Statement by Mr. Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the Republic, on the reform of the international monetary system, in Nanjing (China) on March 31, 2011.

France Nicolas Sarkozy · President of France

31 March 2011 · Seminar on the reform of the international monetary system · Nanjing, China

Context
Sarkozy addressed a G20 seminar on international monetary system reform in Nanjing, China on March 31, 2011, during France's G20 presidency.
Main themes
International monetary system reform, exchange rate volatility, G20 coordination, foreign exchange reserves accumulation, global financial instability, capital flow volatility, international imbalances, reserve currencies, emerging market vulnerabilities, multilateral cooperation
Duration
~23 min
71st percentile
Words
2,704
71st percentile
Sentences
165
84th percentile
Readability
44
45th percentile
Grade
11.2
34th percentile
Syntax
2.75
17th percentile
Vocabulary
2.28
68th percentile

Translated from French

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Economic 64%63%
  • Institutional 17%16%
  • Ceremonial 13%13%
  • Geopolitical 6%6%
  • Social 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 2%

165 sentences in 60 paragraphs

Ladies and gentlemen, dear friends,

Mr. Vice Prime Minister,

Mr. Director General of the IMF,

Mr. Secretary General of the OECD,

Ladies and gentlemen, ministers,

Gentlemen governors,

Mr. Nobel Prize winner in economics, dear Robert MUNDELL,

Ladies and gentlemen, professors,

I would like to express how happy I am to be among you to open this seminar on the reform of the international system.

I would like to thank President HU and all the Chinese authorities for hosting us today in Nanjing.

I had the opportunity to discuss with President HU the priorities of France for the G20 presidency just yesterday during our talks, and I was able to see that we share a common vision on many essential issues for the future.

Mr. Vice Prime Minister, thank you for agreeing to open this seminar.

Please allow me to first think of the Japanese people, with whom we are all united in this particularly difficult moment.

Dear Mr. Vice Minister TAMAKI, I ask you to convey to your Prime Minister our expression of support and solidarity.

The topic that brings us together today is crucial: building a more stable, more resilient international monetary system is a tremendous challenge and a collective challenge. That is why I wanted, in addition to the five G20 invitees, Switzerland, Thailand, and the Netherlands to also be associated with our work.

I thank the Chinese Center for International Economic Exchanges for mobilizing to ensure that this meeting takes place under the best conditions.

I would like to thank all the international organizations present, the Director General of the International Monetary Fund who has an essential role to play in this reflection. And I welcome the presence of eminent scholars.

The G20 has demonstrated its effectiveness in the recovery. Naturally, with this recovery, the temptation for each to look out for themselves is strong. In a crisis, the demand for coordination is strong. In a recovery, the demand for coordination is less immediate. My conviction is that if we lose the momentum we generated during the crisis, the world will inevitably fall back into instability and crises.

Nothing would be worse for the G20 than to act as if nothing had happened and to give in to the temptation of isolationism and self-interest. And this is particularly true in the monetary field. A few months ago, commentators spoke of a currency war. The daily evolution of the markets shows us that the volatility of currencies remains a source of significant instability.

France has wished for the reform of the international monetary system to be a priority for the G20.

The international monetary system we have inherited, based on floating exchange rates between major currency areas, has allowed us to absorb many shocks: oil shock, financial crisis, debt crisis. It has also allowed the emergence of new reserve currencies. I am thinking particularly of the euro, which is the second reserve currency in the world.

But despite these successes, our international monetary system has shown its limits. It has not prevented the accumulation of ever-greater international imbalances. In 10 years, balance of payments imbalances have doubled. In 10 years!

International capital movements have become more volatile. They expose emerging countries to reversals that jeopardize their economic, social, and even political stability. Since 1990, the world has experienced 42 crises of sudden capital flow stops, in one country or region. I want to pose this question: how can emerging countries conduct their economic policy when they are faced, in less than six months, with massive withdrawals followed by massive inflows of capital? How can one conduct an economic policy under these conditions? It is impossible.

Who can contest that excessive currency volatility is detrimental to growth and stability? This March has once again been the scene of exacerbated volatility in the foreign exchange market, with no link to economic fundamentals. The yen experienced unprecedented movements in March, reaching its highest historical appreciation against the dollar since World War II. In just three months, the euro/dollar parity, dear Tim, went from less than 1.30 to over 1.40!

I ask the question: what changes in economic fundamentals can justify such brutal and rapid changes in exchange rates? The answer is simple: there are none.

To face this instability, in this unstable world, what is happening? The need to accumulate foreign exchange reserves has increased. Ladies and gentlemen, the foreign exchange reserves of central banks have doubled between 2000 and 2009 to reach today 6.5 trillion dollars. Doubled since 2000! The accumulation of foreign exchange reserves can be justified in some cases, but it is very costly. It finds its counterpart in a poorly managed, insufficiently diversified supply of reserve assets.

Faced with this situation, which is absolutely undeniable, there are two possible reactions: each for themselves, and in that case, it will be a currency war, and a currency war means new crises; or cooperation and coordination. We have no choice. Currency war, crisis, or coordination and cooperation.

The international monetary system must gradually, Mr. Vice Prime Minister, reflect the major changes in the global economy that we have observed.

The major emerging countries of the G20 represent nearly a quarter of the global economy. In 10 years, you will represent 50% of the global economy. The world is multipolar. That is why I insisted that this seminar take place in China. This multipolar economic world must correspond to a multi-currency monetary world. Emerging countries represent a quarter of the global economy. In ten years, you will be half of the global economy. Who can imagine that the economy changes so much and that the monetary system remains static?

The G20 has taken these developments into account by reforming the governance of international financial institutions. But the G20 must take these developments into account by modifying the organization of the international monetary system.

Our ambition, ladies and gentlemen, is that you can arrive at a common diagnosis, because when we agree on the diagnosis, then we can work together to develop reform proposals.

I want to be clear about the ideas that the French presidency of the G20 wishes to promote.

Today, it is not about returning to a fixed or administered exchange rate system. That would be a complete mistake; it would risk brutal adjustments and, ultimately, for the countries concerned, the loss of autonomy in their economic policy. No one wants that.

It is clear that we must evolve towards a more flexible exchange rate system. Why more flexible? So that it can withstand shocks from the global economy. But this flexible exchange rate system cannot evolve without rules, it cannot evolve without coordination, it cannot evolve without oversight; otherwise, it is instability. However, there is no coordination, there are no rules, and there is no oversight. Without rules, the international monetary and financial system is incapable of preventing crises, financial bubbles, and the widening of imbalances. Without rules, without oversight, the world will be condemned to increasingly severe and grave recurring crises. Over the past 10 years, the volatility of growth has doubled.

It is because we wish to evolve towards more flexibility in exchange rates that we must set new operational rules for the international monetary system. And if you do not take care of it, no one will do it for you, for us. And if we do not take care of it now, we will have to deal with it when it is too late, that is, in the midst of major crises in the international system.

So what does this require? First, coordination of our economic policies within the G20. Achieving significant reductions in imbalances is the whole challenge of the Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth that we defined in Seoul.

In Paris, in February, under the presidency of Christine LAGARDE, to whom I want to pay tribute, an agreement was reached on indicators of imbalances. In April, in Washington, dear Tim, we will discuss the "guidelines." And let no one doubt the French presidency's commitment to continue moving forward on this path.

I hope that we can quickly agree on methods. And method does not mean insulting each other, it does not mean blaming each other; it means understanding each other's problems and knowing that there is no salvation except together, not against each other. In Cannes, at the G20 Summit, I hope we can agree on a concerted strategy.

Beyond that, I am convinced that the oversight exercised by the IMF must not only focus on national economic policies but also on their impact on other countries, particularly through the financial channel.

The liberalization of capital movements and the flexibility of exchange rates are among the achievements of the last 20 years.

Capital movements, which ensure the efficient allocation of capital, come with higher risks of massive withdrawals or inflows of capital that can prove destabilizing.

Everyone may be tempted to protect themselves through unilateral measures. Ultimately, we must avoid two pitfalls. The first is the naive belief that the liberalization of capital movements is sufficient for economic balance, regardless of the circumstances. France does not share this analysis. Let us remember that the crisis in Asia at the end of the 1990s resulted exclusively from forced liberalization and, if I may say so, doctrinaire liberalization of financial flows!

The other pitfall to avoid is the risk that a multiplication of unilateral measures, precipitated by times of crisis, leads to a new financial protectionism from which all economies would suffer.

We will avoid these pitfalls by resolutely adopting the path of multilateralism, the path of cooperative and vigilant liberalism. A code of good conduct, guidelines, a common framework governing the possibility of implementing capital controls when necessary, must set the conditions under which restrictions on capital movements are legitimate, effective, and appropriate to a situation.

If we agree, ladies and gentlemen, on these rules, it will be a major evolution of the IMF's doctrine, to the benefit of emerging countries that suffer from excessive volatility in capital movements. But is it reasonable today, given the growing impact of capital movements, that the IMF can only make recommendations to a country regarding its current account balance and not on the capital account? I would like an explanation of why a recommendation on one would be legitimate and a recommendation on the other would be illegitimate. An expansion of the IMF's oversight to these areas seems essential to me. In the long term, France -- I say it -- is in favor of a modification of the IMF's statutes to expand its oversight capacity. Because if we decide on more coordination, more rules, more oversight, we must decide which body will be responsible for implementing these rules and this oversight. For France, it is clear: it is the IMF.

The 2008 crisis showed us how essential liquidity is to ensure the proper functioning of the global economy. If it disappears, the entire system is jeopardized. I am convinced that the reform of the international monetary system is the natural extension of the reform of the international financial system that we have initiated with the Basel III prudential framework. What is the point of implementing Basel III if we ignore the monetary system? But who can believe that regulating the financial market is sufficient without considering the monetary system? That would make no sense.

So we have made decisions: the agreements on monetary cooperation, the exceptional allocation of 250 billion dollars of SDRs, the third in the history of the IMF. I want to pay tribute, by the way, to the Korean presidency.

But today we must give ourselves the means to consolidate these advances.

We need to ask ourselves certain questions. Are the liquidity instruments at our disposal adequate? Everyone knows we need liquidity, but are today's instruments adequate? Who could answer yes? Are they flexible enough? Who would dare to answer yes? Are they reversible? Should we create other liquidity elements? Should we expand them to be able to respond to a systemic crisis that would affect an entire region and not just one country?

In recent years, regional liquidity support agreements have been created. I am thinking of the Chiang Mai Initiative in Asia, but more recently of the instruments of the Eurozone. We, the countries of the Eurozone, what have we done if not come together to create liquidity and respond to the crisis?

I wish for international organizations and development banks to amplify their actions.

We must also ensure that the accumulation of precautionary reserves that we see in several regions of the world becomes less necessary. I mean that there is a risk of a shortage of reserve assets. We saw it in the crisis; exceptional and contingent allocations of SDRs can be effective. But it seems to me that it would be useful to equip the IMF with the capacity to borrow on the markets to meet the financing needs of countries in times of crisis — with all the necessary safeguards to protect the Fund's resources.

We must accompany the inevitable internationalization of major global currencies. But this is not, of course, dear Tim, about calling into question the prominent role of the dollar; that would be irresponsible, no one thinks that — just as the role of the euro, which must be stable currencies. But the internationalization of some other currencies is already a reality, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister; I am of course thinking of the yuan, and I commend the ambition of the Chinese authorities in this area.

But is it not time today to agree on the timeline for expanding the SDR basket to include new emerging currencies, such as the yuan? Who could contest the major role of the yuan in the functioning of the international monetary system? This pays tribute to the economic power and political power of China, a great monetary power.

Finally, recent events in Japan demonstrate once again the importance of international coordination on exchange rates. The G7's action, dear Christine, on the yen has helped counter speculation disconnected from fundamentals that threatened to increase the difficulties of our Japanese friends as they face events of rare gravity. What happened was unacceptable.

Coordinated interventions are an essential safeguard for the international monetary system against deviations and excessive volatility. It is, of course, a last resort instrument, but it is only effective if used in a coordinated manner.

The G7 exists for this purpose. But China is not part of the G7. And is it normal that we do not have a forum where all the major monetary powers could discuss the international monetary system together? Is it not time to imagine such a forum?

Ladies and Gentlemen,

In order for 2011 to mark a decisive step in the reform of the international monetary system, the French presidency of the G20 expects a lot from your discussions. I am well aware that we will not solve all the problems in a year, and the Deputy Prime Minister is right, but we must move forward today if we want to avoid new crises or new summits where surplus countries oppose deficit countries, where deficit countries denounce surplus countries. What is there to expect from these discussions? Nothing. Nothing, except new crises. The G20 in Seoul entrusted us with a mandate, for which I am accountable as president of the G20. I know it is difficult; I know we cannot reform a system that dates back to Bretton Woods just like that, but, Ladies and Gentlemen, if we do not take care of it, no one will. If we do not do it now, it will be even more difficult to do it tomorrow. Let us agree on a diagnosis, let us start working together, and it is because we will coordinate our policies that we will be able to respect our sovereignty over our economies. And it is because there will be no coordination that there will be pressure from speculation and crises, and that is when our sovereignty over our economies will be called into question. You see, France sets a great ambition for your seminar, but I am sure that the quality of participation will yield great results.

Thank you.