Letter from Mr. Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the Republic, addressed to Mr. François Fillon, Prime Minister, on the main components of a reform of the institutions of the Fifth Republic, November 12, 2007.

France Nicolas Sarkozy · President of France

12 November 2007

Context
Sarkozy addressed Prime Minister Fillon in a formal letter outlining proposed reforms to the institutions of the Fifth Republic on November 12, 2007.
Main themes
Institutional reform of the Fifth Republic, executive power regulation, parliamentary strengthening, citizens' rights, presidential term limits, Balladur committee recommendations, accumulation of mandates prohibition, appointment oversight, Article 16 exceptional powers, Court of Auditors budgetary control, modernization of French democracy
Duration
~22 min
70th percentile
Words
2,624
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Sentences
100
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Readability
28
13th percentile
Grade
15.8
82nd percentile
Syntax
3.16
68th percentile
Vocabulary
2.33
79th percentile

Translated from French

Content
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The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 95%89%
  • Ceremonial 3%3%
  • Social 2%2%
  • Geopolitical 0%0%
  • Economic 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 6%

100 sentences in 35 paragraphs

Mr. Prime Minister,

Because they are at the heart of political life and constitute the foundation of state action, our institutions cannot remain apart from the modernization effort of our country desired by the French people and undertaken by the government.

For fifty years, the Constitution of the Fifth Republic has proven its solidity and effectiveness. Under no circumstances should what it has brought to the functioning of the state and the governance of France be abandoned or weakened. However, our institutions bear some responsibility for the difficulties facing our country and for the growing gap between the people and their elected representatives. Our fellow citizens deeply aspire to an effective state, an exemplary Republic, and an irreproachable democracy.

I also believe that the five-year term has modified, beyond what was perhaps intended, the institutional balance of the Fifth Republic, and that we must respond to this situation.

After three and a half months of consultation and reflection, the committee for the modernization and rebalancing of the institutions of the Fifth Republic, chaired by Mr. Édouard Balladur and composed of personalities from all the major democratic currents of thought in our country, has confirmed the relevance of this analysis and made a significant number of recommendations aimed at better controlling the executive, strengthening Parliament, and creating new rights for citizens. It seems to me that most of these proposals should be adopted.

That is why I am asking you to now engage in a consultation with all political parties in our country on a reform of our institutions, the main components of which would be as follows:

1. A better-controlled executive power

The legitimacy conferred on the President of the Republic by his election by direct universal suffrage and the tools of rationalized parliamentarism make the executive in general, and the President of the Republic in particular, the strong poles of our institutions. This reality must be both better acknowledged and more regulated.

It seems natural to me that, due to the eminent role that the Constitution assigns to him and the legitimacy that his mode of election gives him, the head of state should be able to express himself in person before the National Assembly. This would also be a way to recognize and enhance the role of Parliament. The modalities by which the President of the Republic can already address it, inherited from history, are now outdated. This new possibility, which would naturally correspond to important moments in national public life, should be opened before the National Assembly, before the Senate, or before both chambers convened in Congress. It should allow for debate.

Concerned with seeking the paths of an irreproachable democracy and an exemplary Republic, I believe it is necessary that a number of powers of the executive, particularly those of the President of the Republic, be more regulated. I support a strengthening of the control exercised over the exceptional powers granted to public authorities in the event of a serious crisis (Article 16 of the Constitution, state of siege, state of emergency). I believe that the committee's proposals regarding Parliament's oversight of the most important appointments should be adopted. I wish for the President of the Republic's right of pardon to be reserved for individual cases and that its exercise be preceded by the opinion of a limited number of wise persons. I prefer this formula to that of a prior consultation of the High Council of the Judiciary: by construction, the judiciary has already ruled on these matters.

I consider it desirable to implement the committee's proposals regarding the reimbursement to administrations of the costs of personnel made available to ministerial cabinets, as well as the control by the Court of Auditors of the budgets of "public authorities," as the Presidency of the Republic has already planned to do for its part. For reasons of the effectiveness of state action and full engagement in their mission by those holding ministerial responsibilities, I support the committee's proposal to prohibit the accumulation of a ministerial function with any elective mandate, at least with any executive mandate. In return, former ministers could regain their seat in Parliament.

In accordance with the commitments of the presidential campaign, and even though the committee did not retain it, I propose that the number of consecutive mandates of the same President of the Republic be limited to two. I believe that the role of the Constitution is also to help political leaders act rather than seek to maintain themselves.

On the other hand, after reflection, I do not think it desirable for Articles 5, 20, and 21, which specify the distribution of roles between the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, and the government, to be modified. As long as a change in the nature of the regime is ruled out, any modification of the current wording seems to me to present more disadvantages than advantages. In matters of defense, however, and for reasons of security, clarity, and speed in decision-making, the distribution of competencies within the executive deserves, in my view, to be clarified, as the committee proposed.

2. A strengthened Parliament

The committee chaired by Mr. Édouard Balladur has made very substantial proposals regarding Parliament. This is a well-founded and coherent approach, as the main shortcoming of our institutions is the weakness of our Parliament.

I propose that these recommendations be applied in general, whether concerning the number and role of parliamentary committees, the organization of debates, the regulation of the use of emergency procedures, the sharing of the agenda, the exercise of the oversight function, the possibility for Parliament to adopt resolutions, and its closer involvement in European, international, and defense policy.

Regarding Article 49, paragraph 3, whose symbolic significance should not be underestimated, I believe that its use should be regulated. Several solutions are possible, including that of the committee, of course, but also, for example, a limitation on the number of possible recourse to this article in a session or in a legislature, or a use of Article 49, paragraph 3, that would be limited to periods when the government does not have an absolute majority in Parliament. I ask you to submit this question and these different possibilities for debate.

As requested in its letter of mission, the committee for the modernization and rebalancing of the institutions of the Fifth Republic devoted significant developments to the quality of norms and legal security. I believe that they should largely be implemented, retaining a minimum period of one month—rather than two—between the submission of a text to Parliament and its examination. To complement these proposals, and given the very significant difficulties caused by the fact that too many laws remain inapplicable for too long in the absence of their implementing texts, I wish for a means to be found for Parliament to require and obtain from the government that the implementing decrees of laws be taken within reasonable timeframes. I also wish for the possibility for the government to refer to the Constitutional Council for advice on legislative provisions that it considers raise a delicate constitutional question to be examined. The intervention of the Constitutional Council upstream is clearly preferable to its intervention downstream. However, I am not in favor of the Constitutional Council being able to be seized regarding the admissibility of bills in light of their impact assessment. It is the government's responsibility to act with the necessary discipline in this matter.

Finally, strengthening Parliament also involves improving its representativeness. Both the National Assembly and the Senate must better reflect the different components of the population and the diversity of opinion currents.

A first series of measures seems particularly useful to me for this purpose: improving the representativeness of the Senate, notably by taking greater account of the distribution of the population across the territory in the senatorial election; allowing French citizens abroad, the eighth department of France, to elect deputies; making regular redistricting of constituencies a constitutional requirement and providing for the opinion of an independent commission; creating a status for the opposition aimed at better protecting the rights of minorities and enshrining in the Constitution the principle of a peaceful and irreproachable democracy (the modalities proposed by the Balladur committee seem relevant to me).

A second series of measures concerns more delicate and controversial issues: the accumulation of mandates, on the one hand, and proportional voting, on the other. These issues are not of a constitutional nature, but they contribute to the balance of our institutions and the exemplarity of our Republic. It is legitimate that they be studied together.

The accumulation of mandates has been rightly and significantly regulated in our country in recent years. I note that there is no evidence that parliamentarians with a single mandate are better or more invested than those who accumulate it with a local mandate. Each system has its advantages and disadvantages. However, I am sensitive to the concerns of our fellow citizens regarding the real capacity of the same elected official to hold several important mandates at once, or even to combine them with the exercise of professional functions. It is not inconsistent, moreover, to consider that the strengthening of Parliament should be accompanied by a greater investment from parliamentarians. For all these reasons, I ask you to submit to consultation all possible solutions, from extending the limitations on accumulation to the presidency of public inter-municipal cooperation establishments to prohibiting accumulation, including strengthening sanctions against parliamentary absenteeism, granting additional operating resources to parliamentarians who choose the single mandate, or even a stricter regulation of the possibility for parliamentarians to hold certain professional functions.

Regarding proportional voting, I remain convinced, as I announced during the presidential campaign, that the current difficulties of representing the diversity of opinion currents justify that our electoral processes integrate a larger share of proportional voting. While I tend to believe that the Senate should represent both territorial diversity and the diversity of opinions in our country, which would allow it to continue the modernization it has undertaken in recent years, and while I am also committed to the necessity of being able to form majorities in the National Assembly, I nevertheless ask you to submit for debate the two options—strengthening proportionality in the Senate or creating a share of proportionality in the National Assembly—along with their different modalities.

I also wish for the Economic and Social Council, which is not part of Parliament but nonetheless has an essential role in representing the different components of the Nation and society, to be profoundly modernized. This concerns its composition—far beyond just qualified personalities—its role, and even its name. This third assembly represents the living forces of the Nation. In general, it must be more gender-balanced, make room for young people, particularly students, for environmental NGOs, and for representatives of major spiritual currents.

It is also important to ensure that the process of designating candidates for the presidential election guarantees that all significant currents of opinion can have a candidate. On this last point, several solutions are possible, including those proposed by the Balladur committee, which I ask you to examine.

3. New rights for citizens

Finally, the committee for the modernization and rebalancing of the institutions of the Fifth Republic has made a number of proposals conferring new rights on citizens. I propose that they be largely adopted. Our fundamental law is not only intended to organize the functioning of institutions. It also recognizes rights for citizens, which must evolve at the same pace as society.

A first series of proposals relates to the composition and role of the High Council of the Judiciary. These are fundamental proposals in the context of the modernization and opening of the justice system that our country expects and that our judges hope for. As proposed by the committee, I wish for the composition of the HJC to be more open to French society and to be compatible with the particular positioning of the judicial authority within our institutions; to this end, the HJC should no longer be composed mainly of judges, and the President of the Republic should cease to preside over it. I believe, however, that the Minister of Justice, Keeper of the Seals, should retain the possibility of participating in non-disciplinary sessions of the HJC. It would be curious for the Minister of Justice not to be able to engage with the highest body of the judiciary's organization. Similarly, I wish for the HJC to be consulted on the appointment of public prosecutors and for its referral to be open to litigants in disciplinary matters. It will be necessary to establish - within the HJC - the necessary filters to prevent it from becoming a systematic body for contesting substantive judicial decisions.

As is the case in all major democracies, I believe that citizens should be given the opportunity, in the event of disputes brought before the courts, to refer to the Constitutional Council regarding the constitutionality of laws already enacted in light of fundamental rights. The question of constitutionality could be raised at any point in the proceedings, but ordinary courts would be required either to dismiss it or to refer it, by way of a preliminary question, to the Council of State or the Court of Cassation, depending on the jurisdiction seized, with these two supreme courts responsible for dismissing unfounded questions and referring the others to the Constitutional Council. This major advancement of the rule of law must be reconciled with the legitimate concern for legal certainty and respect for the role of Parliament. These precautions seem to me to allow for this.

The committee has proposed the creation of a defender of fundamental rights modeled on the Spanish "Defensor del Pueblo." This defender of fundamental rights would be responsible, in particular, for helping our fellow citizens who are victims of errors, delays, and dysfunctions inherent in any administration to assert their rights. Besides being enshrined in the Constitution, they could in particular be directly seized by citizens. This proposal represents, in my view, a very significant advancement for citizens' rights, and I ask you to submit its principle and modalities for debate.

Regarding the proposal to establish a council of pluralism, I note that the bodies that would be intended to join this council, particularly the Higher Audiovisual Council, have missions today that are broader than just the question of pluralism. Therefore, a comprehensive reflection must be conducted, the contours of which are not all constitutional. Nevertheless, I share the committee's concern to strengthen the constitutional guarantees attached to the protection of pluralism.

At the end of these consultations, I would like you to inform me of their results and propose a draft text amending the Constitution. Regarding a constitutional reform aimed at an impeccable democracy, an exemplary Republic, and an effective State, it seems desirable and possible to gather broad agreement. Our objective must be to remain consistent with the goals of the reform.

I wish for this work to be completed by December 15, so that Parliament can conduct a first review by February.

At the same time, I wish to deepen the question of modernizing the Preamble of the Constitution of 1958. This Preamble, along with the associated texts (Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen; Preamble of 1946; Charter for the Environment), contains the principles, freedoms, and fundamental rights on which our democracy is built. It seems useful and relevant to regularly ensure that these principles correspond to the state of our society and, if not, to supplement them. I am thinking in particular, but the list is not exhaustive, of the essential question of dignity, as well as those of parity, diversity, and pluralism.

Please accept, Mr. Prime Minister, the assurance of my highest consideration.