Tribune by Mr. Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the Republic, in "Le Figaro" on August 18, 2008, on the action of France and the European Union in favor of resolving the conflict between Georgia and Russia, titled "Russia must withdraw without delay from Georgia."

France Nicolas Sarkozy · President of France

18 August 2008

Context
Sarkozy published a tribune in Le Figaro on August 18, 2008, outlining France's and the EU's diplomatic efforts to resolve the Russia-Georgia war over South Ossetia.
Main themes
Russia-Georgia conflict, French diplomatic mediation, ceasefire agreement, European Union crisis response, Russian military withdrawal, South Ossetia, international stabilization, Lisbon Treaty, EU institutional reform, refugee assistance, UN Security Council resolution
Duration
~7 min
25th percentile
Words
862
25th percentile
Sentences
30
18th percentile
Readability
38
32nd percentile
Grade
15.1
76th percentile
Syntax
3.02
50th percentile
Vocabulary
2.35
84th percentile

Translated from French

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 97%97%
  • Institutional 3%3%
  • Economic 0%0%
  • Social 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Ceremonial 0%0%
  • Not in focus 0%

30 sentences in 8 paragraphs

The time will come when the chain of events and responsibilities can be established in an indisputable and impartial manner: the weeks of provocations and skirmishes along the line separating South Ossetia from the rest of Georgia; the reckless military intervention of Georgia inside the rebel province during the night of August 7 to 8; the brutal and disproportionate response of Russian troops pushing back the small Georgian army from South Ossetia, dislodging it from Abkhazia, the other separatist province where it had regained a foothold in 2006, before advancing into part of the rest of Georgian territory.

In the face of the unleashing of violence, the urgency lay elsewhere: from the very beginning of hostilities, France and Europe fully engaged on the diplomatic front. The first priority was to obtain a ceasefire, to put an end to the suffering of the populations and the destruction. It was also necessary to create the conditions for it to be accepted by both the Russians and the Georgians. Against the advice of many who promised us failure, we decided, along with Bernard Kouchner, to go to Moscow and Tbilisi as early as August 12, armed with proposals to convince the Russians that it was high time to silence the guns and the Georgians that they had even more to lose by continuing the war. The lengthy discussions we had with Dmitri Medvedev and Vladimir Putin during the day at the Kremlin and then with Mikheil Saakashvili at night in Tbilisi ultimately allowed us to extract the agreement of both parties to a six-point crisis exit plan.

This plan did not resolve everything. In fact, that was not its purpose. But it established the parties' agreement to a ceasefire. Its signing by Presidents Medvedev and Saakashvili, and by myself on behalf of the European Union, allows for the withdrawal of Russian forces to their positions prior to the outbreak of hostilities, in accordance with the assurances that President Medvedev gave me.

This withdrawal must be carried out without delay. This point is non-negotiable in my eyes. It must concern all Russian forces that entered Georgia since August 7. If this clause of the ceasefire agreement is not applied quickly and fully, I would be compelled to convene an extraordinary European Council to decide on the consequences to be drawn.

Beyond the withdrawal, much remains to be done to stabilize the situation sustainably. A resolution from the UN Security Council will need to consolidate the initial gains by giving them universal legal force. An international mechanism must be established to separate the parties and verify that they fulfill their commitments. The international community must mobilize to assist displaced or refugee populations and to help Georgia recover from its destruction. We must also determine whether Russia's intervention against its Georgian neighbor was a brutal and excessive response, in this singular case, or whether it marks the beginning of a new hardening of Moscow's stance towards its neighbors and the international community as a whole, which would inevitably have consequences for its relationship with the European Union. Russia must be convinced that it will be heard and respected all the more if it contributes responsibly and constructively to the resolution of the problems of our time.

But there is already a lesson to be drawn from this crisis: the European Union has risen to the occasion. Europe stepped to the forefront from the very beginning of hostilities to resolve this new conflict on European soil, the third since the fall of the Berlin Wall, after the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s and Kosovo at the end of the decade. In this first phase of resolving the current crisis, Europe's commitment has been decisive: it is the Union, through France, that opened up space for diplomacy by quickly proposing reasonable terms for a ceasefire, thus making the political cost of continuing the war exorbitant for both parties. If our efforts have produced initial results, it is because Europe, despite some differences in tone, did not confine itself to mere condemnation. By preferring action and negotiation to incantation and simple denunciation, Europe was able to restore a positive balance of power with Russia and make itself heard by it. When the house is burning, the priority is to put out the fire. Europe has thus proven that it can achieve much when driven by strong political will.

A second lesson deserves to be highlighted: if the Lisbon Treaty currently being ratified were already in effect, the European Union would have been equipped with the institutions it needs to face an international crisis: a stable President of the European Council acting in close consultation with the heads of state and government of the Union most concerned; a High Representative endowed with a genuine European diplomatic service and considerable financial means to ensure, in conjunction with the member states, the implementation of the decisions made.

Thus, I remain convinced that the primary mission of Europe is to protect Europeans. This is precisely what we have done by doing everything possible to reduce this new conflict, the consequences of which could be catastrophic if it were to herald a new Cold War.