Speech by Chancellor Olaf Scholz at the Berlin Security Conference on November 30, 2022, in Berlin:

Germany Olaf Scholz · Member of the Bundestag

4 December 2022 · Berlin Security Conference · Berlin, Germany

Context
Scholz addressed the Berlin Security Conference on November 30, 2022, outlining Germany's defense posture and support for Ukraine following Russia's invasion.
Main themes
Russia's invasion of Ukraine, European security order, Germany's military support for Ukraine, NATO collective defense, Bundeswehr reform and readiness, European missile defense shield, transatlantic alliance, air defense capabilities, EU training mission, Baltic region defense, Ukraine solidarity, neo-imperialism
Duration
~17 min
57th percentile
Words
1,997
57th percentile
Sentences
100
63rd percentile
Readability
43
43rd percentile
Grade
12.3
48th percentile
Syntax
3.02
51st percentile
Vocabulary
2.29
71st percentile

Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 75%73%
  • Ceremonial 8%8%
  • Institutional 6%6%
  • Economic 5%5%
  • Environmental 4%4%
  • Social 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Not in focus 3%

100 sentences in 32 paragraphs

Dear Prime Minister Støre, dear Jonas,

dear Dr. Proll,

dear Wolfgang Hellmich,

ladies and gentlemen,

Russia's invasion of Ukraine at the end of February has dramatically changed our security environment. The foundations of our security remain solid: the transatlantic friendship and the close cooperation within the European Union. However, the European security order of the past decades has been shattered by Russia with its illegal, imperial war of aggression. For all of us in Europe, this means significant adjustments—adjustments that cannot be limited to classical security and defense policy.

These adjustments include our decision to deliver weapons to a war zone like Ukraine for the first time on a large scale—closely coordinated with our allies. I know, dear Jonas, you have made a very similar turn—so have other friends and allies of ours. This strengthens us in our course, a course that I continue to believe is absolutely right in light of the Russian war of aggression.

It is about supporting Ukraine in upholding its legitimate right to self-defense, protecting the European security architecture, and putting a stop to Putin's neo-imperialism. And we are indeed succeeding in this. I am convinced that Russia can and will no longer win this war on the battlefield. The relentless attacks on vital infrastructure, on water and energy lines, on Ukrainian cities and villages—they are a terrible and at the same time desperate strategy of scorched earth, desperate also because we will not let Russia get away with it. Our solidarity with the attacked Ukraine remains unbroken—even though the war also has significant impacts on us.

Russia must understand: We will continue to support Ukraine, for as long as it takes: economically, financially, humanitarianly, through the reconstruction of destroyed energy infrastructure right now—and also with weapons.

Artillery and air defense are what is currently most needed in the fighting in the east and southeast of the country and for the defense of Ukrainian cities. We are supplying artillery and air defense, and we are continuously looking for ways to do even more, currently especially in air defense. In parallel, we are training a Ukrainian brigade of up to 5,000 soldiers in Germany as part of a new EU training mission. And of course, we are also pleased with Norway's support for this EU mission.

From Russia's aggression against Ukraine, we have drawn lessons for the protection of our own country and our allies. At the Bundeswehr conference in September, I told the leadership of the Bundeswehr: The core mission of our armed forces is the defense of the homeland and the alliance—the defense of freedom in Europe. All other tasks of our armed forces derive from this. All other tasks are subordinate to this central mission! And we adhere to the saying of Fridtjof Nansen, which Willy Brandt quoted in his famous speech upon receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo: "Skynd dere å handle, før det er for sent å angre!" For all Germans and Norwegians who did not immediately understand my Norwegian: This saying means: Hurry to act before it is too late to regret.

No aggressor should ever doubt that we are firmly determined to defend every ally and every inch of alliance territory with all the forces at our disposal. For this, we are keeping up to 17,000 soldiers ready for the NATO Response Force in this and the coming two years. In 2023, we will also once again take the lead of NATO's rapid reaction force. It is good to know that Norway and the Netherlands are firmly by our side in this.

We are present with army and air force units in Slovakia. The air force secures the airspace over Estonia, and our navy has increased its presence in the Baltic Sea. And we have permanently strengthened our NATO battle group in Lithuania. At its summit in Madrid, NATO also clearly reaffirmed collective defense as its core mission in its new strategic concept. We are implementing these decisions with all our might.

We are assigning a brigade of the Bundeswehr for the defense of Lithuania, thereby strengthening the defense of the Baltic region as a whole. Last month, initial forces from this brigade already tested their deployment to Lithuania and practiced there with our Lithuanian allies. For the NATO force structure, we have also committed to providing the alliance with an armored division as well as comprehensive air and naval forces that can be called upon in high readiness for the defense of alliance territory. And we are working to improve the military capabilities of the European Union, for example regarding its military and civilian command capabilities and structures or the development of its own capabilities, complementary to NATO.

This applies, for example, to air defense. Three months ago, I proposed in Prague the establishment of a European missile defense shield—as a European contribution to NATO and compatible with the alliance's structures. Fourteen partners have since joined this initiative, and I am glad and grateful that Norway is among them.

We take the irresponsible nuclear rhetoric of the Russian regime very seriously. However, we will not be intimidated by it. Instead, we are doing everything we can to ensure that the red line holds, according to which a nuclear war must never become a reality.

I was also in agreement with Chinese President Xi Jinping on this when I visited Beijing earlier this month. And I am relieved that we were able to anchor this fundamental principle in the final document of the G20 summit.

As long as states like Russia possess nuclear weapons as part of their threat potential, NATO naturally needs a credible deterrent capability. Anything else would mean making ourselves vulnerable to coercion. That is why we have decided to procure F-35 fighter jets in the coming years, thus continuing to provide a German contribution to the nuclear sharing of the alliance in the future. This is a requirement of national, European, and transatlantic security and a contribution to burden-sharing within the alliance.

Our security and that of our allies is also at stake in the implementation of the special fund for the Bundeswehr of 100 billion euros. We are talking about the largest investment in our armed forces since their inception. We want to conclude the first supply contracts this year—for the purchase of the aforementioned F-35s, for the upgrading of Puma infantry fighting vehicles, and for the procurement of bridging vehicles. Our mountain troops are experiencing how and where these can be used during their regular exercises in the Norwegian winter under Arctic conditions. And 1,200 German and Norwegian soldiers from the army, air force, and navy have just experienced this in northern Norway, where they trained together in tactical fire support, an exercise that is unique in this form between our two countries. But that should not remain the case.

It is already clear here: The Zeitenwende and its implications for the Bundeswehr are about much more than just a considerable amount of money. From procurement to equipment, from strategy to operations, we need more decisiveness, more willingness to take risks, and efficient structures. And we need a European defense industry that meets the demands of modern armed forces.

We are making progress in this regard. Just a few days ago, we achieved a breakthrough with France and Spain on the European Future Combat Air System (FCAS), a project that is central to the security and sovereignty of Europe. In close coordination with the industry, we will enter the next project phase this year, in which a technology demonstrator will now be built.

Beyond such concrete progress, Germany also needs a strategic—not to say: mental—Zeitenwende. For this, we are working intensively on a National Security Strategy. This security strategy will take into account a wide range of threats and challenges and a permanently changed global situation.

To achieve this, we will closely interlink the actions of all levels of government, strengthen the resilience of the economy and society, and better coordinate instruments for crisis management, prevention, and recovery. The guiding principle is succinctly called "integrated security."

At the core of our security policy is, of course, the protection of our country and the lives and freedoms of the people in Germany from military aggression. That is why we will commit ourselves in our security strategy to a comprehensive strengthening of our defense capabilities and unconditionally to the obligation to assist our allies. We know who our friends and partners in the world are—and Norway is one of the closest among them.

At the same time, we will actively counter the increasing risk of a new bloc formation in the world. The security and prosperity of our country depend on an international order that binds power to law, as the Charter of the United Nations does with its principles. However, to maintain these principles in a multipolar world, we must work with all the countries that are willing to stand up for this order and further develop it. Therefore, we will always align our relationships in the world primarily towards partnership and cooperation. Anyone who disrupts or seeks to destroy the rules-based international order—like Putin's Russia—must reckon with Germany's resistance.

Another central task is a comprehensive strengthening of resilience within our own country. We must protect ourselves from cyberattacks just as we must protect ourselves from disinformation and hybrid influence on our democratic institutions and processes. We will resolutely fend off attempts to undermine our open and diverse society and our social cohesion.

The acts of sabotage against the Nord Stream pipelines and the attack on the communication network of Deutsche Bahn have shown us how vulnerable our critical infrastructure is. And I am very grateful that Norway and Germany—especially through our navies—are working very closely together on this issue.

Finally—this must also be mentioned—we will protect our globally interconnected economy from unilateral dependencies on raw materials, technology, and energy—but not through a unilateral decoupling from individual states or regions, but through a smart, determined diversification of our supply chains.

Ensuring a reliable and affordable energy and raw material supply remains a central future task for our country. In doing so, we focus on protecting our natural foundations of life, as climate, biodiversity, and natural resources have direct impacts on security and stability. And here, too, Norway is both a model and a partner.

We have just been discussing an energy and industrial partnership between our two countries that is climate-neutral. Today, Norway is by far Germany's most important energy supplier, accounting for over 40 percent of our natural gas imports. Dear Jonas, when Russia first cut its supplies and then completely turned them off, you increased your supplies to us by almost ten percent. We will certainly not forget that. And when I say more often these days, "Germany will surely get through this winter," my thanks also go northward.

However, the potential of our partnership goes far beyond gas supplies. I think of cooperation in renewable energies, in hydrogen, but also in climate-friendly technologies such as the capture and storage of CO2 emissions, where Norway is a global leader.

There is hardly a field where Germany and Norway do not cooperate, where we do not look in the same direction and move forward together. I know that you further north are also drawing the consequences of the Zeitenwende. The accession of our Swedish and Finnish friends to NATO is an expression of that, as is the security policy shift in your country.

We are in the same boat here—I believe we all felt that when we met with the other Nordic heads of government during my visit to Norway in August and then sailed across the Oslo Fjord in truly Hanseatic weather. But you will surely tell us more about the Norwegian perspective on the Zeitenwende shortly—and I do not want to preempt that. Just this: Dear Jonas, thank you very much for your visit here with us! And thank you for Norway's friendship in this turbulent time!