For now, the Afghans want us to remain engaged alongside them to help them ensure security until 2014—I emphasize help: the transition of responsibilities is well underway, so I was able to decide on the withdrawal of 400 soldiers last year and our soldiers are now focusing on support and training. These withdrawals will continue gradually as we see Afghan capabilities solidifying. We will remain engaged alongside them until the transfer is complete in 2014.

Our responsibility, finally, is the security of the French. I know that some have difficulty understanding that our security can also be at stake far from our borders. Yet this is the reality of our world; it is even the price of globalization. It is better to fight terrorists where they are, by strengthening the defenses of our partners in Afghanistan, Africa, the Middle East, rather than suffering their attacks at home. In the face of these threats, I refuse to let France lower its guard. That would be to flee our responsibilities.

Q. I. Three complementary questions, Mr. President: would you say that since your election, you have put an end to the creeping anti-Americanism that has traditionally permeated our diplomacy? Can we speak of a true "unity of destiny" between France and the United States? With the rise of emerging countries, have relations between France and the United States changed?

N. S. It is true that one of my priorities, after my election, was to restore a relationship of great trust with the United States, which had been weakened by our differences over the Iraqi issue. But I believe it is exaggerated to speak of "anti-Americanism" to describe French diplomacy over the last few decades. Take François Mitterrand: he developed a very close relationship with President Reagan, then with President Bush.

I have always embraced my friendship with the United States, even at the height of tensions between our two countries, because my conviction is that we share with the United States a common history and common values. We belong to the same family. The Western family. I claim this belonging.

When we are united, we decisively influence the course of events: the G20, reforms in the face of the crisis, total determination in the face of Iranian nuclear issues, the transition in Afghanistan, support for the Arab Springs, Libya.

This convergence in action is all the more necessary as new poles of power are emerging: China, Brazil, India. Their rise is a good thing for the world, for Europe, and for France in particular, which has managed to forge strategic partnerships with these countries in recent years. But it is true that the unity of Europe and that of the Western family are more necessary than ever if we want to continue to play leading roles on the international stage.

This is my conviction, and I believe it is also that of President Obama. He has developed a new vision of American engagement in the world based on the realization that America cannot do everything alone, particularly on the military front, and that the engagement of its major European allies is an irreplaceable asset. We saw it in Libya, where France, along with the United Kingdom, took the lead of a strong international coalition of 18 nations, with American support. This sharing of roles is good news for Europe, which must rise to its responsibilities by maintaining its defense efforts.

Q. I. It has often been said of Barack Obama that he is, of all American presidents, the one who has turned away the most from Europe. Do you share this sentiment?

N. S. Absolutely not. I say this all the more easily because, for the past three years, we have spent considerable time working with President Obama on all issues, particularly on the responses to the crises the world has faced. Each time, President Obama has made transatlantic dialogue and strengthening ties between the United States and Europe a major element of his action.

Not only is President Obama interested in Europe, but I believe he understands it much better than a number of his predecessors. He has notably understood that America's great allies can play leading roles when they have the will to do so, as we saw in Libya.

Q. I. Due to the crisis facing the eurozone, there is often talk of going "further in European integration." Is this possible, and if so, how far should we go without risking losing sovereignty?

N. S. In the face of the crisis, we must choose between a backward step, which would be catastrophic for all, or an effort to move towards greater integration among the eurozone states. This is essential to prevent such a crisis from happening again.

This begins, first, with a genuine economic government. It is being established with regular summits: realize that until the summit I convened in October 2008, there had been no meeting of the heads of state and government of the eurozone! Today, everyone agrees to hold these summits several times a year to jointly define the economic policy of the zone. This is essential because having the same currency requires us to converge our economic policies in the service of growth and competitiveness—therefore of employment.

This also requires much stricter budgetary discipline. In a monetary union, the excesses of some have an impact on others. To avoid these excesses, each country will have to adopt a golden rule in its Constitution; and if a deviation occurs despite everything—in other words, if the deficit exceeds 3%—then the sanctions must become much more automatic.

This ultimately goes through a solidarity that works. Nothing had been planned on this point in the Maastricht Treaty: we had to invent everything in urgency. In any case, we did it — and that is what allowed us to help Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. Today, we are in the process of establishing a true European Monetary Fund (the future European Stability Mechanism) which will have its own capital and a total capacity of 500 billion euros. It will be able to decide by qualified majority and will be a real financial force to defend the eurozone.

Thus, a real refoundation of the eurozone is underway. This is what France and Germany have proposed to their European partners and what was decided by 26 of the 27 member states during the European Council on December 9, 2011. A new treaty will be needed, which must be signed as early as March. This treaty, which will be intergovernmental, will allow us to take a new step in European construction, that of the integration of the eurozone.

With this agreement, political Europe is getting underway, the one where heads of state and government take their responsibilities and set the course. We are therefore moving towards more integration, but not less sovereignty: on the contrary, in the world we live in, true sovereignty cannot be exercised in isolation, but together, with our European partners.

Europe is therefore not less sovereignty. Europe is more sovereignty because it is a greater capacity to act.

P. I. In a world dominated by continental states such as China, India, Brazil, Russia, or the United States, is the European level still relevant?

N. S. Of course! More than ever, in fact. I remind you that together the 27 countries of the European Union represent the world's largest economy.

The emergence of new great powers like China, Brazil, or India is certainly not a threat to Europe in itself; on the contrary. But it must lead Europeans to strengthen their cohesion and competitiveness.

The lesson of recent years is that when Europe wants, Europe can. The French presidency of the European Union in 2008 was a concrete illustration of this. In the face of the banking crisis born from the collapse of Lehman Brothers, it was Europe that showed the way: it was the European banking plan, adopted at the eurozone summit in October 2008 and whose principles were taken up by everyone, including the United States, that helped avoid the collapse of the global banking system. It was also Europe, through France, that called for a coordinated global response to the economic crisis, which led to the first G20 summit in Washington.

At the G20 summits in London, Pittsburgh, and elsewhere, it was always Europe, and particularly the Franco-German couple, that carried the highest level of ambition in terms of regulation and moralization of capitalism.

P. I. The Americans want the yuan to be revalued. Do you not think it would be in the interest of both France and Europe to strongly associate with this demand?

N. S. I remind you that it was France that proposed and obtained that monetary issues be placed at the heart of the G20's work. This was not an easy task. I still remember the reservations, to say the least, with which my proposal was received at the time. This was before the fear of a real "currency war" led our partners to recognize that this issue was not only legitimate but unavoidable.

But instead of pointing fingers and stigmatizing one another, I proposed to open a deep reflection on the overall reform of the international monetary system. Instead of invective, we preferred an inclusive dialogue, in which the Chinese fully participated, to the point of organizing the G20 seminar on this reform in Nanjing.

Overall, the French presidency of the G20 allowed for considerable progress, which was realized at the Cannes summit in November.

All G20 countries committed to moving towards flexible exchange rate regimes, so that the level of their currency better reflects the fundamentals of their economies. The G20 in Cannes also laid the groundwork for an evolution of the monetary system so that it better takes into account the weight of the currencies of major emerging countries, such as China. The consequence of all these measures is that the Chinese yuan will gradually internationalize, become more flexible, and thus appreciate.

Through dialogue and consultation, we have thus managed to lay the foundations for a reform that will make the monetary system more effective, stronger, and fairer. This reform will help avoid, in the future, that some may be tempted to manipulate their currency to unfairly strengthen their competitiveness at the expense of others.

P. I. Does the "no" of the French in the referendum on the constitutional treaty project in 2005 still weigh on the image and influence of France in Europe and, more specifically, in Germany?

N. S. The initiatives taken by France and Germany in recent months show that this is not the case. As early as May 2007, France proposed a simplified treaty that ended the institutional blockage in which Europe had been for more than ten years. The Lisbon Treaty is undoubtedly not perfect, but it has allowed for the adaptation of institutions to a Europe that today has 27 members, notably by placing a stable president at the head of the European Council and by generalizing qualified majority voting and co-decision. Let us not forget that it is thanks to the Lisbon Treaty that the eurozone had a legal basis that allowed it to take a series of major measures in recent months to respond to the crisis. Today, we need to go further — but without the progress made with the Lisbon Treaty, we would have been in an even more difficult situation.

Beyond these institutional questions, what matters is the policy that Europe pursues. It is because they were not satisfied that a majority of French voted no in the 2005 referendum. Since 2007, I have not ceased to act, with our partners and with the European institutions, to make Europe stronger and less naive.

I think, of course, of everything we have done to establish a true economic pillar alongside the monetary pillar, equipped with a real economic government capable of acting in the service of growth and competitiveness.

I think of all the measures that have been adopted to define a demanding regulation for the financial sector at the level of the 27.

I think of the fight against illegal immigration, a subject that Europe did not care about, or so little, and which is now recognized as a priority by European states. It is to France that we owe the initiatives that led to the reform of the Schengen area — the removal of internal borders is only viable if external borders are effectively guarded.

I think of the rebalancing of trade policy: it was through great effort that France obtained the European Council to set, in September 2010, the principle of reciprocity as a fundamental requirement of Europe in its dialogue with its major partners.

I think of the Common Agricultural Policy. We were told it was outdated and doomed. We successfully defended it, to the point that the Commission itself proposed to maintain its budget until 2020.

For all these reasons, I believe that no one would think to contest that France has regained its place at the heart of Europe, a Europe that we have helped to make stronger and more protective.

P. I. France's return to NATO was meant, in your mind, to allow for the affirmation of a real "European pillar" within the Atlantic Alliance. Are you satisfied with the results obtained on this point?

N. S. Yes, and it is enough to look at what happened in Libya to be convinced of this, where, for the first time since 1949, NATO served a coalition led by two European countries: France and the United Kingdom. This would not have been possible if France had not regained its place in the structures of the Alliance. What a difference from the situation in the Balkans, barely fifteen years ago: Europeans had to beg for the help of the United States to restore peace at Europe's doorstep!

Frankly, what have we not heard, with the government, when we made the decision to fully reintegrate into NATO! End of the policy of national independence, alignment with the United States, renunciation of a European defense...

Here is the reality: in NATO, France is now respected — where it was previously seen by others only as a blocking force, it is now a force for proposal and action. I am of course thinking of Libya — but was it not France that, as early as 2008 at the Bucharest summit, proposed to its allies the transition strategy in Afghanistan and the transfer of responsibilities to the Afghans? Did we not, with Angela Merkel, put our priorities on the NATO agenda at the Strasbourg-Kehl summit in 2009: the reform of commands, cooperation with Russia, addressing new threats?

On European defense, it is time for naivety and good words to stop guiding the policy of Europeans. I made this project a priority of the French presidency of the Union, engaging Europe to take new responsibilities in Georgia to consolidate the ceasefire and in Somalia to fight against pirates, and above all, to develop a roadmap for strengthening military capabilities. On this point, France has done more than its part by establishing, with the Lancaster House agreements, a partnership of a completely new scale with the United Kingdom, which we will resolutely pursue. As for the other countries, I have not overlooked that they are going through financial difficulties, but the crisis should be an additional incentive to pool our resources more. There can be no European defense without real military capabilities and without a collective willingness to use them.

P. I. As you know, Helmut Kohl recently reproached Mrs. Merkel for being too hesitant, and even lacking courage, in her European policy. What reaction does this judgment inspire in you? What is your vision of the Franco-German relationship?

N. S. I have great respect for Helmut Kohl, for the historical work he accomplished at the head of Germany and in the service of European construction. But each era has its demands. Today, Europe must face an economic crisis unprecedented since 1929. We must confront this crisis while preserving the single currency, which is the keystone of European construction and the guarantee of the prosperity of Europeans, while deeply reforming the balance established by the Maastricht Treaty. We are doing this in close agreement with Chancellor Merkel.

France and Germany have a unique role to play in Europe. Our two countries have the imperative necessity to agree to allow European construction to progress. It is on Franco-German reconciliation that European construction has been built, since General de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer. Today, it is our common responsibility with Chancellor Merkel. We do not have the right not to agree, and even less to engage in any controversy — our duty is to work together to build the compromises that move Europe forward. We owe it to our citizens.

You will have understood, Angela Merkel is much more to me than an indispensable partner: she is a stateswoman for whom I have deep admiration and, if she allows me, a great friendship.

I would like to add a final word about Germany: some reproach me for being too focused on this country. This criticism seems strange to me. First, because Germany and France share a history that compels us to work closely together. Secondly, because Germany is our primary partner. Finally, because it is the country that today has the strongest growth and the lowest unemployment in Europe, thanks to the courageous reforms initiated by Gerhard Schröder and continued by Angela Merkel. Not everything is perfect, of course, but on what grounds should we refrain from drawing inspiration from what works? Especially since this success is based on simple principles: constant innovation, a taste for effort, a love of well-done work. These assets are also ours, provided we pursue a policy that values them: we have begun to do so over the past four years.

For all these reasons, I am determined to deepen Franco-German convergence: to draw inspiration from the best of each country and to build together, at the heart of Europe, an economic foundation without equal in the world.

P. I. Mr. President, do you think your diplomatic record can contribute to ensuring your re-election in May 2012? In other words, can a positive record in foreign policy "make the difference" in a presidential election?

N. S. It is often said that foreign policy can lose an election, but never win one. I do not know if that is true and, to be honest, I do not concern myself with it. I readily concede that we could have sometimes done better or differently. But I also believe that there is a merit that cannot be taken away from us: that of having had the will to act, and having actually acted, in the face of the unprecedented challenges and upheavals that our country and the world have faced. Ultimately, over the past five years, France has remained true to its values and its tradition, refusing to be a passive observer of History. On the contrary, it has contributed to writing it. I hope that the French people feel proud of this.