Statement by Mr. Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the Republic, on the role of the Constitutional Council in the institutions of the Fifth Republic, in Paris on November 3, 2008.

France Nicolas Sarkozy · President of France

3 November 2008 · Statement on the role of the Constitutional Council in the institutions of the Fifth Republic · Paris, France

Context
Sarkozy addressed a conference marking the 50th anniversary of France's Constitutional Council in Paris on November 3, 2008.
Main themes
Constitutional Council's 50th anniversary, constitutional review, protection of fundamental rights, Fifth Republic institutions, jurisprudential evolution, separation of powers, European constitutional justice, rule of law, democratic freedoms, constitutional reform of 2008
Duration
~30 min
82nd percentile
Words
3,561
82nd percentile
Sentences
109
67th percentile
Readability
31
19th percentile
Grade
16.8
88th percentile
Syntax
3.37
88th percentile
Vocabulary
2.27
66th percentile

Translated from French

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Institutional 85%84%
  • Ceremonial 11%11%
  • Social 3%3%
  • Geopolitical 1%1%
  • Economic 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 1%

109 sentences in 50 paragraphs

Mr. President of the Constitutional Council, dear Jean-Louis Debré,

Mr. President Jacques Chirac, dear Jacques,

Ladies and gentlemen members and former members of the Council,

Ladies and gentlemen Presidents and members of European constitutional jurisdictions, of French-speaking constitutional jurisdictions, of international jurisdictions,

Madam Minister of Justice,

Of all the institutions of the Fifth Republic, the Constitutional Council is undoubtedly one of the most emblematic. It is the youngest of our institutions since it was created from scratch in 1958, the pale Constitutional Committee of the Fourth Republic hardly being able to claim to be your ancestor. The Constitutional Council is also, very certainly, the boldest of the institutions arising from the Constitution of 1958, the one that has changed and surprised the most since its creation. "Instrument of rationalized parliamentarism," "watchdog of the executive," "regulator of public powers," according to the various formulas that have been used to qualify it at its origins, the Constitutional Council has gradually transformed into an organ for defending the Constitution against the abuses of the legislator, and for protecting fundamental freedoms. Thanks to the Council, the law is no longer a tool solely at the service of power.

This boldness is owed to the Council's youth. From a few constitutional and organic provisions, the Council had to invent everything: its practices, its philosophy, its jurisprudence. It is also due to the intelligence of its successive presidents and members, who have gradually made the Council, with the help of its secretaries general, a unique institution, a guarantor of the balance of powers and the respect of fundamental rights, without ever seeking to take the place of political power, but without ever yielding anything to its mission.

At the end of these fifty years of existence, the Constitutional Council can be proud of the work accomplished. That is why, dear Jean-Louis Debré, in front of the members and former members of the Council, in front of representatives of all judicial authorities and all legal professions, in the presence of judges from most European constitutional courts, from French-speaking states, from the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union, I am both honored and happy to open this conference for the 50th anniversary and to wish the Council a happy anniversary.

Today, and more than ever, dear Robert Badinter, with the reform of last July, but without having waited for it, France ranks among the most advanced nations in terms of constitutional review. It is not said enough. Yet it is the truth. Considerably younger than its illustrious cousin in the United States of America, younger than its Austrian, German, and Italian counterparts, the Constitutional Council has no reason to be ashamed of what it has become, drawing on their example, while respecting our traditions and specificities. It can today contribute in turn to helping the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe establish mechanisms for constitutional justice. Many of these young courts are represented among you this morning; allow me to extend a special greeting to them.

To all the skeptics of the hierarchy of norms - and they exist - to all the detractors of the constitutional review of laws - and they exist - I want to remind you that the time is not so far away when half of Europe lived under the yoke of an ideology that despised the most fundamental rights of the human person. The time is not so far away when, at our doors, entire peoples were deprived of these essential freedoms, enshrined in France as early as 1789: freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, freedom of expression, freedom of movement, protection against arbitrary detention, without which life is nothing but fear.

The time is not so far away either when advanced democracies, shaken by a dramatic economic situation or by a crushing defeat, fell into the terror and ignominy of Nazi barbarism.

When I look at the years that have passed and the changes that have occurred, I am pleased that today, throughout Europe, with few exceptions, the fundamental rights of the person are placed at the highest level of norms, and that they are endowed with strengthened protection mechanisms, both at the internal and international levels. This is what is at stake here.

In our country, so marked by the principle of the absolute sovereignty of the legislator, the Constitutional Council has only imposed itself as the defender of the Constitution and the protector of fundamental rights at the cost of a slow but very skillful jurisprudential construction, constantly concerned with balance and moderation.

The major inflection is obviously the decision of July 16, 1971, by which the Constitutional Council censured legislative provisions for violating the freedom of association. This historic decision definitively settles the previously controversial point of whether the Preamble of 1958 and the two texts to which it referred at the time, the Declaration of 1789 and the Preamble of 1946, were part of the constitutional block or not. It paves the way for a generous jurisprudence in defense of fundamental freedoms and brings France into a constitutional modernity that insists that a Constitution is not only a text governing the relations between public powers but also a charter of rights and freedoms.

This decision was preceded by a discreet allusion to the Preamble in the recitals and reasons of a decision of June 19, 1970, according to this usual technique borrowed from the Council of State, which consists of affirming a principle or launching a trial balloon before making a direct application in a subsequent decision. Generally speaking, it is just to say that the Constitutional Council owes much to the Council of State in the development of its working methods, its judgment techniques, and its jurisprudence.

The list is long of the multiple tools that have allowed the Council to develop an increasingly protective jurisprudence for citizens, without preventing France from being governed and political majorities from implementing the projects for which they were elected: neutralizing interpretation, negative incompetence of the legislator, means raised ex officio, ultra petita control, manifest error of judgment, control of laws already promulgated through amending laws, the notion of objectives of constitutional value, control of the legal guarantees provided for constitutional requirements, refusal to prioritize the different principles of constitutional value, but rather a constant effort to reconcile them in the service of the common good... all these processes are known to your observers and will certainly be mentioned today, as I see the faces in this room.

From a few sometimes elliptical provisions of the Declaration of 1789, the Preamble of 1946, and the Preamble of 1958, you have managed to extract useful principles for addressing the new questions facing our society. Let us think, for example, of the principle of safeguarding human dignity, on the occasion of your 1994 decision on bioethics, or the constitutional objective of decent housing for all. Continuously since 1971, you have ensured that the Constitution and the texts to which its Preamble refers are living texts, bearing meaning, equality, and freedom for all our fellow citizens. It was not obvious to achieve this result.

Of course, like any political leader, I have sometimes questioned, haven’t I Jacques Chirac, the implications of one or another of your jurisprudences. But dialogue with political authorities is necessary for the Constitutional Council. It is our duty to take your decisions into account, not only because they are binding on public authorities and all administrative and judicial authorities - that would be a rather primitive conception of our dialogue - but because they constantly invite us to strengthen the legislative mechanisms for protecting freedoms. It is a plus for the Republic, it is a plus for democracy. I think of the rights of foreigners, respect for private life, the principle of equality, and the protection of the most vulnerable.

But it is your duty, on your side, to take into account the evolutions of society, the new problems facing democracies, because the first threat to human rights is to leave the field open to populisms, whether from the left or the right, to demagogues, from all sides, and, ultimately, to the adversaries of democracy. This is what you have managed to do, for example, in the field of security and immigration, where you have taken your responsibilities.

By proceeding in this way, through a jurisprudence that is both bold and nuanced, your institution, in addition to its many other missions, has not only ensured its longevity but has also significantly contributed to strengthening that of the Fifth Republic.

By refraining from controlling referendum laws and constitutional laws, your institution has never placed itself above the will of the people.

It has accompanied alternation by preventing political majorities from succumbing to the inevitable temptation of excesses. From the right or the left, all political families in our country, when they found themselves in opposition, have seen the Constitutional Council uphold values that were dear to them: the rights of private property at the time of nationalizations - we were very glad to have the Constitutional Council then - as well as those of public property at the time of privatizations; the freedom of education as well as the existence of a public, secular, and free education system.

Finally, within the framework of a rich and constructive dialogue with the Council of State and the Court of Cassation, the Council has clarified the very delicate question of the articulation between internal norms and international and community norms.

The Council has allowed for the full integration of France into European construction and the international legal order, ensuring that the distribution of roles between jurisdictions allows for the greatest efficiency and the best legal security possible. At the same time, through a decision in 2004, and given the weight taken by European directives in our law, the Council has adjusted its jurisprudence from the 1975 IVG and deemed it its duty to control that the laws transposing directives are indeed compliant with them.

In recent years, the Council has reminded us that the superiority of community and international law over French domestic law cannot extend to the Constitution. And it has established the principle of France's constitutional identity in order to preserve what, in our legal tradition, cannot dissolve into international law, no matter how protective of fundamental freedoms it may be. Everyone knows that this particularly concerns secularism, the right to strike, public services, but everyone senses that it could concern much more if that were the will of the Constitutional Council.

It must be noted that, throughout these years, not only has no government challenged the founding orientation of 1971, but all political leaders, on the contrary, have supported the rise of your institution, regardless of their statements before coming to power. What greater tribute than this constantly renewed trust from the constituent power? What better proof of the democratic legitimacy that your actions now enjoy?

In 1974, President Giscard d'Estaing allowed the Constitutional Council to be seized by 60 deputies or 60 senators. Some believed they could qualify the reform as a "minor measure," as others did for the reform of July 23, 2008. This reform by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing had major consequences for the Constitutional Council, making its referral the first right of the opposition. The reform of July 23, 2008, which extends constitutional review to laws already promulgated and creates a status for the opposition, one of whose main rights will be to create inquiry commissions, clearly fits into the same lineage: that of an irreproachable democracy - and I will never understand those who opposed it for such political reasons - of a peaceful democracy, a democracy where the freedoms of citizens are better guaranteed, where the role of the minority is sufficiently valued to have recognized and protected rights.

In 1992, failing to open constitutional review to laws already promulgated, as President Badinter would have wished - what a joy it would have been to implement what you so much wanted to do, that will remain a great satisfaction for me - François Mitterrand allowed sixty parliamentarians to refer the constitutionality of treaties to the Constitutional Council. Each thus contributes their stone to the constitutional edifice.

In 2004, President Jacques Chirac increased the role of the Constitutional Council - also - by taking the initiative to add an Environmental Charter to the list of texts for which the Council is already responsible for ensuring compliance.

In 2008, the Congress consolidated the role of the Constitutional Council in multiple ways: it subjected the appointment of its members to parliamentary oversight. If one trusts Parliament, one cannot contest that this is an essential guarantee; it strengthens the role of the Council in the implementation of Article 16 of the Constitution; it makes it an essential link in the new procedure for popular initiative referendums; it endows the Council with a power of arbitration between the government and Parliament regarding impact studies that will now accompany the submission of bills - and you will see that this reform will matter a lot. This new procedure is a response to the growing problem of the proliferation of norms and the degradation of their legal quality; this problem has been raised and fought against with great determination by the Constitutional Council during Pierre Mazeaud's presidency; finally, the reform of July 23 allows citizens to challenge the constitutionality of laws through the exception, thus giving the Council a full competence comparable to its foreign counterparts; what you had dreamed of, I have offered you.

And yet, Jacques Chirac knows well, I spoke to him about it, I questioned the creation of this exception of unconstitutionality. I challenge anyone not to wonder about the consequences of a reform of this importance.

I was sensitive to the risk of legal insecurity and the increasing judicialization of society. However, it seemed to me that these two pitfalls would be limited by the filtering role of the two supreme courts and the unique referral mechanism to the Constitutional Council.

I then paid attention to the argument of those who believe that the exception of unconstitutionality has become unnecessary, since the control of the conventionality of laws allows litigants to assert their fundamental rights by invoking international or European conventions. Upon reflection, however, I became convinced that these two legal avenues were not equivalent.

First, I do not believe that there is an absolute homothety between the fundamental rights protected by our constitutional norms and the fundamental rights protected by international texts. If the Constitutional Council believed it could extract the concept of constitutional identity of France, it is because it was aware of this difference.

Next, it is singular to observe the ardor of our high courts in recalling the absolute supremacy of the Constitution in the hierarchy of norms, without being genuinely equipped with mechanisms to enforce it. Quite frankly, and the Constituent understood this, I prefer that our laws be censured on the basis of our Constitution rather than on the basis of international and European conventions.

Allowing laws to be challenged on the grounds of our Constitution does not undermine the sovereignty of the people and the National Representation; on the contrary, it strengthens it, because it is the people or the National Representation that writes the Constitution and places it at the top of its norms, whereas neither the people nor the National Representation writes the international norm. This argument was decisive for me in the choice I made to propose to Parliament the reform of July 23, 2008.

Finally, I considered that it was more than time to allow citizens to take ownership of their Constitution and to access the Constitutional Council directly; just as it was urgent that the Constitutional Council and our Constitution not remain apart from this immense corpus of fundamental rights that is being constructed within the framework of a permanent dialogue between national jurisdictions and European and international jurisdictions. For this, it was necessary that the constitutionality of laws could be challenged by litigants, just as their conventionality could.

You will see, Mr. President, dear Jean-Louis Debré, that the reform of July 23 will remain as the great reform, as the great turning point. There will be all those who will say, "I was happy to vote for it," and all those who will say, "But why did I not vote for it?"...

I also want to pay tribute to the professors of constitutional law who are in this room and who participated in the Committee chaired by Édouard Balladur, because they helped me a lot, first to make the decisions we made, and then to explain them to public opinion.

I say this in front of Jean-Jacques Hyest and Jean-Luc Warsmann, who played an essential role in the reform of our Constitution: it was not obvious, but ultimately we were able to make a consensual reform. Certainly voted by two votes, but who speaks of the two votes? We now only speak of the vote. This is how constitutional history goes. There is a lot of fighting beforehand, and then it becomes common law afterward. And that is very good. I feel like July was a century ago, and every day I see the most ardent critics of the reform saying to me, "But why is it not already implemented?" Ultimately, good constitutional law is law that knows how to be charitable. Perhaps one of our fundamental rights is this, knowing how to forgive those who did not understand right away, but who quickly take ownership of a reform that one would say was built for them.

So, Mr. President of the Constitutional Council, ladies and gentlemen members of the Council, you see with what eagerness I came this morning, for a subject that is not technical: constitutional law and law in general, it is not technical, it is about our fundamental freedoms.

Ladies and gentlemen members of the Council, it is now your responsibility to make this reform come to life.

In fidelity to your history and traditions, I have no doubt that you will prove the pessimists and the grumblers of the reform of July 23, 2008 wrong; no doubt, you will make the exception of unconstitutionality of laws as effective as the challenge to their conformity with international law before the ordinary judge, and as fruitful as their control through the a priori appeal; I have no doubt finally that those who explain to you that all this is useless, or even exposed to a risk of failure that makes it dangerous, will soon rush into the prolix commentary of your new decisions.

It will be your task, in this endeavor, to maintain this balanced path between the defense of fundamental freedoms and the respect for the political choices desired by the people. This is the condition of your legitimacy.

Beyond the implementation of this new power granted to the Council, I note that you will examine in the coming months all the organic laws necessary for the implementation of the reform of July 23, as well as the regulations of the two assemblies. Your contribution to the reform will be decisive in this regard.

I want to clarify for the attention of the representatives of foreign Courts that I am one of those who fought for former Presidents of the Republic to continue to sit on the Constitutional Council. I can see, "it will happen to him one day," you must be thinking. It is certain, but frankly, and I ask the great specialists to reflect on it, that there is within the Council a man or a woman who has had to operate the Constitution to bring, beyond the theoretical vision, the concrete and practical aspect experienced by the man or woman who found themselves in a position to decide, there is nothing shocking, quite the contrary. It is a wealth for the Council to see former Presidents of the Republic sit there to bring their vision as practitioners of institutions. After all, the one who made them function is no less competent to comment on them than the one who has only looked at them from the outside.

Ladies and gentlemen, you will have understood, I am proud to be the President of a Republic that, in fifty years, has managed to establish a true constitutional jurisdiction and a jurisprudence that is as balanced as it is rich.

Perhaps because I am a lawyer by training, perhaps because I have personally experienced what it was like to have a democracy that took liberties with elementary principles of political combat in a free country; and then especially because I love France, that I have great ambitions for it, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms, the exemplary Republic, the irreproachable democracy, these are realities that matter deeply to me and that are embodied by a constitutional jurisdiction worthy of the name; "worthy," that is the word you used, Mr. President.

And that is why I would not have missed being present among you this morning for anything in the world, having only one regret: not being able to participate in the continuation of the work, because I imagine there will be many other things to say, and that what I have said deserves many comments and why not numerous criticisms.

Thank you.