- Context
- Churchill spoke in the House of Commons in London on May 10, 1951, in a debate on exports to Communist China, criticising Government rubber exports and urging close accord with the United States.
- Main themes
- Exports of strategic materials to Communist China, rubber exports from Malaya and Singapore, closeness with the United States, resignation of three Ministers, American counter-charge of trading with the enemy, Korean campaign, defence of Western Europe against Soviet power, air superiority and American aid, Government ignorance of its own export figures, civilian requirements of China
- Duration
- ~11 min
- Words
- 1,349
- Sentences
- 45
- Readability
- 50
- Grade
- 13.6
- Syntax
- 3.51
- Vocabulary
- 2.10
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other45 sentences in 17 paragraphs
Quite true, but they have at any rate a fixed date for their elections. To exist month by month in such an electioneering atmosphere as this, may provide many topics to fill the public mind and what is left of the newspapers, but our external dangers do not diminish meanwhile; they grow continually. It is said that we are getting stronger, but to get stronger does not necessarily mean that we are getting safer. It is only when we are strong enough that safety is achieved; and the period of the most acute danger might well arise just before we were strong enough. I hope that may be pondered upon because it is a very potent and relevant factor.
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Our great danger now is in pursuing a policy of girding at the United States and giving them the impression that they are left to do all the work, while we pull at their coat tails and read them moral lessons in statecraft and about the love we all ought to have for China. I would plead in the very short time I beg leave to keep the House this afternoon—because our time is very limited—for a sense of proportion——yes, on the grounds of national safety and even of survival.
I say that we must think not only of ourselves; we must think of our friends in Europe; of the Norwegians, the Danes, the Dutch, the Belgians, the French and others who lie still nearer to the Soviet Power with its mighty armies and satellite States. Their plight is even worse than ours. We, at least, have the Channel, although even that as a means of safety would, without air superiority, soon depart; and air superiority cannot be obtained by us without the fullest aid from the United States. Therefore I say that on every ground, national, European and international, we should allow no minor matters—even if we feel keenly about them—to stand in the way of the fullest, closest intimacy, accord and association with the United States.
I felt bound to raise these matters, these broader considerations, because we really cannot discuss the intimate and complicated matters which have brought about this debate without holding foremost in our minds all the time the overwhelming issues. If the Government so conduct our affairs that we become a cause of diminishing American help for Britain and for Europe, and stimulate the sentiment for isolation which has powerful exponents in the United States, they might well become primarily responsible, not only for our ruin, but for that of the whole of the free world. It is on this basis, and only on this basis, that I venture to examine the details, or some of the details, or some of the aspects of the exports to Communist China which are the cause of the debate— That is not, I hope, a reproach against me for having placed the matter in its proper setting.
These questions of raw materials and of trading with the enemy were brought prominently before us by the resignation of the three Ministers a fortnight ago.
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When the resigning Ministers threw the blame for raw materials shortage in Britain upon the United States, the Americans immediately were greatly stimulated in making their counter-charge that we, while still recognising the enemy and killing them by the thousand in the battles that were taking place, were making profits directly or indirectly out of commerce with them. This tangled question of the supplies of what are called strategic materials to Red China from Great Britain and the Empire and our tropical Colonies is of course only part of the subject, much of which lies in spheres and forms, which are beyond our control. Red China is not the only place and Hong Kong is not the only channel.
Some months ago I complained of the export of high grade war manufacture, and even machines and machine tools, to Russia or its satellites. The Government denied the charge, but took steps to stop it. Whether those steps have been successful I cannot pronounce, nor could we even in a much longer debate reach any definite conclusions here. But even on the direct point of strategic materials being sent by us to China, through Hong Kong or by other routes, it would be difficult this afternoon to reach plain and final conclusions. The statements made by the Minister of Defence, and after him by the Prime Minister, created, I am sure I am right in saying, general astonishment that these Ministers, whose responsibility in the matter is outstanding, were not better informed. It seemed typical of the way in which our affairs are conducted. It was refreshing on Monday to listen to what seemed at first to be a much more precise statement from the new President of the Board of Trade. Here at least there seemed to be evidence of the workings of a clear-cut mind which had been, in the last week or so, turned upon the problem, or upon his brief of the subject.
So far as the regions covered by the figures given by the right hon. and learned Gentleman are concerned the general impression was that the scale of these transactions from the United Kingdom was small, and that there could be no ground for saying that the Chinese have received important assistance from the United Kingdom with the approval of His Majesty's Government. The exports from the United Kingdom are indeed
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petty, and the right hon. and learned Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade was right in saying that it is wrong to suppose that they have been a factor of any significance in the Korean campaign.
We were surprised, however, that he confined his lengthy, well-drafted statement to the exports from the United Kingdom and only mentioned, by reference to the previous answer by the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, the exports of rubber from Malaya. This is the gravamen of the whole dispute. "Exports of rubber from the Federated States of Malaya and Singapore to China," said the Under-Secretary on 12th April, "amounted in all to 77,000 tons in 1950, and are estimated to amount to 46,000 tons"—I am speaking in round numbers—"in the first quarter of 1951." Up till 9th April therefore the Government have taken no effective action in this matter and the exports in the first quarter of the present year show an immense and significant increase on what took place last year; 46,000 tons a quarter is—and I hope I am right in my arithmetic—184,000 tons a year——Is that right? Thank you very much. That is to say two-and-a-half times the annual rate of 1950. That is a very remarkable, substantial, significant advance at this time when matters are becoming more and more tense, serious and critical.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman—I shall have to ascertain the right hon. Gentleman's wish as to whether I should continue to insert the complimentary and formal token "learned"—it will be just as he likes, but I am doing it for today, anyhow—the right hon. and learned Gentleman ended his statement by saying that the Government had from 9th April announced their intention, and that of the Governments of the Federation of Malaya and Singapore, to control exports of rubber down to the estimated civilian requirements of China, namely, about 2,500 tons a month.
I raised the point of how the Government could be sure that these 2,500 tons a month would be solely devoted to civilian purposes, considering that, in time of war, any Government can commandeer for military purposes all civilian supplies. The right hon. and learned Gentleman admitted that it was "quite difficult"—
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that was his expression—to ensure that these limited rubber supplies were not being misapplied. Anyhow, on the Government's own figures, China has already had in the first quarter of this year, imports, approved formally and officially by us, of 45,000 tons; or half as much again as would be the full civilian Chinese ration, as calculated by the Government, for the whole year.
