Speech by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel at the 45th Munich Security Conference on February 7, 2009, in Munich:

Germany Angela Merkel · Former Chancellor of Germany

7 February 2009 · 45th Munich Security Conference · Munich, Germany

Context
Merkel addressed the 45th Munich Security Conference on February 7, 2009, outlining Germany's vision for NATO's future and global cooperation amid multiple international crises.
Main themes
NATO strategic concept, transatlantic alliance, global cooperation, international security, economic crisis, networked security, NATO expansion, German-French partnership, terrorism and asymmetric threats, Israeli-Gaza conflict, Iranian nuclear program, Afghanistan
Duration
~21 min
68th percentile
Words
2,516
68th percentile
Sentences
127
74th percentile
Readability
48
56th percentile
Grade
11.4
37th percentile
Syntax
2.84
27th percentile
Vocabulary
2.06
19th percentile

Munich Security Conference Translated from German

Content
Actors
Style

The broad sphere of national life a sentence belongs to. Every sentence has an Arena, so it is the denominator the other indices are read against.

Other
  • Geopolitical 84%83%
  • Ceremonial 6%6%
  • Institutional 4%4%
  • Social 3%3%
  • Economic 2%2%
  • Environmental 1%1%
  • Technological 0%0%
  • Not in focus 2%

127 sentences in 31 paragraphs

Ladies and gentlemen,

dear participants of this Munich Security Conference,

2009 is an exciting year in many respects: not only because the Security Conference has a new head in Ambassador Ischinger, which is already a novelty in itself – I wish you a successful tenure, Mr. Ischinger – but 2009 is also a year with significant symbolic dates.

There is a new American administration with a new American president. We are very pleased that the Vice President is with us today, also as a sign of the cooperation that this new American administration wishes to foster.

This year, on September 1, we will commemorate the 70th anniversary of the beginning of World War II. NATO will celebrate its 60th anniversary. Twenty years ago, in 1989, the Berlin Wall fell – so to speak, the symbol of the world embarking on a new era of freedom. Before you stand the French President, the Polish Prime Minister, and a German Chancellor who comes from the former GDR. All of this shows what has been possible in the past decades.

At the same time, 2009 is a year that has begun by reminding us that we are in the midst of the most severe economic crisis in decades, triggered by an international financial market crisis. There is a global impact affecting all countries in the world.

The year began with a military operation by Israel in the Gaza Strip. We have found that we have made no progress so far regarding the Iranian nuclear program. We are still not at our goal concerning our challenges in Afghanistan. There are terrible events occurring in Africa. This means that the world is full of conflicts, full of problems.

What does this tell us? For me, the past decades have been decades for the vast majority of those gathered in this room, in which we could show: We are making progress. This should give us the strength and also the hope to make 2009 a successful year – a year that will also be the litmus test for whether we can achieve a qualitative advance in global cooperation and on the path to creating global institutions and agreements with which we can live peacefully with globalization.

As we are gathered here, I ask as the German Chancellor: What unites us in our alliances, within which we live and work? On the one hand, of course, it is the foundation of shared values of freedom and democracy, the common commitment in the transatlantic community, in NATO, which is turning 60 and which, I want to make very clear, is the central anchor of the transatlantic alliance in the 21st century, where we bundle our common interests based on shared values and derive the necessary actions from them. Article 5 as the mutual defense clause remains the core of the alliance. The transatlantic axis is the foundation of our security architecture.

NATO has undergone a significant round of expansion, but we are not at the end yet. We stated in Bucharest: Ukraine and Georgia will also be members of NATO. NATO will insist that there is no right for third parties to decide who becomes a member of NATO and who does not. We will, of course, examine each membership to ensure that it serves the security of the entire alliance.

Sixty years of NATO also means that we face new challenges in the 21st century, such as asymmetric threats and terrorism. There is no longer thinking in blocs; rather, there is a world with completely new conflicts. NATO must adapt to this. That is why we believe that the 60th anniversary of NATO's founding is the right time not only to think about a new strategic concept but to develop it. Germany and France will host the 60th anniversary of NATO's founding. I am not only very pleased that Nicolas Sarkozy, as the French President, is with us today, but also that Germany and France can jointly host this event and that France is taking the step back into all structures of the alliance, completing its integration into the military alliance. This is an important step, especially from a German perspective. NATO will be strengthened by this.

We need to find a working structure for the development of this strategic concept, how we can combine external advice and internal discussion processes so that we can quickly reach results. I want to make clear what I believe this new strategic concept must achieve.

First

– this is my expectation and that of many Europeans from the United States of America: It should unite us in the belief that international conflicts can no longer be solved by any one country alone, but that we need each other. We must do this together. No matter how large a country is, no one can do this alone. This means that the cooperative approach must be the foundation of our actions.

Second:

In recent years, we have worked a lot on the question: What concept of security do we actually have? We have come to the conviction that the concept of Networked Security is the right answer to the challenges of the 21st century. This means that crisis management and crisis prevention must occur through a combination of political, developmental, police, partly cultural, and, where necessary, of course, military measures. NATO is a military alliance. This means we must find ways – this must be part of this new strategic concept – to connect NATO's military capabilities with the concept of Networked Security and to derive the necessary cooperations from it.

The concept of Networked Security shapes the European Security and Defense Policy. The European Security and Defense Policy is now about ten years old. It has taken quite a rapid development and will be institutionally strengthened when we have ratified the Lisbon Treaty – finally, I say – and the tasks of the external and security policy of the Council – that is, the member states of the European Union – and the Commission come into one hand or to one person. Henry Kissinger, whom I, of course, warmly welcome like everyone else, asked years ago: Who do I call in Europe if I want to know what Europe thinks? – I believe we are getting a bit closer to that point with this person, although I cannot guarantee that all the answers from the 27 member states will always be the same at every moment; I want to admit that. But we are making significant progress.

The European Security and Defense Policy has now gone through 22 missions. The European Security and Defense Policy is currently engaged in 13 missions: among others in Chad, in police training in Afghanistan, in Kosovo, in Bosnia militarily and civilly; we are helping to train the Palestinian police and we are fighting piracy off the Horn of Africa; we secured the elections in the Congo. This means we have lived, developed, and been successful in a variety of measures of Networked Security in our missions.

Critically, it must be said that the military capabilities of the European Security and Defense Policy are still not sufficiently bundled. We have the principle of "Battle Groups," but when it comes to practical deployment, we still have many long roads to travel. On the other hand, the diversity of deployments shows what we can already do and where we are ready to take on responsibility.

I see the European Security and Defense Policy as a new form of cooperation with NATO. No longer does each individual member state contribute only on its own, but in some areas, the European Security and Defense Policy also contributes to NATO. This means we have the opportunity to strengthen our alliance, NATO, through the European Security and Defense Policy. I do not see this as competition; I do not see this as rivalry, but we must decide on a case-by-case basis, after joint analysis and with joint decision-making, which form of mission is the appropriate one. This means that our cooperation in NATO can be strengthened by the European Security and Defense Policy. That is at least what I envision.

The new strategic concept of NATO must now correspond to this concept of Networked Security and come closer to it. This means we must learn to perceive Networked Security in action on the ground with NATO's military capabilities. This means, and I have actually spoken about this every year at this Security Conference: NATO must be a place for political discussions. One cannot demand Networked Security and then only understand NATO as a military alliance. That will fail; the essential transatlantic discussions will then take place elsewhere.

I believe we have come very close to this goal and this approach in the Afghanistan mission. Those who were at the Bucharest NATO summit saw that the political representatives of Afghanistan were there, that the United Nations were there, that of course NATO representatives were there, and all the countries that participate in the ISAF mission, which includes many more countries than just NATO member states. That was a political gathering. This kind of approach must be strengthened and expanded.

In addition to the concept of Networked Security in addressing our conflicts that we need to resolve in the world, we always need a regional approach. No conflict can be reduced to one country. When we talk about Afghanistan, we know: We are also talking about the situation in Pakistan. Therefore, we are ready – I say this very explicitly for Germany; the German Foreign Minister has also done so in a comprehensive sense, especially during our EU Council presidency and G8 presidency – to see this regional dimension of conflict resolution and to also involve Pakistan in the commitment not to support the strengthening of the Taliban and others.

However, despite all that has been achieved, it must also be said: The cooperation between NATO and the European Security and Defense Policy is not yet proceeding as we envision. We have endless discussions regarding practical examples – whether it is the question of Kosovo or the question of Afghanistan – because there are unresolved conflicts between member states of the European Union and NATO. At this point, we can name names – for example, Turkey and Cyprus are affected. This means we all have a strong interest in ensuring that such regional conflicts do not hinder our transnational cooperation in the transatlantic alliance or in the European Union, as they cost us much strength and time. This must be worked on.

A new strategic concept for NATO should and must also address the question: How do we deal with arms control and disarmament? This was discussed here yesterday. Therefore, I would like to say at this point: We need more efficient arms control; we need bolder steps towards disarmament. In the conventional area, the question of how to proceed with the CFE Treaty plays a significant role. We must reach the point where this treaty is ratified and further developed. We need progress at the review conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the nuclear area. I believe the European Union should also engage more as a whole in disarmament discussions.

From my perspective, we certainly want to work towards a world where nuclear weapons no longer play a role. But in the next stages, it is primarily about finding efficient ways to disarm nuclear weapons and to have fewer of them. At the same time, it is about preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear bomb. I say: This will also be a litmus test for the international community. I say very clearly: We have made offers to negotiate; we want a diplomatic solution. These offers are on the table. I believe that the new American administration will also make its views regarding Iran clear to us in the coming months. We are ready to walk this path together, but we are also prepared to consider tougher sanctions if there is no progress. It is a must to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

We must, when we think about the security architecture, of course also answer the question: How do we integrate Russia into this architecture? Russia is, of course, part of the disarmament efforts between the United States of America and Russia. However, Russia is also part of Europe. Therefore, relations with Russia are of extraordinary importance. We have established mechanisms that, fortunately, are now being revived, namely the NATO-Russia Council. We should intensify this dialogue. Likewise, we should also respond to the proposals of Russian President Medvedev to find ways for closer cooperation between the European Union, the European Security and Defense Policy, and Russia on issues of European security.

However, I want to make it clear: This must not happen in the spirit of weakening each other – the ESDP and NATO – in order to compete for a certain relationship with Russia. It is in all our interests to integrate Russia into a future security architecture. This must be done jointly with NATO and the European Security and Defense Policy.

We have the great task of advancing a peace process in the Middle East that has suffered setbacks. In this regard, we will work closely with our American partners. The solution to this peace process, the two-state solution – a Jewish state of Israel and a state for the Palestinians – is urgent. It is also the key to many other questions in this region.

The character of our cooperation must therefore be: We analyze together, we then make joint decisions, and we act together. This is of utmost importance in the area of security and defense policy. Whether we are capable of this will be demonstrated by the practical examples I have outlined here. We will have to show elsewhere, when it comes to addressing the financial and economic crisis, at the G20 meeting on April 2 in London, whether we are able to reach joint actions. By the end of the year, we will have to demonstrate in the area of the environment whether we have the strength to develop a successor program to the Kyoto Protocol regarding climate protection.

At its core, although the contents are of a very different nature, it always comes back to the question: Are we able to act cooperatively, together – as countries united by a common value base? Are we able to build a sustainable vision for the future? I believe: Yes, we are. I say: Germany is ready for this. But when we come together for a security conference again next year, we will no longer be able to say that it unfortunately did not work out; rather, we will be able to examine whether we were ready in these different areas to shape globalization and to live globalization in a cooperative sense together. I am full of optimism. We have achieved so much together: 60 years of NATO, the longest period of peace in Europe, democracy and freedom. We can achieve many things if we are in good spirits and make an effort.