Exports To China

United Kingdom Winston Churchill · Leader of the Opposition of the United Kingdom

10 May 1951 · House of Commons debate (Committee) · House of Commons, Palace of Westminster, London, United Kingdom

Context
Churchill addressed the House of Commons in Committee in London on May 10, 1951, in a debate on exports to China, criticising the Government's recognition of Communist China and warning against appeasement amid the Korean War.
Main themes
Recognition of Communist China, exports to China, Chinese intervention in Korea, 38th Parallel and a no-man's-land before the Yalu River, UN resolution branding China an aggressor, strain with the United States over China policy, Colombo Conference of Commonwealth Foreign Secretaries, Soviet support for Chinese forces, criticism of appeasement, Labour backbench sympathies with Red China
Duration
~9 min
32nd percentile
Words
1,083
32nd percentile
Sentences
47
30th percentile
Readability
49
60th percentile
Grade
12.5
51st percentile
Syntax
3.20
73rd percentile
Vocabulary
2.12
31st percentile

Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 84%77%
  • Ceremonial 14%13%
  • Institutional 2%2%
  • Economic 0%0%
  • Social 0%0%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Environmental 0%0%
  • Not in focus 9%

47 sentences in 16 paragraphs

(Woodford)

I hope the Committee will forgive me if I try to look at this topic in its general setting. I am quite sure that justice cannot be done to it in any other way. In November, 1949, I was in favour of the recognition of Communist China, provided that it was de facto and not de jure, or as it would probably be called among the old school tie brigade of the party opposite, "de iure," and provided that it could be brought about as a joint policy with the United States and the Dominions.

The United States had largely disinterested themselves in the civil war in China, and Chiang Kai-shek, who used to be paraded to me in those bygone days of the war as the champion of the new Asia, was being driven off the mainland. I could see no reason why, if we had diplomatic relations with Communist Russia, Communist Poland and other countries inside the Iron Curtain, we could not have them with China. Recognition does not mean approval. One has to recognise and deal with all sorts of things in this world as they come along. After all, vaccination is undoubtedly a definite recognition of smallpox. Certainly I think that it would be very foolish, in ordinary circumstances, not to keep necessary contacts with countries with whom one is not at war.

However, a little later, the Government recognised Communist China, not only

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de facto but de jure, and they recognised it as an isolated act, without agreement with the United States or joint action with the Dominions. The date was oddly chosen. I am told that it was three days before the Colombo Conference of Commonwealth Foreign Secretaries. One would have thought that it was a matter that might have been talked over there. The response of the Chinese Communists was very surly. They took all they could get from our recognition and gave nothing in return. They did not even recognise us. The United States were much offended by our isolated action, and that is how that part of the story ends.

Presently, the situation in the Far East was transformed and everything was sharpened by the Communist aggression in Korea, and was presently brought to a much more serious and intense position by the Chinese intervention. When the United Nations definitely passed the resolution, to which His Majesty's Government assented, branding China as an aggressor, we were left in an uncomfortable and illogical position of having diplomatic relations with a Chinese Government formally censured by the United Nations, and which was engaged in attacking United States soldiers—United Nations soldiers—and also our own small contingent in Korea.

There is no doubt that the maintenance of our relationship with Red China had been and has been totally devoid of advantages to us or to the United Nations, and that it became a reproach against us in wide circles in America. This made a bad foundation between us for discussion with the United States about all the vexing questions of trading with the enemy—as the Chinese Communists had undoubtedly become. Of course, it is the first interest of Britain and of Europe, and also, I believe, of the United States, to make some kind of defence front against the at present overwhelming Soviet power on the European Continent, and all of us on both sides of the House saw good and cogent arguments for our not getting too deeply involved in Korea, still less in China.

We on this side, without taking academic views about the 38th Parallel, were most anxious that the United Nations Forces should not go beyond the waist or narrow part of the peninsula and should keep a broad no-man's-land

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between their own front and the Yalu River. It did not seem wise to broaden the front by another 200 or 300 miles by emerging from the narrow part of the Korean Peninsula into this much expanded area. As it was the policy of the United Nations and of the United States not to enter Chinese territory or even to bomb beyond the frontier line, it seemed especially dangerous to advance close up to that frontier line. It is always dangerous in war to march or walk close up to a wall without being allowed to look over the other side and see what is going on there, and act against it if necessary.

Therefore, personally, not having an opportunity of obtaining any technical information, I wanted to stop at the waist and have a no-man's-land. I think that there was pretty general agreement on that in the House. However, General MacArthur's forces became heavily involved on a much wider front far beyond the waist, and a series of heavy Chinese counter-attacks were delivered. War was in fact begun on a considerable scale between the United Nations and China without any formal declaration of war on either side; and that is the position that exists today with ever-intensifying gravity.

There is no doubt that the Chinese Communist Government is waging war at Russian instigation and with powerful Soviet aid in weapons and supplies, against the troops of the United Nations. Our recognition and maintenance of diplomatic relations with China has undoubtedly been a cause of misunderstanding with the United States, and has made more difficult the discussion of our other joint problems with them in the Far East. I cannot believe that a policy of appeasement to Chinese Communist aggression will bring about peace with Red China. On the contrary, any form of weakness or indecision or division among the anti-Communist forces will only prolong the fighting and increase its scale. I have ventured to deal with these rather wider aspects this afternoon in order to place the matter objectively before the Committee.

I now wish to consider the position of the United States. I always watch the hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway opposite, as that is where the weather

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comes from. I have an advantage over the Foreign Secretary in being able to keep them directly under my view, whereas if he were to keep his head turned, it might well be thought that he was paying them undue attention. We cannot watch and listen to them without deriving the impression that their sympathies are, on the whole, more with Red China than with the United States. But Red China has been branded as an aggressor by the United Nations with the full assent of the present Socialist Government.