- Context
- Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, addressed the House of Commons in London on April 11, 1940, reporting on naval operations after the German invasion of Norway and Denmark and claiming strategic gain for the Allies.
- Main themes
- German invasion of Norway and Denmark, Norwegian corridor and the Allied blockade, British minelaying in Norwegian waters, sympathy for Norway and aid pledged, lessons for other neutral countries, air raids on Scapa Flow, loss of HMS Glowworm, Renown's action against the Scharnhorst, Warburton-Lee's destroyer attack at Narvik, Fleet Air Arm strikes at Bergen and Trondheim, occupation of the Faroe Islands, German naval losses and Hitler's strategic error
- Duration
- ~53 min
- Words
- 6,392
- Sentences
- 238
- Readability
- 54
- Grade
- 12.8
- Syntax
- 3.25
- Vocabulary
- 2.27
Source: Historic Hansard (UK Parliament) ↗
The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.
Other238 sentences in 59 paragraphs
I am sure I shall receive the indulgence of the House if by any chance there should be some minor error in fact or detail in the statement I am going to make, or if it has not received that thorough and prolonged preparation which I have always endeavoured to give to any observations I have had to offer to the House. We are working under very sharp pressure in these times, and I have been most anxious to give the House the fullest possible information agreeable with the public interest, that being the strongly expressed direction and desire which I have received from the Prime Minister and my colleagues in the Cabinet.
The strange and unnatural calm of the last few weeks was violently broken on Monday morning by the German invasion of Norway and Denmark. This crime had, of course, been long and elaborately prepared, and it was actually set in motion in the last week of March. For several
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months past we have received information of large numbers of German merchant ships being fitted as transports and of numerous small vessels being assembled in various Baltic ports and, also, in the river mouths of the Elbe. But no one could tell when they would be used or against what peaceful country they would be used. Holland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden were, as it seemed, all equally liable to a sudden, brutal, capricious and, in any case, unprovoked attack. Which would be selected as the first victim or when the blow would be struck remained, inevitably, a matter of pure speculation.
The Nazi German Government is accustomed to spreading through its channels a continuous flow of threats and rumours. These are put forth by all their agents in neutral countries, by the "hangers-on" of their legations and by their sympathisers and backers, wherever they may be found. I am sure my remarks have no personal aspect. All these countries have been threatened, and as the German Government are not restrained by law or scruple, and as they have an obvious preference for striking at the weak rather than the strong, all the small countries on their borders were, and still are, in a high state of alarm. Even those neutrals who have done the most to placate Germany, and have been the greatest aid to her, could not feel any sense of security that they would not be attacked without any reason or without any warning, swiftly overrun, reduced to bondage and pillaged of all their property, especially all eatables. Fear was, therefore, general in all these unfortunate countries, and none of them could tell, and none of us could tell, which one of them would be the next to be devoured.
In the small hours of Monday morning we learned that Norway and Denmark had drawn the unlucky numbers in this sinister lottery. Denmark, of course, had special reason for apprehension, not only because she was the nearest and the weakest of Germany's neighbours, but because she had a recent treaty with Germany guaranteeing her from all molestation and because she was engaged in active commerce both with Germany and Great Britain, the continuance of which in time of war had been foreseen by Germany, and was guaranteed by special trade arrangements between the German and Danish Governments. This, ob-
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viously, placed her in a position of peculiar danger. The extraordinary configuration of the Norwegian western coast provides a kind of corridor, or covered way, as everyone knows, through which neutral trade and German ships of all kinds, warships and others, could be moved to and fro through the Allied blockade, within the territorial waters of Norway and Sweden, until they were under the effective protection of the German home Air Force in North Germany. They could go to and fro along this route without molestation.
The existence of this geographical and legal covered way has been the greatest disadvantage which we have suffered and the greatest advantage which Germany has possessed in her efforts to frustrate the British and Allied blockade. Warships moved up and down it as they thought it convenient. U-boats used it as they thought fit. Stray German liners and merchant ships, trying to get back to Germany from outer seas, followed this route, which is over 800 miles long, and can be entered or quitted at any convenient point. There has been no greater impediment to the blockade of Germany than this Norwegian corridor. It was so in the last war, and it has been so in this war. Therefore, the British Navy has been forced to watch an endless procession of German and neutral ships carrying contraband of all kinds to Germany, which at any moment they could have stopped, but which they were forbidden to touch by those very same conventions of international law which Germany, in this war, as in the last, has treated with the utmost perfect contempt. During the last war, when we were associated with the United States, the Allies felt themselves so deeply injured by this covered way, then being used specially for U-boats setting out on their marauding expeditions, that the British, French and United States Governments together induced the Norwegians to lay a minefield in their territorial waters, across the covered way, in order to prevent the abuse by U-boats of this channel. It was only natural that the Admiralty, since this war began, should have brought this precedent—although it is not exactly on all fours, and there are some differences—this modern and highly respectable precedent, to the notice of His Majesty's Gov-
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ernment and should have urged that we should be allowed to lay a minefield of our own in Norwegian territorial waters in order to compel this traffic which was passing in and out to Germany to come out into the open sea and take a chance of being brought into the contraband control, or being captured as enemy prize by our blockading squadrons and flotillas. It was only natural and it was only right that His Majesty's Government should have been long reluctant to incur the reproach of even a technical violation of international law. After all, we are seeking to establish the reign of international law, and anyone can see the dilemma upon which those who have to consider these matters are liable to be impaled in such a situation as that. It is intolerable that the good cause should suffer by respecting the conventions which those who champion the bad cause have profited by tearing to pieces. But gradually, as this cruel, deadly war has deepened and darkened, the feeling grew that it was placing an undue burden upon the Allies to allow this traffic to continue and that it was intolerable to watch, week after week, the ships passing down this corridor carrying the iron ore to make the shells which will strike down the young men of France and Britain in the campaign of 1941.
It was, therefore, decided at last—and the scruples caused us injury at the same time as they did us honour—to interrupt this traffic and make it come out into the open seas. Every precaution was taken to avoid the slightest danger to neutral ships or any loss of life, even to enemy merchant ships, by the minefields which were laid and declared on Monday last at dawn, and British patrolling craft were actually stationed around them in order to warn all ships off these dangerous areas. The Nazi Government, the Nazi German Government—I do not know how you can distinguish them; they seem all to be mixed up together, Nazis and Germans, Germans and Nazis—have sought to make out that their invasion of Norway and of Denmark was a consequence of our action in closing the Norwegian corridor. It can, however, undoubtedly be proved that not only had their preparations been made nearly a month before, but that their actual movements of troops and ships had begun before the British and French minefields were laid. No doubt they suspected they
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were going to be laid. It must indeed have appeared incomprehensible to them that they had not been laid long before. They therefore decided in the last week of March to use the Norwegian corridor to send empty ore ships northward, filled with military stores and German soldiers, concealed below decks, in order at the given moment to seize the various ports on the Norwegian seaboard which they considered to have military value. They also set in motion the invading forces which they had long prepared against the innocent neutral countries—or against two of the innocent neutral countries, because there are others not yet affected—who had helped them in so many ways.
I here must say a word about Norway. We have the most profound sympathy with the Norwegian people. We have understood the terrible dilemma in which they have been placed. Their sentiments, like those of every other small country, were with the Allies. They writhed in helpless anger while scores of their ships were wantonly sunk and many hundreds of their sailors cruelly drowned. They realise fully that their future independence and freedom are bound up with the victory of the Allies. But the feeling of powerlessness in the ruthless grip of Nazi wrath made them hope against hope until the last moment that at least their soil and their cities would not be polluted by the trampling of German marching columns or their liberties and their livelihood stolen away by foreign tyrants. But this hope has been in vain. Another violent outrage has been perpetrated by Nazi Germany against a small and friendly Power, and the Norwegian Government and people are to-day in arms to defend their hearths and homes. We shall aid them to the best of our ability, we shall conduct the war in common with them, and we shall make peace only when their rights and freedom are restored. In their very large, wild, mountainous country—freedom, it is said, dwells in the mountains—in their very large country, sparsely populated, but rugged and full of positions where free men can shelter and can fight, they should be able to maintain vigorous and prolonged resistance, costing enormous labour to those who wish to subjugate them to tyranny.
But what an example this Norwegian episode is to other neutral countries. What an example it is of the danger of
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supposing that friendly relations with Germany, or friendly assurances from Germany, or treaties of any kind, or friendly offices rendered to Germany, or advantages given to Germany—what a danger to suppose that any of these are the slightest protection against a murderous onslaught the moment it is thought by Germany that any advantage can be gained by such action. If the Norwegian Government had not been so very strict and severe in enforcing their neutrality against us and in leaving their corridor open to German operations and machinations, and if they had entered into confidential relations with us, it would have been very easy to give them more timely and more opportune support than is now possible. It is not the slightest use blaming the Allies for not being able to give substantial help and protection to neutral countries if they are held at arm's length by the neutral countries until those countries are actually attacked on a scientifically prepared plan by Germany, and I trust that the fact that the strict observance of neutrality by Norway has been a contributory cause of the sufferings to which she is now exposed and in the limits of aid which we can give her will be meditated upon by other countries who may to-morrow, or a week hence, or a month hence find themselves the victims of an equally elaborately worked out staff plan for their destruction and enslavement.
I now address myself to the question which I believe has been asked in some quarters, What is the Navy doing? And I will endeavour to answer it to the best of my ability so far as relates to the past and to the present, but the House would not expect me to lift the veil which should properly and discreetly cover the future operations or operations which are in progress at this moment. As I told the House in the Debate upon the Navy Estimates, we were deprived during all the long winter months of the great strategic advantages of Scapa Flow, but during all that time we laboured might and main to make that base a safe and sure home for the Fleet. About five weeks ago the Home Fleet returned to Scapa Flow and has been resting there or operating from there ever since. We have been exposed to continual air-raid alarms and numerous air raids, but we have now very powerful
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anti-aircraft batteries in action, together with various other methods of defence, and very good arrangements have been made with the Royal Air Force and with our home squadrons of the Fleet Air Arm, so that an adequate number of squadrons are disposed within striking distance.
In all, there have been five raids on Scapa Flow—many alarms, but five raids. My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, who paid a visit to that spot, was, I gather, by accident, so unfortunate as just to miss one of those exhilarating experiences. In all, five raids. In the first a cruiser was hit aft, which necessitated several weeks of repair but no more than that. Otherwise, up to the time I am speaking—there was an air-raid warning this morning, and I do not wish at all, remembering the hon. Lady's fear, to make anything in the nature of prophecy, but we must discard superstition in these days—up to the time of speaking there has been no vessel hit or damaged in Scapa Flow, no objective of the slightest military importance has been hit on shore, and very few people have been hurt. The enemy has shown himself increasingly gun-shy in his attacks on Scapa, and this is hardly to be wondered at, since the batteries, especially when reinforced by the powerful batteries of the Fleet, can deliver what is probably far the heaviest concentration of anti-aircraft fire in the world. It is a tremendous fire, and in the latest raid, which took place last night, at dusk, 60 aircraft attacked in successive waves without doing the slightest damage, although they themselves suffered the loss of at least six aircraft, the credit for which is divided between—I might almost say disputed between—the batteries and the very excellently combined and skilfully used air squadrons. We are ready to fight this matter out at Scapa Flow. It is of the utmost importance to the Fleet to make themselves comfortable there, and the repeated attacks give a practice to the batteries against high-speed aircraft which no towed target which we have been able to devise can possibly supply. It is most necessary to have further encounters between the batteries and enemy aircraft and between the Fleet and enemy aircraft if our gunnery is to develop its full efficiency, and, of course, we must
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always be prepared when we run risks for occasional losses.
The Fleet was, therefore, in instant readiness at Scapa Flow when, on Sunday night, news was received from the air reconnaissance—our air reconnaissance ranges over the whole of the North Sea—that German battle cruisers, with a number of other cruisers and vessels and destroyers, were out at sea and moving very swiftly northwards. The Commander-in-Chief immediately put to sea to find them and bring them to action. At the same time, independently of this, a strong British naval force was approaching Narvik in order to lay a minefield off the Norwegian coast for the purposes which I described to the House a few moments ago. The minefield was laid according to plan at daylight on Monday morning. The task of the minelayers accomplished, they withdrew to the westward in order to avoid the risk of any collision with Norwegian war vessels maintaining their neutrality, which they had been specially enjoined to respect and take every precaution against infringing.
One of the destroyers of this northern force which went to lay mines lost a man overboard on Sunday afternoon and stayed behind some time to pick him up. This destroyer, the "Glowworm," was proceeding northwards to rejoin its force when, at 8 o'clock on Monday morning, she saw first one and then two enemy destroyers, which she engaged. She then reported an unknown enemy ship before her to the northward. These incidents came to us one by one at a few minute intervals as they occurred, but the last message ended abruptly, and we can only conclude that the "Glowworm" has been sunk by the greatly superior forces of the enemy which she had to encounter. The "Glowworm's" light has been quenched, but there is no reason why a large proportion of her crew should not have been saved if the ordinary humanity of fighting men, which is a different thing from the humanity of some Governments, has been practised by the enemy. This chance encounter showed that major elements of the enemy navy were at sea and that considerable events were in train.
Since then fighting has been continuous night and day, without stopping, and is
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going on now—a widely dispersed but none the less a general action between large numbers of German ships and aircraft and such forces as we are able to bring into action. A great deal has been reported in the newspapers, a great deal of what has taken place and even more than has taken place, because, of course, we have not reoccupied the ports on the Norwegian coast. These are rumours which come from neutral sources and are naturally given currency. But the House has read a great deal of the truth and a great deal more than the truth in the last few days. I shall merely try to summarise the principal naval incidents. During Monday morning it looked as though the enemy forces which had sunk the "Glowworm," and which contained German battle cruisers and other enemy ships, would be caught between our forces in the North and the main Home Fleet, both of which were superior. However, they got away, and here I must make a digression about the conditions of sea war.
You may look at the map and see flags stuck in at different points and consider that the result will be certain, but when you get out on the sea, with its vast distances, its storms and mists, and with night coming on and all the uncertainties which exist, you cannot possibly expect that the kind of conditions which would be appropriate to consider in respect of the movements of armies have any application to the chance and haphazard conditions of collisions by ships of war at sea. On Tuesday the Fleet was cruising to the southward about the level of Bergen, when, during the afternoon, it was attacked continuously by German aircraft. The usual tales were put out by the German wireless of several battleships and cruisers being sunk or seriously damaged. I know that some of my friends were concerned at these blatant exaggerations. Actually, two cruisers were slightly damaged by splinters, but this did not at all interfere with their work, and they are still with the Fleet at their stations. One very heavy bomb hit the flagship, the "Rodney," but her very strong deck arm our resisted the impact, and she was not affected in any way by the explosion except that three officers and seven men were injured. As far as the structure of our ships of war is concerned, this incident must be regarded as satisfactory. The cruiser
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"Aurora," which had joined the Fleet, was subjected to five successive bombing attacks, all of which were pressed home with courage and all of which failed, but a destroyer, the "Gurkha," which was accompanying her and to some extent escorting her, was hard hit and listed heavily and sank after four and a-half hours, during which the crew or almost all of the crew were rescued. The same afternoon the destroyer "Zulu" sank a German U-boat off the Orkneys.
Meanwhile, far to the north off Narvik, on this Tuesday morning, at daybreak, the "Renown," one of our battle cruisers, perceived the "Scharnhorst" and a 10,000 ton "Hipper" class cruiser, which had evidently come up with the force the day before, in the distance dimly. Amid snowstorms, a tempestuous day, sea running high, gales blowing furiously, our battle cruiser opened fire at 18,000 yards. After three minutes the enemy replied, but almost immediately turned away. After nine minutes the "Renown" observed hits on the forward structure of the German battle cruiser, and thereafter her whole armament stopped firing. Thereafter her after turret began firing under local control. The speed the battle cruiser maintained was very great, and the "Renown" had to push to 24 knots through very heavy seas breaking over her forward turrets and guns. After a further two minutes of firing a vertical column of smoke from what they call a possible second hit was observed on the "Scharnhorst," which then turned away and directly retired at a high speed without further firing. During this period a shell had passed through our vessel about the water line without bursting. We had something like that in the case of the "Exeter," and it seems to show that Nazi workmanship is not all of a piece. A second shell went through the foremast, carrying away the main aerial. There were no casualties on board the "Renown." The destroyers which were with her were unable to keep up in the heavy seas at the speed at which she was going.
The 10,000 ton cruiser "Hipper" now drew across the battleship "Scharnhorst." The two ships of this class, the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau," are of 25,000 tons and most formidable vessels. The "Hipper" threw a smoke screen across her to cover her retreat.
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The "Renown" opened fire on the "Hipper," which turned away. Both ships now retired at high speed, the "Hipper" swinging to fire a broadside from time to time, and also dodging. Firing was intermittent, as all the time snowstorms were sweeping across and closing the view, and the sea was running very high, but in the end we much regret to say that they succeeded in leaving us. Firing finally ceased at 29,000 yards, when they became quite invisible. Someone will say, "If you had all this news on Tuesday morning, why have you been saving it up for the House of Commons?" All I can say is that I have been most anxious to obtain this information, because the "Renown" signals broke off when they became interesting, and we never heard another word from her until a few hours ago upon that subject. Although she made various signals, she did not think it necessary to tell us what had happened. I must emphasise this, that when sailors are fighting they busy themselves so much upon that, and take so much interest in that, that they quite forget for a long time to tell us what they are doing, which causes some embarrassment to the Admiralty sometimes and even more to the Minister of Information.
I am still on Tuesday. On Tuesday night we gave orders to our destroyers to blockade the West Fjord, that great stretch of water 50 or 60 miles long leading up to Narvik. Our orders to those destroyers were to attack the enemy who had got in there and especially to destroy the store ships in which they had smuggled their soldiers up the Norwegian corridor, and on which they must depend for working up the efficiency of their defences. There were six destroyers and a U-boat reported, and, moreover, it was to be expected that they had landed a certain number of guns in the 24 hours they had been there. The Germans are very quick in landing and making themselves fortified; they are very nimble about these things. From what we heard at the Admiralty late on Tuesday night, we thought the operation so hazardous that at one o'clock in the morning we told the captain of the destroyer flotilla that he must be the sole judge of whether to attack or not, and we would support him, whatever he did and whatever happened. In
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these circumstances, Captain Warburton-Lee entered with five destroyers and attacked the enemy destroyers, and such guns as they could have landed in the interval. In the beginning, all that they reported to us was what they had lost—nothing more—and I let it go out, because I do not think we ought to have a kind of mealy-mouthed attitude towards these matters. We have embarked on this war, and we must take our blows. Therefore, I put the report out, although there was nothing to relieve it, as it were. We are not children to be kept in the dark, and we can take what is coming to us as well as any other country.
As soon as the further report was received at about one o'clock, I prepared it for the Prime Minister, who immediately gave it to the House of Commons and to the country, through the Press, at the same time. The moment we get any news, be it bad or good, once we can rely on it, we shall present it to Parliament, the broadcast and the Press. I am all for propaganda and publicity, but the best propaganda is results, and I must say that I think these are coming to hand in no unsatisfactory manner. The result of this hard, fierce fight in the Narvik Fjord—half the combatant vessels were knocked out on each side—is worthy of any of the records which are preserved with such respect in the long history of the Navy. What was gained was the destruction of these store ships, as well as the crippling of the force, and on the way back the two destroyers, who were escorting their wounded comrade out of the Fjord, unpursued by the enemy, who had received an equal battering, got the "Rauenfels,"full of reserve ammunition with which, I suppose, it was intended to turn Narvik into a kind of Sebastopol or Gibraltar. This ship was blown up, and we must regard that as simplifying the task which obviously might be among those which lie ahead of us.
Now I come to Wednesday. On that day a very determined attack was made by two waves of 12 each of the Royal Air Force—whose flying in every direction, as it were, for the reconnaissance and protection of the Royal Navy has been unceasing, and to whom, on behalf of their naval comrades, I tender a most sincere expression of recognition—on two German cruisers sheltering in the Bergen Fjord and covering German troops that
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had been landed there. One of these light cruisers was hit, and we have not seen anything of her since. She may be at the bottom or hiding in some fjord, but subsequent reconnaissance has not revealed her presence. At dusk on Wednesday, the Fleet Air Arm came on to the scene for the first time in this war. They have been very anxious to come into action with their Skuas, which are perhaps not the latest pattern of aircraft. They have a long range, and they flew from the Orkneys and attacked the remaining German cruiser at Bergen, which was moored alongside. Sixteen of them attacked in successions of three's, all making low bombing dives and casting their 500-pound bombs at the lowest point. They secured three hits, and out of the 16, 15 returned. Then a little later, when a reconnaissance aircraft was sent over, no cruiser was seen where this one had been lying—only a streak of oil about a mile long smearing the surface of the harbour. It looks as if a result has been obtained.
To-day, Thursday, at daybreak, the torpedo-carrying aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm, 18 in number, have attacked enemy shipping in the harbour of Trondheim. We had hoped to get a "Hipper" class cruiser which was reported certainly to be there. She had, however, vanished in the night, and all we got was a destroyer, which was hit by a torpedo. This form of attack by torpedo from the air is very old. I saw it when I was First Lord before the last war and was deeply interested in it. It was used once at the Dardanelles. It carries with it great hopes and possibilities, which have never been fully developed, but we must have more practice and experience in the use of this novel, although not new, and unaccustomed weapon. This we hope to obtain as the fighting proceeds during the summer.
In my task of answering the question, "What is the Navy doing?" I am getting too near the range of current and pending operations to be able to make any further report to the House, but I hope I have to some extent answered the question which has been asked, and shown that the Navy has not been idle or negligent, and that it is actively proceeding on the tasks confided to it by Parliament. I shall look forward to making a further statement to Parliament
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a little later on. I will, however, venture to make a few general observations and attempt to survey the results up to date. When we speak of the command of the seas, that does not mean that the Royal Navy and its French Ally command every part of the seas at the same moment or at every moment. It only means that we can make our will prevail ultimately in any part of the seas which may be selected for operations, and thus indirectly we can make our will prevail in every part of the seas. That is what command of the seas means. Anything more foolish than to suppose that the life and strength of the Royal Navy—which, allow me to remind the House, is engaged in bringing in through the U-boats the immense traffics of this country, now bounding up in their fullness as the U-boat is gradually brought under control, for that is what we are doing all the time while this is going on on the other side of the Island—anything, I say, more foolish than to suppose that the life and strength of the Royal Navy should have been expended in ceaselessly patrolling up and down the Norwegian and Danish coasts, a target for the U-boats, wearing out their crews and machinery on the chance that Hitler would launch a blow like this—anything more foolish than that nobody can imagine. I say with great respect that a man who makes such a suggestion is hardly qualified to offer advice to the nation in these serious times.
In my view, which is shared by my skilled advisers, Herr Hitler has committed a grave strategic error in spreading the war so far to the North and in forcing the Scandinavian people, or peoples, out of their attitude of neutrality. We have suffered from nothing in our blockade policy so much as the denial of the Norwegian coast, and that cursed corridor is now closed for ever. Hitler has effected with his Germans lodgments of various strengths at many points of the Norwegian coasts, and he has felled with a single hammer blow the inoffensive Kingdom of Denmark, but we shall take all we want off this Norwegian coast now, with an enormous increase in the facility and in the efficiency of our blockade. We are also at this moment occupying the Faroe Islands, which belong to Denmark and which are a strategic point of high importance, and whose people showed every disposition to receive us with warm regard. We shall shield the Faroe
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Islands from all the severities of war and establish ourselves there conveniently by sea and air until the moment comes when they will be handed back to the Crown and people of a Denmark liberated from the foul thraldom in which they have been plunged by the German aggression. The question of Iceland needs further consideration, because Iceland is, as it were, a dominion of the Danish Kingdom. What I can say about Iceland at the moment is that no German will be allowed to set foot there with impunity.
In the upshot, it is the considered view of the Admiralty that we have greatly gained by what has occurred in Scandinavia and in Northern waters in a strategic and military sense. For myself, I consider that Hitler's action in invading Scandinavia is as great a strategic and political error as that which was committed by Napoleon in 1807 or 1808, when he invaded Spain. Hitler has violated the independence and soil of virile peoples dwelling in very large and expansive countries capable of maintaining, with British and French aid, prolonged resistance to his soldiers and his Gestapo. He has almost doubled the efficiency of the Allied blockade. He has made a whole series of commitments upon the Norwegian coast for which he will now have to fight, if necessary, during the whole summer, against Powers possessing vastly superior naval forces and able to transport them to the scenes of action more easily than he can. I cannot see any counter-advantage which he has gained except the satisfaction of another exercise of the brutal lust of unbridled power. I cannot see any satisfaction which he has gained which is any adequate offset to these substantial and enduring facts. Grieved as we all are at the suffering and misery which are now extended to wider areas, I must declare to the House that I feel that we are greatly advantaged by what has occurred, provided we act with unceasing and increasing vigour to turn to the utmost profit the strategic blunder into which our mortal enemy has been provoked.
I have two things more to say before I sit down. The first is a very serious thought. Everyone must recognise the extraordinary precision and the reckless gambling which have flung the whole German Fleet out upon the savage seas of war as if it were a mere counter, to
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be cast away for a particular operation. We and the French are far stronger than the German Navy. We have enough to maintain control of the Mediterranean, and, at the same time, we can carry on all our operations in the North Sea. But out of the very much smaller forces of the German Navy, most grievous losses have been already sustained. Four German cruisers—the Norwegian batteries have taken their toll—that is to say, nearly half their total pre-war strength and much more than their existing strength in cruisers, have been sunk, and a number of German destroyers together with several more U-boats have been destroyed, all since Sunday.
Up to the time I speak those losses have been sustained by the German Navy. After all, a navy is an integral organisation, with its battleships, cruisers and its destroyers, and that navy must be regarded as deeply mutilated in respect of this extraordinarily important and indeed indispensable cruiser element. Our submarines, which, I can assure the House, were by no means asleep, have taken heavy toll from the German transports and store ships now crossing into Scandinavia. We have given them the fullest liberty of action in all cases where humanity does not impose restraints. All German ships in the Skaggerak and the Kattegat will be sunk, and by night all ships will be sunk, as opportunity serves. We are not going to allow the enemy to supply their armies across these waters with impunity. They have already ordered all merchant vessels out of this area, and in this respect our advice coincides with theirs. We hope to take unceasing toll. Up to the present nearly a dozen ships, some of large tonnage, have been sunk or captured, either in the Skaggerak and the Kattegat, or in other parts of the North Sea, or in attempting to bring supplies to the forces which were landed at Narvik. The Norwegian batteries have had their successes, and I must consider the German Fleet crippled in important respects.
But, Mr. Speaker—and this is the gravity of the thought which I venture to submit to the House—the very recklessness with which Hitler and his advisers have cast the interests of the German Navy upon the wild waters to meet all that moves thereon—this very recklessness makes me feel that these audacious, costly operations may be only the pre-
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lude to far larger events which impend on land. We have probably arrived now at the first main crunch of the war. But we certainly find no reason in the fact of what has just happened, and still less in our own hearts, to deter us from entering upon any further trials that may lie before us. While we will not prophesy or boast about battles still to be fought, we feel ourselves ready to encounter the utmost malice of the enemy and to devote all our life strength to achieve the victory in what is a world cause.
One word more. There never was a time when the Navy was treated more kindly by the British nation or by the House or when it was regarded with more admiration, nay, I will say affection. It is worthy of your confidence. But showing confidence in the Navy does not only mean applauding it in good days when some glittering success may be proclaimed. It means that those, and they are legion, who repose their faith in our sailormen and their leaders will not falter or become distressed if, for three or four days at a time, silence and darkness and dubious news lie over the sea or come from the sea and that each one who has that confidence and faith will make it his duty to sustain those who are of lesser faith. Each of them will have their part in the great drama of human progress, now so vividly unfolded before us.
