North Atlantic (Supreme Commander)

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Leader of the Opposition of the United Kingdom

19 April 1951 · House of Commons debate · House of Commons, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill addressed the House of Commons in London on April 19, 1951, in a debate on the North Atlantic command, opposing the appointment of an American Supreme Commander of the Atlantic and arguing that naval control should stay with the Admiralty.
Main themes
Proposed Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, U-boat threat to Atlantic convoys, mining of British and European ports, role of the British Admiralty, command of the Eastern Atlantic area, Home Fleet and Western Approaches, Coastal Command and air support, American command at Norfolk Virginia, merchant fleet allocation, tribute to Senator Vandenberg
Duration
~13 min
47th percentile
Words
1,604
47th percentile
Sentences
76
50th percentile
Readability
59
86th percentile
Grade
10.2
23rd percentile
Syntax
3.05
54th percentile
Vocabulary
2.14
36th percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 65%63%
  • Institutional 26%25%
  • Ceremonial 5%5%
  • Social 4%4%
  • Economic 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 3%

76 sentences in 27 paragraphs

(Woodford)

As this matter concerns both our country and the United States, I hope I may have your indulgence, Mr. Speaker, if I say, I think on behalf of all parties and every hon. Member, with what deep regret we have received the news this morning of the death of Senator Vandenberg, a great American statesman whose sure balance of mind and lofty disinterested pursuance of large purposes won him the respect of all parties in his own country and of all parties in our island here.

Now I come to the business of the afternoon, and I hope the House will permit me to range rather widely over this extensive topic. In the event of war with Soviet Russia, two dangers would menace the defence of free Europe and our own life here. The first is the large number of U-boats, far more than the Germans had at the beginning of the late war, of an improved German type and of vastly increased underwater speed and endurance. The second is, of course, the mining peril at all our ports and all free European ports.

This mining attack required from us in the late war nearly 60,000 men and more

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than 1,000 vessels, sweeping and watching ceaselessly under hard conditions. Every kind of device was tried, and, in the main, mastered by us, but now we must expect ever more subtle scientific inventions to prevent detection and clearance by sweeping or explosives. There is no doubt that the whole of this process is being studied and developed by the Soviet Government, aided by German science and German brains. Our means of keeping alive, and the power of the United States and of ourselves to send armies to Europe, depend on our mastering these two problems.

I am sure that no one knows so much about dealing with U-boats in the Atlantic and the mine menace around our shores and harbours of any kind as the British Admiralty, not because we are cleverer or braver than others, but because, in two wars, our existence has depended upon overcoming these perils. When you live for years on end with mortal danger at your throat, you learn in a hard school. "Depend upon it," said Dr. Johnson, "if a man is going to be hanged in a month, it concentrates his mind wonderfully."

During these two recent wars, as First Lord of the Admiralty or as Minister of Defence, I studied from week to week the hopeful or sinister curves upon the charts, and nothing ever counted more with me than their movements. It is the kind of experience, prolonged as it was, which eats its way into you. The late U-boat war lasted nearly six years. I say that to take the control of this process out of Admiralty hands would, I am sure, be a grave and perhaps a fatal injury, not only to ourselves, but to the common cause.

I would begin by asking where, in fact, did this idea of a Supreme Commander for the Atlantic originate. What were the reasons for the acceptance and enforcement of so radical a change from the system which had proved itself in the recent long years of war to work effectively? What would be the powers, apart from the imposing title, of the American Supreme Commander of the Atlantic? Our coastal waters and the English Channel are not under him. It is in the White Paper. He could not move warships and flotillas from the Eastern Atlantic Zone without disrupting or changing all the intricate business of receiving convoys and keeping the ports open.

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Then, what about merchant ships? The Prime Minister told us the other day:

That is really another matter altogether. The allocation of our merchant fleet is, of course, under the Government of this country."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Feb. 26, 1951; Vol. 484, c. 1767.]

Well, the merchant fleet can no more be considered apart from the escorts than the escorts can be considered apart from the merchant fleet. What powers will the Supreme Commander have over the American Navy Department? Can he transfer ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic? Surely not? He might make representations, but they would be settled by the American naval authorities, no doubt after consultation with the British Admiralty. Could he move naval forces from the North Atlantic to the South Atlantic? Is, in fact, the South Atlantic under his command at all? Could he take ships from the South Atlantic or from the Mediterranean and bring them into the Eastern or the Western Atlantic Zones?

It would be quite impossible for him to settle any of these matters, even if he had the authority on paper, except after consulting the United States Navy Department and the British Admiralty. We are told that his appointment is necessary to avoid the ocean war being conducted by a committee composed of 12 Powers, such as the Committee set up under the Atlantic Pact. But who ever imagined that the intricate handling of the U-boat and mining war could be entrusted to a committee of 12 Powers, most of whom have contributed little or nothing to the common stock?

It would not be fair to a distinguished and capable officer, like Admiral Fechteler to cast all the nominal responsibility upon him when, in actual practice, he could not have real power. There is no doubt whatever that the business of bringing in the convoys safely to Europe can only be settled by an officer, whatever his nationality, seated at the Admiralty, and having immediately under his orders the executive Officer Commanding the Western Approaches and the merchant shipping which is the object of the enemy's attack, and whose safety is the whole object of the operation.

Reading the White Paper, which I had the time to do, one finds that Paragraph 25 is strange reading. It says:

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The Atlantic command will include an Eastern and a Western area. The Eastern area, which is obviously the more vital so far as this country is concerned, will be under the command of a British Admiral in association with Coastal Command of the Royal Air Force. This British Admiral will be the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, an appointment at present held by Admiral Sir Philip Vian.

But what has the Home Fleet got to do with the U-boat and mining menace? It has very little to do with them. Of course, when it comes out from its harbours into the ocean it has to look after the convoys and protect them against U-boat attack, and, of course, when it stays in, sometimes it lends the flotillas of the Western Approaches some flotillas of its own. But the Home Fleet, in war-time, dwells mainly at Scapa Flow, and only comes out to deal with enemy surface raiders.

In this imaginary war, to which I am addressing myself, we have, of course, to look at the facts with which one is confronted. The Russians have some modern cruisers, but they have no fast capital ships like the "Scharnhorst," the "Gneisenau," the "Bismarck" and the "Tirpitz," and they can have none in the next two or three years—two, anyhow. How is it then proposed that the Commander-in-Chief of our Home Fleet is to control the movement of convoys in the Western Approaches? The routes to be followed by convoys entering or leaving Britain must be arranged from the British Admiralty. Are the merchant ships sailing from British ports to be given their orders from America, and, if so, how can the American Commander be informed of all that is going on from hour to hour? Fancy presenting us with a plan whereby an American admiral, seated in Norfolk, Virginia, has the supreme command of the Atlantic, although the business of the reception of the convoys and bringing them in through the U-boat and mining attack, must be mainly over here and is vital to us all. I repeat that the Supreme Commander of the Atlantic, if there is one, whatever his nationality, should be situated here.

Of course, since the war stopped, changes in military science have been continued. The power of the air grows ceaselessly. Even at the end of the war, it was at least equal to that of the naval forces at sea. But the movement of convoys on the sea is a matter for naval directions, and in Great Britain the air

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forces allotted to their defence must conform to a comprehensive plan prepared, in the first place, by the Admiralty. This important fact was recognised when, from the outbreak of the last war, the operational control of the Coastal Command of the Royal Air Force was vested in the Admiralty.

It is not clear from the White Paper whether this policy is intended to be applied in the future. Paragraph 25 of the White Paper says:

The Eastern area…will be under the command of a British Admiral in association with Coastal Command of the Royal Air Force.

Is there then to be no American air contribution to this Eastern Zone? Surely, information of this might have been given to us. It is a serious omission on the part of those who drew up this document.

Let me return to the first point I am making, that there is no need for a Supreme Commander of the Atlantic. That is the point which I submit to the House, and, not only to the House, but to the Committee. The overwhelming weight of British naval opinion supports the view that there is no need to appoint a Supreme Commander of the Atlantic.