Statement by Mr. Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the Republic, on the possibility offered to any litigant to raise the exception of unconstitutionality and on the role of the Constitutional Council, in Paris on March 1, 2010.

France Nicolas Sarkozy · President of France

1 March 2010 · Paris, France

Context
Sarkozy addressed senior judicial and constitutional figures in Paris to mark the entry into force of Article 61-1 allowing litigants to raise unconstitutionality exceptions.
Main themes
Priority question of constitutionality, Constitutional Council reform, hierarchy of legal norms, citizens' right to raise unconstitutionality, Fifth Republic parliamentarism, constitutional review of laws, sovereignty of law, separation of powers, constitutional evolution since 1958, role of supreme courts
Duration
~24 min
73rd percentile
Words
2,858
73rd percentile
Sentences
109
67th percentile
Readability
33
21st percentile
Grade
15.1
77th percentile
Syntax
3.08
58th percentile
Vocabulary
2.31
76th percentile

Translated from French

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 82%82%
  • Ceremonial 15%15%
  • Geopolitical 1%1%
  • Economic 1%1%
  • Social 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 1%

109 sentences in 43 paragraphs

Mr. President Valéry GISCARD D'ESTAING,

Mr. President Jacques CHIRAC,

Mr. President of the Constitutional Council,

Ladies and Gentlemen members and former members of the Constitutional Council,

Mr. President of the National Assembly,

Madam Keeper of the Seals, Mr. Minister,

Mr. Vice-President of the Council of State,

Gentlemen the first presidents of the Court of Cassation and the Court of Auditors,

Gentlemen the public prosecutors,

Ladies and Gentlemen the presidents, first presidents, public prosecutors, prosecutors,

Ladies and Gentlemen the bar leaders,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Each of you understands the importance of the event that brings us together today.

March 1, 2010, will indeed remain as the date of a profound change in our legal system. The entry into force of Article 61-1 of our Constitution, as it arises from the constitutional law of July 23, 2008, opens to every litigant the possibility of raising the exception of unconstitutionality. It marks the culmination of an evolution that began with the Constitution of 1958 to establish a true hierarchy of norms in our law, which a long tradition of absolute sovereignty of the law had until then rendered impossible.

This absolute sovereignty of the law had its logic. That of a Republic that had long fought to impose the sovereignty of the nation as the source of all legitimacy. Expressing the general will, the power of the law could neither be subordinated nor limited.

This absolute sovereignty of the law was also fraught with risks. That of a rupture of the balance between the legislative power and the executive power. And that of abuse of power, which is inherent in any unlimited power.

To break with the assembly regime that had alternately generated so many excesses and then so much impotence, the Fifth Republic instituted rationalized parliamentarism that no longer allowed the legislative power to encroach upon the executive power. Thus, for the first time in our history, a control of constitutionality was established which, by obliging the legislator to respect the Constitution, placed it above the law itself, at the top of the legal order.

As jurisprudences and constitutional reforms progressed, this primacy of the Constitution has since been affirmed, establishing a true hierarchy of norms in which first the Preamble of the Constitution, and then, by virtue of Article 55 of the Constitution of 1958, international treaties have taken their place.

I will not recall here the major milestones of this legal construction, marked by the significant decisions of the Constitutional Council, the Council of State, and the Court of Cassation which, since 1971, have accompanied the change in mentalities and the relationship to law in our modern societies. You know them.

After the extension of the "block of constitutionality" to the great principles that underpin our civic and social pact and the broadening, Mr. President GISCARD D'ESTAING, of the referral to the Constitutional Council to sixty deputies or sixty senators, it was difficult, I would even say impossible, to indefinitely keep the citizen away from the constitutional review of laws.

One could naturally have wished to remain with the constitutional review of laws before their promulgation, which was the principle established by the Constitution of 1958 to preserve the stability of the legal order. But after long reflection and observing that the promulgated law was already likely to be challenged in light of international treaties, I became convinced that it was to expose oneself certainly, in the more or less long term, to the constitutional review of laws by the ordinary judge, even if out of respect for the prerogatives of the Constitutional Council, the Council of State and the Court of Cassation had always had the wisdom until then to maintain the centuries-old jurisprudence by which they prohibited themselves from exercising such control.

The choice made by the constituent, on the suggestion of the Balladur committee to which I once again express my warmest thanks for the work it has accomplished, is therefore assumed: to the Constitutional Council and it alone the control of the constitutionality of laws, including promulgated ones, upon referral from the supreme courts of the two judicial orders; but to the ordinary courts and to them alone the control of their compatibility with international treaties and acts of derived law, while respecting, where appropriate, the regulatory role of European courts. The Constitutional Council has indeed itself emphasized the strength and coherence of this distribution of tasks in the decision it recently rendered on the organic law relating to what we will now call the "priority question of constitutionality."

The vast majority of laws currently in force are, in my view, free from the suspicion of unconstitutionality. Because most are recent, notably due to the progress of codification; because the Constitutional Council has been able to be seized by parliamentarians; because upstream the Council of State gives an opinion on all government bill projects, and now - it was all the more necessary - on the bills submitted to it by the assemblies; because the judge has always strived to interpret the texts in force in light of the rules and principles of constitutional value; because finally and above all the control of conventionality, particularly in light of the European Convention on Human Rights, has appeared, to a certain extent, as a substitute for the control of constitutionality.

The entry into force of Article 61-1 nonetheless marks an important advance for the guarantee of rights. Enclosed by the organic legislator in short deadlines - which have been the subject of great debates - ensuring the filtering of challenges lacking seriousness, the treatment of the priority question of constitutionality opens an absolutely considerable field to litigants. Yesterday partial, dependent on a priori referrals - that is to say, on political maneuvering - the verification of the constitutionality of laws becomes potentially systematic, provided of course that a serious doubt arises in the context of an ongoing dispute. For it was not a question of opening a direct and autonomous recourse against the law, whose censorship should only be provoked when its concrete application reveals a real difficulty.

The abrogative effect of declarations of unconstitutionality will be a powerful engine for the effective implementation of this new right. And there are, as we know, many constitutional rules that do not have equivalent protection in international conventions. I am pleased that, precisely at this time when there is a debate on national identity, the "principles inherent to the constitutional identity of France," to use the terms of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Council, are recognized for their full effectiveness instead of being confined to a purely formal primacy. They could not remain any longer, with respect to promulgated laws, in a state of law without sanction.

I add, because I am very attached to it, that the reform will not only allow for a renationalization of certain litigations but will also prove to be an incomparable instrument for the reappropriation, by citizens, of our constitutional corpus.

It was high time to put an end to this incomprehensible situation that had consecrated, since 1981, a right of individual recourse before the European Court of Human Rights while at the same time, the citizen was kept away from the courtroom of the Constitutional Council. A situation that sometimes resulted in disputes, instead of being resolved in France, leading to condemnations of France by the European Court. A fine result! I also commend the choice made by the organic legislator to impose that the constitutional issue be examined as a priority, Mr. President, when a challenge is also raised on the grounds of international law.

The Constitution, which due to this uniqueness was ignored by the vast majority of our fellow citizens, now finds the place it should have always had. The Constitution is not only about the relations of public authorities. The Constitution is also the foundation of the fundamental values in which everyone can and must recognize themselves; values that, in essence, define republican identity, say who we are and where we want to go. Placing it at the heart of judicial procedures contributes to the refoundation of the republican pact.

Finally, I welcome the priority question of constitutionality as an important innovation for our judicial system, with a procedure that renews the terms of the dialogue of judges and allows for its deepening. This is true at the national level, the filtering mechanism by the Council of State and the Court of Cassation having the virtue not only of ensuring an efficient division of tasks but also of ensuring that the supreme courts of each of the two judicial orders, while respecting of course the exclusive prerogatives of the Constitutional Council, are associated with the development of the jurisprudence of the latter. This is also true at the European level, as the European Court of Human Rights, in particular, will be keen to take into account the decisions rendered by the Constitutional Council.

All precautions are taken to avoid any infringement of the legal certainty to which we owe our fellow citizens, especially since the Constitutional Council will now have the ability to modulate the effects of its decisions over time.

But rules alone do not suffice. Each must therefore fully understand how much this new power given to judges to assess the constitutionality of already promulgated laws places a heavy responsibility on them. I want to reiterate here, as guardian of the institutions, that this reform aims to strengthen individual freedoms by consolidating our rule of law, and not to liquidate our republican model. The exception of unconstitutionality opened to any citizen in the course of an ongoing case before a court is the logical culmination of the legal revolution initiated by the constituents of 1958, and it responds to a need expressed in all contemporary democracies. However, this new right must not undermine the fundamental principles of our republican tradition that give the law a prominent place that cannot be contested in favor of a government of judges or experts. This is the limit and the difficulty of your work as well as ours.

Sovereignty belongs to the people who exercise it through their representatives or by way of referendum. This is the cardinal principle of our Republic and our democracy. The judge who rules in the name of the French people cannot judge either the law or the legislator. But the judge has the mission to ensure that the rule of law is a reality, and the control of constitutionality has the role of ensuring the coherence of the legal order from the perspective of both the principles that underpin it and the rules that organize it. There can be no rule of law if the Parliament acting as legislator contradicts the Parliament acting as constituent power. There can be no rule of law if the legislator does not feel bound by the treaties whose ratification he himself authorized. When the law is invalidated, it is up to Parliament to revise the Constitution or to change the law. Each thus finds themselves facing their responsibilities - an essential principle of democracy - and facing an imperative of coherence that allows litigants to know and assert their rights.

If the legislator must respect the hierarchy of norms and the principles that underpin his own legitimacy, the judge must ensure in his jurisprudences the stability and predictability of legal rules, as he must always scrupulously ensure to judge in law and not in opportunity. The constitutional judge must be all the more demanding with himself as he often judges the respect of great principles, his power of appreciation is immense. It is not by chance that we say "the sages of the Palais-Royal," for it is indeed wisdom that the Republic needs when it is confronted with the question of whether it is faithful or not to its own values. There is always, inevitably, a point where the control of constitutionality meets philosophical or moral judgment. How could it be otherwise when judging in light of the rights of man and the citizen, when invoking the principle of liberty or that of equality?

There is a specificity to the control of constitutionality of laws, because the Constitution is not a legal text like any other.

This means that the Constitutional Council cannot be a court like any other. That is why I wanted it to be composed not only of legal technicians and for former presidents of the Republic to retain their status as ex officio members, because the experience of a former head of state, who has operated the institutions, can greatly contribute to the quality of the Council's decisions, to their balance, to their realism. It is with the same concern that the President of the National Assembly, the President of the Senate, and I have chosen the three new members of the Constitutional Council who combine legal expertise with extensive parliamentary experience. The Constitutional Council is not a court like any other.

However, the fact that the Constitutional Council has an interest in fulfilling its mission by being rich in diverse experiences, particularly those of individuals who have held high political responsibilities, should not lead to its being elevated to a sort of political counter-power. Just as the separation of powers is essential to any democracy, the notion of a counter-power is foreign to our conception of the State and the Republic. I say this because I have deeply desired this reform; our rule of law will benefit from it, but it is difficult, it is complex, and it must be measured against the state of mind that each of us possesses.

The response to this challenge largely lies in the political will that the authorities invested with the legitimacy of universal suffrage must know how to demonstrate. Does the Council censor part of the Hadopi law? We find ways to achieve the primary objective of protecting copyright in the digital realm while fully meeting the requirements it has reiterated; the solution has been found. Does the Council censor the carbon tax? We will similarly find ways to respond to the global ecological challenge by taxing pollution and exempting labor, while respecting, once again, constitutional principles. Beyond that, Dean Vedel was right: constitutional censorship resolves less a substantive issue than a conflict of competence between ordinary legislators and the constituent power. There is no need to make a drama out of it. And from parity to the right of asylum, through European treaties, there are not infrequent cases in which the constituent has rightly had the final word on constitutional jurisprudence. The Constitutional Council, moreover, found nothing to object to.

In our Republic, the Constitutional Council is the guardian of the separation of powers. I believe it is not meant to become a Supreme Court overseeing all jurisdictions and establishing a judicial counter-power competing with the legislative and executive branches. That would be contrary to the spirit of the reform and to our Constitution. Our democracy would gain nothing from a permanent conflict between the different powers and authorities through which it expresses itself.

I want to say that until now, everyone has shown enough wisdom. The Council's decisions have not been contested, and the Council has decided wisely. The reform we are introducing today into our law will modify the existing balances. To find new ones, we will need to show even more wisdom, so that each institution can fully assume its role and responsibilities, remembering that the final word always belongs to the sovereign people and that there is no legitimacy superior to theirs.

Ladies and gentlemen, the exception of unconstitutionality is part of those great reforms that no one will reverse. I have also observed with some malice and much interest that the parliamentary opposition, which in its vast majority - it was its right - opposed the constitutional revision, has joined other currents of the national representation to vote almost unanimously for the organic law establishing the priority question of constitutionality. Let us pay tribute to the understanding and a certain form of flexibility. Allow me, moreover, to thank the parliamentarians, particularly from the law commissions, for the quality of the work they have provided.

When I presented myself in 2007 to the French electorate, I promised an exemplary Republic, an irreproachable democracy. The priority question of constitutionality is for me one of its emblematic elements. Let us agree together that beyond the exception of unconstitutionality, the constitutional revision of July 23, 2008, with the Parliament's authorization for external military operations, the rights of the opposition - including the ex officio presidency of the finance committee - the sharing of the agenda, the strengthening of Parliament in the legislative process, oversight of appointments, the Defender of Rights, the reform of the Superior Council of the Judiciary, and the disciplinary referral by litigants, has brought a renewal to our democratic life whose significance time will allow us to measure.

Ladies and gentlemen, we will remember this afternoon, because this afternoon marks a true legal revolution and a new right for our fellow citizens. It seems to me that we should all rejoice in this, regardless of our sensitivities.

Thank you.