Statement by Mr. Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the Republic, on France's return to NATO's integrated command and European Defense, in Paris on March 11, 2009.

France Nicolas Sarkozy · President of France

11 March 2009 · Colloquium on France's return to NATO's integrated command and European defence · Paris, France

Context
Sarkozy addressed a colloquium at the Foch amphitheater in Paris on March 11, 2009, announcing France's return to NATO's integrated military command.
Main themes
France's return to NATO integrated command, European defense, strategic reflection and security threats, transparency in defense policy, French sovereignty and alliances, terrorism and proliferation, globalization and new security challenges, NATO membership debate, White Paper on Defense and National Security, allied cooperation and solidarity
Duration
~52 min
95th percentile
Words
6,251
95th percentile
Sentences
371
97th percentile
Readability
53
72nd percentile
Grade
9.9
20th percentile
Syntax
2.78
20th percentile
Vocabulary
2.20
48th percentile

Translated from French

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 75%70%
  • Institutional 15%14%
  • Ceremonial 7%7%
  • Economic 3%3%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Social 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Not in focus 6%

371 sentences in 140 paragraphs

Mr. Prime Minister, Dear François,

Gentlemen Ministers,

Ladies and Gentlemen Parliamentarians,

Mr. Secretary General of NATO,

Mr. Secretary General, High Representative of the European Union,

Mr. President of the Foundation for Strategic Research,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I want to first thank Bruno RACINE for taking the initiative for this colloquium. Because it is astonishing, whether one is a supporter of NATO, an opponent, or reserved, there is one thing we should have in common, which is the concern to enlighten public opinion and to debate it. What kind of political leaders would assert convictions, which are extremely legitimate, whatever they may be, without debate? What is illegitimate is not to follow through on one's logic and not to inform the French people about the reality of NATO and the reality of France's participation within NATO. This is a point that should enlighten everyone.

And what I discovered with the Prime Minister and the government is that while we are in NATO, because we are, very few people know it.

Are there activities so secret that we must refrain from explaining to the French what we do there? The word "rupture" has often been mentioned; if there is indeed a rupture, it is that of this Government, in the transparency of the decisions it assumes. I will return to this.

This is a debate that must be conducted, and so, Mr. President, you were right.

And then, you gather us in the Foch amphitheater, which is quite a symbol: he was the first Commander-in-Chief of the Allied European and American forces during World War I. The concept of ally and friend does not date from the beginning of my term. Sometimes I feel that it is all new. So, you have made my task easier in the Foch amphitheater.

Bruno RACINE has well presented the conclusions of your debate, with the unparalleled capacity for synthesis that is his and with courtesy - I must translate - to say difference of sensitivities or violence of confrontation of opinions.

As the Chief of the Armed Forces and therefore the guarantor of the defense of vital interests and the security of France, I bear the responsibility for the strategic choices of the Nation. And I would like to affirm a first idea, which is that our strategic reflection cannot remain frozen in a world where the conditions of our security have radically changed. It is not insulting anyone to say this; it is calling all responsible parties to reflect. A strategic concept is only relevant if it is adapted to the situation not only that our country knows, but that it will know. For not only must we not be late in defining a strategic concept, but preferably, we must be ahead.

Eighteen months ago, I wished for a lucid, serene, and transparent debate, involving our political and military leaders, parliamentarians, and researchers. This led to a new "White Paper on Defense and National Security," 14 years after the one from 1994 - and we must pay tribute here to Edouard BALLADUR, who initiated it at that time.

We had to challenge our certainties and, more difficultly, our habits. Because I observe that we have habits that do not necessarily correspond to certainties and sometimes complacencies. And it is not enough to challenge certainties. It is the complacencies and habits that must be challenged, and that is often what is most difficult in France.

France is no longer today threatened by a military invasion, and this may be for the first time in its history.

Other threats have replaced it, linked to globalization: terrorism, proliferation, attacks against space systems, and attacks on computer systems on which our technological societies are deeply dependent.

The crises that strike the world affect our values, our interests, and the security of the French people.

The competitions for access to water, energy, raw materials, environmental degradation, uncontrolled migrations, are heavy with consequences for our security.

And tomorrow, a strategic surprise could literally disrupt the conditions of our security. The global financial crisis illustrates how radically the world can change, and not necessarily for the better.

These threats may seem distant. But let us not be mistaken: the national territory could be struck tomorrow, just like that of our Allies. The distinction on which we relied between internal security and external security can be said to be completely fading. And the defense of France is now played out as much on our territory as thousands of kilometers away, in space, or on computer networks.

To respond to this, we need three things: a strong diplomacy, a strong defense, a strong Europe. I add reliable allies.

Strong diplomacy means a France that assumes who it is and engages. In the world of "relative powers," no State can impose its point of view alone. None. And cooperation and solidarity are the foundations of action. A State alone, a solitary nation, is a nation that has no influence. And if we want to weigh in, we must know how to aggregate allies and friendships to us. We have seen this very well in Europe.

France engages, France speaks to everyone, France moves the lines, France proposes, and France innovates. It does so while being proud of being what it is, a free democracy, a European democracy, and a Western democracy. France wants peace, France wants freedom. And France also knows who its allies are and who its friends are: and I am not afraid to say that our allies and friends are primarily the Western family.

I do not believe that the role of a responsible great power like France is to be halfway between everyone, because that means a France nowhere. I willingly accept that this point creates debate, but I believe that the condition of its independence is first to know where its family is and that its family does not doubt you.

Next, a strong defense means modern armed and security forces, adapted to current threats. Listen, it has been so many years that in France, we have been preparing for the previous war. Again, I do not criticize anyone, but there are historical references to this.

Our armed forces must have the assurance, over time, of having means commensurate with our ambition. Despite the current crisis, with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense, we have maintained the defense effort of France. 377 billion euros for defense by 2020.

We have called for the reform of the armed forces. It will be carried out to completion. The mission of the armed forces, I want to say in front of many parliamentarians, is security. It is not land use planning. So, let us continue to want to do both, and our armed forces will not carry out land use planning and will not be in a position to ensure the security of our country. Our defense is no longer measured by the numbers it employs.

Again, I will do exactly what I said.

To be strong, our defense must be independent: we will therefore equip ourselves with autonomous intelligence and alert capabilities, cyber defense capabilities, and projection forces whose equipment does not date back, as is sometimes the case, to the 1980s, not to mention the 1970s.

We need a strong Europe. Building the Europe of defense and security is an absolute priority. Europe must assert itself as it did last summer in the Georgian crisis. To those who defend national independence - and I am one of them - I would like to compare what happened for Europe with Georgia and what happened a few years ago, in Europe, with Bosnia. Mr. Secretary General, it is not an insult to anyone to say that the Bosnian problem was first resolved by American forces and that the Georgian problem was first resolved by European policy. And that, it seems to me, is something that matters.

In Munich, I said it was a test for Europe: Europe is faced with a very simple choice: does Europe want to be left in peace or does Europe want peace? The choice is clear, and we know what happens to continents and countries that have as their only ambition to be left in peace: one day, war finds them again. And France has had the bitter experience of the theory of "let us be left alone."

And we are, it seems to me, informed by History: we cannot adopt this strategy.

For what is a great economic power that would not have the military capabilities to defend its interests? And how can we speak with one voice for Europe if it remains silent when the guns speak?

Europeans must be able to act by themselves if necessary, and with their allies if they decide. And I know that with our American allies, we agree that we must strengthen European military capabilities. And the Americans have perfectly understood that having weak allies is of no use.

But we can still ask one thing: why does the concept of a European defense advance so slowly, as if everything were in the best of worlds? And what is it that has prevented it from developing? I have a precise idea about the situation.

In 1995, after the White Paper of 1994, Jacques CHIRAC courageously initiated a first modernization of our defense policy. He then drew the consequences of the end of the Cold War, the Gulf War, and Bosnia.

Major decisions were made: the professionalization of our armed forces, the development of projection capabilities, the modernization of our deterrence, and the will for full participation in NATO structures. I was not in government at that time, but I approved this choice. And as everyone knows, if the procedure initiated by Jacques Chirac to reintegrate NATO did not reach its conclusion, it is because our American allies did not accept a better sharing of responsibilities within the military structure at that time. What I am saying is not a value judgment; it is the expression of a truth that is not contested by anyone.

So, in 2009, it is a matter of drawing the consequences of European construction, new threats, and new strategic priorities. But with the same historical objective: to ensure the security and influence of France, while respecting our national independence and our strategic autonomy.

What would a French defense policy isolated, withdrawn into itself, look like? A new Maginot Line against the challenges of the modern world.

We have two pillars of our defense, the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance.

A word on French ambition, and I will tread a bit into sensitive territory because we need to enlighten public opinion. The French ambition for European defense has long aroused distrust in the United States and in Europe, both. In the eyes of many, in Europe, as well as in the United States, France - by pushing for European defense - sought to weaken the transatlantic link and the Alliance. A sterile anti-Americanism too often reinforced this perception.

Since the Saint Malo agreement, initiated by Jacques CHIRAC, between France and the United Kingdom in 1998, European defense has made considerable progress. The European Union has developed instruments and procedures, a capability. It has conducted more than twenty civil and military operations to ensure deep stabilization in crisis regions.

And yet, Ladies and Gentlemen, I discovered in 2007 a completely blocked situation. It is sometimes said that it was due to this or that country, hostile in principle to Europe, a fierce supporter of an integral Atlanticism. This is false. If the situation was blocked, it is primarily France that, by voting "no" in the 2005 referendum, contributed to pushing European construction into a rut. That is why our first initiative, with the Government, was to get out of it, because frankly, we were not out of the referendum in a situation that allowed us to gather all of Europe around us. Europe was stalled, but France was not in a position to show the way out. And, speaking under the control of Bernard KOUCHNER and François FILLON, we worked hard to relaunch things.

With the Lisbon Treaty, we will have a coherent framework in terms of defense. When it comes into force, the institutional framework of the ESDP will be consolidated for many years. And that is very good.

The treaty will create an obligation of mutual assistance in the event of armed aggression and an obligation of solidarity in the event of a terrorist attack. But this treaty, the Lisbon Treaty, was not rejected by the "Atlantists": it was Ireland, a neutral country! And some in France who accuse me of abandoning the European ambition opposed the Lisbon Treaty! That is the truth.

But it must be noted that behind institutional progress, the military reality has not yet caught up. Who contests this? In any case, not me. The absolute priority, as I said last June, on the eve of the French presidency of the EU, is to build modern, robust, and interoperable capabilities in Europe. This is much more difficult than developing institutions and procedures or hiring civil servants.

If we do not develop these capabilities, European defense will be a paper defense. And everyone will lose out, Europe first, but also our allies within NATO.

This objective was at the heart of the French presidency of the EU. I thank all our partners because they understood how much we needed a real revival of European defense, focused this time on concrete actions.

So what are these commitments?

We will establish a new level of ambition for our operations. It will be adapted to various crisis situations, within the overall goal of 60,000 troops.

We will have an enhanced planning capacity, combining military and civilian aspects - something only the EU can do today. We are counting on Javier Solana to set this up, in a renewed spirit.

We will strengthen our military capabilities: projects have been approved, open to those who wish, for the projection and protection of forces, information and space intelligence, interoperability.

We have acknowledged that to build these capabilities, the national framework is no longer sufficient: we need new methods, to pool resources, share costs and equipment, and specialize.

We will create a military "Erasmus" for the joint training of European officers.

We have acknowledged that it will be necessary to restructure the defense industrial base, to form groups of global size. We will develop key capabilities in Europe to strengthen our supply security. And we will facilitate intra-European transfers and access to public markets: I am pleased that the European Parliament has adopted the two directives that have been discussed for far too long.

We will stimulate defense research efforts, which is the very future of our industry, with a collective goal of 2% of the defense effort and a fund to support projects. Synergies between civilian and military technologies will be sought everywhere.

Finally, the EU will engage in the most urgent areas of our security: plans have been adopted for combating terrorism, proliferation, strengthening space security, disarmament...

This is the plan for the future. But the events of last year have shown the urgency of acting right away.

In response to the crisis in Georgia, we deployed a civilian observation operation that consolidates the cessation of hostilities. And, with Bernard KOUCHNER, we were very pleased to be able to propose it.

Against the pirates in the Gulf of Aden who were attacking our ships, we launched Operation "Atalanta": this is the first naval operation of the EU, the first operation that defends purely European interests, and moreover, the first military operation of the EU commanded by the United Kingdom.

And we see that, little by little, taboos are fading and things are unlocking.

We owe this result to the effort of everyone, but also, let’s say it and look at the situation as it is, we owe it to the new spirit that has blown through Europe since France announced its rapprochement with NATO. The rapprochement with NATO reinforces national independence. Our proclaimed and unfulfilled distancing from NATO limits our national independence and our maneuvering room.

I said last year that this movement towards the Alliance first required a revival of European defense. Who can contest that this is a reality?

So I come to NATO. I knew that on this subject, we would provoke a debate in France. What could be more normal in a great democracy?

But we need a debate based on facts. Because if it is not based on facts, Mr. RACINE, this debate is no longer a debate, it is a polemic.

Your symposium recalled the facts that are too often overlooked. It is as if the facts are being hidden from the French; facts that I highlighted during the presidential campaign, I do not betray anyone. I have always deeply believed that France's national interest should lead us to this rapprochement.

But let us remind the French who ignore them, because they have been deliberately kept in the dark. We are founding members of the Atlantic Alliance, born 60 years ago. Founding members and we have never left the Atlantic Alliance. It is and remains a central element of our defense and security policy, with a fundamental commitment: that of mutual assistance in the event of aggression, and it is certainly not the French who will worry about having an agreement with the United States of America in case we are attacked, when our American friends have come to help us, to save us twice.

So, let those who want the polemic go all the way with it. If they no longer want an alliance, in case of aggression, with the United States of America, let them say so! In any case, I, in charge of the higher interests of the nation, tell you, it would be madness.

The Atlantic Alliance is also the symbol of the community of values and transatlantic interests. General de GAULLE himself defined our Alliance in 1966 as "that of the free peoples of the West."

But the Alliance is also, we never say it, a treaty of alliance between the European nations themselves. 21 of the 27 member nations of the EU are members of the Alliance. And they wanted me to wait for the French presidency to announce, in a great surge of European solidarity, that we had no interest in NATO. 21 European democracies in NATO out of 27.

Since 1966, France has gradually moved closer to NATO, most often without saying so.

Thus, agreements were immediately made to coordinate the use of our forces.

In the context of the Euro-missile crisis, in June 1983, the then President of the Republic was François MITTERRAND. An Atlantic Council was held in Paris for the first time since the French withdrawal. At the end of the 1980s, the President was François MITTERRAND, as the Cold War was coming to an end, we had reached an unprecedented level of coherence with NATO's structure in Europe.

Since 1992, the President was François MITTERRAND, drawing the consequences of the new state of the world, we went with NATO to Bosnia and then to Kosovo, after having made Serbia under Milosevic bend with NATO, and finally with NATO we went to Afghanistan. We became, we France, at that time, among the main troop contributors to NATO operations. No one knows this in France, the time has come to tell the truth. In 1993, President François MITTERRAND, we resumed attending the Military Committee, and in 1996, President Jacques CHIRAC, we fully resumed our place there.

Since the strategic concept of 1999, we have supported and participated in the transformation of the Alliance, which led in 2002 to significant changes. We participate in NATO's rapid reaction force.

In 2004, President Jacques CHIRAC, breaking with the taboo of 1966, we began to insert French military personnel into the integrated structure: since then, since 2004, the French flag, Mr. Secretary General, has been flying again in front of NATO's HQ. If we want symbols, I deliver one. And we already have three French headquarters, in Lille, Lyon, and Toulon, certified for allied operations.

As for the standards in armament, it has been a long time since the entire European industry, including ours, has applied the standards defined in common among the Allies.

So this is a continuous process through all successive governments, whether right or left; a process, ladies and gentlemen, that has seen no setback. It was therefore our collective choice, and I approve the decisions of Presidents MITTERRAND and Jacques CHIRAC at that time, we were right to do so.

With all this, we are outside the military structure. Why? I admit I do not hear a convincing argument to justify it.

On the other hand, the disadvantages are obvious. They were so obvious, in fact, that this is what led Jacques CHIRAC and Alain JUPPE to attempt the rapprochement operation of 1995-1996.

The disadvantages are primarily as follows: our position is not understood by our Allies. Our inability to openly assume our position in the Alliance casts doubt on our objectives. As a result, we have an Alliance that is not European enough, Mr. Secretary General, and a European defense that is not progressing as we had hoped.

Presenting European defense as an alternative to the Alliance with the United States ensures that we kill European defense. Presenting European defense as a complementary action to the Alliance with the United States pushes European defense forward.

The second disadvantage: we have no military positions of responsibility. It is fine to send our soldiers into the field, but it is too engaging to place our generals in military committees. We have no say when Allies define the objectives and military means for operations! We send soldiers into the field, we engage the lives of our soldiers, and we do not participate in the committee that defines NATO's objectives. Who can understand such a policy?

And all this by our own doing, as we exclude ourselves. NATO is therefore the only international organization in the world where France does not seek to be present and influential! No other example. Generally, when there is an international organization of which we are a founding member, we seek to be present and influential. NATO until now... No, no, we are present on the ground, we send our soldiers, but excuse us, we do not want to be influential, so we do not want to be present.

The interest of France and Europe

The time has come to put an end to this situation, as it is in the interest of France and it is in the interest of Europe.

By concluding this long process, France will be stronger, France will be more influential. Why? Because the absent are always wrong. Because France must co-lead rather than suffer. That is the idea I have of France.

Because we must be where decisions and standards are made, rather than waiting outside for them to be notified to us. I am in favor of national independence, but my idea of national independence is not a France at the door waiting for standards to be notified to it because it did not want to participate in their development, because it did not want to sit in the place that was offered to it.

Because once we are back in, we will have our full place in the major allied commands.

Because, as the Alliance redefines its role and missions, we want France to weigh in fully on this reform. We must end the illusion that by burying our heads in the sand, we protect ourselves from anything.

Europe itself will be stronger in the Alliance. But they say NATO is dominated by the United States. But how do we expect Europeans to play their full role if France remains outside? What a strange argument! We must strengthen Europe's weight in NATO and forbid ourselves from bringing France closer to NATO. Who can understand such a matter?

If France takes all its responsibilities in NATO, it is Europe that will be more influential in NATO. And therefore, NATO will not be an organization exclusively dominated by the United States.

The Lisbon Treaty itself establishes the link between European defense and the Atlantic Alliance. It states that it is within the Alliance that the collective defense of allies is exercised. And this link, I remind you, was established in 2003, by the Convention on the Future of Europe and then by the foreign ministers gathered in an Intergovernmental Conference. I was not President of the Republic at that time.

Finally, European defense will be stronger. Because by putting an end to an ambiguity about our objectives, we create the necessary trust to develop a strong and autonomous European defense. I believe more than ever in European defense. Do we think that without the movement I initiated, our European partners would have supported us during the French presidency? I think never. And do we think that the United States would provide us with their support, as George BUSH did in Bucharest and as Barak OBAMA does today? Never.

If there is a break in this choice, it is not so much in substance, which is the culmination of a long maturation process. It is in the method.

I could have, as in other times, made a solitary decision, then announced it at a press conference. I could have consulted neither parliamentarians nor our major partners and conducted a secret diplomacy. The reserved domain.

I chose the opposite, with the Prime Minister, that of transparency and debate.

With the opening of the White Paper Commission to all sensitivities, a White Paper that validated after lively debates the approach of rapprochement with NATO.

With the questions we have raised for 18 months.

With the dialogue that has been established between the government and the Assemblies, but also within the majority itself. I thank the Presidents of the committees; it was not so obvious. Everyone has made a journey.

But at the time of concluding, I must assume my responsibilities as Head of State and Head of the Armed Forces, for the good of our country and its security.

That said, I have heard the questions that have been expressed. If we set aside the controversies, a central question has been highlighted: that of our national independence.

On this point, I would like to return to the reasons put forward in 1966 by General de GAULLE, in the context that was that of the Atlantic Alliance at that time. It was about "restoring a completely national character to our armed forces," in line with what he asserted in 1954 when he opposed the European Defense Community. When I am told: "Unfaithful to the legacy of General de GAULLE, he opposed the European Defense Community." Today I advocate for a European defense. Are we unfaithful to the Gaullist ideal by advocating today for European Defense when we were against the EDC? Things have changed.

And therefore, no longer having foreign troops in France and no longer placing French troops under allied command. That was the decision he made in 1966.

Today our armed forces are and will remain national, because our armed forces are the ultimate expression of our sovereignty. Our armed forces will not be integrated into any supranational army whose responsibility would escape us. And besides, no one wants that, to put it plainly. We are really in a fantasy because I have not seen, after countless trips, countless meetings, a government that asks for a supranational army. I have not seen a government at the European Council table asking that it not be unanimous to decide on the engagement of national troops; it is obvious, but it is in France's interest to be at the heart of a dense network of solidarities and alliances.

Naturally, we will maintain our independent nuclear deterrent.

We will retain our freedom of judgment on the deployment of our troops.

And we will not place a contingent permanently under allied command in peacetime.

These principles set forth by the White Paper, I have made my own. And nothing in NATO today contradicts them.

Our strategic independence is recognized by our Allies in the "strategic concept" of 1999. No one imagines that the United States or the United Kingdom will ever place their nuclear weapons under the orders of a committee. It is a joke; the threat, frankly, if this is the only one we have to face, we can sleep soundly. We can have a dialogue on deterrence; we must have a dialogue on disarmament, but the nuclear decision is not shared.

No decision-making process in NATO can constrain us against our will. None. All decisions of the Atlantic Council are made by unanimity, and that will remain so. In Bucharest in 2008, France and Germany said no to an acceleration of Ukraine and Georgia's membership; honestly, we did well, whereas this acceleration of the membership request was supported by the United States. Germany and France said no; it was a no.

And if further proof of our independence were needed, the constitutional revision has given unprecedented powers to Parliament regarding the deployment of our troops in operations.

I say this solemnly: those who claim that our independence is in question are deceiving the French. I add that in saying this, they insult and shock our European partners, our allies, by implying that they are not independent. Felipe GONZALEZ, a great European who brought Spain into NATO, said it forcefully a few days ago.

So, legitimately, others are questioning what NATO will be tomorrow when we occupy our full place there.

With Angela MERKEL, we proposed on February 4 a Franco-German approach. We ask our Allies to launch the work on a new "strategic concept," ten years after that of 1999. I draw your attention to what would be the logic of a France that asks for a new strategic concept of an alliance it created and that would not fully participate in the development of the new strategic concept? Decide alone in your corner on the new strategic concept; we will join you if we like it. Frankly, is this a method of governance in 2009?

We want the Alliance to adapt to new threats. That it be a real place of debate among Allies.

We want a NATO that is more responsive and more effective.

We want it to ensure both collective defense, Article 5, and the missions we conduct in the world in service of our security and peace, in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

We want to strengthen the strategic partnership between the European Union and NATO.

We want an Alliance open to the nations of the Euro-Atlantic space. But our Alliance is not an inn: entering it implies sharing our values, being able to assume responsibilities, and effectively contributing to the security of allies and the stability of the continent.

We also want to build, I should say rebuild, a partnership relationship with Russia, if it wishes, and discuss with it the security of our continent. Another argument, Mr. Prime Minister, to return fully. We will not let the United States and Russia quietly discuss the conditions of security on our continent!

Some tell me that this choice would be a betrayal of General de GAULLE. An "alignment with Washington." A questioning of our vocation to dialogue with Russia or the southern countries. Or that France would engage in a "clash of civilizations," nothing less, against Muslims. And even that if we had been in the integrated command, we would have been forced to participate in the war against Iraq in 2003! Lies! Lies! Falsehoods! One does not inform a great democratic nation with lies.

Who can claim to know what General de GAULLE would do today? Do you think that General de GAULLE, what he did in 1966, was, in his mind, the policy of 1923 when he made his decision?

Yes, we are allies of the United States; we are friends, but standing friends, independent allies, and free partners.

And I assert that in the modern world, we must be able to change decisions made nearly 50 years ago. Should we, in the name of the Gaullist legacy, renounce the Non-Proliferation Treaty that de GAULLE rejected? Because General de GAULLE rejected the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Should we refuse that our German friends station a regiment in France, as we asked, Dear Hervé MORIN, of Angela MERKEL? Should we refuse to touch our defense agreements with Africa and keep perfectly obsolete bases there?

We will continue with all countries in the world a specific dialogue, in line with our interests. France does this with Russia, and I understood, Dear Bernard KOUCHNER, that when we discussed in Moscow this summer, it was not exactly the wish of the United States. And when we invited, Mr. Prime Minister, Syria by renewing the dialogue, did France show independence? And I see with interest the United States of America following the path of France today. And regarding Libya? And regarding Iran? And regarding Venezuela? And regarding Cuba? Is France independent? And sometimes it is the same people who oppose the return to NATO and who accuse me of "colluding with dictators."

Frankly, if France were to speak only with democracies, frankly, my carbon footprint would be considerably improved.

As for the Atlantic Alliance, it does not wage a "clash of civilizations." It is NATO that came to the aid of the Muslims of Bosnia and Kosovo; this is a truth, it is historical, everyone can see it, against the aggression of Milosevic. And it is NATO that defends the Afghan people against the return of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. We can discuss, Dear Pierre LELLOUCHE, endlessly about the strategy: is it good or not? Does it need to evolve? Yes, it must evolve. But who does it defend?

And the war in Iraq has nothing to do with NATO. Even before France did so, Germany opposed it. Spain and Italy participated and left when they decided. As for Turkey, a NATO member, it refused passage to American troops. And countries that are not in NATO followed the Americans there. To say that France's rapprochement with NATO would have led the French army to Iraq is a shameful lie that does not elevate those who utter it. One can have all the convictions one wants, and they are perfectly defensible, but to lie is the opposite of democracy.

Next week, on March 17, our national debate will conclude in Parliament.

The renovation of our relations with NATO is not an isolated question. It is one element, among others, of a foreign and European policy, and of a defense and security policy.

I wish for the national representation to express itself on the choices that have been made since the spring of 2007. That is why the Prime Minister was authorized this morning by the Council of Ministers to engage the government's responsibility on our entire foreign policy. Because, you have understood that this process of rapprochement with NATO is just a stone in a broader process aimed at strengthening and developing the independence of the nation.

Our Allies and European partners will be attentive to this. I am convinced that this debate will be worthy of our country and the stakes of our defense, like the one that took place on the White Paper last June. And I have full confidence in the Prime Minister, François FILLON, to carry the elements of France's foreign policy.

After having taken note of the outcome of the debate, I will write to our Allies to inform them of my decision. We will then meet in Strasbourg and Kehl, on the Rhine. The Rhine has long been a symbol of confrontation; it will be a symbol of Franco-German reconciliation. Angela MERKEL and I will host the summit for the 60th anniversary of our Alliance there.

This will be, I am convinced, a great moment of Franco-German friendship, European unity, and transatlantic partnership. Many people ask me about the reality of the Franco-German partnership, who call on me to defend Franco-German friendship. Well, I will tell you that France's rapprochement with NATO, believe me, is a major element of Franco-German friendship and that our partners, our friends, our German allies are very happy with this movement that will strengthen Europe.

And France, because it is in its interest and because it is its choice, will occupy its full place in this transatlantic partnership. A free ally, a solidary ally, an independent ally, and an engaged ally.

Ladies and gentlemen, I hope you understand, this decision will be the culmination of a process, and I am very proud of the action of French diplomacy led by Bernard KOUCHNER, of the action of the Minister of Defense, Hervé MORIN, of the Secretary of State for European Affairs, Mr. LE MAIRE, and this process will allow one other thing: to better inform the French. And ultimately, if we have worked so hard with the Prime Minister on this issue, it is not because we doubted, it is because we had to face a significant delay in pedagogy and information. Democracy has its demands, and this demand is the truth. And it was time to tell the French what the truth was about our situation in our relations with the Atlantic organization.

Thank you.