North Atlantic (Supreme Commander)

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Leader of the Opposition of the United Kingdom

19 April 1951 · House of Commons debate · House of Commons, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on April 19, 1951, in a debate on the North Atlantic commands, backing a US Mediterranean command while demanding equal Anglo-American division of the Atlantic command.
Main themes
American command of the Mediterranean, division of the Atlantic command between Britain and the United States, dissolution of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee, Atlantic Pact standing group, absence of a British sailor from the standing group, Anglo-American relations during the Korean War, Persian oil and Egypt, defence of the Suez Canal, French contribution in the Mediterranean, defence White Paper criticism
Duration
~9 min
32nd percentile
Words
1,102
32nd percentile
Sentences
50
33rd percentile
Readability
55
77th percentile
Grade
11.2
35th percentile
Syntax
2.99
46th percentile
Vocabulary
2.08
23rd percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 46%42%
  • Institutional 46%42%
  • Economic 4%4%
  • Ceremonial 4%4%
  • Social 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 8%

50 sentences in 14 paragraphs

This is rather up the hon. Gentleman's street. It is right to spread the risk of reprisals. We at home should be safer, and the United Nations and Atlantic Powers would be stronger.

Therefore, I do not oppose the United States taking the command, if that is their wish, of the Mediterranean on the practical and strategic merits. Moreover, there are far-reaching political arguments. We are no longer strong enough ourselves to bear the whole political burden we have hitherto borne in the Mediterranean, or even to take the leading part in the diplomatic control of that theatre. But the United States and Britain together, aided by France—which in the Mediterranean makes a very different contribution to the common strength than it is possible for her to do in the Atlantic, with her bases and her ships—we three together would be in a most powerful position to deal with, say, the Egyptian problem and the whole question of the defence of the Suez Canal. We and the United States ought, to act together there and in these matters.

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I am always looking out for something to give the Government a good mark for, and I read the papers vigilantly every day, and I was very glad to see that about the Persian oil, the Government are already working with the United States. That is right and wise. The same combination will enormously relieve our difficulties in Egypt, the Levant and throughout the Middle East. After all, the United States are now looking after Turkey, and have taken over from us the salvation of Greece. These countries would welcome the United States in the Mediterranean, and would gladly accord them the supreme command there.

What are the Government trying to do? Having let the question of the Atlantic command go largely by default, they hope to put themselves right with the public—this is my guess—by claiming the Mediterranean. It is as if a man had put the wrong shoe on his right foot should say: "I will put the other shoe on my left foot, and that will be a compromise which will make it all right." Such absurdities have no part in the grim realities of warding off war or of war itself.

I ask that this matter should be reconsidered from the beginning. I ask that the command of the Atlantic shall be agreeably divided between Great Britain and the United States on equal terms. In the war the line was eventually drawn at the 26th Meridian—quite a different thing from the 38th Parallel. But wherever the line is to be drawn, it would be easy to arrange for the taking over of the convoys and for their air defence; and the adjustments, sometimes almost daily, can be made quite easily, and can only be made, between the Admiralty and the Canadian and United States Navy Departments. If it is a question of large transfers of forces from one side to the other, that is really a matter first for a Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee, if they exist still, and in the ultimate issue for settlement between the Prime Minister and the President, who together control 90 per cent. of all the effective air and naval forces involved in this whole business.

Now I come to the existing organisation for the Atlantic Pact. The costly error was made when the Combined

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British and American Chiefs of Staff Committee was dissolved, of sweeping this away, of breaking up this organisation. It was a disaster. We speak the same language; we have many other ties. What a pity it was to let go that organisation which served us so well, and which carried the direction of war between allies to the highest and most smooth-working efficiency ever reached in history.

The Prime Minister told us that he regretted the abolition of the Combined Chiefs of Staffs Committee. But why did he not put up a fight about it? Surely this was an occasion when he might have crossed the Atlantic and had a personal talk with the President on the top level. Keeping the Combined Chiefs of Staffs Committee in existence need not have prevented a co-existent instrument with other powers on it for the purpose of executing the Atlantic Pact. Half the misunderstandings which have been so dangerous to Anglo-American relations during the Korean War would, I believe, have been avoided had there been a regular and constant meeting, as there were in the bygone years, between our two Chiefs of Staffs Committees. We cannot afford, in the dangers in which we now stand, to make mistakes like this. By mismanaging these affairs the responsible Ministers may bring untold miseries upon the hard-working, helpless millions whose fate lies in their hands.

What organisation have we got now to replace the contact between the President and the Prime Minister and the continued daily intercourse of the Combined Chiefs of Staffs Committee? We are told of a standing group of Powers under the Atlantic Pact. This group which deals with the forces deployed under that Pact consists of three men—a French general, a British airman and an American vice-admiral. There is not a British sailor on it at all; not at the head of the Fleets not in this higher organisation. But surely the carrying of food and supplies from which Britain lives, carrying the armies of the New World to Europe, and maintaining them there across the broad oceans and through the narrow seas—surely that is a business in which sailors and merchant seamen and ships of all kinds, and naval skill and knowledge have their part.

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I hope that the House will carefully consider many of the arguments that I have ventured to put before them, and I hope that we shall not allow this matter to rest as a thing definitely settled. I hope myself that the mistakes that have been made will be recovered.

This White Paper, so long withheld, is mainly a repetition of the one we got over a year ago. It has the addition of the names of various officers appointed by General Eisenhower in his Continental Command. But it gives us no real information. It is only a painful exposure of the paralysis of Cabinet mentality. If the Minister of Defence is not able tonight to make a genuine contribution to our knowledge, I shall feel it my duty to move a nominal reduction of his salary as a protest against the manner in which these grave matters have, so far, been handled by him and by the Government as a whole.